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Preface 
Every doctoral thesis has a back story of how it came into existence, the events which 
led the candidate to a particular topic that was both academically significant, and of 
sufficient personal interest for them to devote the next few years of their life to 
intensively researching, and writing about, it. My own story began in early 2015. I was 
keen to continue to pursue my interest in Christian-Muslim relations and one of my 
prospective supervisors, Professor Michael Bennett, suggested I have a look at issues 
relating to Christian captivity in the Mediterranean in the early modern period. What 
I found was that while captivity had begun to attract increasing academic and popular 
attention over recent years, little attention had been given to how Britons had dealt 
with ethnological and religious differences in their actual physical interactions with 
the regimes and the peoples of North Africa during this period. The idea appealed to 
me because not long before I had had my own encounters with this region, the 
memories of which were still quite vivid. 
In early November 2008, my wife and I were in Ceuta about to begin a motorcycle 
tour of Morocco. It was a cold, wet, and generally miserable day. Our departure had 
been long delayed by a problem with the paperwork for our group, and by the time 
we left the border it was late afternoon with hours of riding ahead of us. The poor 
condition of the roads along the ‘scenic route’ selected by our guides, the rain, the 
gathering darkness, and the speed at which we were forced to travel unnerved me, 
and I felt a great sense of relief to finally arrive at our riad in Chefchaouen, but only 
after having negotiated the city’s chaotic traffic. My first day in Morocco was defined 
not by excitement, but rather by fear, and I began the second day with a sense of real 
trepidation. Nevertheless, as the days passed, I found myself relaxing, becoming less 
critical, and more receptive to what I found to be new and different. But although 
there were occasions of genuinely friendly engagement with the local people, I 
remained somewhat guarded in my encounters; influenced by preconceptions and 
lacking both an ability to freely converse and sufficient cultural understanding, I 
found myself feeling uncertain, suspicious of their motives and intentions. 
 
 
 
However, the trip was a sufficiently positive experience overall that my wife and I 
again travelled to Morocco in 2011. On this occasion there was no travel group or 
guides, and we decided to spend most of our time residing in one place, Fez El Bali, 
the medina of Old Fez. The medina at first felt threatening; a maze of dark and 
foreboding alleyways, and populated with people who continued to cling to more 
traditional ways of Moroccan life. Yet, apart from the staff of the riad at which we 
stayed, we were on our own, and this forced us to engage directly with Moroccans 
much more that we had before. We became known in the local shops and 
restaurants, started acquiring a little knowledge of the language and local customs, 
and began to venture further into the medina. But, ironically, it was the very same 
people that we had sought so much to avoid during our first visit, the faux guides and 
other touts, with whom we developed the closest relationships, and who became our 
most important cultural mediators. It was a different, and in some ways more 
enriching, experience from our first encounter for various reasons, not least because 
between our two trips we had overcome our initial culture shock and had started on 
the path of positive acculturation. 
 
This study reappraises the attitudes and responses of Britons to Moroccans and 
Anglo-Moroccan relations in the early modern period and challenges some current 
interpretations of the influence that the encounter of Britons with North Africa at this 
time had on the development of British imperial development and self-identity. But 
for me it was more than an academic study; it was through examining the experiences 
of my forebears that I began to really understand my own encounter with Morocco 
over 330 years later. 
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Abstract 
Britons began regularly voyaging to Morocco, or West Barbary as it was commonly 
known, from the early 1550s, and within a few decades England had not only 
developed an extensive trade with the country, but also close political relations; as a 
result, the histories of Morocco and England became closely tied until the late 
seventeenth century. While diplomatic and commercial relations between the two 
countries have been relatively well, but not extensively, studied, understanding of 
the situation of Morocco within British history has been overshadowed by the 
predominance of scholarship which has focussed on relations from the more limited 
perspectives of the threat posed to English shipping and coastal communities around 
the British Isles from ‘Barbary’ corsairs, Christian captivity, and the hostile encounters 
which marked the English occupation of Tangier. However, it is contended that when 
this relationship is re-examined from a more holistic perspective by combining 
elements usually treated in isolation, together with close attention to the impact of 
experiential engagement — an aspect which has received little detailed attention 
outside of captivity narratives — new perspectives on Anglo-Moroccan relations are 
revealed. Only then is it possible to properly evaluate the meaning of Morocco to 
early modern Britons and British history.  
This thesis examines the impact that direct contact with Morocco and Moroccans had 
on the attitudes and actions of early modern Britons concerning them. It seeks to 
identify the psychological responses which experiential engagement elicited, and the 
circumstantial and personal factors which contributed to the different reactions of 
individuals. Furthermore, rather than simply regarding English policies concerning 
Morocco as contingent factors, this study attempts to understand the extent to which 
personal responses elicited by, and the knowledge Britons acquired through, direct 
experience actually helped shape diplomatic and commercial relations. By doing so, 
it shows that the encounter of Britons with Morocco between 1625 and 1684 was 
both a humbling and enlightening experience for them. There was no general turn to 
increasing prejudice and antipathy against the people associated with a desire to 
viii 
 
dominate them and expand England’s nascent empire, as has been argued by other 
scholars. Instead, the thesis demonstrates that early modern Britons not only 
possessed a well-developed capacity to consciously accommodate cultural difference 
in furthering their interests, but some were also susceptible to subconscious 
processes of positive acculturation in their encounters with other peoples. Moreover, 
the behaviour of Britons in Morocco was more likely to be based on pragmatism and 
cultural self-consciousness, than driven by incipient imperial and colonial aspiration. 
1 
 
 Fig. 1 A map of Barbary showing Fez, Marocco, Algiers 
and Tunis [and part of Tripoli], by Herman Moll, 1732. 
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Introduction 
 
But we have never sent any to understand their country, to search 
into their strength and dependancies, to examine their interest, 
their inclinations, and those other things which we might improve 
to the advantage of Tangier. (Anonymous, Tangier, c.1675/76)1 
 
The statement quoted above is from a tract by an English author that was appended 
to a related work, and published in London in 1680. The authors of both texts were 
writing in support of the retention and development of the small English colony of 
Tangier, located adjacent to the Strait of Gibraltar on the coast of Morocco. The 
English had been in possession of Tangier since 1662, and drawn by opportunities for 
trade and privateering had been increasingly frequent visitors to the Mediterranean 
from 1511, and to the Atlantic coast of Northwest Africa from around 1551,2 with 
growing levels of both commercial and diplomatic contact occurring from those 
dates. Given this extended period of interaction, is it really conceivable that the 
English had learnt so little about the country that such a claim could be justified? And, 
if so, what does this reveal to us about their encounters? This thesis seeks to answer 
these questions, and more broadly reappraise the experience of Britons in early 
modern Morocco, part of an area known to them as Barbary, by examining how they 
engaged with this land and its people, and how they were affected, if at all, by the 
experience.   
 
To the Arabs, the area which roughly encompasses the modern-day states of Libya, 
Tunisia, Algeria and Morocco (see fig. 1), and whose peoples shared similar ethno-
                                                        
1 The Present Interest of Tangier (London, 1679), p. 4. Date and place of publication are as attributed 
in the British Library catalogue. Karim Bejjit surmises that the original text was probably written in late 
1675 or early 1676. See Karim Bejjit, ed., English Colonial Texts on Tangier, 1661–1684: Imperialism 
and the Politics of Resistance, Transculturalisms, 1400–1700 (Farnham, UK, 2015), p. 147. Bejjit 
provides a transcription of the text on pp. 147–152. 
2 Richard Hakluyt provides references to some of the earliest English voyages to the Mediterranean 
and Barbary, and associated dealings in the region in The Principal Navigations, Voyages, Traffiques 
and Discoveries of the English Nation, 3 vols. (London, 1599–1600). See also Fernand Braudel, The 
Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, trans. Sian Reynolds, 2 vols, vol. 1   
(London, 1972), pp. 612–615. See pp. 96, 319–[320] of the second volume for details of the first English 
voyages to the Mediterranean and the Atlantic coast of Morocco. Braudel dates the first English 
trading voyage to Morocco to the 1540s, but T. S. Willan asserts that there is no clear evidence of 
earlier voyages. See T. S. Willan, Studies in Elizabethan Foreign Trade  (Manchester, 1959), pp. 93–94. 
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linguistic identity, cultural traditions and religious institutions,3 was traditionally 
known as the Maghrib, the ‘Land of Sunset’.4 But the toponym ‘Barbary’ adopted by 
early modern Britons to denote the area appears to have originated from the Arabic 
adjective, barbarī, meaning primitive and foreign, derived in turn from the Latin name 
for the indigenous people of the area, the Berbers.5  The conflation of the term’s 
pejorative meaning and its use as a geographic identifier by Britons is evident in the 
following extract from John Ogilby’s book on Africa published in 1670: 
The Arabians, according to the testimony of Ibnu Alraquiq, have 
given to this countrey, by Marmol call’d Berbery, the name of Ber, 
that is, desart or wilderness: from whence the inhabitants 
themselves were afterwards Bereberes. But others will have it so 
nam’d by the Romans, who having subdued some parts of Africa, 
this part lying opposite to them, they call’d Barbary, because they 
found the inhabitants altogether beastial and barbarous: nor is it 
improbable, considering it is usual to call such as lead a wilde and 
ungovern’d life, and not civiliz’d by education, Barbarians.6  
 
According to Lofti Ben Rejeb, between the 1490s and the late nineteenth century, the 
association of North Africa with barbarism became the ‘principal frame or prism 
through which Europeans looked at North Africa’, and the basis of a general discourse 
that emphasised the region as a site of piracy, slavery, and hostility to Christendom, 
and the antithesis of European civilisation.7 That may be so, but as will be shown, it 
                                                        
3 Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period (Cambridge, 1987), p. 4; Nabil 
Matar, Britain and Barbary, 1589–1689 (Gainesville, FL, 2006), p. 3. 
4 Abun-Nasr, History of the Maghrib, p. 1. An alternative spelling is ‘Maghreb’. 
5 The term ‘Berber’ itself is derived from the Latin word barbari, which the Romans applied to peoples 
who could not speak either Latin or Greek. See the discussion on the derivation of these terms in ibid., 
p. 2. Godfrey Fisher comments on the imprecise nature of the area encompassed by the term in the 
early modern period. It could vary from the area roughly equivalent to North Africa, excluding Egypt, 
or only to the area which included the three Moroccan kingdoms of Fes, Morocco, and Sus. Similarly, 
the Barbary coast could refer to the Mediterranean coast from Ceuta to Tripoli, or the Atlantic coast 
of Morocco. See Godfrey Fisher, Barbary Legends: War, Trade and Piracy in North Africa 1415–1830  
(Oxford, 1957), pp. 17–18. On issues relating to geographical terminology for the area and its 
significance, see also Abdallah  Laroui, The History of the Maghrib: An Interpretive Essay, trans. Ralph 
Manheim  (Princeton, 1977), pp. 7–9; Lotfi Ben Rejeb, 'Barbary's "Character" in European Letters, 
1514–1830: An Ideological Prelude to Colonization', Dialectical Anthropology, 6 (1982), p. 345. 
6 John Ogilby, Africa: Being an Accurate Description of the Regions of Aegypt, Barbary, Lybia, and 
Billedulgerid ... (London, 1670), p. 146. The book is, in fact, based on a translation of a work, Description 
of Africa, by the Dutch geographer Olfert Dapper, first published in 1668, but with some original 
additions by Ogilby. 
7 Lotfi Ben Rejeb, '‘The General Belief of the World’: Barbary as Genre and Discourse in Mediterranean 
History', European Review of History, 19 (2012), pp. 15–16. On this argument, see also Ben Rejeb, 
'Barbary's "Character"', pp. 345–355. Like Ben Rejeb, scholars commonly use Barbary and North Africa 
as synonymous toponyms. While this is not strictly incorrect, as there is no single accepted definition, 
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was not the only one: other conceptions coexisted with it, informed by different 
experiences and understandings of the region. This was particularly the case with 
Morocco, or West Barbary, a place with a rich history, and geographic and cultural 
diversity, with which Britons of diverse positions, backgrounds, and dispositions had 
a wider variety of interactions over a more extended period than in any other area 
within North Africa during the period. 
 
It is for this reason it is not only difficult to understand the apparent lack of 
contemporary English interest in learning about Morocco implied in the unknown 
author’s statement, but also the relative lack of enquiry by historians for much of the 
twentieth century concerning the role which Barbary and the wider Mediterranean 
basin played in British commercial and imperial expansion in the early modern 
period. Other historians have also commented on this neglect,8 and the omission is 
thrown into stark relief by the absence of any specific chapter on either North Africa 
or the Mediterranean region, and a general paucity of information concerning them, 
in the most recent authoritative survey of the development of the British Empire, The 
Oxford History of the British Empire.9  
 
Nevertheless, the Mediterranean, and North Africa in particular, did continue to 
engage Britons long after the abandonment of Tangier, with tales of ‘Barbary Pirates’, 
of their countrymen taken captive and enslaved by them, and those who ‘turn’d 
Turke’ or ‘turn’d Moor’ by converting to Islam and becoming renegades.10  And the 
                                                        
both Egypt and Sudan are now commonly considered to be part of North Africa. The area generally 
associated with Barbary could more precisely be referred to as Northwest Africa, but in the interests 
of consistency with the general literature, it is referred to as North Africa in this study. 
8 Linda Colley, Captives: Britain, Empire, and the World, 1600–1850  (New York, 2004), p. 17; Kenneth 
Parker, 'Reading ‘Barbary’ in Early Modern England, 1550–1685', The Seventeenth Century, 19 (2004), 
pp. 88–89; Tristan M. Stein, 'The Mediterranean in the English Empire of Trade, 1660–1678', PhD 
Thesis (Harvard University, 2012), pp. 1–3. 
9 Wm. Roger Louis, ed., OHBE, 5 vols. (Oxford, 1998–9). Refer to volumes I and V in particular. The 
scant attention given to Tangier specifically is also highlighted by Colley in Captives, p. 33, and Tristan 
Stein in 'Tangier in the Restoration Empire', The Historical Journal, 54 (2011), p. 985. There was also a 
notable lack of references to either English and later British experience in the Mediterranean in the 
National Maritime Museum at Greenwich when the present author visited there in 2016.   
10 Colley identified fifteen prose Mediterranean captivity narratives with significant autobiographical 
component by Britons and Americans which were published in Britain between 1700 and 1886, many 
with several editions. See Captives, pp. 380–382. For historical works on the subject, see, for example, 
Joseph Morgan, A Compleat History of the Piractical States of Barbary ... By a Gentleman Who Resided 
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appeal of these subjects remains evident. Over the past few decades there has be a 
surge of attention given by scholars and other writers to both piracy11 and European 
captivity in the Mediterranean, a subject discussed later in this introduction. This 
phenomenon is partly explainable by interest in “white slaveryˮ in the Mediterranean 
and its relationship with “black slaveryˮ in the Atlantic during the period, and has 
also, undoubtedly, been encouraged by continuing interest in piracy in popular 
culture.12  Gordon Sayre has also observed that interest in accounts of European 
captivity has been inspired by ‘geopolitical events’ since the terrorist attacks on the 
United States in 2001.13 However, the result has been a perpetuation of perceptions 
of Islamic polities as traditional sites of moral transgression and antipathy to Western 
Civilisation. 
  
The neglect of the Mediterranean in the historiography of the early modern 
development of the British Empire is remarkable given the importance attributed to 
it by contemporary commentators as a locus of English trade and imperial aspiration. 
Charles II certainly had high expectations following his acquisition of Tangier in 1661, 
as he made clear in his instructions to the first English governor of the settlement, 
                                                        
there Many Years in a Public Character  (London, 1750); R. L. Playfair, The Scourge of Christendom: 
Annals of British Relations with Algiers Prior to the French Conquest  (London, 1884); and Stanley Lane-
Poole, The Barbary Corsairs, 4 ed.  (London, 1890).  
11 Much of this activity in the Mediterranean was, in fact, undertaken by privateers, both Muslim and 
Christian whose activities were sanctioned by various states and other polities. 
12 Examples include Peter Earle, Corsairs of Malta and Barbary (London, 1970); Christoper Lloyd, 
English Corsairs on the Barbary Coast  (London, 1981); Paul Baepler, ed., White Slaves, African Masters: 
An Anthology of American Barbary Captivity Narratives (Chicago, 1999); Joe Snader, Caught Between 
Worlds: British Captivity Narratives in Fact and Fiction  (Lexington, KY, 2000); Daniel J. Vitkus and Nabil 
Matar, eds., Piracy, Slavery, and Redemption: Barbary Captivity Narratives from Early Modern England 
(New York, 2001); Colley, Captives; Robert C. Davis, Christian Slaves, Muslim Masters: White Slavery in 
the Mediterranean, The Barbary Coast, and Italy, 1500–1800  (New York, 2003); Daniel Panzac, The 
Barbary Corsairs: The End of the Legend, 1800–1820, trans. Victoria Hobson and John E. Hawkes 
(Leiden, 2005); Gregory Fremont-Barnes, The Wars of the Barbary Pirates. To the Shores of Tripoli: The 
Rise of the US Navy and Marines  (Oxford, 2006); Des Ekin, The Stolen Village: Baltimore and the 
Barbary Pirates  (Dublin, 2008); Adrian Tinniswood, Pirates of Barbary: Corsairs, Conquests and 
Captivity in the Seventeenth-Century Mediterranean  (London, 2010); Alan G. Jamieson, Lords of the 
Sea: A History of the Barbary Corsairs  (London, 2012); Justin J. Meggitt, Early Quakers and Islam: 
Slavery, Apocalyptic and Christian–Muslim Encounters in the Seventeenth Century  (Uppsala, 2013). 
For a critique of academic and popular writing on North African piracy and European captivity, see 
Nabil Matar, British Captives from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, 1563–1760  (Leiden, 2014), pp. 
1–3.  
13 Gordon M. Sayre, 'Renegades from Barbary: The Transnational Turn in Captivity Studies', American 
Literary History, 22 (2010), p. 350. 
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the Earl of Peterborough, in which he states his goals were to not only to expand 
trade with North Africa, but also to extend his dominions into the Mediterranean.14 
A decade and a half later the region’s perceived worth was still such that it led one 
advocate to go so far as to claim that ‘[t]he trade of England into the Mediterranean, 
is equal, if not exceeding all other nations put together. Can anything then challenge 
a greater share in our esteem, than the means which insure this mighty benefit to 
us?’.15 
 
However, around the beginning of the twentieth century the significance of this sea 
to British history began to be recognised by historians, though their interest in the 
subject appears to have been driven more by concerns associated with the present 
than the past. Notable among these scholars were Walter Frewen Lord, who wished 
to impart the lessons he thought could be learnt for the greater good of the empire 
from the loss of Tangier and Minorca, and other British ‘possessions’ elsewhere, and 
from the consequences of a lack of imperial policy in the Mediterranean; Sir Julian 
Corbett, who argued that British experience in the Mediterranean from the 
seventeenth century had been pivotal in Britain’s development as an imperial power; 
and, Enid Routh, who, like Lord, bemoaned the lost opportunity that Tangier 
represented, both in 1684 and in her own time.16 As Tristan M. Stein has observed, 
the resurgence of interest in the Mediterranean at this time arose from a recognition 
of the strategic value of Britain’s presence in the Mediterranean during a period of 
increased geopolitical tension among the European powers. However, while the 
                                                        
14 ‘Instructions for the Earle of Peterburgh’, 6 September 1661, TNA, CO 279/1, f. 29r; BL, Harl. MS 
1595, f. 11r; BL, Sloane MS 1956, f. 68v. 
15 Henry Sheres, A Discourse Touching Tanger on these Heads, 1. The Service Tanger has Already 
Rendred the Crown. 2. What Service it May Render it, if Improv'd. 3. The Mischief it May Do Us, if 
Possess'd by any Other Powerful Prince. 4. Some General Observations Touching Trade. In a Letter to 
a Person of Quality  (London, 1680), p. 32. Authorship of this pamphlet is attributed to Sir Henry Sheres 
in the British Library Catalogue. Sheres (also spelled Sheeres and Shere) was the surveyor-general of 
the Tangier mole from 1676. 
16 Walter Frewen Lord, The Lost Possessions of England: Essays in Imperial History  (London, 1896); 
Walter Frewen Lord, England and France in the Mediterranean, 1660–1830  (London, 1901); Julian S. 
Corbett, England in the Mediterranean: A Study of the Rise and Influence of British Power Within the 
Straits, 1603–1713, 2 vols. (London, 1904). Routh's earliest published work on Tangier was 'The English 
Occupation of Tangier (1661–1683)', Transactions of the Royal Historical Society, 19 (1905), with her 
ideas more fully developed in her later book, Tangier: England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, 1661–1684  
(London, 1912). 
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works of Lord, Corbett, and Routh were shaped by contemporary conditions rather 
than historical realities, as Stein notes, the authors did demonstrate an appreciation 
of the Mediterranean’s significance to the early modern development of Britain 
which has only recently began to be expanded upon by historians.17  
 
Despite their anachronistic perspectives, these studies have been influential in 
subsequent scholarship relating to British activity in the Mediterranean and North 
Africa, and, indeed, remain valuable resources. However, as others have also 
observed, more problematically they are also part of a historiographical tradition, 
which also includes works such as R. L. Playfair’s The Scourge of Christendom (1884) 
and Stanley Lane-Poole’s The Barbary Corsairs (1890), which developed during the 
nineteenth century and is infused with a pervasive imperial mentality.18  While not 
exclusively a British phenomenon, it is characteristic of a late Victorian and Edwardian 
mindset which was informed by a belief in British cultural superiority and an 
associated sense of entitlement. It led to a historicised understanding of North Africa 
which was reductive, essentialising and prejudicial, which either ignored or 
marginalised the distinctive nature of local historical developments and the diverse 
nature of interactions and understandings which existed between North Africans and 
Europeans. Despite the decline of the British Empire over the course of the twentieth 
century, the interpretations provided by this earlier generation of historians — 
loaded as they are with Anglo-centric bias, colonial and imperial rhetoric, and at times 
sentimentality for a bygone age — have become deeply embedded in historical 
understanding and have all too often been insufficiently challenged and scrutinised, 
                                                        
17 Stein, 'The Mediterranean', pp. 10–11. Stein does not include Lord within the scope of his remarks 
but his work was composed in a similar vein. The contemporary concerns which motivated both 
Corbett and Routh are made quite explicit by the authors. See Julian S. Corbett, England in the 
Mediterranean: A Study of the Rise and Influence of British Power Within the Straits, 1603–1713, 2nd 
ed., 2 vols., vol. II (London, 1917), 2, p. 568; Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, pp. 270–271. The 
motivations of Lord are less clearly stated, but can be deduced. See Lord, Lost Possessions, pp. v–vii, 
and England and France, pp. 3–5. On the intellectual and political context of Corbett’s work, see the 
discussion on the subject in David Delison Hebb, Piracy and the English Government, 1616–1642  
(Aldershot, UK, 1994), pp. 107–113. 
18 See, in particular, Parker, 'Reading Barbary', pp. 87–115; Bejjit, English Colonial Texts, pp. 40–42. 
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by present day scholars;19 their legacy is such that one historian, a century after 
Playfair, can still dismiss Salé as ‘that hornets’ nest’ and emphatically affirm the  
general untrustworthiness of the town’s Muslim corsairs;20 another can draw an 
analogy between Muslim corsairs and modern terrorists, a parallel which may not be 
totally unjustified, but is as unhelpful in its simplicity and subjectivity as Playfair’s own 
assertion that the corsairs were the ‘scourge of Christendom’.21 It is a perspective 
perpetuated by over-reliance on the veracity of a self-reinforcing ‘rusty chain’ of 
citations along which the meaning of original sources is suffused with the language 
and mentality of another era.22  
 
However, around the middle of the last century, there emerged one notable 
exception who challenged the traditional historical perspective on Anglo-North 
African relations. Sir Godfrey Fisher, while not necessarily claiming a special role for 
North Africa in British history, did seek to highlight the diversity of political and 
economic relations which existed between England and North Africa from the 
Elizabethan period to the early nineteenth century, and in doing so challenge the 
traditional image of Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli as being miscreant states.23 Fisher’s 
revisionist and sympathetic perspective on Barbary’s Muslim corsairs was subject to 
a mixed reception from his peers, and even later historians remain unconvinced 
about some of his conclusions.24 However, while Fisher may have overcompensated 
                                                        
19 For similar views on the subject, see those expressed by Parker, 'Reading Barbary', pp. 88, 93–94, 
108; Bejjit, English Colonial Texts, p. 42. On the influence of the colonial period on the interpretation 
of Maghribi history, see Laroui, History of the Maghrib, pp. 3–6. 
20 Kenneth R. Andrews, Ships, Money and Politics: Seafaring and Naval Enterprise in the Reign of 
Charles I  (Cambridge, 1991), pp. 168, 183. 
21 Colley, Captives, pp. 46, 50–51. On Colley’s assertion, see also Parker, 'Reading Barbary', pp. 107–
108. 
22 Martin Elbl uses the phrase ‘[a] rusty chain of citation to citation’ in the context the historiography 
of the urban history of Tangier, but extension of the metaphor to British history in the Mediterranean 
and North Africa is apt. See Martin Malcolm Elbl, Portuguese Tangier (1471–1662): Colonial Urban 
Fabric as Cross-Cultural Skeleton  (Peterborough, Canada, 2013), pp. 58, 61, 74. Quotation is from p. 
58.  
23 Fisher, Barbary Legends, pp. 3–7. 
24 See, for example, Robert G. Albion, 'Barbary Legend: War, Trade and Piracy in North Africa, 1415–
1830. Godfrey Fisher', The Journal of Modern History, 31 (1959), pp. 131–132; M. S. Anderson, 'Sir 
Godfrey Fisher's Barbary Legend: War, Trade and Piracy in North Africa, 1411–1830 (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1957)', The English Historical Review, 74 (1959), pp. 724–726; V. J. Parry, 'Sir Godfrey Fisher: 
Barbary Legend: War, Trade and Piracy in North Africa, 1415–1830', Bulletin of the School of Oriental 
and African Studies, 22 (1959), p. 404; F. B. Dowd, 'Barbary Legend. Sir Godfrey Fisher. Oxford 
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in pursuing his argument, his work was a marked, and for some contemporaries a 
welcome, departure from existing scholarship; one which, undoubtedly, encouraged 
others to reconceptualise the history of North Africa, and European relations with, 
and attitudes toward, the region and its people. 
 
Nevertheless, aside from its general interpretative deficiencies, the fact remains that 
until recently the body of work concerning the role played by the Mediterranean in 
British history has been relatively limited. The marginalisation of the early modern 
Mediterranean in the nation’s history has been attributed to a long-held belief that 
the region’s importance as a centre of political power and trade declined during the 
seventeenth century, with attention shifting to the imperial and commercial 
expansion of the states of Northwest Europe.25 The importance of the Mediterranean 
has also been overlooked because of a traditional emphasis on a master narrative for 
the rise of the British Empire focussed on the Atlantic and concerned with the rise 
and loss of the American colonies.26 A belief in the decline of the importance of the 
Mediterranean during the early modern period has been strongly influenced by the 
seminal work of Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World 
in the Age of Philip II, first published in 1949.27 However, a new generation of 
                                                        
University Press', African Affairs, 57 (1958), pp. 79–80; David Delison Hebb, Piracy and the English 
Government, p. 12., n. 3.  
25 Colley, Captives, pp. 33–34; Stein, 'The Mediterranean', pp. 8–10. Similarly, in terms of historical 
disengagement with the Ibero-African frontier in the Western Mediterranean, Andrew C. Hess argues 
that following Spain’s disentanglement with Islam and North Africa on the Iberian Peninsula and the 
discovery of the New World at the end of the fifteen century, the attention of scholars turned to the 
Americas and Asia, the new system of economic relations they helped create, and the religious and 
dynastic conflicts that engulfed Europe. Braudel attributes the lack of attention given to developments 
in the sea in early modern Spanish history to the absence of major conflicts, so that ‘other locations 
steal the limelight’. See Hess, The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth-Century Ibero-African 
Frontier  (Chicago, 2010), pp. 7–9; Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the 
Age of Philip II, trans. Sian Reynolds, 2 vols., vol. 2 (London, 1973), p. 1186.   
26 Colley, Captives, p. 33; Sari R. Hornstein, The Restoration Navy and English Foreign Trade, 1674–
1688: A Study in the Peacetime Use of Sea Power  (Aldershot, UK, 1991), p. 8. 
27 The original text was in French, and not available in English translation until 1972. Aside from 
providing a sweeping geographical and historical survey of the Mediterranean, Braudel’s other 
undertaking in this work was ‘to discover the collective destiny of the Mediterranean in the sixteenth 
century’. See Braudel, The Mediterranean, II, p. 1240. In doing so, he draws attention to what he 
believes to have been an irreversible socio-economic decline in the region. While historians have at 
times emphasised suggestions in the body of the work of an earlier chronology for the commencement 
of this process, Braudel clearly asserts that it did not occur before 1620, and suggests the possibility 
of date as late as sometime between 1650 and 1680. See ibid.   
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historians is reappraising Braudel’s assumptions regarding the waning of the 
influence of the Mediterranean, as well as its cultural unity, and the sea is now 
reclaiming a place in early modern British, European, and global history.28 
 
After a century of being sidelined in the narrative of British commercial and political 
expansion, over the past two decades the Mediterranean Sea has once again begun 
to attract the attention of scholars, who not only now acknowledge the continuity of 
its importance as a meeting place for competing states and cultures, and a centre for 
trade and commerce, but also the significant contribution it made to British culture, 
national identity, and imperial development during the early modern period.29 
Understanding the experience of Britons in the Mediterranean in the seventeenth 
century is important, not only in terms of illuminating Britain’s naval, political and 
economic history, but also to understanding the nation’s social and cultural 
development. The historiography reveals that the Mediterranean, and in particular 
North Africa, provides fertile ground for new directions in research in this respect. 
Furthermore, as one scholar has observed, the Mediterranean is an ‘excellent 
laboratory’ in which to explore the issues of identity, cultures, and the interaction of 
individuals and groups under conditions of both peace and conflict.30 
                                                        
28 See, for example, Hess’ reappraisal of Braudel’s thesis of unity in the Mediterranean in The Forgotten 
Frontier; Molly Greene’s revisionist perspective on Braudel’s unity argument in A Shared World: 
Christians and Muslims in the Early Modern Mediterranean  (Princeton, 2000) in which she emphasises 
the unique dynamic of the eastern Mediterranean, her reappraisal of the Mediterranean in the 
seventeenth century, in which she challenges the validity of Braudel’s ‘Northern Invasion’ paradigm, 
in 'Beyond the Northern Invasion', Past and Present, 174 (2002), pp. 42–71, and her discussion of the 
marginalisation of the importance of the Mediterranean, and its commercial decline in 'The Early 
Modern Mediterranean', in Peregrine Horden and Sharon Kinoshita, eds., A Companion to 
Mediterranean History, Wiley Blackwell Companions to World History (Chichester, UK, 2014), pp. 91–
106; as well as Hornstein, Restoration Navy, Alison Games, The Web of Empire: English Cosmopolitans 
in an Age of Expansion, 1560–1660  (Oxford, 2009), and Stein, 'The Mediterranean' in which they 
reposition the sea into England’s commercial and political expansion in the early modern period. More 
expansive historical works concerning the Mediterranean which also confront Braudel’s legacy include 
Peregrine Horden and Nicholas  Purcell, The Corrupting Sea: A Study of Mediterranean History  (Oxford, 
2002); W. V. Harris, ed., Rethinking the Mediterranean (Oxford, 2005); David Abulafia, The Great Sea: 
A Human History of the Mediterranean  (Oxford, 2011).  
29  Colley, Captives, pp. 33–35; Matar, Britain and Barbary, p. ix; Stein, 'The Mediterranean', pp. 8, 13. 
However, the influence of engagement with the Islamic cultures of the Mediterranean region on 
developments in Elizabethan England has been recognised by some historians and literary scholars for 
some time.  Most recently, this relationship has been examined by Jerry Brotton in This Orient Isle: 
Elizabethan England and the Islamic World, first published in 2016.  
30 Eric R. Dursteler, Venetians in Constantinople: Nation, Identity, and Coexistence in the Early Modern 
Mediterranean  (Baltimore, 2006), p. 2. Dursteler notes that while much of the important earlier work 
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Interestingly, among the first to reappraise the role of the Mediterranean in the 
shaping of British history were not cultural historians but rather literary scholars 
examining how depictions of Muslims in early modern English plays and literature 
reflected contemporary understanding of ethnic and racial difference. Much of this 
work is post-colonial in nature, informed by Edward Said’s concept of a Western 
Orientalist discourse, and attempts to establish a connection between the 
construction of the cultural and ethnic Other and processes of conquest and empire 
building. According to such academics, negative conceptions of the people commonly 
referred to as ‘Turks’ and ‘Moors’ and other non-Europeans, established through 
popular discourse mediated through the stage and text, were influential in 
legitimising English, and later British, colonial and imperial expansion.31  
 
Yet Said did not conceive of an institutionalised Orientalist discourse as existing 
before the late eighteenth century.32 The historian, David Armitage, in fact argues 
that the influence of notions of empire in English literature in the early modern period 
was minimal, and generally critical when it was apparent. He remarks that: 
[R]ecent scholarship has found the literature of the sixteenth and 
seventeenth century to be deeply, because necessarily, inflected by the 
‘imperial’ experiences of racial difference, irreducible ‘otherness’, 
assertions of hierarchy, and national self-determination. However, to 
apply modern models of the relationship between culture and 
                                                        
on the encounter of Europeans with other cultures has been situated in Asia, Africa, and the Americas, 
attention is now being given to the Mediterranean.  
31 Nabil Matar, Turks, Moors and Englishmen in the Age of Discovery  (New York, 1999), pp. 8–12. A. 
G. Hopkins comments on the general ‘mass conversion of newcomers from literary studies’ to colonial 
studies that occurred as a result of the influence of post-modernism. See A. G. Hopkins, 'Development 
of the Utopian Ideal, 1960–1999', in Robin W. Winks, ed., OHBE, 5 vols., vol. V. Historiography (Oxford, 
1998–9), p. 648. 
32 Said explains that ‘Orientalism can be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing 
with the Orient – dealing with it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, 
by teaching it, settling it ruling it: in short Orientalism as a Western style for dominating, restructuring, 
and having authority over the Orient’. See Edward Said, Orientalism  (London, 2003), p. 3. On the 
limitations of the applicability of the concept of Orientalism to early modern English discourse, see, 
for example, Kenneth Parker, Early Modern Tales of Orient: A Critical Anthology  (London, 1999), pp. 
2–6, 28–29; Daniel J. Vitkus, Turning Turk: English Theatre and the Multicultural Mediterranean, 1570–
1630 (New York, 2008), pp. 10–11; Robert Irwin, ‘Introduction’, For Lust of Knowing. The Orientalists 
and their Enemies (London, 2006).  Kim M. Phillips provides an insightful critique of Orientalism and a 
chronology of its development in Before Orientalism: Asian Peoples and Cultures in European Travel 
Writing, 1245–1510  (Philadelphia, 2014), chap. 1. 
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imperialism to early-modern literature and Empire demands indifference 
to context and inevitably courts anachronism.33  
 
That is not to say that literary studies do not correctly identify depictions which 
informed the development of common perceptions of the Muslim Other held by early 
modern Britons, but they have tended to exaggerate their impact. Nicholas Canny 
believes that such work ‘has compounded the belief that English people were more 
blinkered than any other Europeans in the appraisal of alien cultures’.34 Similarly, 
Stein observes that confusing statements of ‘aspiration with the effective expression 
of imperial dominance’ can subvert understanding of the actual role the 
Mediterranean played in England’s political and commercial expansion.35 Despite 
possessing such limitations Saidian notions of power and hegemony, and of colonial 
and imperial discourses, continue to inform the methodologies of studies of the 
contact of Britons with the region in the early modern period. However, as others 
have also observed, and I will similarly argue, such a focus can both limit and skew 
the way in which Britons are seen to have engaged with, and responded to events in, 
Morocco. 
 
Literary scholars have also been influential in drawing attention to another aspect of 
the early modern Mediterranean which has, arguably, wider historical importance, 
and that is the phenomenon of Christian European captivity and enslavement by 
Muslim privateers — more generally referred to as ‘corsairs’ in the context of the 
Mediterranean — operating from the coast of North Africa between the sixteenth 
and nineteenth centuries. Accounts left by the victims — so-called Barbary captivity 
narratives — provide a rich, but at times interpretively problematic, source of historic 
detail derived from the author’s or the narrator’s intimate, often traumatic, 
engagement with Barbary. Various attempts have been made to enumerate the 
number of Christian Europeans who were captured. One estimate is that at least one 
                                                        
33 David Armitage, 'Literature and Empire', in Nicholas Canny, ed., OHBE, 5 vols., vol. I. The Origins of 
Empire: British Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century (Oxford, 1998–9), p. 102. 
See also Vitkus, Turning Turk, pp. 3–5. 
34 Nicholas Canny, 'England's New World and the Old', in OHBE, 5 vols., vol. I. The Origins of Empire: 
British Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century (Oxford, 1998–9), pp. 148–149. 
35 Stein, 'The Mediterranean', pp. 12–13. The confounding of ideas of empire with the reality of empire 
by literary scholars is addressed well by Vitkus in Turning Turk, esp. pp. 5–7. 
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million were taken from vessels and coastal areas of the Mediterranean, the British 
Isles, and as far north as Iceland between 1530 and 1780.36 However, it has been 
argued that these figures are excessive,37 and even the scholar who compiled them 
is circumspect about the reliability of the sources on which they are based.38 But 
whatever the precise numbers, they were undoubtedly significant. Aside from 
inviting us to understand the meaning of individual experiences of capture and 
enslavement, the nature and scale of this phenomenon raises questions about the 
economic impact it had on European states and local communities, as well as about 
its wider social and cultural consequences.39 For many Europeans Barbary was more 
than an imaginative construct, it was a lived reality, often involuntary, and 
experienced in a multiplicity of ways, a fact which problematises generalised 
interpretations of the impact of cultural encounter on European perception and self-
identity.  
 
The work of two scholars has been particularly influential on the subject of the impact 
of Barbary on early modern Britons and Britain, and will provide key points of 
reference and comparison for this study: Nabil Matar, who has been prolific in his 
studies of relations between early modern Britain, Western Europe, and the Islamic 
states of the Mediterranean, with his book Britain and Barbary, 1589–1689 (2005) of 
particular relevance to this thesis;40 and, Linda Colley, through her reappraisal of the 
                                                        
36 Robert C. Davis, 'Counting European Slaves on the Barbary Coast', Past & Present (2001), p. 118. 
Davis does not provide a breakdown of the figures by nationality, but Colley notes that between 1600 
and the early 1640s North African corsairs captured in excess of 800 English, Scottish, Welsh and Irish 
vessels in the Mediterranean and Atlantic, taking perhaps as many as 12,000 English subjects, and a 
further 6,000 Britons may have been seized between 1660 and the 1730s. See Captives, pp. 43–44. 
Colley does not identify the source of her figures. David Delison Hebb in Piracy and the English 
Government, pp. 136–140, 273, estimates that between 1616 to 1642 North African corsairs captured 
around 400 English vessels and more the 8,000 people from them. In British Captives, Matar provides 
listings of the names of captured Britons who he has identified, but despite indicating he intends to 
answer the question of the number of Britons seized in North Africa, he does not achieve this aim. 
While the listings he provides are a useful resource, for the reasons given in his extensive section on 
caveats they do not ‘furnish the names of all captives’, as claimed by the publisher. 
37 Matar, British Captives, pp. 9–11. 
38 Davis, 'Counting European Slaves', pp. 96–97, 118. 
39 Hebb, Piracy and the English Government, pp. 141–146, 157–170; Davis, 'Counting European Slaves', 
pp. 118–124; Sayre, 'Renegades from Barbary', pp. 349–356. Sayre provides a useful discussion on the 
critical use of the captivity narrative genre. 
40 Britain and Barbary was the third instalment in a trilogy which also includes Islam in Britain, 1558–
1685  (Cambridge, 1998), and Turks, Moors and Englishmen. 
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rise of the British Empire in Captives: Britain, Empire, and the World, 1600–1850 
(2002). Their work has contributed to a growing corpus of scholarship which has 
challenged traditional historiography, and provided new perspectives on European 
engagement with the Mediterranean and North Africa.41 While both scholars 
emphasise the important influence that North Africa had on British self-identity and 
imperial development, their approaches and conclusions differ significantly.  
 
Both authors use a similar range of primary source material but their respective 
emphases differ markedly. Like many of his literary confrères Matar adopts a 
framework centred on contemporary theatre. He relies heavily on elite views, those 
of the more notable personalities in English society of the period, including 
playwrights, many of whom had no direct experience of Barbary, to attempt to 
reconstruct popular contemporary images of Moors and North Africa, and to identify 
how they changed over time. However, Colley’s principal sources are the experiences 
and accounts of some of the thousands of Britons captured by non-Europeans in the 
Mediterranean and elsewhere in the world, which she uses to examine and reassess 
traditional historical narratives of British imperial history. 
 
Matar argues that the ascendancy of English military and naval power from the mid-
seventeenth century completely changed the nature of British relations with, and 
perceptions of, the people of North Africa, leading to a ‘paradigm shift’ in the ‘English 
imagination and British political and social self-identity’.42 According to Matar, before 
1649 ‘Britons were fearful of the Moors’ and ‘the encounter with the Moors was 
precarious and dangerous’, but during the second half of the seventeenth century, as 
                                                        
41 Aside from Godfrey Fisher, Andrew Hess, Molly Greene, and Tristan Stein whose contributions have 
already been acknowledged, other notable contributors to Anglophone scholarship in this area include 
Jack D'Amico, The Moor in English Renaissance Drama  (Tampa, FL, 1991); Parker, Early Modern Tales; 
Jonathan Burton, Traffic and Turning: Islam and English Drama, 1579–1624  (Newark, NJ, 2005); 
Dursteler, Venetians in Constantinople; Vitkus, Turning Turk; Games, The Web of Empire. To this list 
should be added Charles-André Julien’s influential The History of North Africa: Tunisia, Algeria, 
Morocco. From the Arab Conquest to 1830, trans. John Petrie, ed. C. C. Stewart  (London, 1970), 
translated from French; the Moroccan historian Abdallah Laroui’s History of the Maghrib, also 
translated from French; and the more recent work of another Moroccan scholar, Karim Bejjit, who in 
English Colonial Texts, emphasises the political agency of the Moroccans in resisting the presence of 
the English in Tangier during the Restoration period. 
42 Matar, Britain and Barbary, p. 11. 
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a result of their maritime victories, ‘Britons developed a sense of imperial glory and 
destiny’, seeing their achievements as evidence of cultural superiority and Protestant 
righteousness.43 Having lost Tangier, but subsequently achieving domination of the 
Mediterranean shores of North Africa, by 1689, the British ‘lost not only their 
curiosity about the inhabitants, but also whatever capacity they had to integrate 
themselves into that world of non-Christians’. Matar claims that this change was so 
incisive that Britons no longer even appeared to be anxious about having been seized 
by Muslim corsairs.44  
 
More recently, Matar and Gerald MacLean have examined what Britons knew about 
Muslims, their lands, societies and religion, through exploring the ways in which 
encounters with Islamdom45 were described by their fellow countrymen, and how 
their lives were influenced by this knowledge. Despite the authors’ objective of 
‘focussing on Britain’s early encounters with North Africa in some detail’ through 
recourse to consular records,46 their findings concerning the perceptions of Britons 
of Muslims essentially differ little from those of Matar’s earlier work. They conclude 
that maritime conflict and the seizure of captives ‘led British writers, sailors, 
preachers, and state officials to create a generalized portrait of Islam as an 
aggressively violent religion peopled by sabre-wielding turbaned janissaries’, 
although the authors do acknowledge the possibility that this may be an 
oversimplification.47 
 
Colley on the other hand argues that the Ottoman Empire was not in serious decline, 
and the Barbary powers continued to be formidable in their own right throughout 
                                                        
43 Ibid., pp. 8, 133. See also p. 158. 
44 Ibid., pp. 10–11. 
45 ‘Islamdom’ is a term coined by Marshall G.S. Hodgson, intended to be analogous to the term 
‘Christendom’, but encompassing ‘the society in which the Muslims and their faith are recognized as 
prevalent and socially dominant’ in preference to ‘the Islamic World’ — which he argues is a phrase 
which is not only clumsy, but uses the term “Islamic” in too broad a sense — and recognises that ‘there 
is only “one world” even in history. If there is to be an “Islamic world,” this can be only in the future’. 
See Marshall G. S. Hodgson, The Venture of Islam, 3 vols., vol. 1. The Classical Age of Islam (Chicago, 
1977), pp. 57–58. 
46 Gerald MacLean and Nabil Matar, Britain and the Islamic World, 1558–1713  (Oxford, 2011), pp. 1–
2, 7. 
47 Ibid., pp. 230–232. 
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the seventeenth century.48 The story painted by Colley of ‘Britain’ in the 
Mediterranean during the period is one of both aggression and vulnerability, and of 
necessary ‘compromises and collusions’.49 She also stresses the heterogeneous 
nature of British imperial experience: she is critical of the way in which British 
attitudes have often been ‘reconstructed – and over-homogenised’ on the basis of 
the perspectives provided ‘by a few conspicuous actors in positions of power or 
notoriety’.50 Colley believes that due to the complex nature of British interaction with 
the region it is necessary to question the extent to which Islam and Islamic societies 
were perceived and treated as being different and inferior, and, conversely, the 
degree to which Britons perceived themselves as superior and possessed of a 
common aim and interest. To this end, in order to identify changes in British attitudes 
to Islam, she believes it is necessary to look beyond standard, stylised denunciations; 
it is necessary to look more broadly and deeper to trace the differing reactions which 
were proliferating after 1600.51 She asserts that ‘British responses to Islam, and to 
Islamic powers … were never static or uniform’. They were dependent on changes in 
British intellectual thought, and the power and reputation of the Islamic states, and 
‘they also changed in accordance with the estimates made by Britons of their own 
state and of its potential’.52  
 
There are clear differences in scope and focus between Colley’s and Matar’s works, 
but they are not sufficiently significant to invalidate a comparison of the authors’ 
views concerning the nature and meaning of the encounter of Britons with North 
Africa in the early modern period. In fact, given the very different interpretations they 
offer there is evident value in further investigating the impact that engagement with 
North Africa had on Britons at this time.  
 
                                                        
48 Colley, Captives, pp. 65–67. 
49 Ibid., pp. 133–134. Colley refers generally to Britain and the British even in relation to the period 
before the formal establishment of Great Britain in 1707. 
50 Ibid., pp. 15–16, 62, 375. Quotations are from p. 15. 
51 Ibid., pp. 102–103, 105. 
52 Ibid., p. 113. 
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North Africa was the region with which Britons had their most widely known, and 
widest-ranging relations with Islamdom in the early modern period.53 But, while 
much of the population of the region shared a common heritage, it is important to 
appreciate that Barbary was not homogeneous in other ways. During the early 
modern period it consisted of four distinct political entities: Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli, 
which developed as client states of the Ottoman Empire; and Morocco, which was 
politically fractured for much of the period but managed to resist Ottoman 
hegemony. The socio-political environment in Morocco was, therefore, very different 
from that in the other Barbary States. Furthermore, the dynamics of contact between 
England and Morocco were also quite distinct. The relationship was defined by issues 
relating to commerce, piracy and slavery, as with the other states, but commercial 
and political relations between the two countries had far greater depth, and for much 
of the period of this study Morocco was also the site of England’s earliest colonial 
venture in the Mediterranean, Tangier, which gave rise to its own unique set of 
interactions and responses.54 These differences between Morocco and the other 
Barbary States significantly complicate contextualisation and interpretation of the 
impact of encounter at the regional level, and for these reasons the principal focus 
of this thesis is on the interaction of Britons with Morocco. 
 
This study is not primarily intended to be a critique of Matar’s and Colley’s theses; 
although it does closely engage with their work. Instead, it seeks to gain more insight 
into how Britons emotionally and intellectually processed their direct experiences in 
Morocco, the extent to which such experiences challenged their preconceptions and 
prejudices, and, in turn, how those experiences shaped their subsequent behaviour 
and influenced Anglo-Moroccan relations more broadly. As a result, this thesis 
reconceptualises in many ways the encounter of early modern Britons with Morocco. 
Such understanding is of intrinsic value because it not only contributes to 
consideration of questions concerning the historical development of British national 
                                                        
53 Ibid., p. 43; Matar, Britain and Barbary, p. ix. 
54 Parker in 'Reading Barbary', pp. 87–88, remarks on the ‘remarkably singular set of responses’ 
associated with the English occupation of Tangier compared to those generally associated with 
relations with the Barbary States, but fails to appreciate the unique nature of Anglo-Moroccan 
relations over an extended period in this context.   
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identity, but also to a growing corpus of British national and imperial historiography 
involving cultural studies in which the influence of the overseas experiences and 
responses of Britons during the early modern period has begun to be recognised.55  
 
This thesis also contributes to a broader turn to studies concerning cultural 
encounters, particularly during the early modern period, in disciplines such as history, 
literature, and anthropology. Stuart B. Schwartz observes that while such work seeks 
to answer common questions of ‘perceptions of self and others, epistemology, and 
the dynamic nature of cross-cultural contact’, the tendency of scholars to work within 
disciplinary boundaries ‘has sometimes led to a narrow conceptualization of 
problems that are in fact shared’.56 It is for this reason in undertaking this present 
study attention has been given to theories, methodologies, methods and studies 
from other disciplines which could usefully contribute to it. However, before turning 
to these aspects, it is timely to highlight two issues which define the scope of this 
study: the nature of the subjects, and the period. 
 
Use of the terms ‘Britain’ and ‘British’ in the context of the seventeenth century is 
always problematic as the political entity of ‘Great Britain’ was not formally 
established until the passing of the Acts of Union in 1707. Use of these terms is 
understandable in the interests of conciseness, but often in the literature they are 
used interchangeably with ‘England’ and ‘English’, resulting in inevitable uncertainty, 
                                                        
55 See, for example, Hopkins, 'The Utopian Ideal', pp. 651–652; Robin W. Winks, 'The Future of Imperial 
History', in OHBE, 5 vols., vol. V. Historiography (Oxford, 1998–9), p. 656; Colley, Captives, pp. 18, 375. 
For a more recent discussion on developments and directions in British (and European) national 
history, see Stefan Berger, 'The Return of National History', in Pedro Ramos Pinto and Bertrand Taithe, 
eds., The Impact of History?: Histories at the Beginning of the 21st Century (Hoboken, NJ, 2015), chap. 
6, esp. pp. 189–190. 
56 Stuart B. Schwartz, 'Introduction', in Stuart B. Schwartz, ed., Implicit Understandings: Observing, 
Reporting, and Reflecting on the Encounters between Europeans and Other Peoples in the Early 
Modern Era (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 3–4. Surekha Davies and Neil L. Whitehead also reflect on the 
shared nature of these questions in 'From Maps to Mummy-Curses: Rethinking Encounters, 
Ethnography and Ethnology', History & Anthropology, 23 (2012), p. 174. Sanjay Subrahmanyam 
comments on the large volume of literature on early modern cultural encounters which focusses on 
how such encounters facilitated the development of new categories of perception and analysis, which 
are considered to have influenced the establishment or development of a range of academic 
disciplines in modern social sciences, and also influenced the study of world history. See Sanjay 
Subrahmanyam, Courtly Encounters: Translating Courtliness and Violence in Early Modern Eurasia  
(Cambridge, MA, 2012), pp. xiii–xiv. 
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if not confusion, and, at times anachronism. To try to avoid such problems in this 
thesis, reference is generally either made to the nationality of the specific actors — 
English, Welsh, Scottish, or Irish — when it is known, or to ‘Britons’ as a multi-national 
group with a common origin in the British Isles. While neither national or confessional 
differences are readily apparent in this study, it is useful to keep in mind that such 
differences did exist because the attitudes and responses of people could be 
influenced in various ways by national identity, and political and religious allegiances.  
Nevertheless, with respect to diplomatic decisions and actions, emphasis will be 
given to those of the English state, being the dominant polity of transoceanic 
enterprise originating in the British Isles throughout the seventeenth century.57  
 
The seventeenth century is a fascinating period for a study of this nature, concerned 
as it is with the attitudes and responses of Britons, for three reasons. Firstly, the 
period is marked by not just social unrest and political conflict in the British Isles but 
also in Barbary, as well as war in Continental Europe and between the Habsburg and 
Ottoman empires, and competition between the European powers for control of 
oceanic trade routes and colonies. Secondly, it also encompassed important changes 
to English society and culture. Christopher Hill, for example, discerned that a 
fundamental transformation took place in England during the seventeenth century 
that was ‘far more than merely a constitutional or political revolution, or a revolution 
in economics, religion or taste.’58 Hill states that a ‘great revolution of human 
thought’ arose from that period involving a general realisation:  
that solutions to political problems might be reached by discussion and 
argument; that questions of utility and expediency were more important 
than theology or history, that neither antiquarian research nor searching 
the Scriptures was the best way to bring peace, order, and prosperity to 
the commonwealth.59 
 
                                                        
57 See Fisher, Barbary Legends, p. viii, and Nicholas Canny, 'The Origins of Empire: An Introduction' in 
OHBE, 5 vols., vol. I. The Origins of Empire: British Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth 
Century, pp. 17–18. Canny discusses the origin and early usage of the terms “Britain” and “British” on 
pp. 1–2. 
58 Christopher Hill, The Century of Revolution, 1603–1714, 2nd ed.  (Wokingham, UK, 1983), p. 4.  
59 Ibid., p. 163. 
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The engagement of Britons with Barbary in the seventeenth century was, therefore, 
backgrounded by a complex interplay of events and ideas that challenged existing 
relationships, principles and beliefs. Thirdly, it is during this century that England 
began to establish itself as a naval and proto-imperial power; when it was finally able 
to begin the realisation of aspirations which had been nurtured during its ‘moment 
of ideological emergence’ between the late sixteenth and early seventeenth 
centuries, and which influenced both the development of English national identity 
and foreign relations.60 
 
Between 1625 and 1688 England created both a fully state owned and funded navy, 
and established a standing army. As a result, among other changes to English 
navigation, state ships began to replace merchant vessels in the defence of trade, and 
the resulting improvement in the protection they offered contributed to the growing 
importance of English shipping in Mediterranean trade during the Restoration Period.   
This increase in naval power not only provided England with a means to protect her 
trade, but also to promote her diplomatic and colonial interests.61 It is the unique 
effects that this period — defined as it was by a marked change to English military 
power and national aspiration, and by developments in English thought — alongside 
more individual factors, may have had on the attitudes of Britons concerning 
Morocco that are explored in this thesis.   
 
The methodological approach which has been adopted for this purpose differs from 
that of other scholarship on the subject in two fundamental ways. First, it is not 
principally concerned with the perceptions or opinions concerning Barbary held by 
elites inhabiting the metropole, or even with the responses of those who suffered the 
fear and indignity of enslavement, which have been adequately addressed by Colley. 
Neither is it concerned with Europeans renegades, whose particular personal 
circumstances and mental pathologies offer potentially intriguing, yet perhaps 
                                                        
60 Vitkus, Turning Turk, p. 9. 
61 Michael J. Braddick, 'The English Government, War, Trade, and Settlement, 1625–1688', in OHBE, 5 
vols., vol. I. The Origins of Empire: British Overseas Enterprise to the Close of the Seventeenth Century, 
pp. 287–289, 291–292; Hornstein, Restoration Navy, pp. 1–3. 
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analytically more challenging, insights into the consequences of cultural immersion. 
Rather, it seeks to contribute to the story of early modern British history in the 
Mediterranean through closer examination of the individual experiences of those 
Britons who sojourned there as ostensibly normal free men.62 To do so it draws on a 
diverse range of published and unpublished accounts which provide insights of 
varying degrees into their experiences, including diaries, memoirs, travel accounts, 
ethnographic writing, letters, official reports, and treatises.  
 
Admittedly, these experiences were shared with Moroccans. However, this study is 
singly focussed on understanding how individual Britons responded to their 
encounter with Morocco, why they responded as they did, and the consequences 
arising from their responses.  For while it is crucial to properly contextualise the 
encounter by describing the individual and collective behaviour of Moroccans with 
whom they interacted, it is not at all necessary to discern the motivations and 
perceptions of the Moroccans themselves for the purposes of understanding the 
impacts on Britons. 
 
Among the people who feature prominently in this study are the royal agent John 
Harrison, the chaplain Lancelot Addison, the secretary John Luke, the surveyor Hugh 
Cholmley, the governor Percy Kirke, and the ubiquitous chronicler of Restoration life 
Samuel Pepys, as well as many fragmentary, but no less important voices. Through 
use of such sources, this thesis seeks to elucidate the ways in which a variety of 
Britons responded to engagement with Morocco, physically, emotionally, and 
intellectually; and how differences in motivation for travel, nature of engagement 
and the personal character of individuals impacted on their experience. It is not that 
the perspectives offered by such people have been overlooked, but rather that they 
are often marginalised, used selectively and decontextualised, within a narrative 
which reinforces relations characterised by hostility, and ethnological and religious 
                                                        
62 Unfortunately, there are no accounts by women for the period under examination. The only account 
of note by a woman set in early modern Morocco is by Elizabeth Marsh who was held captive there, 
some seven decades later. See Elizabeth Marsh, The Female Captive: a Narrative of Facts which 
Happened in Barbary in the year 1756 (London, 1769), and later edited accounts. 
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difference, the hallmark of much of the traditional scholarship on Christian-Muslim 
relations from the Middle Ages to the modern period.  
 
This type of binary narrative is increasingly being challenged, with scholars arguing 
that a more nuanced view of the cultural encounter between Christianity and Islam 
is required.63 Timothy Powell believes that while binary analysis proved useful in 
cultural studies as a means ‘to deconstruct the epistemological structures of 
Eurocentrism and recover historical voices which were overlooked because of 
entrenched ethnocentrism’, its value has diminished because: 
[A] binary form of analysis that collapses a myriad of distinct 
cultural voices into the overly simplistic category of “Other” defined 
in relation to a European “Self” is theoretically problematic. The 
time has come to initiate a new critical epoch, a period of cultural 
reconstruction in which “identity” is reconfigured in the midst of a 
multiplicity of cultural influences that more closely resemble what 
Homi Bhabha has called the “lived perplexity” of people’s lives.64 
While Powell is writing in the context of the analysis of multicultural identities in 
America, Daniel Vitkus believes his appeal ‘for a more complex, non-dualistic 
paradigm … can and should be applied … to early modern cultural identities in 
England and the Mediterranean’.65 Similarly, Eric R. Dursteler, in his study of Veneto-
Ottoman cultural interaction and coexistence, argues for the need for scholars to 
move beyond ‘the “clash of civilizations” model’ of encounter between Islam and 
Christianity, ‘and instead to analyse the lived reality microscopically and on a local, 
cultural level’.66 Dursteler adds that by moving between the macroscopic and 
microscopic levels of the encounter, ‘a more precise picture of the real rather than 
rhetorical character of everyday existence on the frontier materializes’; focussing on 
                                                        
63 For example, see Jo Ann Hoeppner Moran Cruz, 'Popular Attitudes Towards Islam in Medieval 
Europe', in David R. Blanks and Michael Frassetto, eds., Western Views of Islam in Medieval and Early 
Modern Europe (New York, 1999), pp. 55–56; Colley, Captives, p. 103; Dursteler, Venetians in 
Constantinople, p. 8; Daniel G. König, 'Muslim Perception(s) of "Latin Christianity": Methodological 
Reflections and a Reevaluation', Comparativ: Leipziger Beiträge zur Universalgeschichte und 
Vergleichenden Gesellschaftsforschung, 20 (2010), pp. 20–21. For a more general discussion on the 
complexities inherent in the study of cultural contact see Schwartz, 'Introduction', pp. 1–19.   
64 Timothy Powell, ed., Beyond the Binary: Reconstructing Cultural Identity in a Multicultural Context 
(New Brunswick, NJ, 1999), p. 1. 
65 Vitkus, Turning Turk, pp. 2–3. 
66 Dursteler, Venetians in Constantinople, p. 19. See also pp. 6–9. 
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individuals and small groups enables us to go beyond generalisations and 
categorisations ‘that help organize, but may also obscure, the past’.67  
 
With these insights in mind, my second departure from existing scholarship, both in 
relation to the study of Britons in North Africa, and studies of historical cultural 
contact more generally, is that the analysis of the responses of my subjects to their 
encounter is considered with reference to the concept of ‘acculturation’. Schwartz 
notes that while the initial encounter between people of different cultures is framed 
on both sides by existing understandings of self and Other, these understandings are 
modified by the interaction. As further contact occurs, the dynamics of encounter 
and the interpretation of the culture of the other party are subject to adjustment.68 
In other words, a process of acculturation is enacted.  
 
There is no generally accepted definition of acculturation. Understanding of the 
concept varies between the disciplines in which it is studied; it is dependent on their 
particular interests, and the theoretical and methodological bases of their work.69 
One definition which is often cited was proposed by the anthropologists Redfield, 
Linton, and Herskovits in 1936: ‘Acculturation comprehends those phenomena which 
result when groups of individuals having different cultures come into continuous 
first-hand contact, with subsequent changes in the original culture patterns of either 
or both’.70 The definition is recognised as having deficiencies, but it captures the 
essence of the concept.  
 
                                                        
67 Ibid., pp. 19–20. On this via media approach to the examination of cultural encounter, see also Rickie 
Lette, 'The Influence of Inter-Cultural Engagement on the Perceptions of Mendicant Friars in the 
Thirteenth Century Concerning Islam and Muslims', Medieval Encounters, 23 (2017), pp. 481–483. 
68 Schwartz, 'Introduction', p. 15. 
69 Jelena Petkovic, 'A Critical Review of the Relevant Interpretations of the Process of Acculturation', 
Facta Universitatis: Series Philosophy, Sociology, Psychology and History, 11 (2012), p. 91. 
70 Robert Redfield, Ralph Linton, and Melville J. Herskovits, 'Memorandum for the Study of 
Acculturation', American Anthropologist, 38 (1936), p. 149. On the use of this definition see, for 
example, Bitterli, Cultures in Conflict: Encounters Between European and Non-European Cultures, 
1492–1800, trans. Richie Robertson  (Oxford, 1989), p. 49; Floyd W. Rudmin, 'Catalogue of 
Acculturation Constructs: Descriptions of 126 Taxonomies, 1918–2003', in Online Readings in 
Psychology and Culture, 8(1) (2009), at http://dx.doi.org/10.9707/2307-0919.1074, p. 3; 
Subrahmanyam, Courtly Encounters, p. 24  
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The value of acculturation as a distinct phenomenom and object of historical study 
has begun to be recognised by historians. Urs Bitterli observes that acculturation 
pervades the experience of cultural encounter in many different forms and at 
different levels.71 To date, much of the work, and associated debate, on acculturation 
in history, as it has in other fields, has centred on attempts to differentiate and define 
the types of response to cultural contact. However, there are three features shared 
by the work that has been undertaken by historians in this area to date. First, their 
focus has been on the societal or group level. Second, they seek to categorise 
outcomes which were in reality much more varied and complex. Third, their emphasis 
is on the transmission of cultural attributes.72 Consequently, what such approaches 
do not do is help us understand the acculturative response arising from cultural 
contact at the individual level. That is not to say that other historians have always 
overlooked the personal dimensions of cultural encounter. For example, Linda Colley 
does not formally adopt acculturation as an element in her methodology for Captives, 
but despite this much of her analysis concerns the changes which occur as a result of 
cultural immersion, particularly in regard to the perceptions of her subjects about 
individual and group identity. However, I believe that to properly understand the 
personal dimensions of acculturationit is necessary to turn to the field of cross-
cultural psychology. 
 
Berry et al. describe cross-cultural psychology ‘as the study of the relationships 
between cultural context and human behaviour. The latter includes both overt 
behaviour (observable actions and responses) and covert behaviour (thoughts, 
beliefs, meanings)’.73 Cross-cultural psychology recognises the fact that while cultural 
and other acculturative changes at the group level may influence changes at the 
individual level, due to differences in the nature of participation and personal 
psychological characteristics, individual response to culture encounter is likely to 
                                                        
71 Bitterli, Cultures in Conflict, p. 49. 
72 See, for example ibid., pp. 20–51; Subrahmanyam, Courtly Encounters, pp. 24–25. 
73 John W. Berry et al., Cross-Cultural Psychology: Research and Applications, 3rd ed.  (New York, 2012), 
p. 1. The authors acknowledge that interpretations and definitions of the field do vary, but note that 
most, but not all, researchers accept the existence of common psychological functions and processes 
between different cultural groups, that is, there is a ‘psychic unity’ among humans, pp. 1–4. 
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vary. Therefore, the focus of cross-cultural psychology with respect to acculturation 
phenomena is the impact on the individual, not changes elicited at the group level.74 
It directs our attention to the changes which occur to the individual as a result of 
contact with another culture. The realisation that cross-cultural interaction can 
influence changes in individuals is not new. Daniel Carey expresses it well when he 
states that early modern English authors ‘worried about the impact of travel precisely 
because they accepted the commensurability of human beings, and therefore the 
capacity of the English to become like those they observed and with whom they 
lived’.75 These concerns went beyond those associated with simple imitation of ‘alien 
models of power, wealth, and luxury’;76 one of the greatest fears in English society at 
the time was the perceived allure of Islam and the prospect of their fellow citizens 
converting, and ‘turning Turk’. 
 
A generally well accepted model for examining psychological acculturative change is 
the ABC model of ‘culture shock’ developed by Ward, Bochner and Furnham. Ward 
and her colleagues state that contemporary understanding of culture shock not only 
recognises that cultural interactions can often be ‘difficult, awkward and stressful’, 
but also that the responses of people to unfamiliar cultural environments can be 
treated as ‘an active process of dealing with change’.77 The model identifies three 
main areas of change involved in this process: ‘Affect, Behaviour and Cognitions, that 
is, how people feel, behave, think and perceive’.78 While historical studies of cultural 
contact may give attention to one or more of these dimensions of response, they do 
so without any explicit analytical framework within which to integrate them. The ABC 
model provides a means to do so. While other models of psychological acculturation 
have been developed, the ABC model is particularly useful because it possesses a 
broad, integrated theoretical framework, focussed on the main responses elicited by 
                                                        
74 Ibid., pp. 313–314. 
75 Daniel Carey, 'Questioning Incommensurability in Early Modern Cultural Exchange', Common 
Knowledge, 6 (1997), p. 40. 
76 Vitkus, Turning Turk, p. 9. 
77 Colleen Ward, Stephen Bochner, and Adrian Furnham, The Psychology of Culture Shock, 2nd ed.  
(Hove, UK, 2001), p. 270. 
78 Ibid.  
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physical immersion in a new culture.79  The empirical and concrete nature of the 
model also makes it, arguably, a more practical analytical tool than Homi K. Bhabha’s 
more abstract concepts of the ‘third space of enunciation’ and ‘hybridity’ with which 
to examine the interaction between individuals from different cultures.80 
 
The affective or emotional component of culture shock includes such responses as 
anger, frustration, confusion, anxiety, disorientation, suspicion, bewilderment, 
perplexity, and a desire to be elsewhere.81 Other negative manifestations may be 
feelings of nostalgia for the place of origin, and an exaggerated sense of difference 
between the home and new culture.82 However, it is also possible that people may 
experience euphoria, enchantment, fascination, and enthusiasm, at least initially.83 
Moreover, the distress of cultural contact can be mitigated by personal factors such 
as age and gender, by personal resources such as self-efficacy, emotional resilience, 
and education, as well as by access to social support’.84  
 
The behavioural component is associated with cultural learning, and premised on the 
notion ‘that the rules, conventions and assumptions that regulate interpersonal 
interactions, including both verbal and non-verbal communication, vary across 
cultures’. People inserted into an unfamiliar cultural situation who do not possess the 
relevant social skills will have difficulty initiating and sustaining appropriate relations 
with members of the other group.85 To function correctly, a person must acquire the 
necessary skills, which requires acquisition of knowledge of the society’s historical, 
philosophical and socio-political foundations. Failure to do so is associated with many 
                                                        
79 Ibid., pp. 1, 4–5; Berry et al., Cross-Cultural Psychology, p. 314; H. Chad Lane, 'Intercultural Learning', 
in N. M. Seel, ed., Encyclopedia of the Sciences of Learning (New York, 2012), p. 1619.  
80 However, Frederick Fahlander does provide an interesting demonstration of the utility of Bhabha’s 
concepts in 'Third Space Encounters: Hybridity, Mimicry and Interstitial Practice', in Per Cornell and 
Fredrik Fahlander, eds., Encounters-Materialities-Confrontations. Archaeologies of Social Space and 
Interaction (Edinburgh, 2007), pp. 15–41. These and other related concepts concerning processes of 
cultural production were introduced by Bhabha in Locations of Culture, first published in 1994. 
81 Ward, Bochner, and Furnham, Culture Shock, pp. 80, 270–271. Such affective perspectives are also 
referred to in the literature as ‘acculturative stress’. 
82 Eric B. Shiraev and David A. Levy, Cross-Cultural Psychology: Critical Thinking and Contemporary 
Applications, 5th ed.  (Boston, 2013), p. 303. 
83 Ward, Bochner, and Furnham, Culture Shock, pp. 80–82. 
84 Ibid., pp. 270–271; Berry et al., Cross-Cultural Psychology, p. 315. 
85 Ward, Bochner, and Furnham, Culture Shock, p. 271. 
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of the negative aspects of inter-cultural contact.86 However, sociocultural adaption is 
also dependent on psychological adjustment; that is, there is interplay between the 
affective and behavioural outcomes of interaction.87 
 
The cognitive component of the model involves the notion that culture consists of 
meanings shared between members of a group relating to material, interpersonal, 
institutional, existential and spiritual phenomena. However, when a person comes 
into contact with another culture such accepted truths may no longer apply, and the 
way in which such differences are processed may affect how each party sees the 
other, how they regard themselves, and the extent to which they are prepared to 
change their existing views.88 The ABC model proposes that there are four broad 
responses manifested by people when their social reality is challenged through 
cultural contact, and each has a different effect on self-identity: they may respond by 
resisting change, and even become more ethnocentric, that is, more embedded in 
their existing culture; they may accept the new culture, and even assimilate to such 
a degree that they relinquish their original culture; they may synthesise elements of 
both cultures, and become bi-cultural; or, they may vacillate between the two 
cultures, identify with neither, and consequently become marginalised in both.89  
 
Unlike the affective and behavioural aspects of cultural contact, it is more difficult to 
determine what cognitive responses are advantageous, as it will depend on the 
specific circumstance that produce them. For example, maintenance of prejudiced 
attitudes may benefit a person through enhancing his standing within his cultural 
group, and, therefore, make such beliefs hard to change.  Furthermore, the way in 
which cultural contact influences a person’s intrapersonal, interpersonal and 
intergroup identities may manifest itself in his or her affective and behavioural 
responses.90 For this reason, particular attention is given in this study to not only the 
interpersonal beliefs and perceptions that are educed through cultural contact, but 
                                                        
86 Ibid.  
87 Ibid. See Figure 12.11, The ABC model of 'culture shock', p. 274. 
88 Ibid., pp. 271–272. 
89 Ibid., p. 272. 
90 Ibid., pp. 272–273. 
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also the extent to which subjects change their grounds of self-definition as a result of 
such experience. 
 
The insights into acculturation provided by cross-cultural psychology draw the 
historian’s attention to the wider effects of cultural encounter; not just to its 
cognitive outcomes as reflected in acts of representation, but also to its affective and 
behavioural dimensions. They encourage the researcher to try to identify evidence of 
acculturation in narratives of encounter, and to consider their significance. 
Examination of the experience of encounter through the lens of psychological 
acculturation provides another perspective from which to read and analyse historical 
sources, to attempt to understand the meaning of encounter at an individual level, 
and identify the reasons for differences in the responses between people. In this way 
it may be possible to progress beyond generalised notions of cause and effect. 
However, while I believe that an understanding of the processes of psychological 
acculturation has much to contribute to studies of this nature, I am not suggesting 
that such models and associated research should be applied prescriptively to 
historical sources — cultural psychology is a specialised field, and, furthermore, there 
is need for caution in drawing conclusions from contemporary research on 
acculturation in order to avoid anachronism. Rather, I believe that they can be used 
instructively to complement other methods of interpretation available to the 
historian.91 
 
A fundamental issue for historians is the extent to which the representation of 
cultural encounter can provide access to the reality of what actually transpired. Greg 
Dening, states that the experience in ethnography suggests that there is no ultimate 
truth in representation, ‘because all reality like all culture is implicit, virtual’. 
According to Dening, representation is a product of the significance of the ways in 
                                                        
91 The disciplines of history and psychology have had a long troubled relationship of which the historian 
needs to be cognisant. Lynn Hunt provides an excellent survey of key developments in the relationship 
in 'Psychology, Psychoanalysis and Historical Thought', in Lloyd S. Kramer and Sarah C. Maza, eds., A 
Companion to Western Historical Thought, Blackwell Companions to History (Malden, MA, 2006), pp. 
337–356. 
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which it is expressed, and the reality of encounter must be negotiated.92 Stephen 
Greenblatt expresses similar sentiments: ‘It is, I think, a theoretical mistake and a 
practical blunder to collapse the distinction between representation and reality’, but 
acknowledges that they cannot be kept isolated from one another, for ‘they are 
locked together in an uneasy marriage’93  
 
The challenges for the historian negotiating the manifold nuances of the “reality” of 
cultural encounter are compounded by the fact that they rarely possess sources 
which provide clear and comprehensive insights.  Instead accounts are generally 
ambiguous and partial, affected by the limitations of perception and memory,94 
informed by prejudice, prudence, motivation, conventions of genre, and audience 
expectation, and subject to editorial licence. Of course, to borrow a phrase from 
Linda Colley, the historian can test the ‘overall factual anchorage’ of an account by 
‘triangulating’ its details with other relevant sources.95 He or she can also attempt to 
understand the meaning(s) of a text through the practice of close reading. Close 
reading, or reading ‘with the grain’, can be useful because it facilitates 
comprehension of what an author is consciously attempting to communicate through 
a text.  
 
However, if the focus of study is not simply the recorded “facts” of encounter which 
a writer wished to convey, but rather an understanding of the unconscious factors 
which shaped the text, what methods can historians use to access these psychic 
artefacts? To attempt to discern hidden, repressed, or conflated meaning in historical 
narratives requires recourse to textual deconstruction, to reading ‘against the grain’, 
                                                        
92 Greg Dening, 'The Theatricality of Observing and Being Observed: Eighteenth-Century Europe 
"Discovers" the ? Century "Pacific"', in Stuart B. Schwartz, ed., Implicit Understandings: Observing, 
Reporting, and Reflecting on the Encounters between Europeans and Other Peoples in the Early 
Modern Era (Cambridge, 1994), p. 457. See also n. 13. 
93 Stephen Greenblatt, Marvelous Possessions: The Wonder of the New World  (Oxford, 2003), p. 7. 
94 For useful background on the nature of perception see Ulric Neisser, Cognition and Reality: Principles 
and Implications of Cognitive Psychology  (San Francisco, 1976), particularly, pp. xii, 1–3, 9, 53–57, 80, 
87. Perception and memory are closely related. The book is a little dated, but the concepts are well 
explained for the lay reader. 
95 Colley, Captives, p. 13. 
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that is, reading texts against their normal rhetorical interpretation.96 Reading against 
the grain of a narrative involves identifying ‘how texts come to embarrass their own 
ruling systems of logic’,97 by closely examining and questioning the points made by 
an author, his ideas and perspectives, and identifying: ‘firstly, contradictions, 
secondly, linguistic quirks and aporia, thirdly, shifts or breaks (in tone, viewpoint, 
tense, person, attitude, etc.), and finally, absences or omissions’.98 It involves trying 
to interpret what the author is saying from different perspectives. 
 
In practice, the approach to the reading and analysis of texts I have adopted for this 
thesis has been informed by the work of the anthropologist Dianne Bell. She explains 
that she first notes ‘omissions, confusions, and plagiarisms’ that raise questions 
about interpretation, editing, and selection of particular phrases. She then 
contextualises the sources she uses by asking such questions as: What did Europeans 
already know of the inhabitants? What were the observer’s motivations for travel? 
What factors informed their observations? What is known about the observer’s 
personality, training, and interests? Who was the intended audience? She also reads 
her sources against the grain to discern their possible implicit meanings.99 While Bell’s 
‘against-the-grain’ readings are informed by notions of ethnocentrism and the 
historical construction of gender, mine are informed by notions of acculturation and 
the influence of inter-cultural engagement more generally on learning and behaviour. 
As noted above, while there is evidently a relationship between representation and 
reality, they must not be conflated. Representations provide access to perceptions of 
                                                        
96 However, Ann Laura Stoler cautions that students are often too hasty to read against the grain. She 
explains that ‘[r]eading along the archival grain draws our sensibilities to the archive’s granular rather 
than seamless texture, to the rough surface that mottles its hue and shapes its form.  Working along 
the grain is not to follow a frictionless course but to enter a field of force and will to power, to attend 
to both the sound and sense therein and their rival and reciprocal energies.  It calls on us to understand 
how unintelligibilities are sustained and why empires remain so uneasily invested in them’. See Stoler, 
Along the Archival Grain: Epistemic Anxieties and Colonial Common Sense  (Princeton, 2009), pp. 50, 
53. 
97 Terry Eagleton, Literary Theory: An Introduction, 2 ed.  (Minneapolis, MN, 1996), p. 116. 
98 Peter Barry, 'Tackling Textuality – with Theory', The English Association, http://www2.le.ac.uk/ 
offices/english-association/schools/teaching-poetry/tackling-textuality-with-theory, accessed 7 April 
2016. The article was first published in The Use of English, Vol. 52.1, 2000. 
99 Dianne Bell, 'An Accidental Australian Tourist: Or a Feminist Anthropolgist at Sea and on Land', in 
Stuart B. Schwartz, ed., Implicit Understandings: Observing, Reporting, and Reflecting on the 
Encounters between Europeans and Other Peoples in the Early Modern Era (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 
503–504. 
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the Other and are reflection of the self, but it is necessary for the historian to 
negotiate these meanings, to speculate on the extent to which they matched actual 
personal experience and belief. 
 
Colley makes some useful observations about the nature of captivity narratives which 
are apposite to the consideration of other types of contemporary travel-related 
accounts which have been used in this study. She acknowledges that they were 
influenced to varying degrees by bias arising from fear, anger, ignorance, 
preconception and prejudice. However, other factors could also lead to distortion. 
Desperation could play a part in their production, with authors embellishing accounts 
in the hope of persuading Parliament to act to redeem captives.100 Some protagonists 
sought, or were compelled, to tell their story for the purposes of catharsis, social 
redemption or profit, motivations which could also influence the veracity of accounts. 
Without pen, paper or time, they could have difficulty in accurately recalling people, 
places, and events. They could also lose control of their stories: they may have had 
little or no education, and were, therefore, dependent on others to assist in the 
writing of their accounts. In some cases, these other parties are not identified, and 
their motivations and contribution can only be speculated upon. Furthermore, in 
accordance with contemporary conventions and expectations, fictional and pirated 
material could be interposed with the factual.  
 
But Colley, quite rightly, stresses the importance of not attempting to characterise 
accounts as being either truthful or mendacious, as there is always the tendency 
among people to attempt to order facts in coherent patterns, and omit some details 
that are peripheral, discordant, embarrassing or painful.101 What is true of early 
modern English writers, remains equally true for the modern day academic. James 
Clifford expresses the situation well, reinforcing points made earlier: ‘Even the best 
                                                        
100 Colley, ibid., p. 57–58. 
101 Ibid., chap. 6, esp. pp. 84–85, 91–93. Colley cites Lennard J. Davis, who provides a useful discussion 
on attitudes to verity in published texts in early modern England in Factual Fictions: The Origins of the 
English Novel  (Philadelphia, 1996), esp. chap VIII. Davis observes that ‘no confession, history, or 
memoir could guarantee veracity’, a situation that ‘seems to reflect an ongoing fuzziness in the 
definition of fact and fiction’, p. 148. 
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ethnographic texts … are systems, or economies of truth. Power and history work 
through them, in ways that their authors cannot fully control. Ethnographic truths 
are thus inherently partial — committed and incomplete’.102 As Colley observes, most 
historical sources cannot be accepted at face value, writers had their own 
motivations and influences, but ‘they can — and should — be sampled and sieved’, 
and they need to be analysed not simply textually, but also within their wider context 
of production.103 However, it must also be borne in mind that this study is not 
principally concerned with the objectivity and historical accuracy of accounts; it 
matters less whether what authors wrote was either true or false, than what they 
actually said, because their perceptions, as reflected in their statements, shaped their 
personal reality, and their resultant memories of encounter. As Kenneth Parker 
concludes, ascertaining the truth of accounts is less important than understanding 
the reasons for their variety, and how they were received.104 
 
It is for these reasons that this thesis ranges between the macro-historical and the 
micro-historical in order to properly situate the sources, and the experiences of their 
subjects, within the broader socio-cultural, political and historical context in which 
they occurred. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the prevailing situations in the 
Mediterranean and Morocco, and England’s relationship to them. The first section of 
the chapter reveals the complex and dynamic nature of political, religious, and 
commercial relationships which existed in the Mediterranean during the seventeenth 
century and puts into perspective the power and influence of the English in the sea. 
The second section examines the contemporary political situation in Morocco. It 
highlights the long history of political unrest in the country which the European 
powers attempted to exploit, and how a combination of internal and external factors 
would frustrate their efforts. The final section identifies important developments in 
                                                        
102 James Clifford, 'Introduction: Partial Truths', in James Clifford and George E. Marcus, eds., Writing 
Culture: The Poetics and Politics of Ethnography (Los Angeles, 1986), p. 7. 
103 Colley, Captives, pp. 93, 97. Schwartz discusses the challenges associated with issues of objectivity 
and subjectivity in the interpretation of historical cultural encounters in 'Introduction', pp. 1–9. The 
collection of papers he provides in the volume include a number of interesting case studies which 
explore the intersection between reality and representation in such encounters. 
104 Parker, 'Reading Barbary', p. 108. 
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the political and commercial relationship between England and Morocco from the 
middle of the sixteenth century to the middle of the following century. 
 
Whether they were based on fact or fiction, Britons who came to Barbary 
undoubtedly did not do so without some existing notions of the region and its people. 
Chapter 2 considers how Barbary was conceived of by early modern Britons, to 
understand what knowledge, preconceptions, and prejudices they may have brought 
with them. It surveys not only attitudes to religious difference but also to somatic 
difference and ethnicity, both of which are equally important points of reference for 
considering issues of prejudice. Of course, perspectives would have varied widely 
between individuals. The intent, therefore, is not to attempt to reconstruct some sort 
of generalised, commonly held perception of Barbary which would be of questionable 
validity, but rather to identify the different ways — from simple stereotypes to more 
informed understandings — contemporary Britons conceived of it, and the range of 
sources and other factors that informed their ‘imaginative geographies’.105 These 
perspectives provide a means to compare and contrast the responses of Britons that 
were elicited by their encounter with Barbary, and which are investigated in the 
subsequent chapters. The chapter also serves to reinforce another, broader theme 
of this thesis: the way in which perceptions of difference between peoples is not only 
empirical and contingent, but also very much individually constructed. 
 
Chapters 3 to 6 provide the analytical core of the thesis. They engage with primary 
sources and the observations and interpretations of other scholars to (re)examine 
how Britons responded — affectively, behaviourally, and cognitively — to what they 
found and experienced in Morocco. The chapters are organised chronologically 
rather than thematically. This structure has been adopted for two reasons. First, 
observations and admissions made by the subjects often address more than one type 
                                                        
105 ‘Imaginative geographies’, is a concept that was articulated by Edward Said, in which ‘space 
acquires emotional and even rational sense by a kind of poetic process, whereby the vacant or 
anonymous reaches of distance are converted into meaning for us here’. Said goes on to say: ‘For there 
is no doubt that imaginative geography and history help the mind to intensify its own sense of itself 
by dramatizing the distance and difference between what is close to it and what is far away’. See Said, 
Orientalism, p. 55 
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of issue; to tease them apart and consider them separately risks fragmentation, 
decontextualisation, and repetition. Second, the experiences have a particular 
temporal context. In this respect, as another scholar has also observed, a 
chronological examination of accounts in itself provides thematic insight, in that it 
reveals distinct changes in the general nature of relations between England and 
Morocco over time,106 an understanding of which is critical to interpretation of the 
reactions of individual Britons. Consequently, the chapters are organised into periods 
which appear to have a distinct coherence in terms of the prevailing disposition of 
Britons concerning their activities in Morocco. 
 
Contrary to the claim of the author of the epigraph at the beginning of this 
introduction, the evidence presented in this thesis demonstrates that many Britons 
who travelled to Morocco between 1625 and 1684 did seek to understand it, and did 
acquire generally reliable, objective knowledge of its geography and its people. 
Contrary to the claims of some modern scholars, such men did so not for the purposes 
of colonial exploitation, but out of genuine interest and a desire to develop mutually 
beneficial relations. Neither did Britons possess a commonly shared image of 
Moroccans as being barbaric and implacably hostile to Christians, or necessarily 
perceived themselves to be superior to them. Through their contact with the local 
peoples some Britons were able to overcome traditional prejudices towards 
Maghribis. They were able to see beyond cultural and religious differences and 
instead identify equivalences and useful contrasts with their own society, and these 
insights not only influenced how they perceived the ethnic and religious Other, but 
also how they perceived themselves, their compatriots, and their own society. 
Through recognising a shared humanity, some Britons not only came to appreciate 
that Moroccans were worthy enemies, but also their equals, if not their superiors in 
some ways. Despite contemporary rhetoric to the contrary, the encounter of Britons 
with Morocco between 1625 and 1684 was both a humbling and enlightening 
experience for them.   
                                                        
106 Khalid  Chaouch, 'British Travellers to Morocco and their Accounts, from mid-16th to mid-20th 
Centuries: A Bibliography', in Working Papers on the Web, vol. 7 (2004), at http://extra.shu.ac.uk/ 
wpw/morocco/Chaouch/Chaouch.htm, accessed 13 April 2016, p. 3 of 28. 
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This thesis supports Linda Colley’s assessment that there was no monolithic, 
homogeneous perspective concerning Islam and the Islamic powers in the 
Mediterranean held by Britons during the seventeenth century, and that it is 
necessary to delve more widely and deeply in order to appreciate the significance of 
Barbary’s impact not only on British self-identity, but ultimately also on British 
imperial development. In this way it also contributes to a growing body of literature 
on cultural contact in the early modern period which is demonstrating the diverse 
impacts that such contact had on Britons and other Europeans, and on the indigenous 
peoples they encountered.  
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Fig. 2 The Mediterranean as a geographic and political entity, by William Berry, 1685.  
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1. Encountering Barbary 
 
Did our ancestors mean any more by dominion of the sea than 
commanding there or not being commanded by any pirates or 
others there, and not propriety? (Samuel Pepys, voyage from Tangier, 
March, 1684)1  
 
Before examining how Britons responded to contact with Morocco, it is useful to 
appreciate the broader context in which they did so. More generally, as Jack D’Amico 
has noted: ‘It is helpful to consider the real interests, mundane desires, and complex 
political motives that affected the way Moors and Morocco were represented in 
reports, letters, and summaries’.2 In this chapter key events, developments and 
issues are identified which provide a background to the concerns, interests, and 
activities of Britons as they relate to Morocco in the seventeenth century which are 
discussed in more detail in subsequent chapters. This survey highlights the complex 
and dynamic nature of the Mediterranean region as a site of transnational trade, and 
converging and interacting economic, political, religious, and cultural systems during 
the early modern period, and England’s place within it. But it also seeks to reinforce 
the distinctive nature of North Africa, and particularly Morocco, within the broader 
historical contexts of both the Mediterranean and Islamdom.3  
 
The domestic social and political situation in England, and in the British Isles more 
generally, is not examined separately, but instead relevant commentary has been 
woven into the discussion of issues pertinent to the activities of Britons in the 
Mediterranean, and relations between England and Morocco, in the period up to the 
                                                        
1 Samuel Pepys, The Tangier Papers of Samuel Pepys, ed. Edwin Chappel  ([London], 1935), p. 239. 
Although Pepys’ general notes from which the quotation is sourced are undated, based on preceding 
entries it is evident that the relevant sub-section of the papers was written during Pepys’ return to 
England from Tangier, where he arrived on 3 April 1684. 
2 Jack D'Amico, The Moor in English Renaissance Drama  (Tampa, FL, 1991), p. 7. 
3 As noted by Andrew C. Hess in The Forgotten Frontier: A History of the Sixteenth-Century Ibero-
African Frontier  (Chicago, 2010), p. 260. Hess cites the following works for which the region’s historical 
autonomy is a central theme: Charles-André Julien, The History of North Africa: Tunisia, Algeria, 
Morocco. From the Arab Conquest to 1830, trans. John Petrie, ed. C. C. Stewart  (London, 1970), 
Abdallah Laroui, L'histoire du Maghreb: Un essai de synthese  (Paris, 1970), and Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, A 
History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period  (Cambridge, 1971). The 1987 edition of Abun-Nasr’s book 
is cited elsewhere in this thesis. Laroui’s book was later translated into English. See Abdallah  Laroui, 
The History of the Maghrib: An Interpretive Essay, trans. Ralph Manheim  (Princeton, 1977). 
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end of the first quarter of the seventeenth century. However, due to their complexity, 
and their importance in understanding later events and the responses of the 
protagonists, the examination of domestic political developments in Morocco has 
been extended into the 1650s, overlapping with the scope of chapter 3. As will 
become evident throughout this study, significant developments in Europe, in the 
Mediterranean, and in the Barbary states during the early modern period were often 
interrelated or became intertwined as states and polities pursued their respective 
economic and political interests. 
 
1.1. Disorientation and Accommodation: England in the Mediterranean 
 
There is a long-standing narrative which continues to influence the historiography of 
the English in the Mediterranean in the seventeenth century, which portrays England 
as a small nation which overcomes adversity to establish its dominance in that sea by 
the end of century. Through fortitude, superior skills and technology, driven by the 
desire for imperial greatness, and exercising no small measure of aggression, the 
English triumphed over Christian European and Muslim rivals alike.4 In the opinion of 
at least one recent scholar this achievement not only shaped England’s imperial 
future, but also a world view which was defined by an overriding sense of cultural 
superiority and Protestant righteousness.5 But such an interpretation overlooks 
critical elements of the English experience, and the reality appears to be quite 
different, in that the position of the English in the Mediterranean remained 
precarious even towards the end of the century. Instead, the story of England in the 
Mediterranean in the seventeenth century is more one of limits, pragmatism, and 
accommodation, which brings into question the veracity of generalisations 
concerning the impact that this period of Mediterranean activity had on Britons, and 
the development of British self-identity.   
                                                        
4 See, for example, Julian S. Corbett, England in the Mediterranean: A Study of the Rise and Influence 
of British Power Within the Straits, 1603–1713, 2 vols., vol. I (London, 1904), esp. pp. 1–4; Julian S. 
Corbett, England in the Mediterranean: A Study of the Rise and Influence of British Power Within the 
Straits, 1603–1713, 2nd ed., 2 vols., vol. II (London, 1917), esp. pp. 298–300, 566–568; Christopher 
Hill, God's Englishman: Oliver Cromwell and the English Revolution  (London, 1970), pp. 162–168. 
5 Nabil Matar, Britain and Barbary, 1589–1689  (Gainesville, FL, 2006), pp. 8, 133, 158; Nabil Matar, 
British Captives from the Mediterranean to the Atlantic, 1563–1760  (Leiden, 2014), pp. 192–195. 
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Although England’s entry into the Mediterranean is traditionally dated to 1511 based 
on voyages recorded by Richard Hakluyt in The Principal Navigations, Fernand 
Braudel observes that England’s maritime and consular activities in the region date 
to at least the early fifteenth century. However, it was not until early in the following 
century that English merchants began to truly establish themselves in Mediterranean 
commerce, ‘after a long and not always brilliant apprenticeship’.6 But this period of 
success was short-lived; from 1534 English trade in the Eastern Mediterranean began 
to wane, and from the early 1550s, for some two decades, the trade was ‘utterly 
discontinued, and in maner quite forgotten’.7 The reasons for this decline are 
uncertain, but what is evident is that in the early 1570s there was a rapid re-entry of 
the English into this market, along with the Dutch and French.8 While English trade in 
the eastern Mediterranean may have been stimulated by the preparedness of 
southern European cities to employ foreign shipping, it had yet to be resumed in the 
Levant.9  But the excommunication of Elizabeth I in 1570 freed the English from 
restrictions which had been placed by papal edict on trade with Muslims, and the 
Ottomans were keen to obtain the raw materials which England could provide.10 The 
prospect of diplomatic relations with the Sublime Porte was also attractive to the 
queen given rising tensions with Spain. Negotiations commenced in 1578, and in June 
1580 the English obtained the trading privileges they sought.11 England was now 
poised to take advantage of the vast commercial opportunities available in the 
Mediterranean. 
                                                        
6 Fernand Braudel, The Mediterranean and the Mediterranean World in the Age of Philip II, trans. Sian 
Reynolds, 2 vols, vol. I (London, 1972), pp. 612–613. See Richard Hakluyt, The Principal Navigations, 
Voyages, Traffiques and Discoveries of the English Nation, 3 vols., vol. II  (London, 1599–1600), pp. 
96ff. 
7 Hakluyt, The Principal Navigations, II, pp. 136–137. 
8 See, for example, Braudel, The Mediterranean, I, pp. 615, 621–624, cf. Alison Games, The Web of 
Empire: English Cosmopolitans in an Age of Expansion, 1560–1660  (Oxford, 2009), pp. 49–50, and 
David W. Waters, The Art of Navigation in England in Elizabethan and Early Stuart Times  (London, 
1958), pp. 88, 100. On factors which may have influenced England’s interest in the Mediterranean at 
this time, see Ralph Davis, 'England in the Mediterranean, 1570–1670', in F. J. Fisher, ed., Essays in the 
Economic and Social History of Tudor and Stuart England (London, 1974), pp. 117–118. Aside from 
domestic economic changes, Davis also identifies the impact of political developments on the 
European continent during the 1570s. 
9 Braudel, The Mediterranean, I, pp. 623–624. 
10 Games, The Web of Empire, p. 50. 
11 Braudel, The Mediterranean, I, p. 625. 
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The establishment of the capitulations with the Ottomans was followed soon after 
by the establishment of a number of chartered English trading companies from 1581, 
and the installation of an ambassador in Constantinople in 1583. Chief among the 
entities established by the English was the Levant Company which was chartered in 
1592, and grew rapidly. By the mid-seventeenth century there were English trading 
posts and consulates located around the coast and islands of the Mediterranean.12 
Merchant communities were also established in North Africa, and consuls were 
appointed for managing relations with Morocco and the three Ottoman regencies.13 
Along with hundreds of licensed English vessels involved in long distance commerce 
were a multitude of private operators involved in coastal shipping, as well as English 
privateers and pirates, who aggressively competed with both established traders and 
other new European entrants.14  
 
Braudel argued that the commercial environment of the Mediterranean was 
fundamentally transformed by the rise of the northern European powers, particularly 
the English and Dutch, from the last quarter of the sixteenth century, with 
consequent changes to existing systems of commerce, trade, and finance.15  It was 
an argument that became very influential in shaping understanding of events in the 
Mediterranean in the early modern period.16 Molly Greene has examined Braudel’s 
‘Northern Invasion’ thesis and, in particular, its inherent implication that the 
economic competition that arose from the arrival of the northern powers ‘heralded 
a decisive break with the old conflict between Islam and Christianity and the 
                                                        
12 Ibid., pp. 626–629; Games, The Web of Empire, pp. 50–51. 
13 The most comprehensive account of English consular activities in North Africa between the late 
sixteenth and early eighteenth century is still to be found in Godfrey Fisher, Barbary Legends: War, 
Trade and Piracy in North Africa 1415–1830  (Oxford, 1957). While focussed on consular operations in 
the Levant, Niels Steensgaard’s study in 'Consuls and nations in the Levant from 1570 to 1650', 
Scandinavian Economic History Review, 15 (1967), pp. 13–55, also provides insights which are 
generally applicable to consular activity in North Africa. For a contemporary English view of the role 
of consul in North Africa see 'Reasons for keepinge constante an agent or consull at Algier', 1622, TNA, 
SP 71/1/Pt. 1, f. 116r. 
14 Games, The Web of Empire, p. 51; David Abulafia, The Great Sea: A Human History of the 
Mediterranean  (Oxford, 2011), pp. 459–462. 
15 Braudel, The Mediterranean, I, pp. 621–642. Davis, in 'England in the Mediterranean', first published 
in 1961, advances a similar argument. See pp. 127–137. 
16 Molly Greene, 'Beyond the Northern Invasion', Past and Present, 174 (2002), p. 42. 
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beginning of a new, national world’.17 While Greene acknowledges the secular 
character of the developments, she believes that the attention which has been given 
to this interpretation obscures other changes which occurred. Her reinterpretation 
of the situation has important implications for understanding England’s position in 
the sea, and consequently the actions and responses of Britons in North Africa.   
 
In support of her counter-thesis Greene identifies three distinguishing features of the 
situation in the region during the seventeenth century. First, the impact was not 
uniform: it is more evident in the western Mediterranean than the east, and in long-
distance trade than the coastal trade.18 Second, the marketplace was ‘messy’, in that 
it is often difficult to clearly identify the national or religious affiliation of parties 
involved in trade, partly because no state was strong enough to impose order over it. 
The resultant fragmentation of sovereignty across the sea allowed the resurgence of 
both Christian and Muslim piracy.19 Given this situation, Greene claims that the 
identification of means to protect commercial interests became of upmost 
importance, and the arrangements which developed ‘cut across both national and 
religious lines’.20 Furthermore, the European states struggled to impose national 
trade policies on their citizens operating in the region, and, therefore, could not 
readily harness their endeavours in the service of the state. However, importantly, 
Greene also observes that the complexity of trade in the Mediterranean was not 
simply a product of ‘weak states and fractious communities’.21 While the English, 
Dutch and French all sought to expand their trade with the Ottoman Empire, their 
ambition was not sufficient to totally negate the legacy of hostility between 
Christianity and Islam. According to Greene, the tension between these two factors 
created a ‘profound moment of hesitation’, an ambivalence, among all parties.22 
Consequently, the foundation of Mediterranean trade was uncertain: ‘Was the 
                                                        
17 Ibid., pp. 42–43. 
18 Ibid., p. 43. 
19 Ibid., pp. 43–44. See also Tristan M. Stein, 'The Mediterranean in the English Empire of Trade, 1660–
1678', PhD Thesis (Harvard University, 2012), pp. 14–15, 26–27. As Stein notes, the naming of features 
around the Mediterranean in William Berry’s map from 1685 (see fig. 2) highlights the way in which 
the sea was conceived of not just geographically, but also politically. 
20 Greene, 'Beyond the Northern Invasion', p. 44. See also Abulafia, The Great Sea, pp. 462–463. 
21 Greene, 'Beyond the Northern Invasion', p. 44. 
22 Ibid., pp. 44–45, 58. 
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Mediterranean a collection of sovereign states bound by treaty obligations to one 
another? Or was it a cultural and political frontier, where two hostile religions faced 
each other in perpetual enmity?’. Greene believes that both views were asserted.23 
Nor were ambivalence and pragmatism concerning issues of politics and religion 
restricted to merchants and states; they also extended to pirates and corsairs.24 
 
Greene’s third point is that the ‘Northern Invasion’ thesis is silent on the issue of 
religious confrontation, implying that it was no longer an important factor. However, 
she argues that the separate historiography on conflict between Muslim and 
Christian corsairs, known as the ‘corso’, confronts this issue. She notes that 
traditional interpretations of the decline in corsairing are neatly accommodated 
within the framework provided by the thesis.25 According to this scholarship, there 
was a significant increase in corso activity in the seventeenth century, after which it 
went into a terminal decline. Although other factors may have played a part, the most 
favoured explanation for this outcome is that the development of a more tolerant 
perspective made religious differences ‘both irrelevant and anachronistic’.26 Greene 
believes this account, with its ‘Whiggish assumptions’, is of little assistance in 
explaining developments. Instead, the gradual exclusion of Muslims from maritime 
activities suggests that religious difference began to be applied systematically by the 
French and English states towards the end of the century as a means to consolidate 
their control over trade.27 Nevertheless, she believes that commercial activity in the 
Mediterranean during the seventeenth century ‘was characterized by widespread 
inconsistency and disagreement over the proper balance between the pursuit of 
commerce and the defence of religion’.28 Similarly, David Abulafia refers to the 
Mediterranean suffering ‘from a sort of disorientation’, and Kenneth Parker observes 
                                                        
23 Ibid., p. 45.  
24 Peregrine Horden and Sharon Kinoshita, eds., A Companion to Mediterranean History, Wiley 
Blackwell Companions to World History (Chichester, UK, 2014), pp. 175–176, 180–182. 
25 Greene, 'Beyond the Northern Invasion', p. 45. Rather than simply a confrontation between Muslim 
and Christian protagonists, the corso can perhaps be better conceived of as a form of ‘quasi-
commercial trade’ practiced in the Mediterranean which incorporated a religious dimension. See 
Mercedes García-Arenal, 'The Moriscos in Morocco: From Granadan Emigration to the Hornacheros of 
Salé', in The Expulsion of the Moriscos from Spain (Leiden, 2014), p. 288. 
26 Molly Greene, 'Beyond the Northern Invasion', p. 45. 
27 Ibid., p. 46. 
28 Ibid., p. 63. 
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that Europeans travelling in the region became ‘dis-oriented’.29 As Greene astutely 
concludes, it is the distinctiveness of the period, and the ambiguous nature of the 
Mediterranean at the time, which historians tend to overlook in passing judgement 
on European success in the Mediterranean in the seventeenth century.30  
 
But perhaps the failure to appreciate the unique, enigmatic character of the sea at 
this time is more than a simple oversight. Lotfi Ben Rejeb argues that from the early 
sixteenth century a discourse developed among Europeans that eventually reduced 
‘North African history to a story of piracy and slavery driven by fanaticism, and 
Mediterranean history to a Manichean drama — of Good and Evil, of victim and 
victimiser’.31 The discourse was propagated by the recycling of information, a process 
which overtime became self-referential, reinforcing its authenticity, and ultimately 
transformed into an ideological construct, providing the foundation for an eventual 
imperial program of conquest in North Africa.32 It is a discourse which continues to 
exert influence in both popular culture and scholarship. 
 
The complex political, socio-cultural, and religious environment of the 
Mediterranean defies the construction of a simple narrative of binary opposites, as it 
does one based on progressive English dominance during the seventeenth century. 
However, several scholars have asserted that the experience, while challenging, was 
an informative one for both merchants and the state as the nation expanded its 
maritime interests, and that the adaptability demonstrated by the English in the 
Mediterranean would underpin later British imperial development. Tristan Stein 
argues that the complex political and legal regimes which operated in the sea shaped 
the nature of the English presence there, and limited the expansion of its sovereignty 
                                                        
29 Abulafia, The Great Sea, p. 469; Kenneth Parker, Early Modern Tales of Orient: A Critical Anthology  
(London, 1999), p. 3. 
30 Greene, 'Beyond the Northern Invasion', pp. 63–71. 
31 Lotfi Ben Rejeb, '‘The General Belief of the World’: Barbary as Genre and Discourse in Mediterranean 
History', European Review of History, 19 (2012), p. 23. Also see Ben Rejeb’s earlier article on this 
subject, 'Barbary's "Character" in European Letters, 1514–1830: An Ideological Prelude to 
Colonization', Dialectical Anthropology, 6 (1982), 345–355. The Eurocentric nature of North African 
history, and resultant politically inspired reductionism is also discussed by Abdallah Laroui in the 
introduction to his book History of the Maghrib, pp. 3–12.  
32 Ben Rejeb, 'Barbary as Genre and Discourse', pp. 23–25. 
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in the region, highlighting the relative weakness of the early modern English state.33 
He believes that the way in which direct English influence in the Mediterranean was 
restricted provides a model for understanding the way in which the English state 
subsequently expanded its authority beyond its actual claims to sovereignty and 
empire. In the Mediterranean, this involved sending naval fleets to respond to the 
activities of corsairs, the negotiation of treaties, regulation of navigation, protection 
of subjects from foreign powers, and establishing authority over English merchants 
and other subjects through consuls and diplomats. While England attempted to 
expand its authority in the Mediterranean through these claims of jurisdiction, they 
clashed with those of the Mediterranean states and of others operating there, and it 
is these conflicts which defined and limited English authority in the sea.34  
 
Given their precarious position, Britons initially had to take great care in negotiating 
the vicissitudes of Mediterranean commerce, or risk marginalisation or exclusion. 
Rather than military power and force, Braudel remarks that the English approach 
involved subtlety and guile, capitalising on religious divisions, and at times resorting 
to piracy when required.35 Caught between the Catholic kingdoms in the north and 
dār al-Islām in the south and east, the Protestant faith of the English could be both a 
blessing and a curse. The pragmatism demonstrated by the English is a theme 
expanded upon by Alison Games, who argues that it was in the Mediterranean that 
England first acquired the skills and experience in long-distance trade that allowed it 
to develop its global maritime empire: organisation skills such as the securing of 
trading privileges and management of complex trading systems, and, equally 
important, familiarity with cultural exchange and accommodation.36 She 
characterises the approach adopted by the English in the Mediterranean from 1580 
until 1660 as principally one of ‘accommodation and dissimulation’, involving feigning 
support, lying, misleading, and fostering amicable relations in whatever way was 
                                                        
33 Stein, 'The Mediterranean', pp. iii–iv, 21–23. 
34 Ibid., pp. 4–5, 31–32. For a specific study of issues concerning treaties and ‘Euro-American’ consular 
jurisdiction in North Africa, see C. R. Pennell, 'Treaty Law: The Extent of Consular Jurisdiction in North 
Africa from the Middle of the Seventeenth to the Middle of the Nineteenth Century', The Journal of 
North African Studies, 14 (2009), pp. 235–256. 
35 Braudel, The Mediterranean, I, pp. 628–629. 
36 Games, The Web of Empire, pp. 47, 51. 
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most expedient. According to Games, Englishmen were prepared to ‘subordinate 
their pride, their national affiliations, and their faith’, essentially reforming their 
external identities, in order to overcome their ‘political weakness and religious 
vulnerability’; but all that changed when they decided to occupy Tangier, only for 
them to resume their former mode of interaction after the colony’s abandonment.37  
 
While not disputing the generality of Games’ observations about cultural transfer and 
accommodation by the English, I believe that she may be, in fact, conflating two 
distinct modes of adaptive behaviour: conscious acts of deception, and essentially 
unconscious changes arising from psychological acculturation.38 Certainly, 
contemporary observers comment on the importance of the need for travellers to be 
mindful of what they wore in the Ottoman lands. The Levant Company chaplain 
William Biddulph offered a warning to fellow Christians to wear no item of apparel of 
the colour green, ‘for greene, they account Mahomet’s colour’.39 Furthermore, he 
instructs them when travelling outside cities that their apparel ‘must be simple, for 
their safety’.40 The traveller, Sir Henry Blount, went further, promoting the adoption 
of the ‘Turkish manner’ of dress.41 Blount not only understood that the wearing of 
European clothing could provoke anti-Christian resentment, but also believed that 
the use of local clothing was appreciated as a sign of respect: ‘Now there is no 
innovation drawes in forreigne manners faster, then that of apparel. Besides that, it 
                                                        
37 Ibid., pp. 52–53, 74–79, 297–298. Quotations are from pp. 52 and 79. As noted in the introduction 
to this thesis, Linda Colley refers to the necessary ‘compromises and collusions’ which were imposed 
on the British in operating in the Mediterranean. 
38 Games does indicate an awareness that adaptive capability did vary between individuals, noting that 
this English cosmopolitanism ‘was not a coherent system of behaviour or a uniform worldview’, but 
was rather an organic development driven by necessity, aided by a willingness, or even a disposition, 
among some, to adapt to new circumstances. See Games, The Web of Empire, p. 290. 
39 William Biddulph, The Travels of Certaine Englishmen into Africa, Asia, Troy, Bythinia, Thracia, and 
to the Blacke Sea ... Begunne in the Yeere of Jubile 1600, and by some of them Finished in this Yeere 
1608 ..., ed. Theophilus Lavender (London, 1609), p. 64. Biddulph cites the example of two men ‘not 
acquainted with the customes of the countrey’: one has his shoes, with their offending ‘greene 
shoestrings’, removed, and the other has his green ‘breeches cut off, and he reviled and beaten’. 
According to the Prophet, the pious will be rewarded with, among other things, clothes of ‘fine green 
silk and gold embroidery’. See Qur’an 77:1–22. Quotation is from The Glorious Qur’ân, trans. 
Marmaduke Pickthall, bilingual ed. (Istanbul, 2014), p. 579. 
40 Biddulph, The Travels of Certaine Englishmen, p. 101. 
41 Henry Blount, A Voyage into the Levant: A Breife Relation of a Journey, Lately Performed by Master 
H. B. Gentleman, From England, 2nd ed.  (London, 1636), pp. 98–99. 
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seems honourable for the Turkish nation to retain their ancient habit of clothing’.42 It 
was more than an issue of physical subterfuge, of adoption of a superficial disguise; 
to be successful the merchant or traveller also needed to acquire deeper cultural 
understanding. Biddulph’s advice was that those who travel to the Near East must 
emulate servants so that ‘they may learne how to behave themselves in travell’:43 
they must be prepared to eat whatever is available; they must not be sensitive to 
what they hear which may offend them; and, they must be prepared to quickly flee 
from danger. Furthermore, with their ‘hands wide open … they must be faithfull, not 
deceitfull: They must doe nothing closely or secretly’, and be prepared ‘to give 
liberally’ when required to do so.44 A merchant must understand ‘how the place has 
changed his condition’, and he must not stand ‘upon his termes’.45  
 
Both dissimilation and acculturation could have produced ostensibly the same 
outcome — an ability to operate in a potentially hostile environment — but English 
travellers could not easily hide their religious and national identities, and to attempt 
to do so could be dangerous. As Biddulph and Blount show, English travellers in the 
Mediterranean in the early modern period were conscious of the need to understand 
and respect local cultural norms, to put aside notions of cultural and religious 
superiority, in order to gain acceptance, and minimise personal threat, but doing so 
paved the way for more fundamental personal change. Blount found that by fully 
accepting his changed condition and adapting to his new environment he ‘grew so 
confident of the Turkish nature … and nor were my wayes being framed onely to 
receive insolency, able to entertaine malice, especially a malice engaged by 
religion’.46 The rationalist Blount found he began to appreciate the people and their 
culture outside the lens of cultural and religious difference: it was a process 
embraced by him, but feared by the religious Biddulph, who believed that through 
such experience men could be ‘somewhat tainted with their sinnes, if no altogether 
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sowred with the leaven of their ungodlinesse’.47 It was a fear shared by other Britons, 
a fear of their compatriots ‘turning Turk’. 
 
However, while cultural accommodation and deference were means by which Britons 
could further their interests in the Mediterranean, traditionally scholars have 
explained the commercial and political rise of England in the region during the 
seventeenth century principally in terms of the ascendancy of English naval power. A 
detailed examination of the extent to which the English relied on an overt policy of 
aggression, as opposed to one based on pragmatic commerce and diplomacy, and 
how the balance between these two approaches changed during the course of the 
seventeenth century, is outside the scope of this thesis.48 But what appears to be 
clear is that the practice of what some have called the exercise of ‘gunboat 
diplomacy’ by the English during this period,49 was, in fact, quite limited in both its 
occurrence and in its effectiveness in forcing the North African states to the 
negotiating table, and deterring their corsairing activities.  
 
                                                        
47 Biddulph, The Travels of Certaine Englishmen, p. 81. 
48 It is perhaps sufficient to note that views on the subject vary considerably. For example, Matar in 
Britain and Barbary argues for an increasing recourse to aggressive behaviour against Muslims in the 
Mediterranean by the English during the course of the seventeenth century.  Similarly, David Delison 
Hebb in Piracy and the English Government, 1616–1642  (Aldershot, UK, 1994) posits that there was a 
turn from a policy of diplomacy to one focussed on the use of force to deal with North African ‘piracy’ 
between the 1620s and early 1640s. On the other hand, Games, as noted above, sees the English 
occupation of Tangier as marking a period of less cautious and more assertive mode of interaction in 
the region. However, Fisher in Barbary Legends, p. 224, presents quite a different view, discerning that 
the first sign of an explicit recognition of the value of diplomacy in dealing with the North African 
regencies becomes evident in the late 1650s. These different interpretations reflect, at least to some 
degree, the diversity and complexity of the experiences and responses of Britons in the 
Mediterranean: not only how they perhaps changed over time, but were influenced by both the 
circumstances and location of encounter. In particular, as emphasised elsewhere, the dynamics of 
their interaction with Morocco were rather different to those pertaining to their dealings with the 
other Barbary States.   
49 Hill, God's Englishman, p. 168; Matar, Britain and Barbary, p. 9. While he does not use the term, 
Alan Jamieson similarly argues that the Ottoman regencies were all forced to make peace treaties with 
England, France, and the Netherlands. He posits that the reasons they did not simply remove the 
corsair threat was that they wished for them to continue their activities in order to either disrupt the 
trade of their smaller European rivals, or attack their enemies in time of war. These do not appear 
sufficient reasons on their own for such restraint given the impact that corsair activity continued to 
have on the shipping of these three states. See Alan G. Jamieson, Lords of the Sea: A History of the 
Barbary Corsairs  (London, 2012), pp. 18–19. See also Matar’s argument for what he believes was a 
successful explicit strategy by the English and French of disabling North African seafaring capability in 
British Captives, pp. 160–165. 
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The first notable event which has been associated with this approach occurred in 
1620 with the entry of an English fleet into the Mediterranean under the command 
of Sir Robert Mansell. While the aims of the expedition have been the subject of 
debate, its principal purpose appears to have been to suppress the activities of 
Algerine corsairs.50 The naval historian Julian Corbett proclaimed the episode as the 
‘dawn of England’s career as a Mediterranean power’.51 While his assessment is not 
necessarily inaccurate, the fact remains that the exercise achieved little of 
significance or long-term value. Moreover, it may, in fact, have been 
counterproductive by exacerbating the hostility of the corsairs, or at least 
emboldening them.52 David Quinn and A. N. Ryan believe that because of the fact 
that Mansell was explicitly instructed to proceed by diplomacy rather than with 
hostility, the mission should not be dismissed as an example of ‘gunboat 
diplomacy’.53  
 
It was not until thirty-five years later that an English fleet again attempted to enforce 
its will on the regencies, on the occasion of Admiral Robert Blake’s much vaunted 
mission in 1655 to Tunis and Algiers.54 Blake’s action against the Tunisians at Porto 
                                                        
50 Hebb, Piracy and the English Government, pp. 107–115. 
51 Corbett, England in the Mediterranean, I, pp. 111–112. 
52 Fisher, Barbary Legends, pp. 188–192; Davis, 'England in the Mediterranean', p. 130; Christoper 
Lloyd, English Corsairs on the Barbary Coast  (London, 1981), pp. 67–71; Hebb, Piracy and the English 
Government, pp. 105–107, 134–135; Adrian Tinniswood, Pirates of Barbary: Corsairs, Conquests and 
Captivity in the Seventeenth-Century Mediterranean (London, 2010), pp. 106–125. Hebb and 
Tinniswood provide good accounts of the expedition. 
53 David B. Quinn and A. N. Ryan, England's Sea Empire, 1550–1642  (London, 1983), pp. 225–226. 
54 Understanding of the true intent of Blake’s Mediterranean expedition has, according to Julian 
Corbett and Christopher Lloyd, remained elusive, as the commander’s final instructions have never 
been found. See Corbett, England in the Mediterranean, I, pp. 274–276; Lloyd, English Corsairs, pp. 
105–106. However, if an archivist’s notation that a copy of instructions for Blake dates from 1654, not 
1656, then it may be that the original purpose was, at least partly, resolution of issues, and negotiation 
of a peace, with Algiers, and that Blake’s focus on Tunis was in response to later developments. The 
instructions require Blake to demand restitution of all ‘goods, shipps and merchandises’ taken and the 
emancipation of all Commonwealth subjects, and to negotiate ‘just and reasonable’ articles to 
maintain good relations. In the event the Algerines refused, he was authorised to use all necessary 
force to compel them to comply. See ‘Instructions to General Robert Blake’, July 165[4], TNA, SP 
71/1/Pt. 2, f. 165r–v. In the intervening period a squadron had been sent to Salé on the Atlantic coast 
of Morocco in 1637 under William Rainsborough to supress the corsairs operating from that port and 
effect the release of English captives held there, by force if necessary. The mission was successful to 
some extent, not as a result of the exercise of force, but because of the commander’s ability to reach 
accommodations with Moroccan leaders. See discussion of this event in chap. 3. Planning for a similar 
expedition against Algiers was initiated in 1641, but was not progressed due to the political crisis which 
was developing in England at the time. See Hebb, Piracy and the English Government, pp. 265–272.  
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Farina was notable for its destruction of corsair vessels in the face of fire from shore 
batteries, but it was certainly not a decisive victory, and did not result in immediate 
Tunisian capitulation.  It has been argued that the success of Blake’s mission has been 
exaggerated by both contemporaries and historians alike, whereas, in fact, it 
achieved little of long term value. Even Blake attributed the outcome to good 
fortune.55 Nevertheless, as Corbett opines, what is perhaps more salient is how it was 
perceived by Blake’s compatriots at the time, and they appear to have judged the 
expedition an outstanding achievement.56 
 
But even by the 1670s things appeared to have changed little for the English when 
their demands were defied. The English navy could by now bring significant pressure 
to bear on the corsair strongholds, but unequivocal success remained elusive. Despite 
blockading Algiers and destroying a small corsair fleet during their expedition 
between 1669 and 1671, admirals Thomas Allin and Edward Spragge achieved less 
than expected from their negotiations with the Algerines, although articles of peace 
were eventually renewed.57 In late 1674, Admiral John Narborough was sent to Tripoli 
to seek restitution for the seizure of cargo aboard English vessels. The admiral had in 
fact been instructed to attempt to resolve the matter amicably, however, he instead 
decided on a more assertive approach. But he was unable to maintain an effective 
blockade, and despite hostilities lasting about a year, had still failed to land a decisive 
blow against the Tripolitanian corsairs. Narborough was eventually authorised to 
lower his demands, and a new treaty was concluded in March 1676. This episode 
demonstrates that it was not a simple matter of power, but also of economics; such 
interventions were not only costly to the state, but also of concern to English 
merchants because of the effect they had on trade.58  
                                                        
55 Fisher, Barbary Legends, pp. 217–226; Corbett, England in the Mediterranean, pp. 274, 308, 310.  
Tinniswood makes a similar assessment in Pirates of Barbary, pp. 223–227. A peace treaty was 
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58 Ibid., pp. 266–268. Fisher’s conclusions concerning the effectiveness of English force in controlling 
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Concerns about the cost of conflict with the regencies was still as much a 
consideration in the mid-1670s as they were in 1662 when Samuel Pepys remarked 
upon news that treaties had been concluded with Tunis, Tripoli and Algiers by Sir John 
Lawson, that the admiral would return ‘highly honoured’, for ‘by making peace … his 
fleet will also shortly come home, [and the cost of maintaining the navy] will every 
day grow less, and so the King’s charge be abated — which God send’.    59 The inability 
of the English to force the regencies into submission, even towards the end of the 
century, and the costs which they incurred in attempting to do so, is well 
demonstrated in the war England waged with Algiers between 1677 and 1682. It was 
estimated that during this period the Algerine corsairs seized 157 merchant vessels 
and 3,000 captives, and the conflict cost the English Crown some £300,000. 
Consequently, one contemporary reflected that ‘nothing could have been more 
acceptable to the king than the renewal of peace’.60 Godfrey Fisher observes that the 
outcome was ‘neither glorious nor successful’, an assessment which appears to be 
supported by Pepys, who refers to ‘the extravagancy of the peace with Algiers’.61 
                                                        
inconclusive nature of the short term results achieved by the English efforts. See Davis, 'England in the 
Mediterranean', p. 131, and Matar, British Captives, pp. 189–190. 
59  Samuel Pepys, The Diary of Samuel Pepys: A New and Complete Transcription, eds. Robert Latham 
and William Matthews, 11 vols., vol. 3  (London, 1970–1983), pp. 263, 271, entries for 22 and 30 
November 1662 (my interpolation). Tinniswood in Pirates of Barbary, pp. 229–230, notes that 
Lawson’s mission had been preceded by an ‘apparently inconclusive’ attack against Algiers by the earl 
of Sandwich the previous year, and general harrying of Algerian vessels by Lawson. Loades in England's 
Maritime Empire, p. 198, comments that the operation against Algiers was undertaken in collaboration 
with the Dutch, and that it ‘achieved little’. 
60 'Volume 90: April 1–June 15, 1704', in Joseph Redington, ed., Calendar of Treasury Papers, vol. III, 
1702–1707 (London, 1874), at http://www.british-history.ac.uk/cal-treasury-papers/vol3/pp248-271, 
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Linda Colley in Captives: Britain, Empire, and the World, 1600–1850  (New York, 2004), pp. 51–52, 
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some estimates of the number of English vessels captured are as high as 500, but does not provide 
sources for these figures. The English squadrons were under the command of Narborough until 1679, 
and then Arthur Herbert, who was much criticised by Pepys. 
61 Fisher, Barbary Legends, p. 264; Pepys, Tangier Papers, pp. 203–204. Pepys also remarks upon the 
king’s ‘incapacity to maintain the war longer’, but pointedly notes that the navy was maintaining the 
same level of presence as it had during the war, almost two years earlier. Sari Hornstein on the other 
hand, argues that England forced the regencies to negotiate treaties by making it too costly for them 
to continue attacking English vessels, but gives little attention to the costs incurred by the English, and 
fails to reflect on what influence this aspect may have played in the outcome of the war. See Sari R. 
Hornstein, The Restoration Navy and English Foreign Trade, 1674–1688: A Study in the Peacetime Use 
of Sea Power  (Aldershot, UK, 1991), pp. 8, 99–154. See also Tinniswood, Pirates of Barbary, pp. 238–
239. Tinniswood also attributes the capitulation of the Algerians to the cost of the conflict incurred by 
them, but does acknowledge the significant cost also incurred by the English. 
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National pride had to be considered alongside national cost.62 But while England was 
eventually able to mitigate the depredations of the corsairs through a combination 
of intimidation and pragmatic accommodation, it was not the end of England’s 
problems in the region. The sultan of Morocco, Mawlay Ismā‘īl, not only forced 
England to abandon its once lauded colony of Tangier in 1684, but also 
institutionalised corsairing as a means of raising revenue for the state. In 
consequence, Moroccan corsairs continued to plague British shipping well into the 
eighteenth century.63   
 
The English undoubtedly exercised a provocative and aggressive approach to 
pursuing their interests in the Mediterranean at times, but, aside from the costs 
involved, their capability to do so was also severely limited before 1660.64 As noted 
in the introduction to this thesis, efforts to improve the navy commenced from 
around 1625, but the period 1649 and 1660 under Cromwell marked a major turning 
point, with a significant increase in the size and effectiveness of the fleet. The 
development of the navy allowed state ships to begin to replace merchant vessels as 
the principal means of defence of maritime trade, and the resulting improvement in 
the protection they offered contributed to the growth of English shipping in the 
Mediterranean, particularly after 1670.65 Nevertheless, while the ability of the navy 
to project its power increased, G. E. Aylmer cautions about thinking it indomitable, 
as evidenced by the equivocal outcomes of the three Anglo-Dutch Wars between 
1652 and 1672, including  a ‘severe minor defeat’ the English suffered in the Western 
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Mediterranean during the first war.66 Furthermore, Tim Blanning asserts that while 
Britain did eventually achieve naval supremacy over the other European powers and 
Ottomans, it occurred over the course of the eighteenth century, and was not 
ensured until after 1793.67 When the naval chaplain Henry Teonge proclaimed in 
January 1675–76, ‘[s]o that wee are still conquerours’,68 rather than it being an 
exclamation of perceived English hegemony, as has been claimed by one scholar,    69 
is was more likely to have been an expression of relief in response to a pleasing 
change in English fortunes in that sea.  
 
The improvement of the navy was part of a fundamental shift in the role of the state 
in the expansion of English overseas trade. Prior to this, the English state had 
possessed a limited ability to provide diplomatic and military support for the activities 
of its merchants. As a result, trading companies involved in long-distance trade were 
granted monopolies and licensed to undertake these functions.70 However, such 
monopolies became harder to justify as trade became more routine, and the military 
and diplomatic capacity of the government increased. Thus, over the course of the 
seventeenth century the English state’s growing naval, fiscal power, and bureaucratic 
capability allowed it to increasingly rely less on licensed agents, and to assume a more 
direct role in relation to trade and overseas diplomacy.71 But Michael Braddick 
observes that the process of change was complex, with turning points dependent on 
the life cycle of particular trades and settlements, and associated local conditions. It 
was further complicated by domestic developments, and events in England’s 
colonies, and the way in which these issues intersected. He remarks that the resultant 
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‘tangled chronology’ makes it difficult to infer the existence of a ‘coherent Imperial 
vision’ directing English maritime expansionism.72  
 
The issue of the existence, or absence, of such a vision is very much at the heart of 
questions concerning the nature of English activity in the Mediterranean in the 
second half of the seventeenth century: was it driven by the purely commercial 
objectives of private enterprise, and perhaps geopolitical concerns, or did the English 
also have clear imperial and colonial intentions? An understanding of this issue is 
important for the purposes of this present study: if the English, or Britons more 
generally, were possessed of a shared vision for the Mediterranean it may have 
contributed to conditioning their attitudes and behaviours in their encounters with 
other cultures in the region. The late-Victorian historian Walter Frewen Lord certainly 
did not believe that England had ever possessed a coherent strategy for the 
Mediterranean in the early modern period,73 while his contemporary Corbett, 
concludes that there was no such policy until at least the reign of William III (1689–
1702); prior to that, English rulers had possessed no more than ‘an unreasoned 
intuition for dominion’.74 Their views in this respect differ little from those of some 
of their successors, who stress both the lack of clear imperial and colonial strategies, 
and the existence of differing visions for English overseas expansion during the 
seventeenth century; in particular, whether England should aspire to a territorial 
empire or a commercial empire.75 Furthermore, Stein argues that the focus on 
conquest and colonial settlement has conflated ‘expansion and empire’, and 
‘obscured the institutional diversity that underlay the global extension of English 
trade and political authority’.76 As Braddick remarks: ‘The transformation of the 
military and fiscal capacity of the state and the commercial revolution created new 
interests, new possibilities, and new ambitions, but in the end they took their place 
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alongside existing ones’.77 While their newfound naval capability allowed the English 
to attempt to ‘impose their commercial and military will in the region’,78 Braddick 
stresses that it was not an ‘Imperial phenomenon’, rather it was one driven by 
European competition and the civil war at home, but it did support both England’s 
trading and colonial interests.79 However, contemporary uncertainty concerning how 
England should exercise its naval power is perhaps revealed in Pepys’ reflection from 
1684 quoted at the beginning of this chapter: should it be used simply to protect the 
nation’s interests against other European powers and pirates, or as a means to assert 
its sovereignty? It seems that some level of vacillation between these two options 
may have contributed to some of the inherent contradictions which are evident in 
the behaviour of the English in the Mediterranean during the second half of the 
seventeenth century. 
 
                                                        
77 Braddick, 'War, Trade, and Settlement', p. 308. 
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Navy, p. 2. 
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Fig. 3 The principal political domains of Morocco, from The History of the Revolutions in 
the Empire of Morocco, 1729. 
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1.2. Turmoil and Resistance in Morocco 
 
While England was attempting to establish itself in the Mediterranean, and 
contributing to the disruption of the existing maritime order, dynastic change was 
underway in Morocco, which was also, at least partly, due to the encroachment of 
European states, namely the Portuguese and, to a lesser extent, the Spanish. 
Contemporaneously with Morocco, Algeria and Tunisia similarly experienced the 
decline of reigning dynasties and increasing intervention by foreign powers from the 
end of the fifteenth century, with the main protagonists in their case being Spain and 
the Ottoman Empire. New autonomous states subsequently emerged, and the ports 
around which they developed became bases for Muslim corsairs, whose numbers 
were supplemented by Iberian Muslims driven from Spain following the fall of 
Granada, as well as by European renegades. While foreign encroachment had initially 
been facilitated by existing processes of political destabilisation, the subsequent 
interplay between foreign interference, internal political conflicts, changing alliances, 
and, especially in the case of Morocco, religious difference, made the region 
particularly challenging for the European powers for the purposes of trade, 
diplomacy, and, above all, colonial activities.   
 
At the beginning of the sixteenth century the ruling Wattasid dynasty in Morocco 
found itself under pressure from growing internal political conflict, and from the 
expansion of Portuguese commercial and colonial activities. In response, there 
emerged a popular desire for unity and stability within the country. This sentiment 
had both religious and political dimensions, and developed into a distinct religio-
nationalistic movement, inspired to some extent by antipathy toward the European 
presence in Morocco. The Wattasids were unable to provide a rallying point for this 
discontent: as well as lacking religious authority, they were also politically 
compromised, having allied themselves to the Portuguese.80 Sufi shaykhs, sharifs and 
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marabouts became important socio-political forces in response to widespread 
disenchantment with traditional leadership, and growing determination by 
Moroccans to resist the perceived foreign threat to both their country and religion. 
Two sharifian families with the necessary religious affiliations and political authority 
subsequently emerged to provide leadership: the sharifs of Jabal al-Alam in the north-
west, and the Sa‘dīs in the south-west.81 However, the Sa‘dīs were more fortunate in 
that both the Portuguese military presence and Wattasid authority were nominal in 
the kingdom of Sus, enabling them to better organise and sustain their religio-
political movement. 82 
 
After progressive success against the Wattasids, the Sa‘dian ascendancy was also 
enhanced by their achievement by 1549 in dislodging the Portuguese from their 
settlements on the Atlantic coast, enabling the resumption of privateering from 
Salé83 and Larache, and trade with France and England. Following a decisive battle in 
1553, the Sa‘dī leader, Muhammad al-Shaykh,84 emerged victorious, and the Sa’dian 
dynasty was established. Through their control of the principal centres of power — 
Sus, Marrakesh (commonly referred to as Morocco  or Marocco at the time), and Fez 
(or Fès) (see fig. 3) — the Sa‘dīs effectively ruled the whole of Morocco.85 However, 
                                                        
Seventeenth Century During the Interregnum', International Journal of Middle East Studies, 13 (1981), 
p. 47. 
81  Abun-Nasr, History of the Maghrib, pp. 206, 208; Dale F. Eickelman, Moroccan Islam: Tradition and 
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who headed religious lodges, called zawyas, were accorded the title of shaykh. Marabouts in the Sufi 
tradition are persons, either alive or dead, who are considered to possess a close connection with God, 
which enables the marabout to act as an intermediary with the spiritual world. During the fifteenth 
century in Morocco maraboutism and descent from the Prophet became conflated and marabouts 
began to attain the status of saints. See ibid., pp. 6–7, 23–26. 
82 Abun-Nasr, History of the Maghrib, pp. 208–209. 
83 Most commonly transliterated as ‘Sallee’ in seventeenth century English sources, although ‘Sally’ 
and ‘Salley’ were also used. 
84 Also known as Muhammad al-Mahdī. He changed his name in 1541. See Julien, History of North 
Africa, p. 223. 
85 Mantran, 'North Africa', pp. 240–241; Abun-Nasr, History of the Maghrib, pp. 210–211. For an 
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into the twentieth century. 
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the Europeans were not the only foreign powers to have an interest in the country; 
the Ottomans had also become involved in the dynastic struggle. They not only 
appear to have viewed the Wattasids as a potential ally against the Spanish, but were 
also concerned that unification of Morocco by the Sa‘dīs would challenge their own 
leadership in the region.86  
 
Despite their professed aim of expelling the Christian Europeans, the Sa‘dīs were 
pragmatic. Trade with Genoese and Spanish merchants had played an important role 
in equipping them in their struggle against the Portuguese. Furthermore, trade with 
Europeans operating under the protection of the Portuguese was a significant source 
of profit.87 Moreover, in 1555 al-Shaykh entered into an agreement with the Spanish 
for a joint expedition against Algiers. Although the plan was dropped following his 
assassination by the Ottomans in 1557, because of fear of Turkish expansionism al-
Shaykh’s successors maintained an informal alliance with the Spanish.88 
Nevertheless, the Ottomans soon came to play an instrumental role in the country, 
which would not only directly influence Moroccan politics, but would also have far 
reaching, and long-term consequences for Europe as well.  
 
In 1574 the Ottoman sultan agreed to provide military support to al-Shaykh’s son 
‘Abd al-Malik to usurp his nephew Muhammad al-Mutawakkil (r. 1574–1576). In 
response, al-Mutawakkil approached the Portuguese for assistance.89 In 1578, an 
army led by King Sebastian of Portugal landed in northern Morocco but was decisively 
defeated in the infamous (at least in the annals of European history) Battle of Alcazar. 
During the battle, Sebastian and al-Mutawakkil were killed, and al-Malik died shortly 
after. The result for Portugal was disastrous: without an heir to the throne, the 
country was annexed to Spain in 1580. While the Portuguese threat had been 
extinguished, with the death of al-Malik and the presence of Turkish troops in his 
army, the Ottomans now represented a greater danger to the Sa‘dīs. However, al-
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Malik was quickly succeeded as sultan by his brother Ahmad, who began to call 
himself al-Mansūr (‘the victorious’). The transition was smooth, and al-Mansūr was 
able to avoid subsequent dependence on either the Ottomans or European powers.90 
However, al-Mansūr’s success did encourage Spain, France, and England to make 
overtures to further diplomatic and commercial relations with Morocco.91 
 
It was during Ahmad al-Mansūr’s reign (1578–1603) that the Sa’dian dynasty reached 
its zenith, both politically and economically, and an administrative structure was 
established that could effectively facilitate centralised rule.92 Furthermore, he 
developed a large professional army modelled along Turkish lines. But despite his 
achievements, dissent continued. Al-Mansūr’s rule was oppressive, his profligacy 
diminished the country’s economic resources, and the inclusion of Christians and 
Jews in his court was a concern to the religious fraternities.93 As well as imposing his 
authority within the country, al-Mansūr also adopted an audacious foreign policy. He 
maintained friendly relations with Spain as a counter to the Ottomans, who, along 
with their client subjects in North Africa, began to see al-Mansūr as a possible rival. 
But the relationship was a troubling one for the Sa‘dīs due to Spain’s own colonial 
activities in the Maghrib, and it is for this reason, at least in part, that al-Mansūr was 
attracted to the possibility of an alliance with England following concerted efforts by 
the English from 1580 to obtain his support to install Don Antonio on the Portuguese 
throne.94 
 
The death of al-Mansūr in 1603 led to renewed internecine conflict, and another 
highly unstable era in Morocco. The signs of a coming crisis were obvious to an English 
resident as early as 1600.95  The sultanate disintegrated amidst conflict between the 
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late sultan’s three sons and religious fraternities championing the causes of groups 
which, once again, were seeking unity.96 By 1613, the country was essentially divided 
into two parts. One was ruled from Marrakesh by al-Mansūr’s son Zaydān (r. 1609–
1627), the other from Fez by his grandson ʿAbdullah (r. 1610–1627). The dynasty was 
further compromised by ʿAbdullah’s father, Muhammad al-Sheikh al-Mam’un, who 
by handing control of Larache to Spain in 1610 caused his son’s authority to be 
rejected in the old city of Fez, Tétouan and Meknes.97 Meanwhile, Zaydān was also 
having trouble asserting his own authority in the south. Charles-André Julien 
describes it as ‘the darkest period of anarchy that Morocco has experienced’.98 As 
happened a century earlier, the renewed encroachment of the European powers 
resulted in a widespread nationalist and religious movement. In response to popular 
outrage against the surrender of Larache, Ahmad Abu Mahalli, a Sufi leader who 
claimed to be the mahdi whose coming was prophesied in the Qur’an, had 
precipitated a major rebellion against the Sa‘dīs in 1610. Abu Mahalli first seized 
Tafilalt, and then occupied Marrakesh in 1612.99 Zaydān was eventually restored with 
assistance from the al-Hahi fraternity, but at the cost of his subservience to them.100  
 
These events were recounted by Englishmen in several published accounts, which 
reveal how well informed the English were about Moroccan affairs; so much so that 
one historian asserts that the accounts provided by English traders and travellers are 
among the best contemporary sources for the period.101  One account, The Fierce and 
Cruel Battaile, by an anonymous purported eyewitness concerns the struggle 
between al-Mansūr’s sons for control of Marrakesh between December 1606 and the 
following April. The author provides not only a detailed description of the events, but 
also reflects on the intensity of the hostility: ‘the like slaughter was never to 
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foreseene nor heard of in Barbarie’.102 The pamphlet is particularly notable for the 
obvious insight that the author possessed about the political situation, and the 
general sentiment of the people, particularly their ambivalence concerning whom 
they should support.103 The author’s belief in the rebellious nature of the people was 
not necessarily the product of English bigotry either: it was also attested to by a 
contemporary Moroccan writer and a Portuguese nobleman.104 
 
Another pamphlet, The New Prophetical King of Barbary, published in 1613 by John 
Harrison, a notable personality in Anglo-Moroccan relations in the early part of the 
seventeenth century, also reveals that the English were not only well informed about 
developments, but were also cognisant of the religious dimensions of the conflict; 
although they may not have fully understood their implications.105   It is an interesting 
text for a number of reasons, not least in highlighting the powerful role that religious 
leadership played in Moroccan society. Harrison’s correspondent, a merchant ‘who 
hath long time sojourned there’, and who only identifies himself as ‘R.S.’, recounts 
events relating to the revolt led by Abu Mahalli (whom he names as ‘Mulley Om 
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Hamet ben Abdela’) against ‘Mulley Sidan’.106 R.S. refers to the ‘beginning and rising’ 
of the Sufi mystic, which he notes ‘are very strange’.107 He records that Abu Mahalli 
proclaimed at a meeting with European merchants that he came to make peace, 
having been sent by God to challenge the current ruling dynasty, ‘to stablish their 
Prophets religion … and recover those parts of Christendome the king of Spaine holds 
from them’. Abu Mahalli asserted that the Moors would not only gain Spain, but also 
Italy and France, ‘[b]ut for England, Flanders or other parts they have not to doe, they 
will have friendship with us’.108 The text is inherently contradictory: R.S.’s attitude 
towards Abu Mahalli as conveyed through his letter ranges from initial admiration, 
to ambivalence, and finally outright hostility.109 Nevertheless, the account does 
demonstrate how Abu Mahilli’s piety could impress those who met him, and how he 
promoted a vision that could be used both to inspire his countrymen and potentially 
attract the support of Protestant Europeans through the promise of the conquest of 
the Catholic powers. In this way, it also reinforces the degree of pragmatism that 
Moroccan leaders were capable of when required, and how astute they had become 
in their understanding of the interests of Europeans, and in manipulating them.110 
 
Zaydān died in 1627 without having been able to establish control over large areas of 
the country. The period following his father’s death had been marked by general 
economic decline in Morocco, arising from both the internal conflict and external 
factors. Not only were trading activities frustrated by the political instability, but the 
goods of interest to European merchants became scarce. Loss of Moroccan influence 
in western Sudan had reduced the supply of gold, there was a decline in sugar 
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production, and the activities of the Dutch and French on the West African coast led 
to a diversion of trade routes.111 These conditions not only affected trade, but also 
the general population. As the author of the The Fierce and Cruel Battaile remarked 
even a decade earlier: ‘the country is spoyled, and the dearth increaseth … for many 
persons die of meere hunger’.112 
 
By the time of Zaydan’s death the political situation in Morocco had become even 
more complex, having fractured along both tribal and sectarian lines, but with three 
principal groups opposed to the Sa‘dīs having emerged. The most important of these 
were the Dilā’īs in the Middle Atlas, followed by Shaykh Abū Hassūn who occupied 
Sus and Tafilelt, and the Moriscos of the self-proclaimed republic of Bou Regreg.113 
The leaders of all three groups possessed political aspirations masked by their 
professed religious causes, but only the Dilā’īs aspired to replace the Sa‘dīs as the 
rulers of Morocco.114 The republic of Bou Regreg, which was centred on the adjacent 
towns of Rabat and Salé, had been established by descendants of the Iberian 
Peninsula’s Muslim population, who had either fled or been expelled from Spain. 
These refugees had an antipathy towards Christians, and Salé became the major base 
of Muslim corsairs operating in the Atlantic, the infamous ‘Sallee Rovers’.115 The 
people of Bou Regreg were drawn into an alliance with Muhammad al-ʻAyāshī, a 
leader of a local Arab tribe who had commenced a jihad against the Spanish along 
the Atlantic coast and subsequently rebelled against the Sa‘dīs. While he was 
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unsuccessful in removing the Spanish, by the early 1630s he had largely eliminated 
Sa’dian authority from the Gharb, but in the process had also alienated the Moriscos, 
who subsequently turned against him, and allied themselves with the Dilā’īs.116 
Meanwhile the marabout Abū Hassūn had achieved political control of Sus, and with 
it control of trade with the Sudan, ensuring the economic viability of his rule, and 
providing him the means to obtain armaments from Europe.117  
 
Unlike the other two factions, the Dilā’īs were Berbers, and descendants of a 
prominent religious family, which had been held in high esteem by the Sa‘dīs. During 
the turmoil which followed al-Mansūr’s death, the leader of the community assumed 
a political leadership role among the Berber tribes of the Middle Atlas, but it was his 
successor, Muhammad al-Hajj (1636–68), commonly referred to as ‘Ben Bucar’ by the 
English, who actively pursued political power.118 Al-Hajj was ambivalent about the 
Sa‘dīs, partly out of deference to their sharifian status, but also because his territorial 
interests lay towards the ocean, and for this reason he was less accommodating 
towards al-ʻAyāshī, who impeded his plans to gain control of Salé. Under the pretext 
of defending the Moriscos of Bou Regreg, al-Hajj commenced a campaign against al-
ʻAyāshī in 1640, and in a final battle in 1641 al-ʻAyāshī was killed and his troops were 
routed. However, those of his followers who escaped would go on to lead a rebellion 
that in turn contributed to the collapse of the Dilā’īs. 119 They would also play a pivotal 
role in developments during the first decade of the English occupation of Tangier 
under the leadership of al-Khadr Ghailan.  
 
The Dilā’īs quickly went on to occupy Salé, Fez and most of the key centres in northern 
Morocco, including Tétouan. Between 1641 and 1651 the Dilā’īs permitted the 
Moriscos in Salé and Tétouan to maintain their autonomy. It was an arrangement of 
benefit to them given the inhabitants of these centres were familiar with dealing with 
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Europeans, and managing such relationships indirectly avoided compromising their 
moral authority, while still permitting access to European trade, especially to military 
equipment.120 But despite their military success and political cohesion, the authority 
of the Dilā’īs was insufficient to maintain a stable government. Its political structure, 
dominated as it was by Berbers, did not accommodate the interests of the Arabs, and 
they did not possess the sacral authority of sharifs. For this reason, the Dilā’īs 
struggled to maintain control of the important centre of Fez from the beginning of 
their occupation in 1641, and finally lost control of the city in 1664, at the same time 
that their last links with Salé were severed, and the ‘Alawi sharifs began their rise in 
the north-east of the country.121 
 
The Sa’dian dynasty came to an end following the death of its leader Mawlay 
Muhammad al-Aṣghar in 1654, and the assassination of his son, Abou el Abbas, in 
1659. Following a further decade of conflict, it was the ‘Alawī sharif Mawlay al-Rashīd 
who was able to assert his authority across the country and founded the ‘Alawid 
dynasty.122 As Jamil Abun-Nasr has observed, the case of the Sa‘dīs suggests sharifian 
descent had become a necessary precondition for recognition of both religious and 
political authority in Morocco, and through this to achieve unity among the various 
religious and tribal factions. As was shown by the example of the Dilā’īs, military 
might was not sufficient on its own. What was required was religio-political status 
that could unite the entire Muslim community, both Berber and Arab.123 Even then, 
the multiplicity of Moroccan ethnic and tribal interests had to be respected. As a later 
English visitor observed: ‘So dangerous and impolitick it is in any prince to declare 
publickly his aversion to any body of his people’.124 
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the French Conquest of Algeria  (London, 2002), chaps. 1 and 2. 
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1.3. Mutual Needs: The Beginnings of Anglo-Moroccan Relations 
 
Rather than deter commercial and political relations, the internecine conflicts in 
Morocco actually helped to encourage the development of closer ties between 
Morocco and England during the sixteenth and early seventeenth centuries. In fact, 
the two countries were at times drawn together by their mutual need for political 
alliances in the face of internal dissent or external threat. The relationship between 
them is surprisingly long for this very reason. In perhaps the earliest account of 
dealings of this nature, the English chronicler Matthew Paris wrote that King John 
sent an embassy to the Almohad caliph in around 1213 seeking his support against 
an unspecified threat. It was a sign of the king’s desperation, according to Paris, that 
John offered to become a tributary of the caliph, and even to convert to Islam.125 
While the veracity of Paris’ account has been challenged, it does indicate just how 
long Northwest Africa had been a part of the geographic imagination of Britons.126 
The long history of Anglo-Moroccan relations is often given scant attention by 
scholars, instead it is often overshadowed by a focus on corsairing, captivity, and the 
trials and tribulations of the English occupation of Tangier. 
 
But it was trade, not politics, that encouraged the English to return to Morocco some 
three centuries after John’s purported delegation. The exact reasons are unclear, but 
it appears to have been driven by a combination of factors: the transfer of activities 
from the eastern Mediterranean;127 the decline in demand for English cloth on the 
Continent; and the country was considered to be a good source of gold and sugar.128 
The first voyage recorded by Richard Hakluyt left Portsmouth in 1551 under the 
command of Thomas Wyndham, and arrived in ‘Zafia’ (Safi). No details of its cargo 
                                                        
125 Matthew Paris, Chronic Majora, ed. Henry Richards Luard, 7 vols., vol. II (London, 1874), pp. 559–
564.  
126 It is worth noting that Paris is known for his critical appraisal of John’s personal morality, which 
draws attention, at the very least, to the possibility that the episode was embellished to impugn the 
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by Ilan Shoval, King John's Delegation to the Almohad Court (1212): Medieval Interreligious 
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127 See the discussion on this issue in the previous section on the Mediterranean in this chapter. 
128 T. S. Willan, Studies in Elizabethan Foreign Trade  (Manchester, 1959), pp. 94–95. Willan discusses 
the dating of the beginning of Anglo-Moroccan trade on pp. 92–94.  
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are provided, however, the Spanish ambassador in England claimed that among the 
merchandise were pikes and armour. Interestingly, Hakluyt’s  correspondent notes 
that they also transported ‘two Moores, being noble men, whereof one was of the 
kings blood, convayed … into their countrey out of England’.129 How these men 
arrived in England, and their purpose for being there, is not revealed, but it appears 
they may have been emissaries of the Wattasids, sent to seek Spanish support against 
the Sa‘dīs.130  
 
The results from the voyage were sufficiently promising that Wyndham led a further 
expedition in the following year. The fleet anchored first in Safi, and then in ‘Santa 
Cruz’ (Agadir), where they were well received, and were successful in bartering their 
cargo. In contrast to their warm reception in Morocco, on their return home they 
encountered a Portguese fleet and it was made clear to them that England’s entry 
into the Moroccan trade was unwelcome, and would not be tolerated.131 But perhaps 
the Portguese had concerns that went beyond commercial jealousy, for the Spanish 
ambassador once again provides further detail about the cargo, claiming that the 
vessels had also been carrying ‘all sorts of munitions of war’.132 As an English king had 
once reached out to Morocco for help to defend his throne, the English were now 
returning to assist Moroccans to similarly prosecute their own monarchial claims, and 
defend their country against foreign threat, but only in the pursuit of profit. 
 
It was also for profit that the Sa’dian ruler ʿAbdullah al-Ghālib (r. 1557–74) 
encouraged English commercial activity on the Atlantic coast.133 By 1558, trade with 
Morocco had sufficiently developed to justify the presence of at least one English 
factor, who ‘travellyd the contreys to provide and buye suche quantitie of gome 
                                                        
129 Hakluyt, The Principal Navigations, II, pp. 319–[320]. Willan refers to the ambassador’s report in 
Elizabethan Foreign Trade, p. 98. 
130 Willan, Elizabethan Foreign Trade, pp. 96–97. 
131 Richard Hakluyt, The Principal Navigations, II, pp. [320]–[321]. The Portuguese had lost both Safi 
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[gum] as he myght gett’, and by 1559 at least two English ships were engaged in the 
trade, one of which carried a merchant who it is claimed had acquired the ability to 
understand and converse in Arabic.134 T. S. Willan remarks that what is remarkable 
about the development of Anglo-Moroccan trade is how quickly it established itself 
in the conventional Western European pattern of organisation. But he also highlights 
that the English in Morocco were operating in a very different environment, one 
which required them to negotiate the intricacies of royal monopolies and Jewish 
middlemen, who themselves occupied a delicate position between the two sides.135 
Commercial disputes of one form or another arising from these arrangements would 
be the cause of much tension in Anglo-Moroccan relations.  
 
The staples of the trade were English cloth and Moroccan sugar. While English 
armaments and Moroccan gold are also often cited in the secondary literature as 
being significant components of the trade, their prevalence is more difficult to 
identify and assess.136 There does appear to have been some illicit trade in arms to 
Morocco, but claims concerning the extent of such transactions may have been 
exaggerated by parties who sought to regulate the trade through the establishment 
of a monopoly, and Portuguese reports identifying shipment of arms were most likely 
seeking to persuade Elizabeth I to prohibit commerce with Morocco.137 While there 
were attempts to formalise this trade, Elizabeth was concerned that such an 
arrangement would be viewed with disfavour and hostility by her counterparts in 
Europe, and Mawlay al-Mansūr was similarly reluctant to do so.138 However, from 
around the 1570s, trade, politics and diplomacy did become inextricably linked in 
Anglo-Moroccan relations.139 
 
English trade with Morocco was conducted by merchants individually or in 
partnerships through their resident factors. In his examination of Elizabethan foreign 
                                                        
134 Willan, Elizabethan Foreign Trade, pp. 104–105. Quotation is from p. 104. 
135 Ibid., p. 106. 
136 Ibid., pp. 114, 116, 120–121. 
137 Ibid., pp. 108, 116–117. 
138 Ibid., pp. 118–119. Cf. Abun-Nasr, History of the Maghrib, p. 218. 
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trade, Willan provides details of the lives and activities of these men.140 What is 
particularly interesting about English activity in Morocco at this time is the freedom 
of movement which they appear to have enjoyed, their close involvement in sugar 
production, their direct dealings with rulers and officials, and their general immersion 
in Moroccan society. English factors were not only based in the ports of Safi and 
Agadir, but also inland in Marrakesh, and even further afield.141 While conventional 
in its general nature, the relationship between factors and merchants was 
complicated in Morocco by necessary engagement between factors and local 
authorities. Factors were required to operate both through Jewish middlemen, acting 
on the basis of royal grant or favour, as well as, on occasion, directly with the 
Moroccan ruler. It not only made trade more difficult, but also riskier.142 The central 
role played by Jewish middlemen in Moroccan society is apparent from the attention 
given to them in a brief description of the country and its customs which precedes an 
account of the Battle of Alcazar published in 1589: 
In this countrye are manie Jewes enhabiting, in whose hands 
consisteth the most parte of the trafique of the country, being the 
onely merchantes of sugers, mallasses, and other riche 
marchandise which the same yeldeth: for the which, they paye 
great sums of money to the king.143  
 
Informed by traditional anti-Semitic stereotypes, Jews were generally either depicted 
as agents of deceit or being subject to exploitation by Moroccan rulers in 
contemporary English accounts.144 The relationship between Britons and Moroccan 
Jews was at times strained, and pre-existing prejudice and the liminal status of Jews 
in Moroccan society made them a subject of suspicion during the English occupation 
of Tangier. 
 
                                                        
140 See, for example, discussion on the dealings between the factor Philip Westcott and the merchant 
Walter Brook in Willan, Elizabethan Foreign Trade, pp. 123–128. 
141 Abun-Nasr, History of the Maghrib, p. 219. 
142 Willan, Elizabethan Foreign Trade, pp. 136, 145. 
143 A Dolorous Discourse, of a Most Terrible and Bloudy Battel, Fought in Barbarie, the Fowrth Day of 
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144 Gary K. Waite, 'Reimagining Religious Identity: The Moor in Dutch and English Pamphlets, 1550–
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The difficulties of commerce with Morocco are exemplified by a petition presented 
by a group of English merchants in 1577. The merchants sought redress for the failure 
of Jewish intermediaries to secure payment owing to them.  The problem was such 
that Elizabeth dispatched an ambassador, Edmund Hogan, to the court of Mawlay al-
Malik to obtain a resolution.145 Hogan may also have been charged with negotiating 
a general alliance between the two countries;146 there is no mention of this matter in 
Hogan’s official instructions, but in his account of the mission he refers to having 
discussed the ‘private affaires’ of the queen and sultan.147 The mission was a partial 
success, with al-Malik issuing decrees which removed the obstacles to trade 
complained of by the merchants. Furthermore, in a written response to Elizabeth he 
proposed to send an ambassador to her to conclude an alliance. But an embassy did 
not proceed, and an alliance was not concluded before al-Malik’s death the following 
year.148 
 
As noted in the preceding section, the Battle of Alcazar had significant ramifications 
for both Morocco and Portugal. It resulted in the consolidation of Sa’dian rule in 
Morocco, the succession of Mawlay Ahmad al-Mansūr, and the annexation of 
Portugal by Spain.  It also led to the development of plans by Spain’s enemies to install 
Don Antonio on the Portuguese throne. Elizabeth attempted to enlist the assistance 
of al-Mansūr to this end, and while she was ultimately unsuccessful in doing so, his 
accession did mark a new stage in Anglo-Moroccan relations.149 Initially, however, 
there was concern as to whether al-Mansūr would honour the undertakings 
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concerning trade made by his brother. So, in the summer of 1579 Elizabeth 
dispatched a ‘gentleman called Skydmoore’ with letters for the sultan concerning 
these issues. While al-Mansūr provided assurances that he would comply with her 
requests, a local correspondent, Augustine Lane, notes that the sultan’s response was 
‘a satisfaction in wordes, but nothinge in deedes’.150 Nevertheless, al-Mansūr 
continued to show support for the relationship, responding positively to further 
requests, including representations on behalf of merchants made by the queen in 
1580 and 1581, and in that same year, arrangements for the supply of Moroccan 
saltpetre in exchange for naval timber finally began to be advanced. This scheme was 
significant because it indirectly led to the establishment of the Barbary Company.151 
 
The first voyage giving effect to the scheme which embarked in December 1582 also 
carried letters from Elizabeth offering al-Mansūr aid and munitions in response to 
reports of an expected Spanish assault on Larache.152 Despite the Queen’s initial 
reluctance to sanction the supply of war materials, and in the face of Spanish threats 
against English ships found with these goods, the arrangement was of sufficient 
promise for the earl of Leicester and his associates to seek to establish a monopoly 
for the control of all trade with Morocco. Existing merchants appear to have been 
coerced to support the change, and Elizabeth was persuaded to grant a charter by 
the prospect of the establishment of an agent in the country who could act as her 
ambassador at no cost to her.153  The Barbary Company was granted a charter in July 
1585 giving it a monopoly on both English exports to, and imports from, Morocco for 
a period of twelve years. It had the potential to have a significant effect on both trade 
and diplomatic relations between the two countries. In particular, by providing the 
English with a means for collective bargaining, it held the promise of overcoming the 
difficulties which they had regularly faced in commerce with the country. However, 
it proved to be ineffectual and the company was wound up in 1597; rather than 
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having been created to assist the general merchant community, the company, in fact, 
appears to have been an arrangement imposed on the majority for the benefit of a 
few.154 In the meantime, Elizabeth got what she desired: the company’s first agent, 
Henry Roberts, who arrived in Morocco a few months later.  
 
During his three years in the post, Robert’s main diplomatic task appears to have 
been to pursue Elizabeth’s plan to secure al-Mansūr’s support for Don Antonio.155 By 
June 1588, Roberts and an ambassador sent by Don Antonio were in negotiation with 
the sultan seemingly for this purpose. While they were waiting for a response, news 
of the departure of the Spanish Armada arrived, leading Roberts to the view: ‘that 
this Kinge dowthe prolounge the times, to knowe howe they spede’.156 It was also 
around this time that Roberts delivered a letter from Elizabeth in which she advised 
the sultan that because of the wars with which her country was involved, she was 
unable to accede to his request for the supply of ‘certaine things’, presumably arms, 
but had commanded that they be supplied ‘in part’.157  
 
Roberts appears to have been correct in his assessment that Al-Mansūr had been 
prevaricating. The defeat of the Armada evidently led the sultan to quickly reassess 
the value of continuing dialogue with the English: on his return to England in late 
1588 Roberts was accompanied by a Moroccan ambassador, Marzuq Rais, who 
arrived in London on 12 January 1589.158 Plans were being prepared by the English at 
the time for reprisals against the Spanish. Once again, a central element was the 
restoration of Don Antonio, and the hope of Moroccan assistance to achieve this.159 
Rais advised that his master would provide ‘men, money, vyctualls, and the use of his 
poortes’.160 While the active participation of the Moroccans in the expedition was 
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diplomatically problematic for Elizabeth and was delicately refused as being ‘not 
good’ for either party, the provision of money and supplies was welcomed.161 
However, al-Mansūr sought more than the ‘sownde and perfect leage of amytye’ with 
England which he professed.162 He also wanted access to ships and crews in the event 
of war with his neighbours, the hire of ‘some carpenters and shipwrightess’, and to 
purchase ‘such provisione and commodityes’ he required.163 Elizabeth’s response to 
these demands was equivocal, and was not dispatched until the fleet had sailed.164  
No alliance was brokered, and there was no explicit Moroccan support for the 
expedition later that year. Despite the failure of her scheme, Elizabeth continued to 
seek a commitment from al-Mansūr, sending envoys later that same year and in the 
following year, to no avail, and she made one final attempt in 1595, the year of Don 
Antonio’s death.165  
 
Following the return of Roberts to England, the Barbary Company did not appoint 
another resident agent-cum-ambassador. Diplomatic relations between the two 
countries were maintained through the exchange of correspondence and the 
occasional dispatch of envoys.166 However, the failure of earlier diplomatic initiatives 
had not deterred either monarch. On 15 August 1600 a Moroccan embassy arrived in 
London led by Abd al-Wahid al-Annuri, the purpose of which was shrouded in secrecy. 
The ambassador was received with due honour, and had two audiences with the 
queen before returning to Morocco early the following year.167 The arrangements for 
the return of the delegation proved to be problematic: the governor of the Levant 
Company was unable to accede to a request from the Privy Council to arrange 
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passage — although the reasons are not stated, the Council considered them ‘very 
just and reasonable’, and subsequently arranged for an English warship to be made 
available.168 The well connected, and prolific, letter-writer John Chamberlain169 
indicates that the reason for the Company’s refusal was religious intolerance: 
because merchants and mariners ‘thinck yt a matter odious and scandalous to the 
world to be too friendly or familiar with infidels’.170  However, this explanation does 
not accord well with the Council’s response, and the fact the delegation had arrived 
on an English vessel.171 In any event, Chamberlain personally thought it a great 
honour that people from ‘nations so far remote, and every way different, shold meet 
here’.172 There was also much speculation at the time concerning the purpose of the 
visit, with a wide variety of ideas being bruited, but it appears that it principally 
concerned an ambitious scheme proposed by al-Mansūr to capture parts of Spain and 
Spanish possessions in the East and West Indies. Elizabeth agreed to further 
discussions on the objectives for an alliance, but, once again, nothing came of the 
proposal.173  
 
Despite the fact that commercial and diplomatic relations were so closely intertwined 
during this period, the continual failure of both monarchs to achieve their desired 
political outcomes while maintaining normal trading relations testifies to the 
somewhat unique nature of the relationship that developed under their reigns. The 
factor which united them, and yet also frustrated their respective plans, was their 
                                                        
168 ‘Acte due Conseil Privé’, 22 September 1600, ‘Acte due Conseil Privé’, 28 September 1600, and 
‘Acte due Conseil Privé’, 29 September 1600, in Castries, SIHMA, II, pp. 184–185, 189, 190. 
169 P. J. Finkelpearl, 'Chamberlain, John (1553–1628)', in David Cannadine, ed., ODNB, Online ed. 
(Oxford, 2004), accessed 14 July 2016. 
170 ‘Lettre de John Camberlain a Dudley Carleton’, 15 October 1600, in Castries, SIHMA, II, p. 192. 
171 It is possible that the company’s unwillingness to transport the delegation was due to its proposed 
itinerary, as the Moroccans wished to travel to Turkey first before returning to Morocco, or it was in 
response to some risk to English shipping which existed at the time. Cf. Nabil Matar, Turks, Moors and 
Englishmen in the Age of Discovery  (New York, 1999), p. 34, and Jonathan Burton, Traffic and Turning: 
Islam and English Drama, 1579–1624  (Newark, NJ, 2005), pp. 247–248. 
172 Castries, SIHMA, II, p. 192. 
173 ‘Mémorandum D’Abd El-Ouahed’, 13 September 1600, and ‘Mémoire de Moulay Ahmed El-
Mansour Pour Élisabeth’, 23 Sha’ban 1009 [17 February 1601], in ibid., pp. 177–179, 206–209; Willan, 
Elizabethan Foreign Trade, pp. 306–307; Rogers, Anglo-Moroccan Relations, pp. 19–20. Stephen Cory 
provides an interesting discussion on Al-Mansūr’s motivations for the proposed mission in Reviving 
the Islamic Caliphate, pp. 205–208. García-Arenal in 'Moriscos in Morocco' highlights the role that 
strongly felt sentiment among Moriscos in Morocco to return to Spain, or re-conquer parts of it, played 
in shaping the political and diplomatic strategies of Moroccan sultans. 
75 
 
common fear of Spain; but the dynamics of their individual relations with the 
Habsburgs varied over time, as did the impact of other factors which influenced the 
level of their mutual dependency.  
 
Al-Mansūr prevaricated on the issue of support for Don Antonio, and clearly did so in 
an attempt to maintain good relations with England, without greatly offending 
Spain.174 The sultan required external sources of income but of a kind that would not 
offend local interests, and the participation of the English in the sugar trade achieved 
this aim. He was also in need of supplies for his army and navy, and the English 
demonstrated some willingness to meet these needs. 175 On the other hand, despite 
traditional Moroccan antipathy toward the Spanish, al-Mansūr sought to maintain an 
informal alliance with them as a counter to the Ottomans, but at the same time 
playing them off against the English by fostering uncertainty about his intentions.176 
But Elizabeth faced similar challenges. Commerce with Morocco had become very 
important to England, and it was also a source of much needed saltpetre. The queen 
also used diplomatic brinkmanship in her war against Spain, at first to counter the 
existential threat of the Armada, and then to prosecute her plans for retribution by 
attempting to establish political alliances with both Moroccans and their antagonists 
the Ottomans. Like the situation faced by al-Mansūr, it involved a careful balancing 
act, not only requiring the extraction of desired concessions at the least cost, while 
maintaining some measure of good faith, but also avoiding offending the religious 
sensitivities of their respective internal and external constituencies.   
 
The deaths of both Elizabeth and al-Mansūr in 1603 were important milestones in the 
histories of their respective countries, but they also marked the end of a rather 
unique period of Anglo-Moroccan political relations.177 As one scholar has observed, 
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while the English remained suspicious, the close diplomatic relations England 
fostered with Morocco during this time did encourage ‘a discourse of wary respect 
and cooperation’, and not one of hostile prejudice.178 But it was a discourse 
influenced by realpolitik, not ideology; opinions about Moroccans among Britons 
varied widely, but at the very least prejudice based on religious and ethnological 
difference was tempered in the interests of trade and politics.179 However, political, 
commercial, and social conditions were considerably different at the beginning of the 
seventeenth century. Morocco was entering into a long period of social unrest and 
civil war. The death of Elizabeth allowed England to finally conclude a peace with 
Spain. Furthermore, the Ottomans no longer presented a direct threat to Morocco, 
negating the need for the rulers of that country to foster cordial relations with Spain. 
Nevertheless, while Spain was expelling Moriscos from the country, and occupying 
Larache and Mehdya, these facts did not deter various Moroccan factions from 
seeking Spanish assistance from time to time.  
 
The second half of the sixteenth century had been a propitious time for the English 
in their endeavours to develop relations with Morocco, in that England faced little 
competition from other European powers; aside from the vexed relations Morocco 
had with Portugal and Spain, the French were preoccupied with their wars of religion, 
and the Dutch were only beginning to take an interest in the country.180 But England 
would face greater competition in the first half of the seventeenth century as the 
French and Dutch began to actively pursue their own opportunities for trade with 
Morocco. Furthermore, as noted earlier, the social and political instability which 
followed al-Mansūr’s death stifled trade with Europe because of a scarcity of the 
goods sought by merchants. 
 
The resulting division of Morocco also led to other changes. While the conflict was 
fuelled by anti-Christian sentiment it did not have as significant an impact on 
European relations with Morocco as might be expected, as it was offset by the 
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pragmatic needs of competition between the warring parties. As local and regional 
factions regained their authority, among them the city-states of Tétouan and Salé, 
they began to establish their own relationships with the English and other Europeans. 
Even a mujahid like Muhammad al-ʻAyāshī was prepared to set his ideals aside to 
obtain military supplies from the English or Dutch. Consequently, relations varied 
greatly according to the nature of the party in question and circumstances which 
prevailed at the time.181 While France continued to play only a minor role in Morocco 
during this period, the English maintained a relatively active trade with the country, 
supplying both licit goods and illicit matériel to legitimate rulers as well as rebels, and 
as noted in the previous section, the English continued to be very well informed of 
domestic developments.  However, it was the Dutch who conducted the most active 
trade. Unlike the English who had made peace with Spain, the United Provinces were 
at war with the Habsburgs and sanctioned the supply of ships and weapons to various 
parties in Morocco in order to further their own political aims.182   
 
Ironically, it was Queen Elizabeth’s former ambassador to Morocco, Henry Roberts, 
who attempted to establish a new era in relations of a very different kind. Within a 
few weeks of Elizabeth’s death, Roberts wrote to King James I presenting a ‘true and 
plaine project’ for the conquest of Morocco which would be to ‘the great glorie of 
Godd, profite and increase of your ma[jes]ties domynions, traffique of marchantes, 
ymployment of navies and people, and to the universall good of all Christendome’.183 
The proposal detailed what the country had to offer, and the size and disposition of 
its army. He assured the king that the majority of the sultan’s soldiers would flee 
rather than fight, and that many people would convert to Christianity, or in due 
course submit to the king for the better governance that he would bring.184 Roberts 
may have been the first Englishman to have proposed English conquest in North 
Africa, but he was acting alone and does not appear to have been inspired by imperial 
                                                        
181 Ibid., pp. 240–241; Laroui, History of the Maghrib, p. 258. 
182 Julien, History of North Africa, pp. 241–242. 
183 ‘Memoire de Henry Roberts a Jacques Ier’, [3 April 1603], in Castries, SIHMA, II, p. 223. 
184 Ibid., pp. 223–226. 
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zeal; rather it was an act of desperation by a destitute man.185 In any event, nothing 
came of Roberts’ scheme.  
 
It was not the last ambitious strategy involving Morocco which would be proposed 
by a Briton, but the issue that really came to define Anglo-Moroccan relations in the 
first half of the seventeenth century was the rise of corsairing in Morocco, and 
attempts by the English to respond to this development. The activities of the corsairs 
operating from Salé quickly became a source of political tension, not simply due to 
the disruption of shipping and trade, but also increasingly in response to the capture 
of crews and passengers, who were either held for ransom or sold into captivity; 
although it was the grievances of English merchants that first forced James to send 
an envoy.186  
 
Complaints from Morocco had started being received very soon after al-Mansūr’s 
death, expressing concern about the behaviour of the late sultan’s son, Abu Faris, 
who controlled Marrakesh. It was claimed that Abu Faris had reneged on 
commitments negotiated with his father, and that he was not protecting the interests 
of the English trading community.187 The political agent John Harrison arrived in 
Morocco in June 1610 to deliver a letter from the king to Mawlāy Zaydān, who now 
ruled Marrakesh and Sus. After a long delay Harrison was finally able to submit to him 
the details of the grievances. Zaydān refuted the claims, advising Harrison that the 
merchants had breached the laws of his country. Consequently, he would not 
compensate them, but he did confirm the maintenance of existing trading privileges 
given by his predecessors to the English. With this concession Harrison returned to 
London in April 1611.188  
 
                                                        
185  Ibid., p. 227. See also Matar, Turks, Moors and Englishmen, p. 10, cf. Matar, Britain and Barbary, 
pp. 40–41.  
186 Rogers, Anglo-Moroccan Relations, pp. 22–24. 
187 ‘Lettre de George Thomas a Robert Cecil’, 30 October 1603, and ‘Requête de Thomas Pate a Jacques 
Ier’, [late 1603], in Castries, SIHMA, II, pp. 229–235, 236–239. 
188 ‘Lettre de John Harrison a Salisbury’, 10 June 1610, and ‘Lettre de John Harrison a Salisbury’, 14 
October 1610 in ibid., pp. 449–450, 452–454; Rogers, Anglo-Moroccan Relations, p. 24. 
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Immediately upon his arrival in Morocco, Harrison had made note of a report of 
‘pyrats’ operating out of Mehdya on the Atlantic coast. The concern at the time was 
not the effect of their activity on English vessels, rather the fact that the pirates were 
selling goods they had seized at discounted prices.189 But it was the issue of the 
capture and enslavement of Englishmen by the ‘Sallee Rovers’ that was the reason 
for Harrison’s next mission to Zaydān. He was dispatched with letters from the king, 
and finally arrived in Zaydān’s camp in November 1614. Harrison was granted an 
audience with the sultan, who agreed to free any English captives held in his 
dominions.190 A possible Anglo-Dutch alliance against Spain may have also been 
discussed, and this could explain why Harrison was accompanied by the sultan’s 
agent in the Netherlands.191 Zaydān provided Harrison with a letter to James in which 
he reaffirmed his friendship with England, and Harrison was also requested to 
personally deliver a letter to the States-General of the United Provinces. He returned 
to Morocco around June the following year to deliver the responses.192 Harrison was 
again sent to Morocco by the king in early 1616 to arrange the release of his subjects, 
as previously agreed, but had still not received a response from the sultan when he 
departed from the country almost sixteen months later without having even 
disembarked. It is unclear whether Zaydān’s failure to receive Harrison or establish 
any contact with him at this time was an unintentional snub, or, in fact, a sign of a 
more significant change in Zaydān’s disposition toward England, as asserted by 
Harrison much later.193  
 
Whatever the reason, the incident led to a hiatus in formal diplomatic relations which 
lasted for some seven years, and only ended when an English monarch once again 
sought the assistance of a Moroccan ruler against Spain, and to appease the concerns 
                                                        
189 Castries, SIHMA, II, p. 450. 
190 ‘Relation de John Harrison’, [end of 1627], in Pierre de Cenival and Philippe de Cossé Brissac, eds., 
SIHMA, 3 vols., vol. 3 (Paris, 1935), p. 67; Rogers, Anglo-Moroccan Relations, pp. 24–25. 
191 Nabil Matar, 'Harrison, John (d. 1641x52)', in H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison, eds., ODNB, 
Online ed. (Oxford, 2004), accessed 12 July 2017. On attempts by Moriscos, with the aid of Zaydān’s 
Jewish agent, Samuel Pallache, to engineer an alliance with European powers against Spain, see 
García-Arenal, 'Moriscos in Morocco', pp. 312–313. 
192 Cenival and Cossé Brissac, SIHMA, III, pp. 67–68; Rogers, Anglo-Moroccan Relations, p. 25. 
193 ‘Lettre de Francis Cottington a John Coke’, 31 March 1618, and ‘Lettre de John Harrison a Moulay 
Zidân’, Tétouan, [c. July 1625], in Castries, SIHMA, II, pp. 509, 571; ‘Relation de John Harrison’, [end 
1627], in Cenival and Cossé Brissac, SIHMA, III, pp. 68–69. 
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of his subjects about their kin held captive in Morocco.194 Nevertheless, the archival 
records for this period of diplomatic quiescence reveal the strength of the underlying 
interest that Britons had with Morocco: trade and commerce continued unabated, 
merchants and officials maintained a close eye on political developments and other 
happenings, negotiations on the release of captives were undertaken by private 
agents, and attempts were made to nurture relations with local rulers within a 
splintered polity.195 
 
Conclusion 
 
The experience of the English in the Mediterranean during the seventeenth century 
was marked by neither single-minded imperial intent, nor an unchallenged maritime 
ascendency. Rather it was defined by uncertainty and caution, and frequent 
vulnerability requiring necessary compromises and cooperation with both Christians 
and Muslims alike.196 They achieved much through the exercise of naval power, but 
also through pragmatism and accommodation; the English recognised that outright 
aggression may not only be counterproductive, but also prohibitively expensive. 
Contrary to Games’ belief that accommodation was only a defining characteristic of 
English behaviour towards the regencies up until 1660, it appears that such a 
disposition extended long after, influenced by the lack of success the English 
experienced in their earlier efforts to subdue the corsairs, and necessitated by the 
complex socio-political environment in which they continued to operate. 
Furthermore, as demonstrated in later chapters, even their occupation of Tangier 
between 1662 and 1684 did not represent a marked departure from this traditional 
pattern of behaviour. 
 
Akin to the general feelings of disorientation and uncertainty experienced by 
Europeans in the Mediterranean identified by a number of other scholars, Colley 
                                                        
194 ‘Lettre de Charles Ier a Moulay Zidân’, [27 March–1 June 1625], and ‘Lettre de John Harrison a 
Moulay Zidân’, Tétouan, [13 June–30 July 1625], in Castries, SIHMA, II, pp. 565–566, 571–572. 
195 See, for example, the correspondence dealing with these issues in ibid., pp. 510–564, passim. 
196 Colley similarly argues that aggression and vulnerability were both intrinsic aspects of the early 
British imperial experience. See Colley, Captives, pp. 133–134, 365–366. 
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observes that relations between Britain and the North African states in the early 
modern period tended towards ambivalence: although Britain resented the impact 
that the Muslim corsairs had on trade, its subjects and its status, the states remained 
important as both markets for British goods, and, perhaps even more critically, in 
supporting the country’s strategic interests in the Mediterranean.197 But, as will be 
argued in this thesis, these were not the only factors which could give rise to 
equivocal responses in the encounter between Britons and Maghribis. 
The relationship between Morocco’s rulers and foreign powers during the sixteenth 
century and the first half of the seventeenth century was complex and dynamic, 
changing according to the vicissitudes of the former, and the actions of the latter. The 
Ottomans and Europeans were both a threat to them and a source of succour, 
depending on circumstances. Moroccan rulers and factional leaders not only became 
adept at resisting them, but also using and manipulating them for their own 
purposes. In Barbary, the English were not the only ones using guile and 
accommodation to achieve their ends when it suited them. However, the contact 
which ensued facilitated processes of exchange that went beyond the immediate 
needs of commerce and warfare: it also enabled the mutual acquisition of knowledge 
and understanding of the other. But in their relations with the Christian powers, 
aspirants to the Moroccan throne or regional dominion also came to realise that they 
had to take great care that their actions did not compromise their moral and sacral 
authority, which became the foundation of their personal power.  
By the middle of the seventeenth century Britons, as testified by their accounts, had 
acquired a wealth of knowledge of, and experience in, Morocco. While historians 
have given much attention to the English occupation of Tangier, what is often 
overlooked, or at least under-appreciated, is that this episode was preceded by over 
a century of close and generally amicable commercial and political relations which 
had provided Britons with detailed insight into the country and its culture, religion, 
society, and politics. When they embarked on their first colonial venture in North 
                                                        
197 Ibid., p. 81. See also Fisher, Barbary Legends, p. 224; Lotfi Ben Rejeb, 'Barbary as Genre and 
Discourse', pp. 19–20. 
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Africa in 1662 they were not necessarily ignorant of what they faced in attempting to 
establish a permanent presence there. The central question that this study seeks to 
answer concerns how Britons between 1625 and 1684 responded to direct encounter 
with an unfamiliar, although a not altogether unknown, socio-cultural environment. 
Did they utilise the legacy of knowledge and experience left to them by their 
predecessors? Did they remain receptive to new cultural and religious 
understandings? Could they positively adapt to the new environment in which they 
found themselves? Or was it the case, as argued by others, that during the course of 
the seventeenth century Britons were increasingly incapable of such reflexivity, 
blinded by their own sense of cultural and religious superiorty, and driven by imperial 
aspiration? In the following chapters these questions are explored. 
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2. Imagining Barbary 
 
For the most part we do not first see, and then define, we define 
first and then see. In the great blooming, buzzing confusion of the 
outer world we pick out what our culture has already defined for 
us, and we tend to perceive that which we have picked out in the 
form stereotyped for us by our culture. (Walter Lippman, 1922)1 
 
In order to more fully appreciate the psychological impact that contact with Morocco 
had on Britons it is useful to understand their personal imaginative geographies of 
that place, and with this knowledge assess how these conceptions may have been 
either challenged or confirmed by the experience of encounter. More precisely, this 
means seeking to understand their pre-existing attitudes towards the country and its 
people, characterised by the nature of the stereotypes, prejudices, or opinions they 
held relating to them.2 While there may have been dominant perspectives held by 
Britons about Morocco, and North Africa more generally, and the peoples associated 
with them, it would be wrong to assume that they can be reduced to simple 
statements which reflect prevailing public opinion. Furthermore, historical sources 
do not necessarily have either precision or completeness. Their limitations in 
providing ethnographic and other personal insights were discussed in the 
introduction to this thesis: they are inherently partial, in being both incomplete and 
subject to various types of bias. Commentators occasionally provide statements 
which reveal their personal attitudes, or provide insights into those held by people 
about whom they wrote, and make explicit references to the impact that encounter 
had on their understanding or perceptions. Sometimes sufficient information may be 
gleaned from the sources to enable the impact to be inferred. But the preconceptions 
held by many subjects are much less clear and, consequently, it is far more difficult 
to precisely assess just how they were affected.  
                                                        
1 Walter Lippmann, Public Opinion: With a New Introduction by Michael Curtis  (New Brunswick, NJ, 
1998), p. 81. 
2 The sociologist Paul F. Lazarsfeld notes that the contemporary concept of ‘attitude’ relates to how 
people see the world, and combines both rational and emotive elements. Attitudes may be 
characterised as ‘stereotypes’, ‘prejudices’, and ‘opinions’ depending on the mix of rational and 
emotive elements. See Paul F. Lazarsfeld, 'A Sociologist Looks at Historians', in Melvin Small, ed., Public 
Opinion and Historians: Interdisciplinary Perspectives (Detroit, 1970), p. 39. The term ‘attitude’ is used 
throughout this thesis in this sense. 
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Unquestionably though, attitudes could vary between individuals, sometimes 
markedly, with the defining characteristics of group identity becoming less distinct at 
the personal level. They were influenced by factors such as a person’s class, 
education, profession, beliefs, and broader life experiences (with these invariably 
informed by gender). The intent of this chapter is to identify the various ways in which 
contemporary Britons conceived of Morocco and its people, the events and sources 
that informed these views, and to trace how attitudes changed over time. However, 
the corpus of scholarship concerning the attitudes of Britons toward racial, 
ethnological, and religious difference is extensive, and the following discussion can 
by no means provide a comprehensive survey on these subjects. For this reason 
particular attention has been given to more common stereotypes and their principal 
modes of transmission. 
 
The stereotype is a concept popularised by Walter Lippmann in the 1920s. Lippmann 
conceived of stereotypes as entrenched cognitive habits by which people classify and 
abstract information about their environment, and which usually provide a distorted 
picture of the world.3 Stereotypes consist of ‘images, categorizations, or 
generalizations taking a particular view of, or emphasizing or exaggerating traits or 
characteristics or behaviour patterns’ which are assigned to a particular individual or 
group, and which can arise out of sociological, pyschological, or cognitive processes.4 
They are a means by which people simplify their world in order to extract meaning 
from it, and make decisions. Similarly, in the context of historical cultural contact, 
Stuart Schwartz refers to people possessing an ‘implicit ethnography’. It was implicit 
in the sense it was unstated, but it represented a common understanding among 
members of a society of ideas concerning themselves and others outside their group 
about those things which they identified as contributing to their collective self-
identity, such as language, colour, ethnicity, kinship, gender, and religion, and which 
                                                        
3 Michael Curtis, 'Introduction to the Transaction Edition', in Public Opinion: With a New Introduction 
by Michael Curtis (New Brunswick, NJ, 1998), pp. xvii–xix. Lippmann is perhaps most well-known for 
popularising the term ‘Cold War’ to characterise the post-WWII confrontation between the USSR and 
USA. 
4 Ibid., pp. xxiv–xxviii. Quotation is from p. 24. 
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influenced the way in which they thought and acted.5 Such shared understandings — 
in effect stereotypes of self — became (and continue to be) the measures against 
which others were judged, and the resulting differences were embodied in 
stereotypes of these outgroups. Therefore, much can be inferred about how Britons 
saw themselves individually and as a collective from the stereotypes they held about 
others. 
 
Stereotypes can become deeply entrenched in the individual and collective psyches, 
and resistant to change, because they, and attitudes more generally, tend to be self-
reinforcing; we are subconsciously drawn to evidence that supports our existing 
beliefs, and reject information that contradicts them — commonly referred to as 
confirmation bias — particularly when the same beliefs are shared amongst our peers 
or in the broader society. As observed by Jack D’Amico: ‘The interchange between 
cultures is shaped by ways of framing experience that experience does not easily 
change’.6 Roxanne Euben explains that ‘systems of representation can be impervious 
to mechanisms of verification and argumentation’, because they are the means by 
which we make sense of the world, and they in turn influence our judgements about 
it, and our actions.7 Nevertheless, as Euben also points out, both physical and 
imaginative encounters with other ‘modes of life’, can provide ‘dislocating 
mediations’ which may challenge existing beliefs, and facilitate more expansive 
frames of reference.8  
                                                        
5 Stuart B. Schwartz, 'Introduction', in Stuart B. Schwartz, ed., Implicit Understandings: Observing, 
Reporting, and Reflecting on the Encounters between Europeans and Other Peoples in the Early 
Modern Era (Cambridge, 1994), pp. 2–3. On stereotyping in cultural encounters, see also Peter Burke, 
Eyewitnessing: The Uses of Images as Historical Evidence  (London, 2001), pp. 125–128. 
6 Jack D'Amico, The Moor in English Renaissance Drama  (Tampa, FL, 1991), p. 1. Tom Griffiths refers 
to people having a daily, socialised experience of myth and memory which becomes the source of their 
understanding, and the basis of their judgement, made independent of more informed and objective 
sources of knowledge’. See Tom Griffiths, The Art of Time Travel: Historians and their Craft  (Carlton, 
Vic., Aust., 2016), p. 91 
7 Roxanne L. Euben, Journeys to the Other Shore: Muslim and Western Travelers in Search of Knowledge  
(Princeton, 2006), p. 193. 
8 Ibid., pp. 18, 193–197. The disruptive effects of inter-cultural engagement on human behaviour as 
explained by psychological theory and Homi K. Bhabha’s concept of Third Space are discussed in the 
introduction to this thesis. Imaginative, as opposed to physical encounters, can also be conceived of 
as intellectualised engagement. See Rickie Lette, 'The Influence of Inter-Cultural Engagement on the 
Perceptions of Mendicant Friars in the Thirteenth Century Concerning Islam and Muslims', Medieval 
Encounters, 23 (2017), pp. 504–505. 
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This sequence is very well demonstrated in the present study: as contact with 
Morocco and knowledge about it increased during the course of the seventeenth 
century, perceptions concerning its peoples advanced from simple, predominantly 
prejudicial, stereotypes to increasingly more ambivalent, nuanced, and even openly 
positive understandings which existed alongside the old ones. One particular 
manifestation of acculturative change identified in this and the following chapters 
which could arise from both physical and imaginatives encounters, were the drawing 
of what might be called ‘equivalences’: comparisons made by Britons between things 
they were familiar with from their own society and culture — including there own 
sense of identity — with what they found in Morocco, or by reading about it, or even 
through contact with Moroccans at home.9 However, while it is a useful term to 
categorise such responses, it is important to understand the nature and intent of 
comparisons when they appear in sources. Some may, in fact, simply be rhetorical 
analogies intended to provide the reader with familiar examples to reinforce 
prejudicial judgements. It is necessary to avoid confusing rhetoric informed by bigotry 
and prejudice with responses, both negative and positive, arising from acculturation, 
as they are fundamentally different things. 
 
This chapter is concerned with identifying common cultural understandings 
transmitted through processes of public discourse in the British Isles in the early 
modern period, particularly those in circulation from around 1600 to the early 1680s, 
being the formative period for many of the subjects examined in the following 
chapters. Specifically, it seeks to identify the attitudes of Britons towards Morocco, 
its people, and their society, culture, and religion. However, while North Africa was 
not an homogenous entity in any concrete sense, distinctions between its various 
parts and peoples were not always clearly made. As one contemporary Scottish 
traveller observed: all the lands between Egypt and Ceuta in Morocco ‘by ignorant 
sea-men and ruvide [rough] Moores is termed Barbary, who can not distinquish parts 
                                                        
9 Direct comparisons were also made by Moroccans about the English and England, but discussion of 
these is outside the scope of this thesis. 
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nor provinces … and know no further of their ancient nor particular titles’.10 The 
racial, ethnological,11 and political complexity of the region was often either 
overlooked, or misunderstood: North African Arabs, Berbers, and Moriscos could 
simply be labelled as either ‘Moors’ or ‘Turks’, among other generalised epithets.  
 
While attention is often given to the issue of skin colour in scholarship on 
representations of North Africans, colour was more often a concern of playwrights 
than of others. In fact, it has even been proposed that the white/black binarism which 
is evident in the plays of the Tudor period, and which influenced later stage 
depictions of North Africans, can, perhaps, be best explained not as a product of 
implicit racism, but rather in terms of symbolism: ‘the prejudices of Elizabethans were 
specifically against blackness, not necessarily against dark-skinned people’.12 
Admittedly, use of the term ‘Blackamoor’ as opposed to Moor could indicate a 
perception of racial difference — specifically sub-Saharan African descent — by some 
writers, but for most Britons in the sixteenth and early seventeenth century the key 
factors which informed their attitudes to other people were religion and social class, 
rather than race.13 The resultant homogenisation of North African identity, facilitated 
                                                        
10 William Lithgow, The Totall Discourse, of the Rare Adventures, and Painefull Peregrinations of Long 
Nineteene Yeares Travayles from Scotland, to the most Famous Kingdomes in Europe, Asia, and 
Affrica ...  (London, 1632), p. 362 
11 As observed by Robert Bartlett the terms ‘race’ and ‘ethnicity’ are problematic, with the distinction 
made between them differing between different people. Race may be used to distinguish groups on 
the basis of biological, somatic difference, while ethnicity may be used to identify cultural differences 
between groups. On the other hand, there are those who reject the term race altogether because of 
its association with racism, and regard ethnicity as a suitable alternative. In Bartlett’s view, rather than 
following social trends, usage of terms should be based on the intellectual value of the distinctions 
they provide. He goes on to state that: ‘Ethnicity and race both refer to the identifications made by 
individuals about the groups they belong to. If one word has a use, then the other does’; they are both 
ultimately socially constructed concepts. Kim F. Hall similarly notes that ‘race was [in the early modern 
period] (as it is now) a social construct that is fundamentally more about power and culture than about 
biological difference’. See Robert Bartlett, 'Medieval and Modern Concepts of Race and Ethnicity', 
Journal of Medieval and Early Modern Studies, 31 (2001), pp. 39–42; Kim F. Hall, Things of Darkness: 
Economies of Race and Gender in Early Modern England  (Ithaca, NY, 1995), p. 6. I use both terms as 
the context dictates, to differentiate between perceptions of difference grounded in either somatic or 
cultural factors. 
12 Greg Bak, 'Different Differences: Locating Moorishness in Early Modern English Culture', The 
Dalhousie Review (1996), p. 201. 
13 Leland  Barrows, 'Review of Matar, Nabil, Turks, Moors, and Englishmen in the Age of Discovery', in 
H-W-Civ, H-Net Reviews (2000), at http://www.h-net.org/reviews/showrev.php?id=4632; Miranda 
Kaufmann, Black Tudors: The Untold Story  (London, 2017), pp. 4–6. Cf. Nabil Matar, Turks, Moors and 
Englishmen in the Age of Discovery  (New York, 1999), pp. 6–8. On the distinction which some English 
commentators made between the two types of Moors, see Eldred Jones, Othello's Countrymen: The 
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by a shared affiliation with Islam, and its association with barbarism, may indeed have 
became the ‘principal frame or prism through which early modern Europeans looked 
at North Africa’.14 But, it was certainly not the only one used by Britons. There was a 
range of other, less prejudicial and essentialising perspectives which emerged with 
which it coexisted and competed for recognition. 
 
2.1. The Roots of Anti-Islamic Prejudice and the Barbary Discourse 
 
What is often overlooked by scholars, or given scant regard by them, when examining 
the response of Britons to North Africa is that key elements which underpinned 
common Christian European perceptions of Barbary and its peoples did not 
spontaneously emerge in the early modern period; their substantive roots are deeply 
embedded in medieval images of Islam and Muslims.15 The medievalist Norman 
Daniel famously argued that a hostile, ‘deformed image of Islam’ developed during 
the course of the Middle Ages which was instrumental in establishing a ‘canon of 
what … Muslims believe and do’, and formed the basis of an integrated European 
view of the religion that survived until the modern period.16 While scholars are 
increasingly recognising that Christian perceptions of the Muslim world were much 
more nuanced than allowed for by Daniel, it is clear that prejudicial views of Islam 
and its adherents continued to dominate Western European thinking, despite the 
availability of increasing knowledge about them.17 Furthermore, from the time of the 
                                                        
African in English Renaissance Drama  (London, 1965), pp. 10, 22–23, incl. n. 49. On the influence of 
issues of geography, ethnicity and religion in the construction of the image of the Moor in early 
modern England, see Daniel J. Vitkus, Turning Turk: English Theatre and the Multicultural 
Mediterranean, 1570–1630  (New York, 2008), pp. 90–91. 
14 Lotfi Ben Rejeb, '‘The General Belief of the World’: Barbary as Genre and Discourse in Mediterranean 
History', European Review of History, 19 (2012), p. 16. 
15 Cf., for example, Matar, Turks, Moors and Englishmen, pp. 12–14. 
16 Norman Daniel, Islam and The West: The Making of an Image  (Edinburgh, 1960), pp. 3, 8. 
17 For a good general survey of European perceptions of Islam in the Middle Ages, and discussion 
concerning their persistence, see John Tolan’s influential book, Saracens: Islam in the Medieval 
European Imagination  (New York, 2002). For a specific study on the influence of medieval polemical 
writings on Muhammad in the construction of representations of Islam, Muslims, and Islamic culture 
in early modern Britain, see Ian Jenkins, 'Writing Islam: Representations of Muhammad, the Qur’an 
and Islamic Belief and the Construction of Muslim Identity in Early Modern Britain', PhD Thesis (Cardiff 
University, 2007). However, despite the significant attention which has been given to the polemical 
aspects of Christian-Muslim relations in the Middle Ages, Olivia Remie Constable has observed that 
scholars remain divided on the issue of an overall interpretation of the respective attitudes of Western 
Christians and Muslims to each other during this period. See Constable, 'Muslims in Medieval Europe', 
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First Crusade the Western Christian Church was instrumental in promulgating public 
perceptions of Islam and Muslims among its followers: according to Norman Housley, 
the need for the Church to entice people to participate in crusade, and the associated 
creation of an imago inimici, ‘shaped a dominant picture of Islam, its founder, and 
adherents that was inaccurate, stereotypical, and lacking in humanity’.18 
Understanding this medieval epistemological heritage is critical because proper 
contextualisation of the subsequent development of anti-Islamic discourse in early 
modern Britain facilitates understanding of the more proximate factors which 
influenced its precise contemporary form. 
 
But Ben Rejeb suggests that a specific Barbary discourse emerged following the end 
of the Spanish Reconquista and the expulsion of the Andalusian Moors, who, 
together with the Ottomans and their North African proxies, came to challenge 
Portuguese and Spanish expanionism in the Western Mediterranean. In this 
environment, piracy and captive-taking were not seen by Christian Europeans as 
legitimate acts of resistance by North Africans, but rather as ‘savage acts of 
vengeance’. The reconceptualisation of North Africa was completed with the 
adoption of ‘Barbary’ as a toponym for the region following its use by Martin 
Waldseemüller in his Modern Map of the First Part of Africa in 1513, possibly as a 
result of an association established in contemporary accounts.19  By extension, all its 
inhabitants could be labelled simply as ‘Barbarians’, and the conflation of the term’s 
pejorative meaning and its use as a geographic identifier by Britons ‘was a gift of 
which generations of polemicists made adundant and predictable use’.20 The 
                                                        
in Carol Lansing and Edward D. English, eds., A Companion to the Medieval World, Blackwell 
Companions to European History (Oxford, 2013), pp. 313–332. 
18 Norman Housley, 'The Crusades and Islam', Medieval Encounters, 13 (2007), pp. 189–208. While I 
disagree with the limits Housley imposes on the positive outcomes which could also result from 
Christian-Muslim contact during the medieval period, he does provide a useful account of the 
contribution made by the Church in shaping a general Western Christian ideological perspective. 
19 Ben Rejeb, 'Barbary as Genre and Discourse', p. 17. See discussion on the subject in the introduction 
to this thesis. 
20 Linda Colley, Captives: Britain, Empire, and the World, 1600–1850  (New York, 2004), pp. 44. On 
early modern European understanding of the concept of the barbarian, see Anthony Pagden, The Fall 
of Natural Man. The American Indian and the Origins of Comparative Ethnology  (Cambridge, 1982), 
chap. 2. For an interesting discussion on the concept of the barbarian from a variety of historical 
cultural perspectives, see K. N. Chaudhuri, 'From the Barbarian and the Civilized to the Dialectics of 
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resulting discourse not only defined the Otherness of North Africa through the lens 
of religious difference, but essentialised it as a site of piracy, slavery, and hostility to 
Christendom, and as being the antithesis of European civilisation.21   
 
While Nabil Matar argues that the English ‘imposed the moral constructions they had 
devised to legitimate the colonization … and destruction’ of the Amerindians on 
Mediterranean Muslims in order to compensate for their ‘colonial and cultural 
inadequacies’, to the extent that the two ‘became completely superimposable’,22 
such a discourse is not apparent in the sources which have been examined in this 
study, and Colley believes that such a degree of superimposition was rare.23 The 
association of Muslims with, for example, sodomy and holy war were already well 
entrenched in European Christian thought without requiring transposition from the 
New World. Of course, the way in which individual Britons conceived of North Africa 
could never be entirely isolated from the influence of other factors — people 
naturally draw on familiar stereotypes in attempting to understand, and in response 
to, new phenomena — but the region and its people generally appear to have 
possessed their own distinct character in the minds of Britons, shaped by traditional 
religious and cultural prejudice, current events, and new experiences and learnings.    
 
The increase in English adventurism and overseas trade during the seventeenth 
century resulted in a growing volume of publications on voyages, travel, and 
geography, the popularity of which is impossible to assess. However, it is clear that 
the circulation of such texts was expanding, and what could perhaps, broadly, be 
defined as travel literature came to have a widespread and pervasive appeal among 
literate Englishmen, especially those with an interest in trade. Nevertheless, the 
quality of the information provided varied considerably: while some authors sought 
                                                        
Colour: An Archaeology of Self-Identities', in Peter Robb, ed., Society and Ideology: Essays in South 
Asian History Presented to Professor K. A. Ballhatchet (Oxford, 1993), pp. 22–48. 
21 Colley, Captives, pp. 101–102; Ben Rejeb, 'Barbary as Genre and Discourse', p. 18. 
22 Matar, Turks, Moors and Englishmen, pp. x, 16, 170. Quotations are from p. 16. 
23 Colley, Captives, p. 106. 
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to capture current knowledge, there were others who sought to appeal to less 
sophisticated readers, and simply reworked ancient myths and stereotypes.24 
 
Yet traditional prejudice and tropes could still be found even in the most popular, 
high-end examples of the genre. Both Colley and Ben Rejeb cite the influential travel 
books of the clergyman Samuel Purchas as demonstrating the types of stereotypes 
which were conveyed through the Barbary discourse. In Purchas His Pilgrimes, a 
compilation of travel accounts first published between 1624 and 1626, the author 
describes Algiers as: 
the whirlepoole of these seas, the throne of pyracie, the sinke of 
trade and stinke of slavery; the cage of uncleane birds of prey, the 
habitation of sea-devils, the receptacle of renegadoes to God, and 
traytors to their countrey.25 
 
One of his sources, the Flemish historian Jean-Baptiste Gramaye, delivers a similarly 
scathing critique of North Africa.  Referring to Barbary generally, but ‘chiefly therein 
Algier’, as:  
the whip of the Christian world, the wall of the barbarian, terror of 
Europe, the bridle of both Hesperias (Italy and Spaine) scourge of 
the islands, den of pyrates, theatre of all crueltie, and sanctuarie of 
iniquitie, holdeth in captivity one hundred and twenty thousand 
Christians.26 
                                                        
24 P. J. Marshall and Williams Glyndwr, The Great Map of Mankind: British Perceptions of the World in 
the Age of Englightenment  (London, 1982), pp. 51, 54, 56, 60. Kenneth Parker claims that the 
popularity of works of this kind were perhaps second only to that of sermons. See Kenneth Parker, 
'Reading ‘Barbary’ in Early Modern England, 1550–1685', The Seventeenth Century, 19 (2004), p. 107.  
25 Samuel Purchas, Purchas His Pilgrimes in Five Bookes ..., 4 vols., vol. 2 (London, 1625), p. 873. Ben 
Rejeb also cites a passage from the earlier Purchas His Pilgrimage, however, Purchas sourced this 
material from Leo Africanus’ Description of Africa (1550). Africanus was a Berber or Arab born in 
Granada and raised in Fes, who later converted to Christianity, and on that basis his writing cannot be 
considered representative of a true European discourse on Barbary. Furthermore, the ‘negative 
images’ which Ben Rejeb refers to only relate to ‘the mountainers and ruder rustikes’, not ‘the 
inhabitants of the cities’ who are said to be ‘studious, especially in matters of their law’ although they 
‘are very proude and revengefull’. See Ben Rejeb, 'Barbary as Genre and Discourse', p. 18, and Samuel 
Purchas, Purchas His Pilgrimage. Or Relations of the World and the Religions Observed in all Ages and 
Places Discovered, from the Creation unto this Present in Foure Partes ...  (London, 1613), p. 502. The 
term ‘uncleane birds’ may have been inspired by its use as a metaphor for Islam by John Fox in Actes 
and Monuments of these Latter and Perillous Days (1563), or by Edward Brerewood in Enquiries 
Touching the Diversity of Languages, and Religions through the Chiefe Parts of the World (1614). See 
Nabil Matar, Islam in Britain, 1558–1685  (Cambridge, 1998), p. 157. 
26 Purchas, Purchas His Pilgrimes, 2, p. 1565. The same account can also be found in Samuel Purchas, 
Hakluytus Posthumus or Purchas His Pilgrimes: Contayning a History of the World in Sea Voyages and 
Land Travells by Englishmen and Others, 20 vols., vol. IX (Glasgow, 1905), pp. 267–284. Whether this 
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Nevertheless, while the accounts in Purchas’ work are peppered with Eurocentric 
intepretations, much of the content is surprising for its lack of harsh judgement of 
cultural and religious practices observed, or heard of, by commentators.  
 
Two issues that gave rise to the greatest animosity among writers about North Africa 
were Christian slavery and apostasy. The French geographer, Nicolas de Nicolay’s 
observations about Algiers, written in about 1550, are largely objective, even when 
describing brutal events. It is only when he turns to slavery and apostasy that 
impartiality escapes him. He refers to the prevalence of ‘Muhumetised’ European 
Christians among the ‘Turkes of Algiers’, who are given to ‘whoredome, sodometrie, 
theft, and all other detestable vices … and with their practike art bring daily to Algier 
a number of poore Christians’ who are  subsequently sold, beaten, made ‘to worke 
in the fields, and in all other vile and abject occupations’.27 Given the elapse of time, 
Purchas felt it necessary to supplement Nicolay’s account with details from 
Gramaye’s work, dated 1619, to shed ‘some better light on this hel-mouth, the centre 
of earthly darkness’.28  
 
In the first two-thirds of his account, Gramaye makes repeated references to the 
number of Christian slaves in the city and Barbary generally, refers to the problem of 
forced conversion, recounts examples of brutality and arbitary justice, and ridicules 
the religious beliefs and practices which Algerians share with other Muslims — some 
are misrepresented, others are almost certainly contrived, such as claims of 
prostitution of men’s wives to holy men, rampant sodomy, and bestiality. But on the 
other hand he also notes they do not gamble, swear, or fight each other, that they 
wash before work, eating, and prayer; and he describes other aspects of their culture 
and way of life without judgement.29 However, Gramaye reserves his harshest 
                                                        
statement is actually attributable to Gramaye is admittedly uncertain as the distinction between 
authorial and editorial voice in unclear in much of Purchas’ work. Colley in Captives, p. 44, includes a 
quotation obtained from a secondary source which she attributes to Purchas, which, strangely, 
combines elements from both this passage and the preceding one. 
27 Purchas, Purchas His Pilgrimes, 2, p. 875. On the dating of this account, see ibid., p. 1562. 
28 Ibid.  
29 Ibid., pp. 1561–1565. 
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criticism for the last third of the account, which contains the most sustained polemic 
against Barbary slavery in Purchas’ collection. Gramaye remarks on how the 
conditions and despair of enslavement force many Christians to convert, and goes on 
to describe in disturbing detail how they are tortured and forced to make false 
confessions when captured, and are treated with contempt and brutalised once 
enslaved. Furthermore, according to him, the Muslims of Algiers are hypocrites, and 
cannot be trusted. Gramaye makes it clear that no Christian European is safe either 
physically or spiritually in Algiers; all they can expect from their captors is antipathy, 
which is required of them by their religion.30 The author’s subjectivity is perhaps 
understandable, as Gramaye himself was held captive in Algiers for six months.31 But 
Purchas sought more than simply to enlighten his readers about Algiers and the 
deprivations of its Christian population; he also wished to elicit Christian zeal, 
compassion and charity: either Christians must pursue means to ensure the 
redemption of their co-religionists, or conspire to destroy Algiers.32   
 
Even though written media, including books, pamphlets and newspapers increasingly 
helped inform the views of Britons in the seventeenth century, literacy was still 
limited and oral forms of communication remained important.33    The promotion of 
accounts of Barbary captivity through collection campaigns for the redemption of 
captives, public ceremonies celebrating their release, ballads, plays, and church 
sermons, were more common channels for broad public dissemination of information 
and propaganda concerning Barbary, and for influencing public sentiment.34  
 
A redemption sermon delivered in 1636 by the clergyman Charles Fitzgeffry and the 
pamphlet in which it was published provide examples of the way in which appeals for 
Christian charity towards captives and their families could be reinforced by 
passionate explications of their suffering, and condemnation of those who held them.  
                                                        
30 Ibid., pp. 1565–1566. 
31 Ibid., p. 1566. 
32 Ibid., p. 1565. 
33 R. A. Houston, Literacy in Early Modern Europe: Culture and Education 1500–1800  (London, 1990), 
pp. 6–7, 230–232.  
34 Colley, Captives, pp. 75–80, 88, 99–101. 
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The sermon was written in response to increased Muslim corsair activity around the 
coasts of Cornwall and Devon at that time.35 In it, Fitzgeffry professes his ambition to 
‘be the drummer…to give the march until the Lords armies, against his, and his 
peoples enemies’.36 The sermon integrates traditional anti-Islamic polemic with the 
characterisation of North Africa as a barbaric land: a place of abundance, ‘save 
goodnesse’, inscribed historically with Christian significance but which is now 
despoiled by a ‘barbarous, brutish nation’, the opposite of a civilised England, whose 
people are ‘1 irreligious; 2 covetous, 3 cruell; 4 base and contemptible’.37 With its 
denigration of Islam and Muslims, evocation of the desecration of holy places and 
Christian persecution, and its call to spiritual and temporal action, it bears similarities 
to Pope Urban II’s sermon almost six centuries earlier with which he launched the 
First Crusade. But as Kenneth Parker notes, this condemnation also serves another 
purpose. Fitzgeffry recounts reports demonstrating the compassion and charity 
shown by ‘Turks’ towards  birds. In doing so he seeks to use them as a foil to highlight 
the moral and religious deficiencies of his congregation and readers, and encourage 
them to be ‘as charitable to our brethen under Turks as Turks are to birds’. But even 
this positive observation is not left to hang: if ‘reasonlesse creatures’ can be treated 
such by ‘unreasonable creatures’, how can Christians face God if they do not do the 
same for their captive brethren? Christians must aspire to a greater level of piety than 
that evinced by the barbarian Turk.38  
 
Two decades after Gramaye wrote about Algiers, the persistence of the same 
essentialised images of Barbary are evident in the account of an English merchant, 
Francis Knight, of his own experiences of slavery in the city. Knight states he was 
motivated to write about them for the purpose of ‘inlargement of the multitude of 
my poore country-men groaning under the weight of Turkish thraldome’, who suffer 
‘scoffes, threats, blowes, chains, hunger, nakednesse … and which is most deplorable, 
                                                        
35 Anne Duffin, 'Fitzgeffry, Charles (c.1575–1638)', in David Cannadine, ed., ODNB, Online ed. (Oxford, 
2004), accessed 12 July 2017. 
36 Charles Fitzgeffry, Compassion Towards Captives Chiefly Towards our Brethren and Country-Men 
Who are in Miserable Bondage in Barbarie  (Oxford, 1637), dedication, sig. 2v. 
37 Ibid., pp. 8–12. Quotations are from pp. 8, 9, 10. 
38 Ibid., preface, p. [2]; Parker, 'Reading Barbary', pp. 105–106. 
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their danger of falling from the Christian and most holy faith’, driven by ‘the 
extremitie of their sufferings’, the memory of which ‘doe still increase my zeal for 
their liberties’.39 He refers to Algiers as ‘that citie fatall to all Christians, and the 
butchery of mankind’.40 But while the account includes numerous details of Muslim 
brutality and depravity, and Christian suffering, he also expresses admiration for the 
discipline of their soldiers, the bearing of their governors, and the greatness of the 
city, and acknowledges the obligation he owes to some of them for the kindly 
treatment he was accorded.41  
 
As noted by Colley, Knight’s account is distinctive among other published English 
captivity narratives of the period both for its length, and also for his attempt to 
provide a more multi-faceted perspective on captivity;42 in doing so he reveals a 
significant degree of ambivalence towards the place and its people, which is unlikely 
to have escaped the attention of his readers. Furthermore, Matar draws attention to 
the fact that it is much more than an autobiography. Unlike earlier English captivity 
accounts, Knight devotes considerable attention to describing the place of his 
captivity, its geography, history, society, culture, and economy. But, as he also notes, 
Knight’s reason for doing so was clearly more than to satisfy the interest of his 
readers; it was also to cajole the king to take greater responsibility for the redemption 
of English captives, and convince him of the value of establishing  commercial and 
diplomatic relations with Algiers.43 The inconsistency in the critiques of 
commentators such as Fitzgeffry and Knight was more than mere hypocrisy. As 
argued by Jonathan Burton, the juxtaposing of condemnation of Islam and Mulims 
with praise and exhortations to emulate them demonstrates the uneasy tension 
which could result from the confluence of traditional perspectives, new insights, 
                                                        
39 Francis Knight, A Relation of Seaven Yeares Slaverie Under the Turkes of Argeire, Suffered by an 
English Captive Merchant ..., 2nd ed.  (London, 1640), sig. A3–A3v. 
40 Ibid., p. 1. 
41 Ibid., pp. 3, 31–32, 34, 39, 41. 
42 Colley, Captives, p. 88.  
43 Knight, A Relation of Seaven Yeares Slaverie, pp. 51–54; Nabil Matar, Britain and Barbary, 1589–
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normative understandings of identity, and domestic concerns.44 On the other hand, 
such dissonance could also be the result of an author seeking to assure the reader 
that they themself had not been corrupted by their inter-cultural encounter, rather 
than being the outcome of a sub-conscious process of attempting to reconcile 
conflicting attitudes.45 
 
The treatment of captivity in public discourse clearly could provide Britons with a 
distorted understanding of not only the nature and extent of Christian captivity, but 
also of North Africa and Islam more generally.46 The recycling of negative stereotypes 
was perpetuated by ‘fear, anger, ignorance, and prejudice’.47 But, it was also driven 
by simple desperation; accounts of captivity could be deliberately exaggerated in 
order to engender action by the community and state authorities.48 Perceptions 
about the extent of the problem of Muslim corsairing, the poor treatment of captives, 
and the associated risks of apostasy became sufficiently important in the minds of 
Britons to force Charles I to respond to the concerns of captives, their families, and 
merchants by recalling Parliament in November 1640. After much deliberation the 
outcome was the passage in December 1641 of An Act for the Releife of the Captives 
Taken by Turkish Moorish and Other Pirates and to Prevent the Taking of Others in 
Time to Come.49 Although there clearly was a political dimension to the drafting of 
the legislation intended to embarrass the king, as argued by Matar,50 the language 
which it employs is instructive in revealing attitudes towards Barbary which prevailed 
among members of the political class at the time. The Act begins by recalling the:  
many thousands of your majesties good and loving subjects with 
theire ships and goods have of late beene taken surprised and taken 
at sea … and some of them to free themselves of the cruell and 
barbarous usage of those pirats have renounced the Christian 
religion and turned Turks and others … are in great danger thereby 
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45 Ibid., p. 166. 
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48 Robert C. Davis, 'Counting European Slaves on the Barbary Coast', Past & Present (2001), pp. 101–
102; Colley, Captives, p. 57. 
49 Matar, Britain and Barbary, pp. 65–67. 
50 Ibid., pp. 67–68. 
97 
 
to lose theire lives unlesse they they shall alsoe foresake the 
Christian religion.51 
 
But it is also evident that the supporters of the legislation were as concerned about 
the impact of piracy on Mediterranean trade as they were about Britons suffering in 
captivity and ‘turning Turk’; piracy not only disrupted trade, but also led to a loss of 
‘expert and skillful mariners’, which was both prejudicial to the interests of 
merchants, ‘and hurtfull to the trade and merchandise of your majesties 
dominions’.52 The excoriation of Barbary ‘pirats’ was a phenomenon not just driven 
by moral indignation concerning the risks of captivity and apostasy, it also had a 
significant economic dimension. 
 
2.2. Inter-cultural Learning and the Development of New Perspectives 
 
Notwithstanding ongoing predation on English shipping and the enslavement of 
English subjects, the foundations of the traditional Barbary discourse began to break 
down over time. In this respect Colley notes a paradox created by the issue of captive 
taking: while it exacerbated hostility toward Islam, it also contributed to an 
improvement in the quality and breadth of information about the religion (and the 
societies in which it was practised for that matter), and similarly extended the level 
and complexity of contact between Britons and North Africa.53 Just as notions of 
Africa based on classical legends and imagination began to be displaced by fact from 
the middle of the sixteenth century,54 the ‘deformed image’ of Islam which had 
developed within Western Christendom also began to be seriously challenged as a 
result of growing trade and diplomacy between the Islamic and Christian states.55 The 
need to train officials and interpreters to support the management of relations with 
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the Ottoman Empire and North African states helped encourage the study of Arabic 
and establishment of chairs in Arabic studies at Oxford and Cambridge during the 
1630s.56 But perhaps more so, the study of Arabic in Europe was driven by the 
particular interests of antiquarian scholars. First, there was renewed interest in Arab-
Islamic learning, and a desire to directly acccess the works of the Arab-Muslim 
philosophers and scientists which had so impressed and inspired their medieval 
forebears. Second, there was a desire to explore biblical texts and other literature 
written in Arabic to gain a better understanding of the Old Testament.57 
 
A new approach to the study of Islam was emerging that was part of a fundamental 
change to the study of history, which among other things included the publication of 
texts about the religion.58  An English translation of a French version of the Qur’an, 
The Alcoran of Mahomet, was published in 1649. Alexander Ross, to whom 
responsibility for the translation has traditionally been attributed, claimed in the 
‘Caveat’ to the text that the purpose of its publication was to reveal to the public the 
absurdity of the Qur’an and reinforce the truth of Christianity. However, it has been 
argued that its actual translator was Thomas Ross, and that he or the backers of the 
project were, in fact, motivated by profit rather than piety, aware of the likely public 
interest in the translated text; if so, their expectations were met, as a second edition 
was published later that year. The number of other works on the Qur’an proposed by 
English Arabists during the first half of the century highlights the widespread interest 
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in Islam which existed at the time, including a belief in the need to base the study of 
Arabic and Islamic culture on an understanding of the Qur’an. 59  
 
In the same year, the Orientalist and religious scholar Edward Pococke produced his 
Specimen Historiae Arabum. Pococke had been chaplain to Levant Company 
merchants at Aleppo between 1630 and 1636, and while he does not appear to have 
greatly enjoyed the experience of living there, it did prove to be an informative period 
in his intellectual development and understanding of Islam: according to one 
correspondent at the time, his sole reason for staying was that he had ‘made Arabb 
his mistresse’.60 To one of the editions of the Specimen Historiae Arabum Pococke 
included three hundred pages of notes which provided ‘a large account of the true 
opinions of the Mahometans’ seeking, where appropriate ‘to do them justice, by 
vindicating them from such things as have been fasten’d upon them without 
sufficient ground’.61 The text continued to be an authoritative source for later writers 
on Islam for a century and a half, and the new understanding of Islam promoted by 
people such as Pococke was extended by subsequent orientalists who wrote in 
modern vernaculars, making this knowledge accessible to a wider, less academic 
audience. 62  
 
One such person was the physician, polymath, and outspoken author Henry Stubbe 
(1632–1676). Stubbe was even less circumspect in proclaiming the rationality of 
Islam, which is perhaps why his manuscript on the subject was unattributed to him; 
a number of manuscript copies were produced, but it remained unpublished until the 
early twentieth century.  In Account of the Rise and Progress of Mahometanism with 
the Life of Mahomet and the Vindication of Him and His Religion from the Calumnies 
of Christians, written sometime between 1671 and 1676, Stubbe made what were 
controversial claims for the time: that Islam was not a religion ‘clogging men’s faith’ 
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with notions ‘which are often contrary to the dictates of reason and common sense … 
nor loading them with the performance of many troublesome, expensive, and 
superstitious ceremonies’.63 Notwithstanding the positive insights of men such as 
Pococke and Stubbe, the focus of most Islamic scholarship in England in the 
seventeenth century was the traditional historical study of religion, with greater 
importance placed on knowledge of Muhammad and his teachings, rather than on 
the traditional and current religious practices of Muslims. Nevertheless, while 
perspectives on Muhammad and the Qur’an which prevailed among academics in the 
seventeenth century continued to be heavily influenced by medieval polemic, it was 
becoming recognised that Muslims were neither implicitly hypocritical or cruel.64  
 
But increasing familiarity with Islam and Islamicate65 societies could also provide 
other insights which challenged other long held beliefs.  While Britons may have 
generally held firm to their belief in the superiority of Christianity, some could also 
view the achievements of Islam and its civilisation with admiration, and even awe. 
During the course of the seventeeth century increasing numbers of Britons and other 
Europeans came to acknowledge and respect Islamic learning, the extent of Islamic 
empires and their military power, and the fact that Muslims followed a religion that 
was not only monotheistic and widespread, but also possessed a demonstrated 
power to convert.66 As a consequence, according to Colley, it became a ‘part of polite 
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British culture’ to have some familiarity with Islam.67 Even the aforementioined 
Francis Knight, who had spent seven years as a slave in Algiers, came to appreciate 
and acknowledge the wonders possessed of the city he at first decried as sinful and 
barbaric. 
 
The evident increase in interest among educated Britons concerning Islam, and 
changes in the way they responded to it, during the course of the seventeenth 
century was informed by Barbary captivity, commercial relations, and scholarly belief 
in the value of an informed understanding of Islam, rather than the desire for 
conquest.68 This is undoubtedly true, but captivity and commerce not only 
contributed to improved understanding among Britons of Islam qua Islam, but 
together with diplomatic relations they also facilitated the acquisition among Britons 
of wider cultural understanding of Islamicate societies. As shown in chapter 1 and will 
be discussed further in chapter 3, this was particularly evident in the case of Morocco: 
between the 1550s and the occupation of Tangier in 1662, the two countries enjoyed 
close and generally amicable commercial and political relations which provided 
Britons with detailed insight into the country, and its culture, religion, society, and 
politics. The recognition of the benefits of commercial and political cooperation 
helped marginalise the impact of religious, cultural, and ethnic difference, at least 
among government officials and merchants. This response was chiefly borne out of 
pragmatism in the pursuit of essentially partisan interest. However, the greater 
tolerance which was engendered, together with the knowledge that had accrued 
from experiential engagement, did enable conventional Barbary and Islamic 
stereotypes to be challenged, and a more genuine, positive understanding of 
Morocco and its people to develop.69  
Despite continuing popular concerns about Barbary piracy and enslavement, and 
about general hostility of Muslims toward Christians, more enlightened 
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Historicising Concepts of Discourse', SOAS Journal of Graduate Research, 1 (2005), p. 12. 
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representations of Morocco  could find their way into wider public discourse, at times 
as a consequence of incidents which also contributed to the perpetuation of 
prejudicual attitudes. Only a year after Charles Fitzgeffry delivered his scathing attack 
on Muslims inspired by the activities of corsairs, it was the release of Britons held at 
Salé and negotiation of a treaty that resulted in the sultan of Morocco deciding to 
send an ambassador to England in 1637. A pamphlet, The Arrivall and Intertainements 
of the Embassador, lauded the visit of the sultan’s envoy, and presented Britons with 
a very different perspective on the Moroccan people and their religion.70  
Undoubtedly, one reason for the official and popular enthusiasm which the visit 
occasioned was the release of the captives, and the promise of the cessation of 
predation on English shipping and coastal villages by the ‘Sallee Rovers’. But the 
pamphlet also reveals the existence of an ideology and epistemology which provided 
the public with another way to conceptualise relations with that part of Barbary 
represented by Morocco: one grounded in the experience of long standing political 
and commercial relations between the two countries, which elicited a more 
sympathetic and informed understanding of Moroccan society and its cultural and 
religious practices. Muhammad may have been a ‘false prophet’, but the author 
acknowledges the piety and morality of Moroccan Muslims, and in doing so 
recognises a shared humanity between the people of the two nations.71  Rather than 
conflict and difference, the author emphasises concord and commensurability.  
 
The influence that singular events could have on the promotion in the public sphere 
of more positive representations of Morocco and Moroccans is again demonstrated 
in accounts of the visit of another ambassador almost five decades later. Muhammad 
bin Haddu had been dispatched by Mawlay Ismā‘īl to meet with Charles II to resolve 
remaining issues concerning a treaty following the concerted, but unsuccessful, 
assaults by the Moroccan army against Tangier in 1680.72 Despite the bloody events 
which had preceeded it, and public expressions of anti-Moroccan sentiment and 
                                                        
70 The Arrivall and Intertainements of the Embassador, Alkaid Jaurar Ben Abdella, with His Associate, 
Mr. Robert Blake from the High and Mighty Prince, Mulley Mahamed Sheque, Emperor of Morocco, 
King of Fesse, and Suss  (London, 1637). 
71 Ibid., pp. 35–40. 
72 On these events and the negotiations, see chap. 6 of this thesis.  
103 
 
jingoism which had accompanied them,73 the ambassador’s arrival in January 1682 
was greeted with surprising enthusiasm, at least within official and elite social circles.  
 
The ambassador’s entrance into London did not attract the same fanfare and crowds 
that greeted his predecessor, but he was still accorded the honour of being 
conducted in the king’s state coach, accompanied by a large contingent of members 
of the nobility and other dignitaries.74 The excitement associated with the visit was 
undoubtedly fostered by expectations of a resolution to the stand-off at Tangier, but 
also inspired by genuine interest in this representative of faraway Barbary, whose 
bearing and conduct clearly impressed many observers. Narcissus Luttrell recorded 
that: ‘The court are very pleased with [him], and he with them, he proveing a person 
of the blood royall. And very intelligent in most matters’.75  
 
Luttrell’s fellow diarist Sir John Evelyn observed upon first seeing him that bin Haddu 
‘was a handsome person, well featured, of a wise look, subtle, and extremely civil’.76 
Evelyn goes on to describe the exemplary behaviour of the ambassador and his 
retinue at a dinner, and, as do Luttrell and others, remarks on bin Haddu’s popularity 
among members of English elite society, as well as the Moroccans’ impressive 
displays of horsemanship and martial skills.77 Compared to bin Haddu, the Russian 
ambassador ‘behaved himself like a clown’, opined Evelyn; the Moroccan may have 
been a heathen, but he was, in Evelyn’s estimation, a ‘civil heathen’.78 His positive 
opinion of bin Haddu and his attendants is even more marked when compared to his 
assessment of two ambassadors from the East Indies in London at the same time, 
whom he describes as ‘very hard-favoured, and much resembling in countenance 
                                                        
73 See discussion of the responses in chapter 6 of this thesis. 
74 CSPD: Charles II, 1 January–31 December 1682, ed. F. H. Blackburne Daniell, 28 vols., vol. 23 (London, 
1932), p. 7, entry for 3 January 1681/2; Narcissus Luttrell, A Brief Historical Relation of State Affairs 
from September 1678 to April 1714, 6 vols., vol. I (Oxford, 1857), p. 155. Routh provides a reasonably 
good account of the embassy and the response to it in E. M. G. Routh, Tangier: England's Lost Atlantic 
Outpost, 1661–1684  (London, 1912), pp. 223–228. 
75 Luttrell, A Brief Historical Relation, I, p. 158. 
76 John Evelyn, The Diary of John Evelyn, ed. William Bray, 2 vols., vol. II ([London], 1901), p. 163, entry 
for 11 January 1681/2. 
77 Ibid., II, p. 164, entry for 24 January 1681/2; Luttrell, A Brief Historical Relation, I, pp. 158, 160; P. 
Wynne to Henry Sheres, Whitehall, 30 January 1681/2, BL, Add. MS 19872, f. 81r. 
78 Evelyn, The Diary of John Evelyn, II, p. 164, entry for 24 January 1681/82. 
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some sort of monkeys’.79 While Evelyn gives only a cursory description of the 
‘Moorish habit’ of the former, he provides a much more detailed critique of the 
physical appearance and dress, of the latter, which is less than flattering: he does not 
appear to have discerned the same level of ethnic and cultural difference with the 
Moroccans as he did with the ‘exotic guests’ from Java.80 But in both cases their 
religion appears to have been of little concern to Evelyn; his only comments on the 
subject were to note that Javanese royalty had in recent times converted to Islam, 
and that one of the Javanese ambassadors had been to Mecca, and was ‘deemed a 
holy man’.81  
 
The difference in Evelyn’s assessment of the two groups perhaps reflects the extent 
to which Moroccan Moors had became a familiar part of the cultural landscape for 
some Britons by this time.82 His observations also reinforce the way in which Islam 
too was becoming more understood and accepted in England. Certainly, neither bin 
Haddu’s ethnicity nor religion deterred important institutions of the English 
establishment from honouring him. During his stay he was admitted as an honorary 
member of the Royal Society,83 was received and entertained by the vice-chancellors 
and masters of the universities of Cambridge and Oxford,84 and was admitted as a 
member of Lincoln’s Inn.85 Nevertheless, there were others who were not so 
enthusiastic about meeting the Moroccans; in the estimatation of the mayor and 
alderman of Cambridge, the occasion of the ambassador’s arrival in the town was not 
worthy of their official presence, as the visitors from Barbary were not of sufficient 
‘quality’.86 
                                                        
79 Ibid., II, p. 169, entry for 19 June 1682. 
80 Ibid., II, pp. 163, 169–170, entries for 11 January 1681/2 and 19 June 1682. 
81 Ibid., II, p. 169, entry for 19 June 1682. 
82 On the domestic exposure of Britons to Ottoman Turks, North Africans, and sub-Saharan Africans 
during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, see Jones, Othello's Countrymen, pp. 11–13; Matar, 
Turks, Moors and Englishmen in the Age of Discovery  (New York, 1999), chap. 1, esp. p. 39; Kaufmann, 
Black Tudors: The Untold Story  (London, 2017), passim. 
83 Evelyn,The Diary of John Evelyn, II, p. 169, entry for 31 May 1682. 
84 CSPD, 1682, pp. 117, 222, entries for 11 March and 30 May 1682; Samuel Newton, The Diary of 
Samuel Newton, Alderman of Cambridge (1662–1717), ed. J. E. Foster  (Cambridge, 1890), pp. 82–83; 
Luttrell, A Brief Historical Relation, I, pp. 176, 190.  
85 Luttrell, A Brief Historical Relation, I, p. 169. 
86 Samuel Newton, The Diary of Samuel Newton, p. 83. 
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Aside from the possible slight by the burghers of Cambridge, the diarists are silent 
about any discontent associated with bin Haddu’s visit. However, a poem published 
in February of that year, which is effusive in its praise of the ambassador, alludes to 
the existence of disaffection with the presence of the Moroccans among the common 
people of London, chastising the uncivil behaviour of the ignorant ‘multitude’ toward 
a man ‘That out of love comes to us about Tangier’.87 The writer is keen to placate 
any insult felt by bin Haddu over the incident, beseeching him to ‘let it pass over’, and 
not ‘record it with your good red oker’. This unattributed work was quite possibly 
sponsored by the English authorities to help counter negative sentiment arising from 
the visit which might have compromised the critical negotiations that would 
determine not only the future of Anglo-Moroccan relations but also the fate of 
English Tangier. Clearly, not all Britons were prepared to leave old hostilities and 
prejudices behind in the interests of a new era of peaceful relations.  
 
The three Moroccan ambassadorial visits undertaken between 1600 and 1682 
provided a means for Britons, possibly for the first time, to see Moors in the flesh, 
and in a reassuringly safe environment. In addition to the written testimony of 
observers, there are also visual artifacts from these visits which provide insights into 
how these representatives from Barbary may have been perceived by Britons who 
encountered them. Portraits of Abd al-Wahid al-Annuri — who was Ahmad al-
Mansūr’s ambassador to Elizabeth I in 1600 — Jaudar ben Abdellah, and Muhammad 
ben Haddu (figs. 4–6) were produced under different circumstances and by different 
artists.88 The works were also, possibly, commissioned for different purposes. Aside 
from these factors, it is generally accepted that images do not necessarily depict 
objective reality, but rather their reality is mediated through the personal 
perspectives — both conscious and unconcious — of the artist, as well as through 
those of the viewer, including the retrospective judgement of the historian. Function, 
                                                        
87 A Congratulatory Poem Dedicated to His Excellency, the Ambassador, from the Emperor of Fez and 
Morocco  ([London], 1682), pp. 1–2. 
88 See chap. 1 for details of al-Annuri’s visit. Bernard Harris provides a useful discussion of the visit in 
'A Portrait of a Moor', in Catherine M. S. Alexander and Stanley Wells, eds., Shakespeare and Race 
(Cambridge, 2000), pp. 23–36. An account of ben Abdellah’s visit is provided in chap. 3. 
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context, and personal bias complicate the analysis of historical images to discern the 
contemporary mentalities associated with them.89 However, as Peter Burke argues, 
it is more difficult for the artist to obfuscate. Unlike writers who can conceal their 
true attitudes, the act of physical representation requires artists to adopt a more 
committed position, where they are required to represent ‘individuals from other 
cultures as either like or unlike themselves’.90 Informed by these considerations one 
scholar has analysed two of these portraits for signs of how English attitudes towards 
Moroccans may have changed in the eight decades which separate them, and has 
argued that there is a distinct, but ambiguous, change in treatment between them.  
91  
 
Rather than Abd al-Wahid al-Annuri’s image possessing a ‘stern face and fierce look’ 
indicative of the painter feeling alienated from, and intimidated by, his subject, as 
proposed by Matar,92  J. A. O. C. Brown instead suggests ‘the hint of a wry smile’, the 
artist seeking to convey the strangeness of his subject, yet at the same time 
presenting him realistically, and with respect.93 I concur with Brown. Al-Nurri’s image 
does not convey a sense of threat; it is perhaps enigmatic, conveying some sense of 
difference, of foreignness, but it is not insensitive.94 The treatment accorded ben 
Abdala is similar in this respect, although this is perhaps less surprising given his 
Portuguese origin.95 On the other hand, Brown sees the depiction of ben Haddu as 
                                                        
89 For a useful discussion on issues relating to the use of images in historical research see Burke, 
Eyewitnessing: The Uses of Images as Historical Evidence  (London, 2001). 
90 Ibid., p. 124. 
91 Brown, '‘Orientalism’, ‘Occidentalism’', pp. 6–7. 
92 Matar, Turks, Moors and Englishmen, p. 34. 
93 Brown, '‘Orientalism’, ‘Occidentalism’', p. 7. Virginia Mason Vaughan similarly interprets the image 
as being that ‘of a man of dignity and high status who merited respect’. See Virginia Mason Vaughan, 
'Representing the King of Morocco', in Brinda Charry and Gitanjali Shahani, eds., Emissaries in Early 
Modern Literature and Culture: Mediation, Transmission, Traffic, 1550–1700 (Farnham, UK, 2009), p. 
84. 
94 However, I do not accept Brown’s suspicion that the emptiness of the background in the painting is 
significant, suggesting ‘a sense of distance and fear in the mind of the artist’, or the artist’s inability to 
relate his subject to conventional categories or symbols. Such treatment in Tudor portraits was not 
uncommon: the piece is in fact reminiscent of a Holbein ‘costume piece’. According to Ellis 
Waterhouse this style, with its ‘tendency to flat pattern, with elaborate dresses and aloof, inscrutable 
figures, persisted in England right up to the reign of James I’. See Ellis Waterhouse, Painting in England 
1530–1790  (Harmondsworth, UK, 1978). 
95 It was known that the ambassador was born in Portugal, taken captive at the age of eight, and 
subsequently, ‘by command…hee distesticled, or Eunuch’d’. See The Arrivall and Intertainements of 
the Embassador, p. 5. 
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being ‘Europeanised and romanticised’, the ambassador being contained ‘within 
preconceived European categories’,96 with the trope of the warrior-prince perhaps 
the most apposite; an interpretation which appears more apt than the image’s being 
an invocation of belief by the artist in the ‘notion of the Moor as an energetically 
violent figure’.97  
 
But Brown is unclear as to what he believes these differences in treatment mean in 
terms of changes in English attitudes toward Moroccans during the period. In the 
present author’s view they highlight two important points. First, all three portraits 
humanised their subjects and, in doing so negated a key element of alterity implicit 
in the traditional Barbary discourse. Second, the assimilation of ben Haddu into 
English cultural norms indicates a preparedness by some Britons by this time to 
accept Moroccans, at least some, as equals. Such acceptance is evident in the 
ambassador’s reception in England, and in the previously mentioned poem which was 
composed for him: 
Serene sir, you’r welcome to the nation, 
A man of honour, and splendid in your station, 
Whose noble worth, and ever-matchles fame, 
Does cause the vulgar to applaud the same 
… 
And when you’r gone, this we will proclaim, 
You left behind you a sweet and rosie name.98 
While North Africans and sub-Saharan Africans were evidently not an uncommon 
sight in the streets and ports of Tudor England, particularly in London, the critic 
Bernard Harris remarked that the painting of al-Annuri ‘presents ‘ocular proof’ of 
what the Elizabethans saw as a Moor of rank’.99 The same can be said of the paintings 
of ben Abdala and ben Haddu for later generations. The visits of these three 
                                                        
96 Brown, '‘Orientalism’, ‘Occidentalism’', p. 7. 
97 See Karim Bejjit, 'Encountering the Infidels: Restoration Images of the Moors', in Working Papers on 
the Web, vol. 7 (2004), at http://extra.shu.ac.uk/wpw/morocco/Beljjitt/Beljjitt.htm, under II– 
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98 A Congratulatory Poem, pp. 1–2. 
99  Harris, 'A Portrait of a Moor', p. 23. Harris in fact appears to have been the first critic to speculate 
whether Shakespeare’s depiction of Othello may have been modelled on al-Nurri. On the presence of 
North Africans and sub-Saharan Africans in England see n. 81 in this chapter. 
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ambassadors may not have significantly negated any sense of incompatibility 
generally held by Britons about Moroccans,100 but they, perhaps, did help to 
rehabilitate the image of the Moor as someone not too dissimilar to themselves, and 
worthy of some level of respect. Such visits remind us, as one scholar has put it, of 
‘the political forces that frame a society’s ‘racial imagination’ just as effectively as the 
literary ones’,101 with another similarly observing that how the Islamic Other was 
judged ‘depended on not only ideological stereotype, but also on the particularities 
of diplomatic liaison and changing allegiance’.102 
 
Further evidence of changing popular attitudes towards Moroccans during the 
period, founded on an increasing acceptance of a shared humanity — as well as a 
further demonstration of the way events could effect unexpected changes to 
perceptions — can also be observed in a surprising source. Despite the ferocity of the 
siege of Tangier in 1680, and the patriotic sentiment it elicited among Britons, a ballad 
which was composed for a company of Scottish grenadiers on their way to defend 
Tangier at that time is remarkable for the moderate way it represents the enemy. 
While such a song could be expected to utilise hostile imagery to motivate the men, 
in fact, it does not denigrate their adversaries in any way, labelling them only as 
‘proud Mores’, presumably because of their successes in besieging the town.   The 
writer of the song wanted the grenadiers to help ‘[b]eat the Mores from Tangiers’, 
but obviously did not see that it was necessary to vilify them using traditional 
ethnological or religious epithets.103 Instead, he was prepared to accept them on 
their own terms, as a proud people, and worthy adversaries, perceptions well 
established by this time as a result of the Tangier garrison’s earlier encounters with 
them.  However, another ballad composed around the same time, and also intended 
                                                        
100 Harris in ibid., p. 35, believes that for Londoners, al-Nurri’s visit emphasised the ‘nature of the deep 
difference between themselves and their visitors’. He may well be correct, but such a generalisation 
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101 Margo Hendricks, 'Surveying 'Race' in Shakespeare', in Catherine M. S. Alexander and Stanley Wells, 
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102 Jonathan Bate, 'Introduction', in Jonathan Bate and Eric Rasmussen, eds., Othello (New York, 2009), 
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Ebsworth, ed., The Roxburghe Ballads, 9 vols., vol. VII (Hertford, UK, 1893), pp. 528, 532–533; Routh, 
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to inspire the fervour of soldiers departing for Tangier, does resort to negative 
stereotypes of the Moor, referring to them as ‘swarthy devils’ and ‘barbarians’, and 
appealing to jingoistic sentiment in response to the garrison’s recent defeats.104 Once 
again, more enlightened perspectives coexisted alongside older prejudices and 
insecurities. 
 
 
 
                                                        
104 The English Courage Undaunted: Or, Advice to those Brave Valiant Blades Now Going to Tangier, to 
Maintain the Old English Courage against the Moors (London, 1680), cited in Margarette Lincoln, 
'Samuel Pepys and Tangier, 1662–1684', Huntington Library Quarterly, 77 (2014), pp. 423–424. 
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Fig. 4 Portrait of Abd al-Wahid al-Annuri, by unknown artist, 1600.  
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Fig. 5 Portrait of Jaudar ben Abdellah from frontispiece of The Arrivall and Intertainements 
of the Embassador, by G. Glover, 1637. 
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Fig. 6 Portrait of Muhammad ben Haddu, by Sir Godfrey Kneller and Jan Wyck, 1684. 
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2.3. The (Disruptive) Influence of Theatre 
 
One medium that has not yet been addressed is theatre. It is instructive to consider 
the influence that it had during the period in shaping the perceptions of Britons 
towards Morocco as not only was it a means of cultural production readily accessible 
to the illiterate, but it was also potentially influential among all levels of early modern 
society. It is cited frequently by scholars as evidence of prevalent attitudes which 
existed among Britons about Moors and North Africa, but frequently without 
sufficient explication of implicit themes and meanings, consideration of the 
receptivity of the audience, and its general influence in society.  
 
Of particular relevance to this thesis is the observation by Daniel Vitkus of the role 
the theatre played in English culture in ‘adapting, articulating, and disseminating 
foreignness’; drama enabled differences between peoples — their appearance, 
behaviours, and beliefs — to be imported into society, and subsequently ‘distorted, 
mimicked, and displayed’.105 But, according to Vitkus it was not the representation of 
the exotic that principally occupied the English, but rather the various types of 
exchange which could occur with, or between these other cultures. In this way the 
theatre performed a pedagogical function providing an ‘imaginary geography’ in 
which examples of different actions and reactions could be played out, thereby 
providing ‘scripts for the practice and performance of cultural behaviour’.106 
Consequently, given its increasing political and commercial importance to England 
from the last quarter of the sixteenth century, it is not surprising that the 
Mediterranean world features so prominently in plays written during the late 
Elizabethan and Jacobean periods.107 In particular, D’Amico has shown how the close 
commercial and diplomatic relations which developed between Morocco and 
England during the Elizabethan period drew the attention of English playwrights and 
shaped their representation of the Moor on the English stage.108 Furthermore, Eldred 
                                                        
105 Vitkus, Turning Turk, p. 29. 
106 Ibid.  
107 On the importance of the Mediterranean to England, see chapter 1 of this thesis. On why the 
Mediterranean was of particular interest to English playwrights, see Vitkus, Turning Turk, pp. 29–30.  
108 D'Amico, The Moor in English Renaissance Drama  (Tampa, FL, 1991), esp. part 1. 
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Jones suggests that North Africa served as a useful setting for their work because it 
allowed ‘the dramatic effectiveness of the Negro’s blackness’ to be combined ‘with 
the excitement and conflicts of the North African scene’ conveyed through 
increasingly common published tales of travel and adventure.109   
 
As has been demonstrated in the preceding sections of this chapter, perceptions of 
the Moor in the imaginative geography of early modern Britons were constructed 
through the interplay of contemporary understandings of racial, ethnological, and 
religious difference. Matar comments on how the image of the Moor in English drama 
has attracted the attention of scholars interested in its literary derivation, issues of 
European racial and cultural identity, and Christian-Muslim relations.110  Between 
1587 and 1630 there were at least seventeen plays, masques and pageants composed 
in England which feature the image of the Moor, Moor-like figures,  or which evoked 
North Africa or Africa more generally.111 These were part of a much more extensive 
corpus of compositions produced for the stage during the late sixteenth century and 
seventeenth century set within the Mediterranean or Near East, and concerned with 
issues of racial, cultural and religious difference.112 It is outside the scope of this study 
to survey these works in detail. Rather an overview of general observations and some 
of the more insightful perspectives provided by critics on the subject should suffice 
                                                        
109 Jones, Othello's Countrymen, p. 15. 
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reference points — composition, first performance, or publication — although frequently the nature 
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112 Shakespeare alone wrote twenty plays with a Mediterranean setting. See Vitkus, Turning Turk, p. 
39. Furthermore, Burton in Traffic and Turning: Islam and English Drama, 1579–1624  (Newark, NJ, 
2005), p. 11, asserts that between 1579 and 1624 there were in excess of sixty dramatic works 
produced in England which feature Islamic characters, or associated themes or settings.  
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to highlight the ways in which drama may have influenced the attitudes of  Britons in 
the seventeenth century toward Moroccans and Morocco. 
 
Matar has argued that the creation of Muslim alterity in England was principally 
undertaken within the context of literary (by which he means principally dramatic 
literature) and theological discourse. He asserts  ‘it was the stereotype developed in 
literature that played the greatest role in shaping the anti-Muslim national 
consciousness’ in England, as it did in Spain, Portugal, France and Italy. According to 
Matar, in England ‘Eleazer and Othello became the defining literary representation 
of the “Moor,” and Bajazeth, Ithamore, and Amureth of the “Turk”’: as long as the 
authors of such works, such as Marlowe and Shakespeare, ‘were viewed, rightly, as 
supreme icons of European imagination, the polarization with Islam and Muslims 
could only continue’.113 It is an astounding claim which, aside from failing to 
demonstrate the extent of the popular influence of the works of playwrights such as 
Marlowe and Shakespeare in the Jacobean and Caroline periods, also overlooks the 
diverse perspectives which had began to develop in English society about Islam and 
the Muslim Other. As remarked by Linda McJannet in relation to Matar’s assertion, 
in making such generalisations in order ‘to arrive at a “bottom line” about cultural 
matters’, scholars risk losing sight of evidence to the contrary, and entrenching the 
very prejudices and ideologies which we seek to challenge. 114 A more nuanced 
approach is required if we are to attempt to understand how “Moorish” characters 
and themes developed by English playwrights may have actually been interpreted by 
contemporary audiences and readers. In this respect, while D’Amico acknowledges 
that the representations of the Moor on the Elizabethan stage drew ‘on certain racial, 
religious, and cultural preconceptions that form part of the Western tradition’, he 
insists it is important to identify the ideas and experiences which shaped these 
representations in order to understand how a playwright might have exploited such 
preconceptions.115 
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Vitkus has observed that with their increasing exposure to foreign cultures during the 
‘Age of Exploration’ the English were subject to a powerful set of contradictory 
perspectives about other cultures and peoples. They were ‘both demonized and 
exalted, admired and condemned’, and the resulting xenophobic and xenophilic 
tendencies of English culture were played out on the early modern stage.116 The 
English harboured anxieties about the Mediterranean as a site of transgression, of 
potentially contaminating cultural exchange, but being unable to fully subvert this 
process they often found it necessary (and even useful) to accommodate cultural, 
ethnic, and religious difference, and it was such developments which were keenly 
observed by Elizabethan and early Stuart playwrights, and articulated by them in their 
work.117 Moreover, the Moor and Barbary were also often used by playwrights as 
foils and metaphorical devices to enable them to explore other contemporary 
concerns about domestic cultural, societal and religious developments. 
 
Thomas Heywood’s play The Fair Maid of the West, Part I (1600–1603) and Part II 
(1630?) provides an instructive example, having been described as ‘a  particularly 
useful mirror of English attitudes at the turn of the century’.118 The play is not pure 
fantasy; it demonstrates that Heywood had some familarity with the history of North 
Africa, the region’s socio-political structure, and understanding of Anglo-Moroccan 
relations as they stood at the time it was composed. In this respect there are parallels 
which can reasonably be drawn between the play and the relationship which existed 
between Queen Elizabeth I and Mawlay al-Mansūr, and English hopes of establishing 
beneficial relations with Morocco.119 At one level that may be true, but the play 
displays far greater thematic complexity. As argued by D’Amico, Heywood does not 
use either part of the play to expand the repertoire of the representation of the 
Moor, or significantly exploit existing stereotypes. Rather, he uses the setting of 
Morocco as a foil for English court life, and to explore the outcomes which arise when 
                                                        
116 Vitkus, Turning Turk, p. 22. 
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different socio-cultural perspectives meet.120 Although the Moroccan sultan in the 
play, Mullisheg, may be subject to some racial slurs, and is perhaps stereotyped as a 
lustful Moor in his pursuit of the English female protagonist, Besse, he is also 
portrayed as an essentially good, if tyrannical, ruler; and at times noble.121 There is 
clear ambivalence in Heywood’s treatment of Mullisheg.122 But aside from this, as 
D’Amico points out, the themes of power, lust and emasculation played out in 
Mullisheg’s court would have been understood as not being unique to Morocco.123  
 
In fact, other critics have also reflected on the way in which contemporary issues in 
English society concerning class, sexuality, gender, and national identity are evident 
in the subtext of plays such as The Fair Maid of the West, and Philip Massinger’s The 
Renegado (1624).124 Consequently, while Muslim women could be negatively 
portrayed as wanton, sexual predators, and the antithesis of non-Muslim characters, 
the construction of these characters had less to do with perceptions of otherness, 
than in developments regarding the discourse on gender, and varied according to 
prevailing concerns in this respect. For this and other reasons, characterisations of 
Turkish and Moorish women both on the stage and in travel accounts were notably 
ambivalent.125 
 
Arguably, the aspect of contact with Islam that most disturbed the English was the 
threat of religious conversion.126 Burton observes that while the issue of ‘turning Turk’ 
was a subject often addressed by English writers, rather than responding directly to 
the actual perceived threat, they ‘invariably turned the subject on its head’, often by 
                                                        
120 D'Amico, The Moor, pp. 89–91, 96–97. 
121 See, for example, Part I, 4.1 (pp. 46–47, 53–55), and 5.1 (p. 61) of Thomas Heywood, The Fair Maid 
of the West. Or, A Girle Worth Gold  (London, 1631). This edition contains both parts of the play. 
122 D’Amico refers to Mullisheg wavering ‘between lust and nobility’. See The Moor, p. 85. Similarly, 
see also Jones, Othello's Countrymen, pp. 19, 116. Cf. Matar, Britain and Barbary, p. 33. 
123 D'Amico, The Moor, p. 97. 
124 See, for example, Howard, 'An English Lass', esp. p. 102; Barbara Fuchs, 'Faithless Empires: Pirates, 
Renegadoes, and the English Nation', ELH, 67 (2000), esp. p. 61. 
125 Lamiya Mohamed Almas, 'The Women of the Early Modern Turk and Moor Plays', PhD Thesis 
(University of Minnesota, 2009), pp. 153–155. 
126 Jonathan Burton, 'English Anxiety and the Muslim Power of Conversion: Five Perspectives on 
'Turning Turk' in Early Modern Texts', Journal for Early Modern Cultural Studies, 2 (2002), p. 52; Vitkus, 
Turning Turk, pp. 77–78. 
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either turning apostasy into comedy, or treating it as a providential ‘saintly trial’.127 
He notes that insistence on the existence of a providential order was an important 
structuring device in various literary genres, including travel accounts. Use of 
providentialism extended beyond polemic, providing the English with a means to 
understand the course of events in the world, particularly in times of adversity and 
cataclysm. It allowed such events to be understood as tests of faith, and 
demonstrations of its power, providing reassurance of the righteousness of 
Protestantism in the face of Islamic hegemony.128 Recourse to providentialism is 
evident in a number of the personal accounts that are examined in this study.  
 
However, Burton demonstrates how plays, such as The Fair Maid of the West, and 
The Renegado, use comedy rather than reliance on predestination to mediate 
concerns about conversion. Both these plays involve clownish servants who seek 
preferment while in the court of a North African Muslim ruler, and are subsequently 
threatened with castration, circumcision, or conversion.129 Critics have interpreted 
the meaning implicit in the emasculation of Heywood’s character Clem in various 
ways: ‘punishment for social mobility’ and symbolic of the way in which the English 
viewed their relationship to other contemporary empires;130 or a warning about the 
dangers of submitting to another culture.131 But Burton argues that the comic 
element of the The Fair Maid of the West was a means to allay contemporary anxiety 
about conversion to Islam by first deconstructing the process of ‘turning Turk’, and 
then restricting the threat only to common fools, not proper Englishmen.132 
 
This review of the representation of the Moor and Barbary in early modern drama is 
admittedly cursory, but it does help reinforce several points pertinent to considering 
the impact that theatre may have had on English society in informing public 
perceptions.  The inter-articulation of domestic concerns, universal issues, traditional 
                                                        
127 Burton, 'English Anxiety', p. 59. 
128 Ibid., pp. 41–45. 
129 Ibid., pp. 52–53. 
130 Fuchs, 'Faithless Empires', pp. 61–62. 
131 D'Amico, The Moor, p. 85; Howard, 'An English Lass', p. 115. 
132 Jonathan Burton, 'English Anxiety', pp. 52–55. 
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assumptions, and new insights by English playwrights helped inform the construction 
of particular characters and relations between Christians and Muslims that 
transcended simple stereotyped representations. As noted by D’Amico, while issues 
of difference presented in plays would have been assessed by audiences against 
contemporary norms, drama ‘had the potential to force a reassessment of those 
norms and of the cultural judgement’ exemplified by the play.133 The figure of the 
Moor could be used by playwrights to reinforce traditional stereotypes and assert 
Western superiority, but conversely, could also be a means for them to challenge 
assumptions based on conventional binarisms, such as English–foreign, friend–
enemy, black–white, Christian–infidel.134 This is vividly exemplified in Othello, where 
the eponymous protagonist is possessed of an unstable spiritual identity which is 
‘neither “white” nor “black”’.135 Through the disruption of such binaries, early 
modern English playwrights left ‘a space for questioning, rethinking, reacting, and 
reconstructing’ ideas of cultural, ethnic, and religious difference.136               
 
Besides the uncertain influence which the theatrical representation of Moors and 
Barbary actually had on prevailing attitudes, another question which has to be 
considered is the extent of its impact into the seventeenth century. Following the 
accession of James I, there was both a political and imaginative withdrawal of the 
English from Barbary and the Mediterranean world more generally, evidenced by a 
decline in interest in the Moor on the stage.137 Aside from a lack of interest in the 
subject, there was also a significant change in the nature of stage productions. 
Alexander Johnston notes that while a ‘seriousness of purpose’ is evident in English 
drama between 1560 and 1625, during the reign of Charles I public theatre ‘sank to 
the portrayal of cynical violence’, and productions held for the court became ‘shallow 
                                                        
133 D'Amico, The Moor, p. 1. 
134 Ibid., pp. 2–3, 212–213; Patricia Parker, 'Preposterous Conversions: Turning Turk, and its "Pauline" 
Rerighting', Journal for Early Modern Cultural Studies, 2 (2002), p. 27; Vitkus, Turning Turk, pp. 22–24, 
30, 42–43. On the complexity and contradictory nature of images of Barbary and the Moor in early 
modern England, see also Virginia Mason Vaughan’s essay 'Representing the King of Morocco', pp. 77–
94, passim. 
135 Vitkus, Turning Turk, p. 23. 
136 Ibid., pp. 23–24. See also D'Amico, The Moor, pp. 215–216. 
137 Matar, Britain and Barbary, p. 36; Jerry Brotton, This Orient Isle: Elizabethan England and the Islamic 
World (London, 2017), pp. 298–304. 
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masques divorced from reality’.138 In a further blow to English theatre, in 1642 the 
Long Parliament ordered the closure of public theatres within the city of London, with 
the ban not being lifted until 1660.  Furthermore, rather than representing an 
expansion of their reach, the movement of Elizabethan plays from the realm of mass 
public spectacle in London to personal consumption as expensive printed reading 
editions signalled the start of their long restriction to a more elite audience. For these 
reasons it is unlikely that drama once again played a significant role in reinforcing, let 
alone shaping, popular sentiment toward Moors and Barbary until the 1670s, with 
the appearance of a series of plays featuring Moors or North African settings. 
 
John Dryden’s two-part play, The Conquest of Granada, first performed in 1670–
1671, was followed by Elkanah Settle’s The Empress of Morocco (1673), Aphra Behn’s 
Abdelazer, or the Moor's Revenge (1677), and Settle’s The Heir of Morocco (1682). 
This resurgence of interest is likely to have been, at least partly, inspired by the 
English occupation of Tangier, and developments concerning it, particularly sporadic 
attacks by Moroccans.139 But Karim Bejjit observes a paradox: despite more factual 
information about Morocco than ever before being available to Britons, the dramatic 
treatment of the Moor in plays such as The Empress of Morocco and Abdelazer 
continued to be largely based on the same themes and structures that characterised 
English Renaissance plays.140 Nevertheless, while earlier generations may have 
accepted the blurring of fact and fiction in the interests of dramatic impact, by the 
latter part of the seventeenth century Britons were clearly becoming better informed 
and less forgiving of factual error, if the ridicule suffered by Settle from his peers  over 
the perceived deficiencies of The Empress of Morocco is any indication.141 However, 
despite these flaws, Bejjit discerns a preparedness by Settle to portray Moroccans ‘in 
their intellectual and moral diversity’, not simply as foils for ‘good-natured white 
Christians’.142 Anthony Barthelemy elaborates: ‘in Settle’s Morocco plays there are 
                                                        
138 Alexandra F. Johnston, 'Tudor Drama, Theatre and Society', in Robert Tittler and Norman Jones, 
eds., A Companion to Tudor Britain (Malden, MA, 2004), p. 444. 
139 See, for example, Matar’s observations concerning this influence in Britain and Barbary, p. 145. 
140 Bejjit, 'Encountering the Infidels', under I–From Dramatic to Colonial Space. Matar in Britain and 
Barbary, pp. 145–146, 148, 161, also identifies parallels with earlier works. 
141 See discussion in Matar, Britain and Barbary, pp. 148–149. 
142 Bejjit, 'Encountering the Infidels', p. 3 of 12, and n. 7. 
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virtuous and evil Moors, forthright and duplicitous Moors. Settle’s plays present the 
range of humans we generally expect to find in drama’.143  
 
Restoration playwrights may have potentially been better informed than their 
predeccesors, but it is not evident that the period saw a ‘radical shift’ in the way in 
which Moors were perceived and represented by them as a result of the occupation 
of Tangier and the frequently hostile encounters this elicited.144 There were changes 
regarding the issues which playwright’s wrote about and the social-cultural context 
in which they did so, but there were also continuities. As was the case with their 
Elizabethan and Jacobean antecedants, Restoration drama was not necessarily 
polemical in nature, and while admittedly it could at times misinform, and convey 
and reinforce prejudicial attitudes, it could similarly destablise the traditional 
stereotypes on which it drew, and by doing so contribute to the development of a 
more diverse and nuanced discourse on Moors and Barbary.145 However, it is 
important not to overemphasise the role of theatre. It was only one medium of many 
which informed the perceptions and beliefs of early modern Britons, and it remains 
uncertain what audience members actually ‘read’ into plays and just how influential 
theatre was in reinforcing or changing attitudes about North Africa and its peoples. 
   
Conclusion 
 
Early modern Christian Europeans were the inheritors of already well entrenched, 
strongly prejudicial stereotypes concerning Islam and Muslims. But over the course 
of the sixteenth century, with new tensions arising as a result of European and 
Ottoman expansionism, the traditional Otherness of Islamic North Africa, defined as 
it was by religious and cultural difference, was further reinforced by its association 
with piracy, slavery, and overt hostility to Christianity, resulting in the development 
                                                        
143 Anthony Gerard Barthelemy, Black Face Maligned Race: The Representation of Blackness in English 
Drama from Shakespeare to Southerne  (Baton Rouge, 1987), p. 198. 
144 Cf. Bejjit, 'Encountering the Infidels', under I–From Dramatic to Colonial Space. 
145 As Stuart Sherman observes in relation to many of Dryden’s theatrical works, ‘the emphasis on 
topicality can sometimes obscure the deliberate densities and intensities of dramatic texture. See 
Sherman, 'Dryden and the Theatrical Imagination', in Steven N. Zwicker, ed., The Cambridge 
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of a specific Barbary discourse. Accounts of Christian captivity in North Africa, and 
associated fears of violence and apostasy, played an important role in promulgating 
and inculcating this discourse within Europe. The discourse reified a particularly  
negative set of images of the region and its people: North Africa was viewed as 
uncivilised, iniquitous, a sanctuary for pirates and European renegadoes, the 
antithesis of Europe, and a place unsafe for good Christians; while its Muslim 
inhabitants were variously characterised as evil, violent, cruel, deceitful, covetous, 
lustful, sodomites, effeminate, hypocrites, pagan idolators, and possessing  an 
irredeemable hatred of Christians. 
 
However, ironically, over time, captivity narratives, through the less partial insights 
their authors often provided into the customs and practices of the people who 
enslaved them, contributed to destablising the very discourse they had helped to 
construct. These insights, together with observations made by sojourning Britons 
resulting from an increasing level of diplomatic and commercial contact with the 
region, fostered progressive development of a more informed understanding about 
Islam and Islamicate societies. Furthermore, the expansion of England’s activities in 
the Mediterranean during the seventeeth century and renewal of academic 
engagement with the language, as well as with Islam and Arab-Islamic learning, 
encouraged the incorporation of Arabic studies into university curricula. These 
developments were accompanied by increasing interest in, and respect for, Muslims 
and their religion within broader circles of English polite society.  
 
Nevertheless, Morocco held a particular place in the imagination of many Britons 
with respect to Islamdom, and North Africa in particular. One very important reason 
for this was the extended period of close and generally positive relations enjoyed by 
the two peoples up until England’s occupation of Tangier. Although born out of 
pragmatic mutual needs, the cooperation which ensued, albeit often tinged with 
suspicion and involving discordant ends, did attenuate the impacts of conflict and 
religious, cultural, and ethnic difference, and the fear and anxiety which they 
engendered, allowing a less biased, more human, perspective of the Moor to emerge. 
The unique nature of this relationship attracted the attention of English playwrights. 
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Using old tropes and new insights, and navigating an imaginative geography situated 
between fact and fiction, the depiction of Barbary and the Moor on the stage became 
means by which playwrights explored a range of issues of contemporary social and 
cultural relevance through their work. By doing so, they could unsettle traditional 
paradigms and provided another medium which encouraged Britons to reassess, and 
possibly reconfigure, their attitudes towards Morocco and Moroccans, and the 
stereotypes on which they were based. 
 
Through reports and accounts based on the direct experiences of their compatriots 
and other Europeans, more informed and objective exegesis of Islam, and increasing 
public dissemination of information about them in a variety of forms, Britons began 
to have access to a wide array of alternative perspectives of North Africa and its 
peoples which challenged the binarism implicit in the Barbary discourse and other 
traditional stereotypes, providing Britons with the capacity to understand them more 
clearly on their own terms.146 As Burton observes, scholars often overlook the 
significance of the ways in which the Other can, in effect, “write back” through tales 
of encounter to reconfigure the prevailing narrative.147 Britons had long appreciated 
Barbary’s abundant natural resources and strategic location, which inspired among 
some of them imperial and colonial aspirations. But they were also becoming aware 
of the region’s cultural and ethnic diversity, socio-political complexity, and rich 
material culture and heritage.148 Such factors were important in informing positive 
attitudes among early modern Europeans about non-Western societies, despite 
religious difference continuing to be an essential point of reference.149  
 
The region’s Muslim inhabitants became appreciated by some Britons for being other 
than what the traditional Muslim/Moorish stereotypes prescribed them to be: they 
                                                        
146 Burton similarly refers to Britons drawing from an ‘experiential inventory’ of knowledge about Islam 
acquired from cultural contact through trade, travel, captivity, and diplomacy from the sixteenth 
century. He argues that this inventory of ideas was ‘triangulated’ with ‘textual-historical’ and 
‘domestic’ (normative concepts of self-identity) inventories. See Burton, Traffic and Turning, pp. 22–
24. 
147 Ibid., pp. 22, 52. 
148 On this issue see Colley, Captives, pp. 109–112. 
149 Michael Adas, Machines as the Measure of Men: Science, Technology and Ideologies of Western 
Dominance  (Ithaca, NY, 1989), p. 64. 
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became accepted for being not wholly different, even equals. In fact, they were at 
times even elevated to role models; their piety and civil conduct were often remarked 
upon and praised by observers, and contrasted with that of Britons and other 
Christians. But this new ‘more measured and multifaceted discourse’, not just 
concerning North Africans but Muslims more generally, did not replace conventional, 
more prejudicial stereotypes; instead, it existed alongside them.150 The ostensibly 
contradictory perspectives which could result from this inter-articulation of old and 
new ideas is evident when an author could seek to deride Islam by declaring that 
Muhammad was a ‘false prophet’ while also confidently asserting that the adherents 
of his religion ‘surpass many Christians in righteousness and just dealing toward 
men’.151 
 
Walter Lippmann argued that until we know what people think they know, that is, 
until we have gained insight into their understanding of the world, we cannot fully 
understand their acts. If we seek to do so, we have to ‘appraise not only the 
information which has been at their disposal, but the mind through which they have 
filtered it’.152 This is the challenge which underlies this study, and is the subject of the 
following chapters. In fact, it is a two-fold challenge, for it not only involves appraising 
the minds of Britons who had contact with Morocco, but also how those minds may 
or may not have been changed by their encounter with the ‘great blooming, buzzing 
confusion’ of that country.   
                                                        
150 Colley, Captives, pp. 107–108. On the persistence of traditional representations and beliefs 
concerning Islam in early modern Britain, see Jenkins, 'Writing Islam', esp. pp. 21–27. Jenkins’ study is 
interesting and useful, but he too readily dismisses the influence of direct cultural encounter on 
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Mr. Robert Blake From the High and Mighty Prince, Mulley Mahamed Sheque, Emperor of Morocco, 
King of Fesse, and Suss  (London, 1637), p. 40. 
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125 
 
3. Pragmatism (1625–1660) 
 
I thought it my dutie both out of the love I beare to my owne native 
countrie, and lykewise this your countrie, where I have bin so often 
imployed, to publish to all to whom his majesties letters cannot be 
communicated … this his princely intendment and disposition, the 
rather in respect of the present tymes and occassions, for the 
benefite and behoofe of both nations. (John Harrison, Tétouan, 27 
June 1625)1 
 
While relations between Christian Europe and the Islamicate societies of North Africa 
during the early modern period have began to attract increasing attention from 
scholars, there remains much work to be done to properly historicise the events of 
this period, and understand the repercussions for each party’s subsequent economic, 
political, and socio-cultural development. In this respect, as discussed in the 
introduction to this thesis, there is a fundamental question that remains to be 
satisfactorily addressed concerning the activities of Britons in North Africa during the 
seventeenth century, and that concerns the impact that their encounters with this 
part of the world actually had on the development of British self-identity, and, by 
extension, Britain’s imperial progression.  
 
The challenge for anyone seeking to answer this question is to establish a clear 
relationship between cause and effect: to distinguish the particular influence that 
experience in North Africa may have had on shaping the worldview of early modern 
Britons and nurturing imperial and colonial aspiration, and separating this influence 
from the many and varied other factors which undoubtedly contributed to this 
development. For this reason, in a departure from previous work on the subject, the 
focus of this study is not so much on generalised interpretations, but rather on 
elucidating a deeper understanding of the impact of encounter at the individual level 
amongst Britons who had actual lived experience in that part of North Africa in which 
they had the most consistent, and broadest range of, relations during the early 
modern period, Morocco. In this chapter, and the three which follow, the impact of 
                                                        
1 ‘Lettre de John Harrison aux Maures’, 27 June 1625, in Henry de Castries, ed., SIHMA, 3 vols., vol. 2 
(Paris, 1925), pp. 567–568. 
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encounter is examined by reference to the affective, cognitive, and behavioural 
responses of some of the many thousands of Britons who set foot in that country, 
not as captives, but as free men between 1625 and 1684 — from the start of a more 
assertive English presence in the Mediterranean to the demise of English Tangier. 
These observations will be used to help identify the personal and other proximate 
factors which influenced those responses, and in assessing the impact that their 
experiences had on them, and in shaping Anglo-Moroccan trade and diplomatic 
relations more generally. 
 
What is particularly notable is the dearth of detailed studies on the period between 
the close of the Elizabethan period — commonly regarded by both contemporaries 
and modern scholars as marking the end of a golden age of Anglo-Moroccan relations 
— and the more turbulent period of relations associated with the occupation of 
Tangier. While perhaps this is not surprising given the events by which it is 
bookended, the lacuna results in a prolonged discontinuity in understanding what 
their experience in Morocco reveals about English colonial and imperial aspiration, 
and attitudes to other peoples during what has been recognised as a particularly 
tumultuous period of ideological and social change associated with what has been 
characterised as a ‘general crisis’ in Europe. According to Hugh Trevor-Roper, one of 
the early proponents the concept, the crisis was the result of a widespread 
breakdown in relations between expanding and wasteful state structures and the 
societies they governed, tensions exacerbated by changes in intellectual thought and 
religious developments.2  
 
The anxieties arising from the developing sense of crisis that emerged in the late 
sixteenth century reached their zenith in the middle of the following century, and 
are, I believe, very much evident in the thinking and behaviour of Britons who were 
                                                        
2 H. R. Trevor-Roper, 'The General Crisis of the 17th Century', Past & Present, 16 (1959), pp. 31–64. 
Other notable proponents of the ‘general crisis’ thesis are Theodore K. Rabb, and Geoffrey Parker. 
See, for example, Theodore K. Rabb, The Struggle for Stability in Early Modern Europe  (New York, 
1975); Geoffrey Parker, Europe in Crisis, 1598–1648, 2nd ed.  (Oxford, 2001), [first published in 1979]. 
Parker, and others, have also discerned the phenomenon had a global dimension. On this reappraisal, 
see Parker’s more recent book Global Crisis: War, Climate Change and Catastrophe in the Seventeenth 
Century  (New Haven, 2013). 
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active in Morocco during this time. This is particularly the case with the key 
protagonist of this chapter, John Harrison, as well as in proposals for trade and 
settlement in the country which were floated by those who followed after him, 
including the traveller Stephen Scott, the naval commander George Carteret, and the 
merchant Robert Blake, which are also examined.  
 
As will be shown, the experiences of these men and their responses to them were 
influenced by conditions which differed markedly from those which prevailed at the 
beginning of the century. Aside from the general anxieties felt by Europeans at the 
time, Morocco was experiencing political anarchy and England was facing a new set 
of geo-political challenges. It is only when this context is fully appreciated that their 
thinking about Morocco can be properly understood as not being the product of 
imperial and colonial aspiration but rather pragmatic, creative, if unrealistic, 
responses to these particular circumstances. Notably, their actions were also 
generally premised on an understanding of the need to demonstrate mutual benefit.    
 
Much time is devoted to an examination of the exploits of Harrison, because unlike 
the other Britons who feature in the chapter he left an extensive record of not only 
his activities but also his thoughts. His story not only emphatically reveals the role 
that religious conviction and ideological belief could play in personal acculturation, 
but also provides a very good introductory case study clearly demonstrating how a 
focus on the processes of acculturative change can provide novel, more nuanced 
insights into the consequences of historical encounters between European and non-
European peoples. 
 
3.1. The King’s Agent: Negotiating National Interest and Personal Belief 
 
In 1625 James I died and was succeeded by his son, Charles. James had never 
embraced relations with Morocco, at least beyond the necessity for prosaic 
diplomacy to negotiate the release of captives. The factors which had helped drive 
and define Anglo-Moroccan diplomatic relations during the latter part of the 
sixteenth century were no longer extant: both architects of the entente, Elizabeth I 
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and sultan Ahmad al-Mansūr, were dead, and, critically, the threat from Spain had 
diminished with the signing of the Peace of London in 1604. Furthermore, there was 
no longer a central government in Morocco. With al-Mansūr’s passing, Morocco had 
descended into political and social anarchy, making it difficult for merchants and 
officials alike to negotiate the everchanging landscape of sovereignty across the 
country, and disrupting traditional trading patterns. But, conversely, it encouraged 
illicit trade by English merchants with the warring parties, particularly in weapons, 
which exacerbated diplomatic tensions.  
 
Preparations for the resumption of hostilities with Spain in 1625 motivated the new 
English king to attempt a rapprochement with his country’s past ally, and he 
dispatched his father’s former envoy, John Harrison.3 In a letter to Mawlay Zaydān, 
Charles reminded the sultan of the ‘greate amyty and corespondacy’ which had 
existed between Elizabeth and al-Mansūr, and expressed his desire that it ‘continewe 
for the good of the subjects of both our dominions, and other reasons he [Harrison] 
can more at large informe yow’.4 Harrison subsequently arrived in Tétouan in June 
that same year. It was his fifth mission to Morocco since 1610, and he would 
undertake a further three.  
 
Harrison’s extensive experience both as a commercial and political agent provided 
him with a sound knowledge of Moroccan history, society, culture, religious practices, 
and political structures. One scholar has gone as far as describing him as having ‘laid 
the foundations for England's commercial and ideological relations with Morocco’,5 
but this claim cannot be substantiated based on the available evidence. England’s 
commercial relationship with Morocco was already well established by the time 
Harrison appeared, and there is little proof of his having had a direct, long-term 
impact on shaping either English geopolitical or commercial thinking about the 
region. Nevertheless he was highly regarded, and an important figure in Anglo-
                                                        
3 Refer to chapter 1. 
4 ‘Lettre de Charles Ier a Moulay Zidân’, [27 March–1 June 1625], in Castries, SIHMA, II, p. 566. 
5 Nabil Matar, 'Harrison, John (d. 1641x52)', in H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison, ed., ODNB, Online 
ed. (Oxford, 2004), accessed 12 July 2017. 
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Moroccan relations in the first third of the seventeenth century, and his life and 
writings about Morocco warrant more attention than they have been given by 
historians. He is an excellent subject for a study of the present kind because of the 
extended period over which he worked in Morocco, the breadth of his experiences 
there, and the detailed accounts that he left. 
 
There is little currently known about Harrison’s early life. He appears to have served 
in the English army in Ireland under Elizabeth I, and upon the accession of James I 
Harrison was appointed to the privy chamber of his son, Prince Henry, remaining in 
that position until Henry’s death in 1612. He then joined the retinue of James’ 
daughter Elizabeth, the Countess Palatine of the Rhine, until at least 1619, later being 
appointed sheriff, or governor, of the Somers Isles (Bermuda), before he once again 
returned to Morocco.6 The following discussion contributes to the limited 
information available on this intriquing figure by revealing new insights into his 
beliefs and motivations. 
 
While they were undoubtedly important to him, Harrison’s interests in North Africa 
were clearly more than just his desire to serve his country and to achieve financial 
gain. His writings reveal him to be a deeply religious man, staunchly anti-Catholic, and 
possessed of ‘a deep evangelical zeal’.7 The way in which the interarticulation of 
these elements of Harrison’s character and motivations helped shaped his thinking 
about Morocco is well demonstrated in a pamphlet he published in 1613, The New 
Prophetical King of Barbary, which was introduced in chapter 1 of this thesis. The 
pamphlet is purported to reproduce correspondence from an English merchant in 
Morocco concerning the latest political developments there. Harrison’s 
correspondent, ‘R.S.’, recounts the success of the marabout Abu Mahalli against 
                                                        
6 'Harrison, John (fl.1630)', in Dictionary of National Biography, 63 vols., vol. 25 (London, 1885–1900), 
p. 33; Matar, 'Harrison, John'. 
7 Matar, 'Harrison, John'. 
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Mawlay Zaydān. The majority of the account is particularly noteworthy for R.S.’s 
support for, and admiration of, the rebel leader.8 
 
R.S. records that Abu Mahalli announced that he came to make peace, having been 
sent by God to challenge the ruling dynasty, ‘to stablish their Prophets religion … and 
recover those parts of Christendome the king of Spaine holds from them … and tels 
his people they shall yet see great wonders come to passe’. One such wonder would 
be the appearance of a bridge across the Strait by which his followers would invade 
Spain, Italy, and France, and having achieved this he would reign for forty years until 
the coming of Christ and the final judgement, but, he insisted, ‘for England, Flanders 
or other parts they have not to doe, they will have friendship with us’.9 R.S. recounts 
all this without any hint of alarm or scepticism. But the treatment of subsequent 
details of the marabout’s life and achievements becomes distinctly ambivalent.10  By 
the end of the account the tone changes once again, from ambivalence to outright 
hostility, with R.S. purporting to state:  
For my owne part I am perswaded, they be delusions of the divell 
done by witchcraft, and permitted by the Lord, to seduce them to 
further error. God deliver us Christians well from among them, and 
grant us the use, and true knowledge of his holy word preached in 
Christian countries which here we want.11 
During the course of the letter Abu Mahalli has been transformed from a saviour of 
the country, and a potential ally of Protestant nations, to an agent of the devil. The 
combined text is inherently contradictory — Abu Mahalli is both lauded and 
demonised — so much so that the exercise of editorial licence by Harrison appears 
to be the only plausible explanation.12 At the very least the account, as with others 
                                                        
8 See, for example, R.S., The New Prophetical King of Barbary or the Last Newes from Thence in a Letter 
Written of Late from a Merchant There, to a Gentl. Not Long Since Imployed into that Countrie from 
His Maiestie, ed. John Harrison  (London, 1613), sig. B3v, B[4]v–Cr. 
9 Ibid., sig. B3r–v. 
10 Ibid., sig. Cr–C2v. 
11 Ibid., sig. C[3]r (my emphasis). 
12 Gary K. Waite compares and contrasts this account and two Dutch pamphlets which also deal with 
the conflict between Mawlay Zaydān and Abu Mahilli during this time. However, Waite overlooks the 
inherent dissonance in the English text. See Waite 'Reimagining Religious Identity: The Moor in Dutch 
and English Pamphlets, 1550–1620', Renaissance Quarterly, 66 (2013), pp. 1278–1285.  
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from this period, is marked by ambivalence, of conflicting perceptions concerning the 
indigenous peoples, particularly their leaders.13 
 
The pamphlet as a whole appears to be intended to serve as an apocalyptic and 
cautionary tale, warning of the dangers of false prophets (including the Pope),14 
highlighting the risk of civil conflict arising from pride and self-interest,15 and 
defending the doctrine of the divine right of kings, ‘whether Christian, or heathen’.16 
But Harrison also teasingly remarks in the epilogue that the civil unrest ‘may serve 
for another use: a finall use of all, either that hath passed, or may hereafter fall out’.17 
It is a cryptic statement, but he appears to be implying that an opportunity may arise 
as a result of the disorder. It is possible that Harrison was conveying a millenarian 
expectation, but more likely he was alluding to the more immediate possibility of 
political and evangelical intervention in Morocco, proposals for which he would later 
develop and promote. However, the timing of the publication and its nature indicates 
that Harrison had a motivation beyond patriotic and religious service. In the previous 
year he had lost his patron, Prince Henry, and the pamphlet appears to have been a 
means by which he sought to promote himself as a man of true Protestant conviction, 
having significant knowledge of, and experience in, Morocco, and possessing a 
mysterious, yet beguiling, plan.  
 
Harrison’s lack of gainful employment again appears to have been a motivation 
behind his publication of another text which also appeared in 1613, the treatise The 
Messiah Alreadie Come.18 It was dedicated to Maurice, Prince of Orange, from whom 
                                                        
13 Kenneth Parker also makes this observation in 'Reading ‘Barbary’ in Early Modern England, 1550–
1685', The Seventeenth Century, 19 (2004), p. 101. 
14 R.S., The New Prophetical King, sig. A[4]r–v. 
15 ‘Non unquam tulit documenta, fors majora quam fragili loco starent superbi’ = Never did fortune 
give larger proofs on what shaky ground stand the proud (my translation). See epilogue in ibid. 
16 Preface in ibid. 
17 Epilogue in ibid. 
18 John Harrison, The Messiah Alreadie Come. Or Proofs of Christianitie, Both Out of the Scriptures, and 
Auncient Rabbins, to Convince the Jewes, of their Palpable, and More then Miserable Blindnes (if More 
May Be) for their Long, Vayne, and Endles Expectation of their Messiah (as They Dreame) Yet For to 
Come  (Amsterdam, 1613). A second edition was printed in Amsterdam in 1619, and a third edition 
appeared in London in 1656, entitled A Vindication of the Holy Scriptures. Or the Manifestation of Jesus 
Christ. The True Messiah Already Come. 
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Harrison undoubtedly sought favour.19 But it is an altogether different document 
from The New Prophetical King; written by Harrison while he was residing in Morocco 
in 1610, it provides insights into his attitudes to Moroccan society and his theological 
beliefs. The treatise reveals Harrison as a millenarian Protestant who was also 
influenced by a movement promoting a more positive interest in the Jewish people, 
and their culture and history, a general disposition that has been termed philo-
Semitism, which developed in England from the early seventeenth century.20 It is a 
detailed apologetic intended to convince Jews of the truth of Christianity, and 
encourage them to convert, not simply to save their souls, but, together with the 
destruction of the Catholic Church, as a precondition for the arrival of the Apocalypse 
and the Second Coming.21 The identification of Harrison as a millenarian is reinforced 
by his continued interest in the dispossessed elector of the Palatinate, Frederick V 
(the ‘Winter King’), and his wife, whose cause became the focus of various portentous 
ideas among Protestants with chiliastic beliefs.22 
 
During his mission to Morocco in 1610, Harrison spent a period of almost six months 
in Safi on the Atlantic coast, during which time he was befriended by a local rabbi, 
and a further three and a half months living among the Jewish community in 
Marrakesh.23 While in The New Prophetical King Harrison does not express any views 
about Arab or Berber Moroccans, beyond criticising them for their gullibility for 
having been deceived by ‘idle and superstitious vanities’,24 in The Messiah Alreadie 
Come he openly reveals his feelings and perceptions about Moroccan Jews. He notes 
                                                        
19 Refer to the last paragraph of the dedication. To ensure that was there no doubt about the reasons 
he was giving Maurice the honour, nor about his current circumstances, the dedication was also 
translated into Dutch while the remainder of the document is only rendered in English. 
20 Ronald H. Fritze, 'Jews in England', in Ronald H. Fritze and William B. Robison, eds., Historical 
Dictionary of Stuart England, 1603–1689 (Wesport, CT, 1996), pp. 269–270. For a more detailed 
account of the development of philo-semitism in England, see David S. Katz, Philo-Semitism and the 
Readmission of the Jews to England, 1603–1655  (Oxford, 1982). 
21 Harrison acknowledges that much of the content is not original, but ‘borrowed’ from another text, 
‘The Christian Directorie or Resolution’, by which he undoubtedly means Robert Persons’ The Christian 
Directorie, Guiding Men to their Salvation, originally entitled The First Booke of the Christian Exercise, 
Appertayning to Resolution, published in 1582. See Harrison, The Messiah Alreadie Come, sig. A2v. On 
the importance of the Jews to English millenarian thought, see Katz, Philo-Semitism, chap. 3. 
22 John Reeve, 'Sir Dudley Carleton and Sir Thomas Roe: English Servants of the Queen of Bohemia 
and the Protestant International during the Thirty Years War', Parergon, 32 (2015), p. 166.  
23 Harrison, The Messiah Alreadie Come, pp. 61–62. 
24 R.S., The New Prophetical King, sig. A[4]r. 
133 
 
that while in Safi, the rabbi helped better acquaint him with Hebrew, and Harrison 
found him to be ‘of grave, and sober cariage, and pleasant otherwise’, and was glad 
to have his company during what he describes as ‘that tedious time’.25  In Marrakesh 
he ‘grewe familiarly acquainted’ with various members of the Jewish community, 
attending wedding ceremonies and ‘solemne feasts’, and was introduced to their 
‘dainties’ (food) which he ‘tooke very kindly, and ever since have studied’.26 It is 
unclear whether his experiences in Morocco in 1610 encouraged Harrison to embrace 
philo-semitism, or he had already done so, but they undoubtedly contributed to his 
convictions. His account of that time reveals him to be a person who was genuinely 
interested in Jewish culture, and who possessed a level of concern about the situation 
of Jews, particularly that of ‘the forlorne, and distressed Jewes in Barbarie’,27 that 
went beyond the requirements of pure eschatological belief.  
 
The exact purposes for which Harrison had been sent to treat with the sultan in 1625 
are not clearly stated in the letters provided to him by Charles I and Harrison. Charles’ 
earlier letter indicates that captives remained a source of grievance, and Harrison 
confirms that he had been charged to negotiate their release.28 But the king also 
referred to ‘other reasons’ that would be expounded on by Harrison. While Harrison 
did not elaborate in detail, it is clear that Charles was seeking assistance from  Zaydān 
in his war with Spain. In a letter to Zaydān written shortly after his arrival, Harrison 
reminds the sultan that he had requested Harrison to advise him ‘if there were any 
lykelyhood of wars’ and he would give assistance to the English. He goes on to insist 
that ‘now is the tyme or neaver’ for both parties ‘to right themselves against theire 
enimies.’29  
 
However, in a report to Charles, Harrison later reveals that the mission had been 
initiated, at Harrison’s suggestion, to ‘sound the affectiones and dispositions of that 
                                                        
25 Harrison, The Messiah Alreadie Come, p. 61. 
26 Ibid., p. 62. 
27 Ibid., p. 61. 
28 ‘Lettre de John Harrison au Commandant de la Flotte Britannique’, 20 July 1625, in Castries, 
SIHMA, II, p. 575. 
29 ‘Lettre de John Harrison a Moulay Zidân’, [13 June–30 July 1625], in ibid., p. 572. 
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people [Moroccans], and especiallie the Moriscoes or Andaluzes banished out of 
Spaine’ who, as a result of their hatred for the Spanish and knowledge of that country, 
may be useful in many ways, including in the provision of supplies and other 
necessities for the English navy. 30 But it is unclear if, when Harrison embarked on the 
mission, he possessed a clear plan for how Morocco could be engaged in prosecution 
of the war.31 A plan would emerge, shaped by Harrison’s subsequent experiences in 
the country, and detailed in a proposal that he sent to the commander of an English 
fleet which he had been advised would visit Morocco shortly after his arrival. 
 
Harrison had intended to travel first to Salé, ‘there to have understood the state of 
the countrie’, and then to meet with the sultan.32 But he was convinced by the 
muqaddams (leaders) of Tétouan that due to the conflict within the country it was 
far too dangerous to do so by land, and he was otherwise dissuaded by them from 
meeting with Zaydān. His hosts proceeded to impugn Zaydān’s character and power 
before revealing that they no longer paid allegiance to him, and set about attempting 
to take advantage of the good fortune of having the king’s representative in their 
midst.33 They offered Harrison, ‘freelie, and of their owne accord’, in excess of ten 
thousand men to assist the English to take the Spanish enclave at Ceuta, ‘or any other 
place near’. All that they requested in return was a supply of gunpowder and the 
repair of some ordnance.34  
 
Harrison was very much enamoured of this offer and was clearly convinced that there 
was not only widespread popular support for war with Spain, but also a ‘generall 
disposicion and inclination both towards our nation, and even to Christian religion’.35 
He was not necessarily misguided in these conclusions.  As Mercedes García-Arenal 
                                                        
30 ‘Relation de John Harrison’, 1 September 1627, in Cenival and Cossé Brissac, SIHMA, III, p. 30. 
31 C. f. Matar, 'Harrison, John' 
32 ‘Lettre de John Harrison au Commandant de la Flotte Britannique’, 20 July 1625, in Castries, SIHMA, 
II, p. 580. 
33 Ibid., pp. 575–576, 581.  
34 Ibid., p. 576. In this account Harrison implies that the offer of the ten thousand men was the initiative 
of the muqaddams, but in a much later account indicates that this had been his aim from the 
beginning. See ‘Mémoire de John Harrison’, 15 July 1631, in Cenival and Cossé Brissac, SIHMA, III, p. 
145. 
35 ‘Lettre de John Harrison au Commandant de la Flotte Britannique’, 20 July 1625, in Castries, SIHMA, 
II, p. 578.  
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points out, the Moriscos not only considered the English and Dutch as potential allies 
in their long-held plans to reconquer their former lands in Spain, but also found the 
form of Christianity which they professed easier to identify with than Catholicism.36 
Inspired by his positive reception and ‘to blow the fire already kindled’,37 Harrison 
drafted two public letters (an extract from one of these is provided as an epigraph to 
this chapter) to express England’s amity with ‘Moores, Turkes, Jewes and others’, and 
highlight their common cause against the Catholic powers.38  The events in Tétouan 
also gave him cause to reflect on his mission and consider new possibilities. In his 
report to the commander of the English fleet, Harrison outlines an ambitious plan. 
He explains that with the help of the people of Tétouan, Ceuta could be taken and 
become an entrepôt for English trade. Jews and Moriscos, most of whom were 
‘alreadie Christian in heart’, and even Moors, would flock to the enclave providing it 
both with men and other supplies. He further suggested dispossessing Spain of 
Gibraltar and ‘Mamora’ (Mehdya) on the Moroccan Atlantic coast to provide England 
both control of the Strait, and an operating base from which to attack Spanish 
shipping, and disrupt supplies to their other possessions in Morocco.39  
 
What Harrison proposed, at least in part, was a strategy to help prosecute the war 
with Spain. But like Henry Roberts over two decades earlier,40 Harrison was also 
offering a means to further England’s religious, political and commercial interests in 
Morocco itself. However, unlike Roberts, Harrison was not recommending that this 
be achieved through the conquest of the country, but rather by nurturing the 
continuation of political instability, and the development of relationships with all 
parties which were advantageous to England’s interests.41 While Roberts had been 
principally motivated by impecuniousness, Harrison was inspired by evangelical zeal 
                                                        
36 Mercedes García-Arenal, 'The Moriscos in Morocco: From Granadan Emigration to the Hornacheros 
of Salé', in The Expulsion of the Moriscos from Spain (Leiden, 2014), p. 314. In fact, García-Arenal also 
notes that following their arrival in Morocco many Moriscos proclaimed to be Catholics, and were 
treated as apostates. See ibid., pp. 317–318. 
37 Castries, SIHMA, II, p. 578. 
38 ‘Lettre de John Harrison aux Maures’, 27 June 1625, in ibid., pp. 567–568. 
39 ‘Lettre de John Harrison au Commandant de la Flotte Britannique’, 20 July 1625, in ibid., pp. 579–
580. 
40 See chapter 1 of this thesis. 
41 Castries, SIHMA, II, p. 580. 
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and a belief that Moriscos and Jews were crypto-Christians awaiting release from 
Muslim thraldom. Harrison’s religious myopia even allowed him to envisage a general 
flight of people from tyranny in Spain, Portugal, and Morocco following the execution 
of his plan.42  
 
In this respect, the report appears to indicate a significant change in his attitude 
toward Zaydān, and perhaps Morocco’s traditional political leadership more 
generally, which may have helped inform his plan. Whereas, Harrison had previously 
defended Zaydān as the divinely appointed ruler of Morocco, his report reflects 
disillusionment with the sultan. Concerned with what he had heard about the sultan’s 
usage of his people and Christian captives, and his complicity in corsairing, ‘even to 
the English Channell’,43 Harrison began to question Zaydān’s legitimacy, allowing him 
to conceive of usurping his authority in the interests of England’s Protestant cause. It 
was a bold but naïve plan, and, as with such proposals in the past, it came to nothing, 
as was also the case when Harrison presented a similar proposal to Charles I some 
two years later.44 These proposals were no more than fantasies based on an 
overestimation of English military power, and either a flawed understanding of 
Moroccan motivations and aspirations, or an overriding desire to believe otherwise. 
Yet while they may not represent a milestone in the evolution of English colonial 
adventurism, they certainly indicate a marked development in Harrison’s thinking. 
 
Harrison left Tétouan and travelled to Salé in early 1626 where he met with the 
marabout and rebel leader Muhammad al-ʻAyāshī, who was keen to foster relations 
with England, particularly to enlist assistance to take Mehdya. Harrison also 
concluded an agreement with the Moriscos to provide them with armaments and 
ammunition in exchange for the release of captives, before embarking for England in 
May.45 However, it was not long before he returned, arriving in January 1627 with 
                                                        
42 Ibid., p. 581. Cf. Nabil Matar, Britain and Barbary, pp. 42–43. 
43 Castries, SIHMA, II, p. 580. 
44 ‘Relation de John Harrison’, 1 September 1627, in Cenival and Cossé Brissac, SIHMA, III, pp. 53–54, 
56. See also Matar, Britain and Barbary, p. 43. 
45 ‘Lettre de Sidi Mohammed el-‘Ayyachi a Charles Ier‘, 7 May 1627, and ‘Relation de John Harrison’, 1 
September 1627, in Cenival and Cossé Brissac, SIHMA, III, pp. 23, 32–34. 
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instructions to treat with the ‘King, Princes, Governors and Commanders of the parts 
of Barbary’ for both the redemption of captives and to establish relations for ‘our 
common utillety and safety’.46 The king was clearly not concerned at the time with 
whom Harrison treated, so, it is unsurprising that he first contacted the Moriscos of 
Salé with whom he had developed a close relationship. It was around this time that 
the Salétins withdrew their allegiance to the Sa‘dīs and formally announced their 
independence. Notwithstanding this development, Harrison negotiated an 
agreement with the town’s leaders which guaranteed freedom of trade with Salé and 
protection of English vessels, and provided for the release of Britons held captive 
there.47 Despite receiving an order from Zaydān soon after the agent’s arrival, that 
Harrison be sent to him, the Salétins refused to release him, and Harrison made no 
effort to meet with the sultan before embarking for England in late May 1627.48 As 
well as returning with almost two hundred emancipated Britons, Harrison also 
brought with him a draft treaty which may have been of great potential benefit to 
England.  
 
However, Charles declined to endorse the treaty on the advice of the Court of 
Admiralty that the Moriscos were not suitable treaty partners, as they were 
considered to be both pirates and rebels.49 Without their maritime activities being 
sanctioned by a recognised sovereign power, the Moriscos of Salé could not even 
claim the questionably superior status of corsairs.50 Nevertheless, not wishing to 
antagonise the Salétins, the king, in a carefully worded letter, did express his 
gratitude for the release of his subjects and for the promise of freedom of trade, and 
                                                        
46 ‘Lettre de Commission pour John Harrison’, 5 December 1626, in ibid., p. 12. 
47  ‘Projet de Traité Entre Salé [Rabat] et L’Angleterre’, 30 April 1627, in ibid., pp. 16–20. 
48 ‘Relation de John Harrison’, 1 September 1627, in ibid., pp. 39–40, 48. 
49 P. G. Rogers, A History of Anglo-Moroccan Relations to 1900  (London, [197?]), p. 27; Kenneth R. 
Andrews, Ships, Money and Politics: Seafaring and Naval Enterprise in the Reign of Charles I  
(Cambridge, 1991), p. 169. The House of Lords had earlier agreed that a treaty was the best means to 
achieve the release of the captives and that the king be advised to this affect, but members had 
assumed that any treaty would be with the sultan. See 'House of Lords Journal Volume 3: 19 April 
1626', in Journal of the House of Lords: Volume 3, 1620–1628, BHO ed. (London, 1767–1830), accessed 
15 July 2016. See p. 564 in printed edition. 
50 On the legal status of corsairs and prize law in the Mediterranean in the early modern period, see 
Tristan M. Stein, 'The Mediterranean in the English Empire of Trade, 1660–1678', PhD Thesis (Harvard 
University, 2012), pp. 208–211. 
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assured them that they would receive similarly favourable treatment from the 
English.51 While Charles did not intend to formally acknowledge the treaty, he clearly 
desired the terms which had been negotiated; it was to be a treaty in all respects but 
in name.  
 
Harrison subsequently prepared a report for the king on his last two missions. But it 
is more than a simple account of events and observations; he uses it as a means to 
undermine the perceived legitimacy of Zaydān’s rule, and argues fervently in support 
of alliances with the Moriscos of Tétouan and Salé, and with Muhammad al-ʻAyāshī. 
In doing so, it also reveals more on Harrison’s personal beliefs, and what effect his 
experiences in Morocco may have had on them. His disdain for Zaydān is obvious 
throughout the account. In Harrison’s view, the sultan is not only a cruel tyrant, but 
the ‘originall of all these evils’ committed against Christians at Salé;52 the instigator 
of the enslavement of the king’s subjects;53 and, treacherous.54 Furthermore, he 
insinuates that Zaydān’s hold on power is tenuous,55 he is regarded with suspicion by 
even his own men, and is in league with Spain.56 In contrast, he asserts al-ʻAyāshī was 
an enemy of Spain, and a friend of England, whose followers held the king in ‘great 
honour and love’.57 The Moriscos also held the king in high regard, grateful for the 
assistance he had provided, and offering their services to him.58 According to 
Harrison, the Moriscos possessed ‘a verie great affection and inclination to our 
nation’, as do many Arabs and Berbers.59 He argues that this sentiment must be 
patiently nurtured.60 He also questions whether they, in fact, should be regarded as 
rebels. If England was prepared to treat with Algiers, why should it not also do so with 
the Moriscos? And in any event, to whom should they be loyal when they were born 
Christians in Spain, banished and delivered ‘into the hands of infidels’, and now after 
                                                        
51 ‘Lettres de Charles Ier’, 12 October 1627, in Cenival and Cossé Brissac, SIHMA, III, pp. 58–59. 
52 ‘Relation de John Harrison’, 1 September 1627, in ibid., p. 42. 
53 Ibid., pp. 33, 51. 
54 Ibid., pp. 39–40. On Harrison’s views regarding Zaydān and his rule, see also ‘Relation de John 
Harrison’, [end 1627], in ibid., pp. 65–67. 
55 ‘Relation de John Harrison’, 1 September 1627, in ibid., pp. 32, 36–37, 53. 
56 Ibid., p. 37. 
57 Ibid., p. 44. 
58 Ibid., pp. 30–32, 38, 40–42. 
59 Ibid., p. 42. 
60 Ibid., pp. 42–43. 
139 
 
establishing a ‘Christian government’, they profess their love for Charles and seek his 
protection.61 Overlooking the obvious difference in religion, Harrison questions 
whether in this respect they are any different from the States General of the 
Netherlands, which England was supporting.62 
 
Harrison was attempting to convince the king to support the Moriscos in what he 
believed to be the furtherance of England’s religious and secular interests, but in 
doing so he reveals genuine empathy for them. In particular, he laments their forced 
exodus from Spain, drawing parallels with those other people of Morocco with whom 
he also had affinity, the Jews: 
Never the like desolation of people since that and of the Jewish 
nation … yea, more then lamentable … banished and betrayed, not 
only their bodies but their soules as a praie of the Devill into the 
hands of the Turkes and Moors … as a forlorne people scattered and 
dispersed like the Jewes to this daie.63 
 
Harrison did not express any significant general prejudice against either Moroccan 
Arabs or Berbers, but it was the Moriscos, with their knowledge of Christianity and 
Europeanised culture, whom Harrison held in greatest favour, along with the Jews.  
 
The religion with which the majority of the people for whom he was eliciting support 
were affiliated warranted little critical attention from Harrison. His only explicit 
comments depict Islam as an oppressive system of idolatrous belief opposed to 
Christianity.64 Nevertheless, he comments favourably on marabouts,65 and, in 
particular, thought highly of al-ʻAyāshī, even though he was a committed mujahid.  
Harrison’s relationship with al-ʻAyāshī is interesting; he obviously believed him to be 
a friend of England and useful for that reason, and, as with his relationship with the 
people of Tétouan and Salé, went no further to question his motives. Instead Harrison 
seems less concerned with understanding their religion than with finding signs that 
                                                        
61 Ibid., pp. 51–52. Quotations are from p. 51. 
62 Ibid., p. 53. 
63 Ibid., p. 41. Mercedes García-Arenal also remarks on the obvious sympathy which Harrison felt for 
the Moriscos. See García-Arenal, 'Moriscos in Morocco', p. 314. 
64 ‘Relation de John Harrison’, 1 September 1627, in Cenival and Cossé Brissac, SIHMA, III, pp. 42, 52. 
65 Ibid., pp. 32, 44, 46. 
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confirmed to him that the people of Morocco were potential allies, and critically, 
ultimately religiously redeemable.  
 
However, Harrison was eventually forced to acknowledge that the issue of religious 
difference did present a major problem for any cooperative endeavours against the 
Spanish. Asked by al-ʻAyāshī to help enlist the support of a Dutch fleet for an attack 
against Mehdya, Harrison, in consultation with the Dutch admiral, had to concoct an 
excuse against their involvement. Despite the Spanish being ‘of a contrarie profession 
and enimies’, he did not believe it to be honourable ‘to betraie them into the hands 
of infidels to be made slaves’.66 He even anguished over wishing al-ʻAyāshī ‘good 
successe’.67 Harrison clearly possessed a sense of fundamental Christian unity which 
overrode his anti-Catholicism. But this was not his only reservation. He also 
demonstrates a general abhorrence of slavery irrespective of the nature of the 
victims. Misquoting Exodus 21, he states: ‘Condemned by the law of God … 
Manstealers and mansellers both alike, were they never so great enemies either to 
nation or religion; they [those enslaved] are the image of God by creation as the first, 
and so to be respected’.68 While Harrison’s attitudes and actions were clearly 
informed by religious conviction, they also appear to have been influenced by more 
general humanistic belief. 
 
Harrison was clearly frustrated that his warnings about Zaydān and plans for fostering 
closer relations with Tétouan and Salé were falling on deaf ears. Toward the end of 
1627 he wrote again to the king expressing criticism of the sultan. He questioned 
Zaydān’s integrity, and contrasted his behaviour with that of the Moriscos, and the 
outcomes which had been achieved by treating with them. Harrison even went so far 
as advocating that a naval squadron be sent to the sultan’s stronghold at Safi to 
coerce him to release captive Britons and to correct other alleged wrongs. Once 
again, Harrison asserts his belief in the imminent conversion of the Moriscos, and 
                                                        
66 Ibid., pp. 44–45. 
67 Ibid., p. 45. 
68 Ibid., p. 36. 
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emphasises the strategic value of their ports for the supply of English vessels, 
particularly now that England was at war not only with Spain, but also with France.69  
 
Notwithstanding Harrison’s unwaveringly positive assessment of the Moriscos’ 
disposition toward England, attacks on English vessels and captive taking by their 
corsairs continued to escalate. But the Moroccans in turn alleged that their ships 
were being preyed upon by English merchants and privateers, despite a proclamation 
by Charles prohibiting attacks on vessels from Algiers, Tunis, Tétouan and Salé.70 In 
response, Harrison was again sent to Morocco to negotiate the release of captives 
and to re-establish peaceful relations.71 After a long delay due to his 
impecuniousness, Harrison arrived in Morocco in March 1630. He claims to have 
successfully allayed the concerns of the Salétins, confirmed their commitment to 
peace, and negotiated proposals for the improvement of trade. Harrison proposed to 
the king that he return with ‘a mynister or twoo’ to attend to the local merchants and 
proselytise among ‘bothe Moores and Jewes, whose conversion we daylie expecte’. 
Before departing for England in late August he dispatched a letter to the new Sa‘dī 
sultan, Abd al-Malik II, who had assumed the throne following his father’s death in 
1627, but made no effort to meet with him, concerned with how he would be 
received, and regarding al-Malik even less favourably than his father.72 
 
Harrison had not given up on his plans for expanding England’s interests in the region, 
appending to his report a revised, and more detailed proposal for the taking of 
Mehdya.73  In his view the action was justified because the place was held by the 
Spanish, ‘enemies of both our nation and religion’.74 Furthermore, he believed the 
town would provide a good harbour for the resupply of vessels, a base from which to 
suppress the activities of both the Spanish and Muslim corsairs, and a trading centre 
                                                        
69 ‘Relation de John Harrison’, [end 1627], in ibid., pp. 63–72. 
70 ‘Proclamation de Charles Ier’, 22 October 1628, in ibid., pp. 80–81. On these developments, see 
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for the whole area. Harrison envisaged a fortified plantation fully maintained by 
customs duties. He assured the king that the Moroccans ‘earnestlie desire it’, and 
that Jews and Moors would come seeking the king’s protection from their own rulers 
and the civil unrest they had created.75 There was no risk, he states, that the 
Moroccans would retake it, ‘for they desire it not to be in their owne hands’, yet still 
advised that, just to be sure, fifty percent of customs duties should be paid to al-
ʻAyāshī.76  
 
But that was not the limit of Harrison’s vision. He suggested that the people of Salé 
might also wish to join with the English enclave, and enticed the king with a sign of 
their imminent conversion and a report of a nearby secret silver mine.77 Perhaps 
inspired by a French attempt to colonise the city the previous year, he went on to 
propose that given the contempt which the sultan had shown towards the king and 
his subjects, an island off the coast of ‘Mogodore’ (Essaouira) be taken from him, and 
another plantation established there on the same terms with the local leaders. From 
these two sites, Harrison conjectured, the English could monopolise trade across the 
country, and obtain the supplies necessary to attempt to take from Spain ‘the 
Maderars’ (Madeira), or possibly Gibraltar and Ceuta.78 These plans and expectations 
of popular support were not simply the products of Harrison’s own devising, they had 
been actively nurtured by the leaders of Tétouan and Salé, al-ʻAyāshī, and even 
‘Captain John’, the notorious Dutch renegade corsair better known as ‘Murat Reis’, 
the former president and grand admiral of the republic of Salé,79 with whom he had 
developed a close relationship; and they continued to press him for a response from 
the king. Harrison concludes by suggesting that if the king does not wish to take 
advantage of these opportunities, he commission his brother-in-law, the exiled 
Elector Frederick V of the Palatinate, to work with the Dutch to do so. For Harrison, 
                                                        
75 Ibid., pp. 125–126. 
76 Ibid., p. 128. 
77 Ibid., pp. 127–128. 
78 ‘Relation de John Harrison’, 28 September 1630, and ‘Mémoire de John Harrison sur la Mamora’, 28 
September 1630, in ibid., pp. 117–118, 130. 
79 Jan Janszoon van Haarlem. Among van Haarlem’s exploits was the so called ‘Sack of Baltimore’ in 
June 1631, in which he captured 109 English inhabitants of the town of Baltimore, on the coast of 
County Cork in Ireland, and sold them into slavery in Algiers. 
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it was not solely an English cause, but more generally a Protestant one, and one he 
felt compelled to pursue one way or another. Whether the king provided a response 
to Harrison is unknown, but in any event it quickly became redundant with the signing 
of a treaty the following month which ended the war with Spain.  
 
Harrison returned to Morocco in September 1631 with instructions to meet with al-
Malik’s successor, his brother Mawlay al-Walid (r. 1631–1636), and negotiate the 
release of captives.80 He had also intended to visit Salé to reassure the town’s people 
that action was being taken to address their grievances, but by this time the Salétins 
had lost faith with the English because of ongoing breaches of the peace, and became 
openly hostile toward them.81 Harrison was extremely disheartened by the situation. 
He was critical not only of the actions of his compatriots, but also the failure of the 
government to act on his advice. He was concerned about the prospects for 
escalation of corsair activity, and, ultimately, the impact on the reputation of his 
nation and religion, and England’s interests in Morocco.82 His concerns appear to 
have been heightened by both the concurrent efforts by the French to establish 
diplomatic relations with al-Walid, and the start of a new entente between the 
Salétins and the Sa’dis which he seems to have believed also threatened English trade 
and influence.83 Too ‘afraid and ashamed to go ashoare’ at Salé, Harrison proceeded 
to Marrakesh to meet with the new sultan.84   
 
He already held high expectations for al-Walid,85 and the sultan indeed proved more 
receptive that his father and brother to normalising relations with England and 
releasing captives. By February 1632 they had negotiated a draft treaty.86 The 
document principally concerns the rights of the English in the conduct of business in 
                                                        
80 ‘Lettre de Charles Ier a Moulay El-Oualid’, 19 July 1631, and ‘Lettres de John Harrison a A. Carnwath’, 
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84 Ibid., pp. 165–166. 
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pp. 174–178. 
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Morocco, and the obligations of the sultan and his subjects in this respect, although, 
interestingly, it does provide Moroccans with the right to both buy and sell goods in 
England.87  It is notable for the recourse in its construction to the ‘favours and 
priviledges auntiently belonging to the English nation’,88 with specific references 
made to those existing under the reign of Ahmad al-Mansūr, which were part of the 
perceived golden age of Anglo-Moroccan relations frequently evoked in 
correspondence by parties on both sides during this period. While the treaty focussed 
on English interests, it was conditional on acceptance of the sultan’s own demands. 
As al-Walid explained in a letter to Charles, his subjects had been taken captive 
because English merchants had been trading in contraband arms with his enemies, 
and if the king wished to restore traditional relations he must put a stop to this 
trade.89 Harrison returned to England in May 1632 and presented the draft 
agreement to Charles, but the king, for reasons which were not revealed, failed to 
endorse it, and did not call on Harrison ever again. 
 
Clearly unhappy with the outcome, in 1633 Harrison published an account of the 
reign of al-Malik II in which he detailed his ‘cruel acts, and mad-pranks’, none of which 
he had in fact witnessed himself, instead relying on the testimony of ‘such both of 
our owne nation and others’.90 Harrison claims to have written it as a present for 
Charles Louis, the new Elector Palatine, and to assist him ‘discerne betwixt a blessed 
Christian government … and a cruel-tyrannous Mahometan government’.91 But this 
detail appears to simply have provided the context for its true purpose, a proposition 
and petition appended to the account. Expressing guilt and remorse for not having 
completed his mission of freeing the remaining Britons in Morocco, Harrison calls on 
Protestant rulers to unite and act to redeem all Christians held in North Africa, ‘all 
those poore soules that are in miserie, both under the Turks and Moores’.92 
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Harrison’s utility as a diplomatic agent had perhaps come to an end due to the 
convergence of a number of factors, which had less to do with his capabilities as an 
envoy than with his beliefs. Under James I there had been a move away from the 
more radically inclined Calvinist predestinarianism adhered to by Harrison. 
Furthermore, by the 1630s Spain was no longer seen as England’s implacable enemy. 
In the interests of trade and the Exchequer, Charles I adopted a position of pro-
Spanish neutrality; as a result, support for Protestant internationalism, of which 
opposition to Spain was a central component, was no longer only a minority view, 
but also a potentially treasonable one.93 Moreover, while interest in philo-semetism 
and millenarianism would not peak until the middle of the century,  the promotion 
of  Jews as being central to Christian eschatology was a contentious issue.94 
Therefore, Harrison’s confessional and millenarian beliefs were, if not yet all 
outmoded, potentially problematic. While over the following decade responsibility 
for guiding Anglo-Moroccan relations would be assumed by men who were less 
concerned with religious dogma than with trade, they were similarly sensitive and 
pragmatic in their dealings with Morocco. 
 
3.2. Competing Agendas, Different Understandings 
 
Having received no response from Charles, al-Walid wrote to him around July 1634 
again complaining that his subjects were continuing to supply ammunition to rebels 
and requesting (or demanding) that the king take action to put a stop to this trade.95  
The reason for the failure of the king to address the issue in some way to this point is 
unclear, but the Privy Council’s consideration of a matter subsequently referred to it, 
                                                        
93 Reeve, 'Carleton and Roe', pp. 164, 175. 
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reveals the existence of competing agendas within the English merchant community, 
premised on different understandings of how best to progress trade and diplomatic 
relations with Morocco, which may have played some part in forestalling action by 
the authorities.  In November 1635 Edmund Bradshaw petitioned the Council, 
claiming that a group of English merchants continued to trade with the rebels, leading 
to more of the king’s subjects being taken captive, and the non-payment of debts, 
specifically a large debt owed to him by the sultan. He further notes these men had 
failed to effect the release of any captives with the money which had been collected 
and provided to them for this purpose. Bradshaw argued that neither the release of 
the captives nor payment of his debt could be effected until amicable relations had 
been restored with the sultan, which required the merchants in question to desist in 
their trade with the rebels.96  Over the following three months a series of accusations 
and rejoinders were submitted to the Council by the two parties. 
 
In their defence the accused merchants claimed that the captives held in Marrakesh 
had long before been enslaved, and those now held in Salé had been taken because 
of a previously reported attack on a vessel from that town and the sale of its crew by 
the master of an English ship, not by their own actions. Furthermore, all English 
merchants conducted trade in ports not controlled by the sultan. They sought to 
justify their actions by explaining that after initially visiting the sultan’s port of Safi 
they would then seek to sell the remainder of their goods elsewhere, as do the Dutch. 
They also asserted that conditions for trade in Safi and Morocco are ‘quiet and 
peaceable’, and Bradshaw could easily recover any debt, because their own factors 
had never been denied justice. As for the collection moneys, the merchants advised 
that they were still awaiting direction from the Council.97 In a subsequent rebuttal, 
the group highlights considerations which went to the crux of the matter. Firstly, the 
sultan had not issued a proclamation prohibiting trade at other ports, nor punished 
those who had conducted such trade. Rather, he had specifically requested that 
English traders cease supplying ammunition to the rebels. Secondly, Salé was clearly 
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97 ‘Réponse des Marchands Accusés par Bradshaw’, 4 December 1635, in ibid., pp. 218–221. 
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not under the authority of the sultan, as had been demonstrated by the treaty 
negotiated by Harrison with the leaders of that town, without reference to the sultan; 
a treaty with the sultan would, therefore, not resolve the problem of the Britons held 
there. Thirdly, they claimed that the petition was motivated by personal interest: the 
recovery of Bradshaw’s debt, and to facilitate an associate obtaining rights over the 
collection of customs duties payable at the sultan’s ports.98  
 
Bradshaw instead proposed that English merchants only be permitted to trade in 
ports and other places agreed upon by the two rulers.99 He does not address the 
claims of pecuniary interest, but argued that preventing merchants from trading in 
Sus would neither reduce trade nor decrease the king’s customs revenues, as claimed 
by the defendants, because the bulk of English goods sold there found their way into 
Marrakesh and other areas controlled by the sultan in any event. He further assured 
the Council that the restriction of trade would not benefit England’s competitors; 
indeed, concluding a peace with the sultan would protect English ships from being 
taken by the French under the terms of a treaty they had themselves recently 
concluded with him. Furthermore, even if the sultan did not possess the authority to 
demand the repatriation of the captives held in Salé, the prospect of substantially 
increased customs duties from English trade in his ports would encourage him to 
make every effort to ensure their release.100  
 
The veracity of the protagonist’s claims in this matter is less important than what the 
issues underlying the dispute demonstrate. Commerce with Morocco clearly 
remained important to the English, despite a claimed ten-fold decrease in its value 
since the ‘league’ between Queen Elizabeth and Mawlay al-Mansūr.101 Undoubtedly, 
the respective positions of the parties were framed by their personal interests, which 
were defined by two different models for trade with Morocco — one based on 
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centralisation through ports controlled by the sultan, the other on a more laissez-
faire approach. But, critically, their positions also reflect opposing perspectives on an 
issue that was fundamental to the management of Anglo-Moroccan relations at this 
time which the king had earlier tried to skirt in relation to a peace with the Salétins, 
and that was the issue of political legitimacy. 
 
The problem for the English was determining by what measure they should judge the 
legitimacy of the various fraternities which exercised control across Morocco. 
Reliance on customary authority did not always provide a satisfactory solution. For 
while the Sa’dis had been the dominant political power for over a century, as the 
merchants pointed out to the Council, the family of al-Walid’s adversary in Sus, the 
marabout ‘Cidi Ally’ (Abū Hassūn), had in fact governed much of that region since the 
time of his grandfather, Ahmad Abu Mahalli, and he had even received 
correspondence from the king, which, in effect, affirmed acceptance of his status.102 
John Harrison instead had invoked considerations of moral authority, popular 
sentiment, and territorial control to either support or challenge the legitimacy of 
various Moroccan leaders. It was an issue that would continue to vex the English in 
their activities in Morocco for several more decades, and perhaps not coincidentally, 
it was also one that assumed great significance within England itself from around the 
same time as Parliament began to vigorously challenge the authority of the Stuarts, 
and as the country commenced its own descent into civil war.103  
 
However, the immediate problem confronting the English authorities was the status 
of the Bou Regreg republic, the people of which had been doubly damned as being 
both rebels and pirates. But as the king’s earlier actions concerning relations with this 
group demonstrates, the achievement of national interests could justify some level 
of pragmatic accommodation with so-called rebel groups. However, on this occasion, 
the Privy Council accepted Bradshaw’s argument and on 9 March 1636, an order was 
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leading up to the civil war, see Robert Zaller, The Discourse of Legitimacy in Early Modern England  
(Stanford, CA, 2007), esp. chap. 7. 
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issued that prohibited any of the king’s subjects trading at any port or other place not 
under the control of the sultan. Shortly after, the Council also agreed to recommend 
to the king that Bradshaw be dispatched to negotiate with the sultan the release of 
captives, and the means to prevent the taking of further Britons in the future.104  
 
Bradshaw arrived in Marrakesh in September 1636 only to find that a man named 
Robert Blake had already arranged for the release of the thirty-six Britons held there. 
Blake is an enigmatic character, who has at times been confused with the 
contemporaneous naval commander of the same name.105 Despite the role he later 
played in an important development in Anglo-Moroccan relations, nothing is known 
about his life before his arrival in Morocco in 1636 as the factor for two prominent 
English merchants. Following his arrival, he quickly ingratiated himself with the new 
Sa’dian sultan, Muhammad al-Shaykh al-Asghar (r. 1636–1654), obtaining the rights 
to farm the customs duties of the ports of Safi and ‘Aer’ (the lagoon of present day 
Oualidia), and was granted a monopoly over the production and export of saltpetre. 
Although Bradshaw initially praised Blake’s achievements, the relationship soured as 
he found that Blake was involved in a heated dispute with other members of the local 
English merchant community, and was also attempting to undermine his own 
standing in the eyes of the sultan.106 In any event, Bradshaw’s mission was not a 
success, as the merchants had foreshadowed in their response to the Privy Council. 
The sultan requested the Salétins desist in their attacks on English shipping and 
negotiate the release of their existing captives, but they refused to do so, claiming 
that the peace had first been broken by the English.107 Bradshaw was still hopeful of 
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a positive response in March 1637, but by this time another plan to deal with the 
problem was well advanced.  
 
3.3. Convenient Alliances: The Siege of Salé and the Promise of Peace 
 
Charles was under pressure to resolve the matter, having received an increasing 
number of reports, complaints, and petitions about attacks on English ships and the 
enslavement of Britons by North African corsairs, not only in the Atlantic and 
Mediterranean, but also, of greater concern, around the coasts of England and 
Ireland.108 This is despite the king’s having taken the unprecedented initiative in 1634 
to request the collection of ship money in a time of notional peace, and extend it the 
following year to inland towns and counties. They were measures contested both in 
principle and in their application, but also created an expectation that this impost 
would achieve results.109 Among other things, Charles promulgated these measures 
to provide his navy with the means to mount a more effective response against 
piracy; a focus which became more pronounced from the summer of 1636.110  He was 
not only urged to take action by family members, mayors, merchants, and ship 
owners, but also publicly criticised for what at least one member of the clergy saw as 
his profligacy at the expense of the freedom of captives.111 Towards the end of 1636, 
the king decided that he must act decisively, and that the only way to free the 
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captives held in Salé, and stop the attacks by the corsairs originating from there, was 
with a demonstration of English naval power.112 The desperation felt by the king and 
his councillors at this time can perhaps be gauged by comparing their response to the 
advice provided by a committee some four years earlier concerning the redemption 
of captives held in Tunis and Algiers, which concluded that military action by sea or 
land was not only too costly, but also too risky.113 But what, in fact, unfolded at Salé 
changed the immediate course of Anglo-Moroccan relations, and briefly provided the 
prospect of a positive new era of engagement between the two countries. 
 
The instructions issued by the admiralty on 17 February 1637 were, at face value, 
straightforward. The commander of the mission, Captain William Rainsborough, was 
to sail to Salé ‘and there to imploye’ himself ‘with industry and courage’, ‘principally 
for supressing of Turkish pyrattes and redeeming his majestyes subjects’. However, 
they go on to state that once there, the commander is to act in accordance with any 
instructions subsequently issued by the king.114 Pierre de Cenival and Philippe de 
Cossé Brissac note that while the king’s instructions had not yet been found, they 
were intended to answer questions posed by Rainsborough, which among other 
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things, concerned the nature of his relations with al-ʻAyyashi, and what condiƟons of 
peace were to be imposed on the Salétins.115 While the timing of the fleet’s arrival in 
Salé has been portrayed as being serendipitous,116 the fact that Rainsborough was 
asking about how he was to deal with al-ʻAyyashi indicates that both the Ɵming of 
the mission, and the commander’s actions at Salé were more than fortuitous; rather 
they had been informed by useful intelligence. Furthermore, whatever benefit that 
was derived from the mission was not principally due to English naval power, 
Rainsborough’s skill, or his shrewd manipulation of the Moroccans, as some have 
claimed, but rather the willingness of the English protagonists to work within the 
Moroccan polity to achieve mutually beneficial outcomes.117  
 
In fact, a merchant by the name of Giles Penn, who claimed exceptional knowledge 
of ‘those people and country’ acquired over thirty years, had been closely involved in 
the conception of, and planning for, the mission, having spent eight months since his 
return from Morocco ‘soliciting for the good of his majesties subjects liberties’.118 
Penn had been involved in discussions with the king and his councillors concerning 
Salé since at least June 1636, and his counsel had been well received.119 A letter he 
wrote to the lord commissioners of the Admiralty in December 1636, presented to 
them the following month, appears to contain his final advice on the matter. In 
addition to advising on the preparation of the fleet, he also apprises the 
commissioners of the current political situation. He notes that the two Morisco 
factions, the Andalusians and the Hornacheros, were in conflict, and that the former 
has assumed control of the fortress in the new town. Furthermore, he points out, al-
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ʻAyyashi had joined forces with the former governor of Tétouan against the Moriscos, 
and is intending to take the fortress himself. Penn proposed seeking an alliance with 
the marabout whereby his forces besieged the fortress by land, and the English navy 
by sea. In this way the English could both destroy the corsairs, and recover the 
captives. However, he cautioned that it was necessary for the squadron to be at Salé 
before the middle of March, by which time the corsairs commenced leaving the port 
for their annual predation.120  
 
Rainsborough and his squadron did not arrive until 3 April but found that the port still 
hosted more than forty vessels.121 He initially had hoped that by blockading the 
harbour he could force the Andalusians to concede to his demands, but claims that 
he found them unwilling to negotiate, and was frustrated at being unable to either 
maintain an effective blockade, or destroy their vessels in the harbour.122 However, 
as Giles Penn had foreshadowed, the ‘Saint’, Muhammad al-ʻAyāshī, was also 
besieging the new town. Within five days of the squadron’s arrival al-ʻAyāshī had 
established contact with Rainsborough, and almost immediately the English began 
providing assistance to his forces.123  Rainborough then proceeded to ‘treat and 
conclude a peace with him’, noting that this was in accordance with his 
commission.124 By 15 May a formal treaty had been decided, under which, among 
other matters, the marabout agreed the following: to release all Britons held in the 
                                                        
120‘Mémoire de Giles Penn’, December 1636, in Cenival and Cossé Brissac, SIHMA, III, pp. 263–270; 
CSPD, 1636–1637, pp. 362–363. 
121 The squadron was to consist of two naval vessels (Leopard and Antelope), and two merchant vessels 
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Sally Fleet with the Proceedings of the Voyage, ed. Ralph Hall  (London, 1637), pp. 5–6. Based on Penn’s 
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Anglo-Moroccan Relations, p. 31. In addition, Matar in Britain and Barbary, p. 59, in discussing this 
episode refers to the ‘Old Saletians’ inhabiting Rabat, and the ‘New Saletians’ being in Salé, however, 
it was in fact the converse. Balleine in G. R. Balleine, All for the King: The Life Story of Sir George 
Cartaret  (St Helier, Jersey, 1976), p. 14, also makes the same error. 
124 ‘Lettre de W. Rainsborough a L’Amirauté’, 20 May 1637, in Cenival and Cossé Brissac, SIHMA, III, p. 
312. 
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areas he controlled and to take no more; not to make peace with the Moriscos 
without ensuring the release of Britons held by them; and the means to repatriate 
those already sold in Algiers and Tunis. In exchange Rainsborough agreed to maintain 
a blockade while the marabout’s forces attacked the dissidents, and, notably, he was 
not to make peace with the Moriscos without the consent of al-ʻAyāshī.125   
 
It is possible that Rainsborough may have been premature in so quickly aligning 
himself with al-ʻAyāshī. In a report dated 30 May, his deputy, George Carteret, 
recounts advice they received that the governor of the new town had complained to 
the sultan that the English ‘had entered in league with his enemies before he could 
send us an answere of our letter’. The governor further claimed that if he had been 
given the opportunity to negotiate fairly, he would have given Rainsborough ‘all the 
satisfaction [he] could desire’.126 It was perhaps a ruse, or the governor was 
protecting himself from possible recrimination from the sultan. But the fact that this 
claim was made may explain why Rainsborough makes no mention of his earlier 
assistance to al-ʻAyāshī in his report to the Admiralty of the same date, only noting 
that the marabout sent a representative aboard to negotiate a treaty on 11 May.127 
After all, Rainsborough himself admits to being ‘not skilled in making articles of 
peace’, perhaps acknowledging he lacked skills of diplomacy more generally, but, 
more importantly, he had a clear desire to make most of the corsair fleet 
‘unserviceable’ before returning to England.128 In any event, over the course of 
almost four months, the English worked closely with their Moroccan allies, providing 
them with logistical and artillery support, to force the capitulation of the Moriscos. 
 
It is useful to note at this point, that despite the length of time they spent in Salé, the 
letters, reports and memoirs of the Britons who participated in the mission reveal 
                                                        
125 ‘Traité Entre Charles 1er et Sidi Mohammed El-‘Ayyachi’, 5 May 1637, in ibid., pp. 292–294. The 
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Politics, p. 175, remarks that Rainsborough was not well qualified to deal with the complexities of 
Moroccan politics which prevailed at this time, the mission being essentially a diplomatic operation 
rather than a naval one. 
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little about their perceptions of, and attitudes about, the country and its people. 
Accounts, perhaps not surprisingly, were focussed on events, not personal 
reflections. At the very least they appear to have been largely indifferent to the 
religious and cultural character of their allies and enemies, although Rainsborough’s 
criticism of the governor of the new town was at least partially framed by cultural 
and religious bias.129 More generally though, the character of the inhabitants of the 
new town was defined by their perceived status as pirates; the commander himself 
declaiming that they were ‘wicked fellowes’, and the place nothing ‘but a denn of 
theifes’.130 More surprising perhaps is the fact that despite al-ʻAyāshī being a central 
figure and frequently mentioned, little is said by commentators about what they 
thought about him; all Rainsborough reveals is that he had ‘great confidence’ in the 
marabout,131 and the master of his flagship, John Dunton, acknowledges him as ‘our 
friend’.132 
 
By early July the combined assault was starting to show results; food shortages and 
desertions began to be reported, and the Andalusians were making overtures for 
peace.133 By common consent they had also deposed their governor, apparently in 
an attempt to placate al-ʻAyāshī whom the governor had earlier offended, and had 
dispatched him to the sultan.134 The sultan, Al-Asghar, in fact, was preparing his own 
                                                        
129 See, for example, ‘Lettre de W. Rainsborough a W. Aston’, 18 April 1637, in Cenival and Cossé 
Brissac, SIHMA, p. 282. 
130 ‘Lettre de W. Rainsborough a L’Amirauté’, 8 August 1637, in ibid., p. 326. 
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134‘Lettre de W. Rainsborough a L’Amirauté’, 8 August 1637 and ‘Lettre de G. Carteret a E. Nicholas’, 
21 September 1637, in Cenival and Cossé Brissac, SIHMA, III, pp. 324, 340; Dunton, A True Journall, p. 
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assault on the new town — a prospect welcomed by Rainsborough — but was 
prevented from doing so by al-ʻAyāshī, who was determined to take control of the 
town after having invested so much in his siege.135 However, the marabout’s 
ambitions were foiled when the sultan in the first week of August issued a general 
pardon for the inhabitants, ahead of the arrival of the former governor, in the 
company of one of his qā’ids (commanders), and his adviser, the controversial Robert 
Blake.136  
 
Despite the treaty which Rainsborough had entered into with al-ʻAyāshī, the English 
agreed to the sultan’s request for his representatives to enter the new town, and 
within days the Moriscos had released all the Britons they held captive. In total some 
three hundred, including eleven women, were liberated before the squadron 
departed.137 While Rainsborough attempts to take credit for the outcome by 
insinuating that he forced the hand of the Moroccans to release the captives, Carteret 
reveals that the sultan, in a letter to the commander, had already given this 
undertaking.138 Despite being so close to delivering a decisive blow to the Salé 
corsairs, the English instead accepted a diplomatic solution, and, not surprisingly, 
Carteret notes that ‘the Saint was much displaised’ with the outcome.139 But in any 
event, the timing of the arrival of the sultan’s delegation had been fortuitous for the 
English, for the Moriscos were determined not to surrender to al-ʻAyāshī and had 
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and Carteret) to 1 August (Rainsborough).  
135  ‘Lettre de W. Rainsborough a L’Amirauté’, 8 August 1637 and ‘Lettre de G. Carteret a E. Nicholas’, 
21 September 1637, in Cenival and Cossé Brissac, SIHMA, III, pp. 323, 340. 
136 Ibid., pp. 325, 341; Dunton, A True Journall, p. 19. 
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Journall, pp. 19–20. 
139 Cenival and Cossé Brissac, SIHMA, III, p. 325. 
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been negotiating to hand the town to the Spanish, only ceasing entertaining this 
option upon receiving the letter of pardon from the sultan.140 
 
For al-ʻAyāshī the siege had been a no-win situation, but for the English it now 
promised a means of not only addressing the problem of the corsairs, but also of 
normalising commercial and political relations with the sultinate. Whether at the 
invitation of the sultan or, as indicated by Rainsborough, at his own instigation, 
Rainsborough, accompanied by Blake, left Salé on 30 August for Safi to negotiate a 
formal treaty with al-Asghar in Marrakesh.141 A treaty consisting of twenty-one 
articles was subsequently concluded on 22 September.142 While there are many 
similarities with the treaty negotiated by Harrison with Mawlay al-Walid in 1632 in 
terms of the issues which it addresses, there are also some very significant 
differences. The treaty was more comprehensive, and balanced, providing the sultan 
and his subjects with the same rights as the English, and imposing on the English the 
same obligations as the Moroccans. Notably, it retained an article providing 
reciprocal rights of free trade in the dominions of each ruler (article 4). In an attempt 
to mitigate attacks on the vessels of each party, it imposed on local governors a 
responsibility to take measures to avoid such attacks, and an obligation on them to 
provide redress in the event of a breach (article 15).  There were also two significant 
concessions by the English. First, the treaty sanctioned the taking by the Moroccans 
of any English ship, along with its crew and goods, found trading with the sultan’s 
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enemies (article 9). Second, it held out the possibility of the sultan obtaining use of 
English ships should they be required by him to deal with rebels or trade with his 
enemies (article 16). 
 
In recognition of this new era of Anglo-Moroccan détente, al-Asghar sent his 
ambassador, Jaudar ben Abdellah, to England to finalise the treaty with King Charles. 
The ambassador was accompanied by Blake.143 The delegation arrived in England on 
8 October 1637, and entered London on 19 October. Details relating to the embassy 
are provided in an account, The Arrivall and Intertainements of the Embassador, 
published that same year, which was introduced in the previous chapter. It describes 
how the ambassador and his retinue were received on their approach to the city, 
heralded by a cannonade of ‘Love and Welcome’, ‘in state as was fitting and 
honourable’, met by members of the Privy Council, attended by thousands of 
spectators on their arrival at Tower-wharf, conveyed in coaches, including the king’s 
own, and escorted by Barbary merchants and city officials to their lodgings.144 The 
general tone of the pamphlet is one of approbation of relations with Morocco. In 
particular, the author appears to actively seek to identify areas of affinity between 
the two nations and their cultures rather than differences. Even his treatment of 
Islam is moderate, and relatively well informed, and while he wishes ‘they [Muslims] 
were all inspired by holinesse from God’, he is ‘sure that they do surpasse many 
Christians in righteousnesse and just dealing towards men’.145  
 
The theme of Anglo-Moroccan affinity was echoed by the sultan himself when he 
wrote to Charles on 15 November 1637, not only emphasising the interest which they 
shared in rooting ‘out the generacions of those, who have been soe pernitious to the 
good of our nations’,146 namely the corsairs of Salé, but also the common bond which 
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existed between them as legitimate rulers: ‘The regall power allotted to our charge, 
makes us first commen servants to our creator, then of those whome wee 
governe’.147 To emphasise the potential mutual importance of the relationship, the 
sultan goes on to suggest Charles join with him, as they did at Salé, waging ‘warr 
against Tunis, Argeire and other places’;148 it was a plan, as Giles Penn argued, that 
the sultan had no hope of ever effecting.149 
 
3.4. Practical Opportunism: Working within a Fractured Polity 
 
At the same time as their compatriots were celebrating the start of what they 
believed to be a new epoch in Anglo-Moroccan commercial and political relations, 
there were others who provided contrary opinions based on deeper insight into the 
prevailing situation, informed by their knowledge of, and actual experience in, that 
country. Penn offers a sober assessment of issues concerning peace and trade in 
Morocco. The whole of Sus, he notes, is under the control of Abū Hassūn, who is 
unlikely ever to be defeated by al-Asghar. Further, he ‘hath alwayes bene a greate 
freind to our English nacion’, for unlike the rulers of other areas of the country he 
does not hold Britons captive, and trade and commerce is far greater in that region 
than in the territories controlled by the sultan.150 He goes on to explain that if English 
merchants were forced to cease this trade not only would it result in a direct loss to 
them and the nation, but would open this market to the French and Dutch. In relation 
to the territory of Marrakesh held by the sultan, it is both weak in trade and military 
power, he claimed. Furthermore, aside from being unable to recover either Sus or 
Fez, al-Asghar’s hold on power in the new town of Salé is tenuous; the only thing 
preventing the Moriscos rebelling again was the risk of another attack on the port by 
English ships, to which the sultan may have recourse under the proposed peace. Penn 
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also responded to reports that a treaty would require all English trading to be 
conducted through Safi. He counsels that any attempt to prevent merchants trading 
in Sus would lead to conflict with Dutch and French traders who attempted to access 
this market, and a possible wider escalation of national conflict. Furthermore, he 
accuses Blake of monopolising trade in Safi, and for this reason believes that limiting 
trade to there would prejudice both English merchants and the king’s customs.151  
 
Penn then turns to the issue of Salé, observing that trade in that area had been far 
better when al-ʻAyāshī had controlled both towns, but believed that it was doubtful 
whether he would assist the English again in any action against the new town if that 
proved necessary. But irrespective of whoever controlled that town, if they wished 
to have peace and trade with England, Penn’s advice was that an agent or consul 
should be appointed to monitor their activities. With a similar indifference to political 
regime, he notes that Tétouan had always been a good place for the English to trade, 
and continues to be so, despite its Morisco inhabitants no longer being subject to the 
authority of either al-ʻAyāshī or the sultan.152 
 
The influence of vested interest in the way in which Penn framed his advice cannot 
be discounted — after all, he was appointed as the first English consul in Morocco, 
with specific responsibility for affairs at Salé, not long after153 — but he was not alone 
in questioning the wisdom of reliance on the fragile Sa‘dian regime, and suggesting 
other means to pursue England’s interests in the country.  Another commentator, a 
Stephen Scott, who claims to have travelled extensively throughout Sus for seven 
years, also wrote about the advantages of relations with Sus, and asked that his 
experience be taken into consideration in negotiating any treaty with the sultan.154  
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In his advice, Scott first details the riches which Sus had provided Mawlay al-Mansūr 
and reflects on the destruction of the sugar industry and the change in political 
control which had occurred there since his death.155  Given that al-Asghar had not 
been able to regain Sus, he asks the king to consider how his interests are best served, 
given that trade with the kingdoms of both Marrakesh and Fez was of little value on 
its own, and the greatest benefit of any peace with their rulers he could hope for was 
to avoid the payment of ransoms for his subjects taken captive.  He then goes on to 
optimistically propose that Charles make an offer jointly to both Abū Hassūn and al-
Asghar to contract the purchase of sugar from Sus to enable the industry there to be 
re-established. Oddly, Scott also thought that in addition to purchasing sugar at an 
agreed price, the offer would be made even more attractive by requesting rights to 
the town of Agadir, and for the construction of a small fort in the nearby port of Santa 
Cruz, which would not only provide for the safety of the king’s subjects, but would 
allow the king to ‘defend that port from all invaders’, presumably as a service to the 
sultan.156 Scott’s principal rationale for this proposal was the profit that could be 
made from sugar at a time when England was importing vast quantities at great cost, 
and the Dutch were developing their own sources in Brazil. But he concludes by 
warning the king against ignoring Abū Hassūn: doing so runs the risk of Britons in Sus 
being held captive, and the financial opportunities which exist there being lost to 
others.157   
 
Scott clearly believed that Morocco could be a source of great profit for England, but 
he was not advocating exploitation of the country by the use of force and usurpation 
of political control. Like John Harrison’s earlier proposal for Mehdya, he envisaged 
that the benefits of a permanent English presence could be achieved with the support 
of the Moroccans themselves on the basis of the identification and fulfilment of 
mutual interests. But, like Harrison, Scott appears oblivious to the efforts made by 
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Moroccans to rid their land of European enclaves for over a century, and the 
importance of those sites that remained under European control in leveraging religio-
nationalistic sentiment by factional leaders in their bids for territorial control and 
necessary sacral and political legitimacy. 
 
Despite the warnings offered by Penn and Scott, Charles maintained his faith in the 
Sa‘dian regime and the final form of a treaty of peace and commerce with the sultan 
was ratified by the king on 8 May 1638.158 The document differs significantly in tone 
and content from the one negotiated the previous year. While still offering (notional) 
protection to the sultan’s subjects from being held as slaves in the king’s dominions 
(article [4]), and prohibiting trade with his enemies (article [10]), its focus is squarely 
on English rights. Gone are the reciprocal rights of free trade and supply of vessels; 
the obligation on the king’s governors to prevent attacks on Moroccan vessels and 
provide redress when necessary; the sanctioning of the seizure of vessels found 
trading with rebels; and the explicit right of the sultan to request the use of English 
vessels. The treaty was framed around England’s commercial interests and was 
supported in this respect by two important developments.  
 
The first of these was the king’s appointment of Robert Blake as his agent ‘for 
Barbarie’, a role for which the ‘cheif indevor’ was to ‘protect our marchants in the 
priveleges and freedom of their trade’ according to the treaty.159 As the king’s agent, 
Blake was also to be the ‘keeper and conservator’ of the articles of the treaty.160 The 
second development was the issuing shortly after of a charter for the establishment 
of a joint-stock company which was to have a monopoly on all English trade into and 
from an area extending from ‘Cape Blanco’ (on the Atlantic coast between Mauritania 
and Western Sahara) to ‘the port of Tremezeene’ (Oran in Algiers), for at least three 
years.161 The proposal appears to have originated with Blake, who became one of the 
members, but the prospect for such an arrangement had been contested by other 
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merchants operating in the region, the latest episode in their long battle against 
changes to traditional trading arrangements.162 However, the king had supported the 
idea, and provision for the establishment of such an entity was incorporated into the 
final treaty, which required the sultan to permit any such company to have the right 
to ‘determine all differences and controversies’, which arose among its members, 
and to enforce decisions in accordance ‘to such orders and commission as they shall 
receave from their owne king’.163 Through these means, and the appointment of 
Penn as consul at Salé, the English authorities were not only attempting to ensure 
compliance with the terms of the treaty by the Moroccans, but also asserting 
England’s extra-territorial jurisdiction over its own subjects.164 It is in relation to the 
latter concern that the rationale for the establishment of a trading company differs 
from that of its predecessor in the previous century; no longer was the issue one of 
simply improving the political and commercial leverage of England in overseas 
markets, but also of controlling the overseas activities of Britons.165  
 
The ambassador, in the company of Blake, left England on 31 May and arrived off Salé 
on 19 June in a vessel under the command of George Carteret. What the captain 
found there and observed over the course of the following months exemplifies the 
challenges faced by the English in Morocco during this period. Carteret left a journal 
of his voyage in which he describes a complex and fluid situation, involving multiple 
parties and uncertain allegiances, about which he appears to have acquired a sound 
understanding.166 He notes that through discussions with one of the sultan’s 
commanders (a French renegade who governed Safi) and with English merchants, 
some of whom had lived in Morocco for two decades, ‘I did informe my selfe of theise 
                                                        
162 'Ordre du Conseil Privé', 18 April 1638, in ibid., pp. 397–398. 
163 Ibid., pp. 402–403. 
164 See the discussion on the extension of English jurisdiction and authority in the Mediterranean in 
chap. 1 of this thesis. See also Blake’s later response to the sultan’s concerns about the establishment 
of the joint-stock Barbary Company and its control of trade pricing, in 'Journal de Robert Blake', 21 
May 1638–26 December 1638, in ibid., pp. 508–509. Blake explains to the sultan that such companies 
are ‘noe newe thinge’, and ‘upon this coast it was most necessary’, to enable, among reasons, King 
Charles to ensure that his subjects did not trade with the rebels.  
165 See the discussion on the original Barbary Company in chap. 1 of this thesis. 
166 See George Carteret, The Barbary Voyage of 1638, ed. Boies Penrose (Philadelphia, 1929). An 
extract from the journal for this part of Carteret’s voyage is provided as 'Journal de G. Carteret', 20 
April–30 October 1638, in Cenival and Cossé Brissac, SIHMA, pp. 442–460. 
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three theings especially (viz.) the trade, the government, and the extent of the 
[Moroccan] king’s dominions which he hath in present posesion’.167 Described by one 
biographer ‘as a sober, hardworking servant of the King, whose Royalism was his 
Religion’,168 his contemporary Samuel Pepys considered Carteret to be intemperate, 
stating he was ‘the most passionate man in the world’, but also believed him to be 
an honest one.169 
 
Upon his arrival in Salé, Carteret found the Moriscos were again in conflict, and al-
ʻAyāshī was continuing to besiege the new town. He reflects on the duplicity of both 
al-ʻAyāshī and the Andalusian governor in their dealings with the sultan. The 
marabout had shown himself to be a particularly adept manipulator of allegiances 
during the earlier siege, and Carteret describes how he now feigned support for the 
sultan to enact a plan to infiltrate the new town with his supporters. He also details 
the desperate measures taken by the garrison to survive. Short of supplies and 
holding little hope of being relieved by the sultan, the men reached out for assistance 
from Spain, and even the sultan’s rebellious half-brother in Fez.170 
 
While the sultan failed to make good his promises of relief, the Spanish provided the 
beleaguered garrison the prospect of reprieve with the arrival around July of soldiers 
and supplies. The Andalusians in the fortress were receptive to accepting the 
assistance, but the sultan’s commander declined the offer.171 However, by the 
beginning of September, he was reconsidering the possibility of handing the fortress 
to the Spanish if help did not arrive soon. Carteret saw the opportunity to resolve the 
problem of Salé once and for all. He advised the commander that he strongly 
approved of the possibility of ‘putteinge it into the Christian hands’ rather than 
deliver it up to the rebels, but pointed out the risk to the sultan of Spanish possession 
of another strategic site in Morocco by which they may be emboldened to launch a 
                                                        
167 Carteret, The Barbary Voyage, p. 24 (my interpolation). 
168 Balleine, All for the King, p. 2. 
169 Samuel Pepys, The Diary of Samuel Pepys: A New and Complete Transcription, eds. Robert Latham 
and William Matthews, 11 vols., vol. 6  (London, 1970–1983), p. 175, entry for 31 July 1665; ibid., 8, p. 
165, entry for 12 April 1667. 
170 Carteret, The Barbary Voyage, see, for example, pp. 16–19, 28–29. 
171 Ibid., pp. 28–29. 
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wider conquest. Instead, the captain shrewdly suggested that it would be ‘farr safer’ 
for the sultan to offer the fortress to the king of England, whose friendship and 
support had been amply demonstrated.172 The commander promised to convey the 
offer to his master, but Carteret had received no response before he departed for 
England six days later.173 
 
The new treaty was ratified by the sultan on 25 July 1638.174 However, it was not long 
before the strength of the newly forged relationship was tested by news that English 
merchants were continuing to trade with the rebels; the sultan was understandably 
incensed.175 He was also troubled about the power the joint-stock company had over 
the pricing of imports and exports,176 and he was not alone in having concerns about 
the company’s monopoly. The trading arrangements were unravelling in the face of 
infighting within the company itself, and resistance from the traditional traders.177 
On 4 February 1639, the Privy Council requested that representative of the two sides 
meet to attempt to negotiate a resolution to their differences, but with the clear 
expectation that the joint-stock company would be maintained.178 However, by 13 
March there had been a significant change in direction: the king had decided that in 
the interests of trade, the company be dissolved and merchants should no longer be 
limited to conducting their business in ports in the sultan’s domains, but be at liberty 
to trade in any port to avoid the loss of commerce to their competitors. But they held 
that an entity should continue to manage trade with Morocco, although rather than 
a joint-stock company it was decided it should be a regulated charter company, 
allowing all traders to participate equally.179 While the sultan did not agree with the 
merchants’ complaints about the existing restrictions of trade, he was prepared to 
accept the change on the basis of a prohibition on the trade in arms and ammunition, 
                                                        
172 Ibid., p. 32. 
173 Ibid., pp. 33–34. 
174 Cenival and Cossé Brissac, SIHMA, III, p. 401, n. 1. 
175  'Journal de Robert Blake', 21 May–26 December 1638, in ibid., pp. 504–505. 
176 Ibid., p. 508. 
177 Blake’s journal entries for this period detail the emerging issues in relations with the sultan, with 
members of the company, and with other merchants. See ibid., esp. pp. 503–513. 
178  'Ordre du Counseil Privé', 25 January 1639, in ibid., pp. 515–518. 
179  'Ordre du Counseil Privé', 3 March 1639, in ibid., pp. 520–521. 
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which had been imposed by Charles as a condition of the new arrangements.180 The 
Barbary merchants had finally achieved the outcome they had fought so long for. 
 
In what would be his last notable attempt to influence English involvement in      
Morocco, on 5 September 1641 Robert Blake submitted a proposal to the House of 
Lords for authority to negotiate with the defenders of the fortress at Salé which had 
been under almost continuous siege for some four years. Blake claimed that the 
sultan’s garrison was prepared to surrender the fortress in exchange for being 
transported to safety elsewhere, and argued there were strategic and commercial 
benefits to be gained from possessing not only the fortress, but the whole new town. 
According to Blake, it would not only secure the port from being a haven for corsairs, 
but also provide a supply point for English vessels. More significantly, he also 
proposed driving the inhabitants out of the town, taking over control of the nearby 
salt pans, and limiting production of tin from a nearby mine, and selling it with 
Cornish tin to maximise its price.181 It has been claimed by one scholar that Blake 
intended to enslave the population and ‘was eager to begin the age of African 
imperialism’ by following the Spanish model of exploitation in South America.182 
However, this is a misreading of Blake’s proposal. Nowhere does he even imply an 
intent to enslave Moroccans, and nor did he hint at having an interest in areas outside 
the immediate vicinity of the town. In fact, his aims were well defined and limited, 
and his motivations not totally unreasonable. He stresses that it would be important 
to reassure people in adjoining areas that the occupation of the fortress and 
demolition of the town was ‘not anie ways to offend them, but onlie to preserve 
ourselves from the piracie and spoyle of those who inhabit that towne’. He also 
expected that by assuaging the concerns of the local people, the English could 
develop ‘the greatest trade of all the coasts of Barbary’ with them, and exclude the 
French and Dutch from commerce in the region.183  
 
                                                        
180 'Lettre de Moulay Mohammed ech-Cheikh el-Asghar à Charles Ier', 20–29 July 1639, in ibid., pp. 
530–533. 
181 'Mémoire de R. Blake', 26 August 1641, in ibid., pp. 548–549. 
182 Matar, Britain and Barbary, pp. 44–45. 
183 Cenival and Cossé Brissac, SIHMA, III, p. 549. 
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Blake was neither necessarily being disloyal to his benefactor, the Sa‘dī sultan, nor 
the harbinger of English imperialism in North Africa, rather he was just being practical 
and opportunistic; either the English took Salé, or it fell to the sultan’s enemies, or 
even to Spain, both of which outcomes would be the cause of ongoing problems for 
both the sultan and the English. What is notable about Blake’s proposal is not that he 
conceived it, but rather, despite his intimate knowledge of Moroccan politics and 
society, his expectation was that Moroccans would accept any attempt by a Christian 
state to sequester their land. It is difficult to get a measure of Blake’s character, 
beyond the fact he was a shrewd businessman, and a conniving opportunist, and 
given this, it is not surprising that his celebrity and role in Anglo-Moroccan relations 
was short lived; despite the favour shown to him by Charles I, he was hanged in 1643 
on the order of Prince Rupert for betrayal.184 
 
3.5. Needs Must: Finding Common Ground for a New Rapprochement 
 
However, by the time Blake submitted his proposal the political landscape in both 
Morocco and England was changing, and the period of rapprochement between the 
two countries which had begun in 1625 was drawing to an end. The paucity of official 
documents in the archives for 1642 to 1657, concerning England’s relations with 
Morocco, reveals a total political disengagement.185 Charles had been unable to stop 
the trade in arms with the rebels by his subjects as required under the treaty with the 
Sa‘dī sultan, but in any event by 1642 Salé was effectively under the control of the 
Dilā’īs and the preoccupation of the English with their own civil war allowed the 
corsairs to quickly renew their predation on English shipping. Nevertheless, despite 
the political turmoil, and the risk of attack and enslavement, English merchants 
continued to ply their trade in Morocco, and were even engaged as intermediaries 
by the English government to negotiate ransoms for the release of their captured 
countrymen.186  
                                                        
184 On Blake’s execution, see Rogers, Anglo-Moroccan Relations, p. 38; Lloyd, English Corsairs, p. 97. 
185 See the indexes for the two principal manuscript volumes of state papers relating to Morocco for 
this period, TNA, SP 71/13/Pt. 1 and TNA, SP 102/2/Pt. 2. See also the overview for the period 1642–
1660, 'Les Rapports de l'Angleterre et du Maroc', provided by Pierre de Cenival and Philippe de Cossé 
Brissac in SIHMA, III, pp. 552–555.     
186 Cenival and Cossé Brissac, SIHMA, III, pp. 552–553. 
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It was Oliver Cromwell’s more aggressive foreign policy following the end of the first 
Anglo-Dutch war in 1654, that reignited England’s interest in renewing political 
relations with Morocco. War with Spain in 1656 and a desire to maintain a naval 
presence in the Mediterranean necessitated that the English find a port near the 
Strait of Gibraltar from which to supply the fleet. Gibraltar had been considered, as 
had another site (probably on the Alhucemas Islands off the Mediterranean coast of 
Morocco), but both options had been ruled out as being unfeasible, and so they 
turned to Tétouan.187 Admiral Robert Blake attempted to finalise a peace with both 
Salé and Tétouan in the summer of that year. Negotiations with the Salétins broke 
down over the redemption of captives, but despite his response to Tunisian 
intransigence the previous year, and reports at that time that he intended to take 
punitive action against the Salétins,188 he instead attempted to coerce them by 
maintaining a blockade of the port.189 Blake found the governor of Tétouan, ‘Abd el-
Krim en-Neksis, more receptive: ‘Abd el-Krim not only proposed a treaty, but also the 
appointment of an English agent to monitor its adherence. Blake was required to 
depart before finalising negotiations, but his vice-admiral, Richard Badiley later 
submitted an application to the Admiralty to pursue the matter.190 By November 
1657, a young merchant operating in Tétouan, Nathaniel Luke, had been appointed 
provedore for the navy in the port, and as the English consul for the ports of Salé, 
Asilah, Tétouan, Safi, and Santa Cruz, with responsibility for directing and assisting 
‘our merchants and people aforesaid in their commerce and business’, among other 
                                                        
187 Julian S. Corbett, England in the Mediterranean: A Study of the Rise and Influence of British Power 
Within the Straits, 1603–1713, 2 vols., vol. I (London, 1904), pp. 318–334. On Cromwell’s thinking 
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things pertaining to the duty of a consul.191 Nathaniel and his older brother John 
would go on to assume roles in the governance of English Tangier. 
 
The prospects for peace and commerce in Morocco looked promising for the English 
at this time. A peace was finally concluded with the Salétins in July of that year,192 
and a treaty with the Dilā’ leader Muhammad al-Hajj was signed the following 
month.193 The Dilā’ regime had been ascendant in northern Morocco since the early 
1640s, and with control of Fez and the demise of the Sa’dian dynasty, al-Hajj had 
gained effective sovereignty of the region. Also joined in the treaty was Abd el-Krim, 
as governor of Tétouan, and one of the other signatories was possibly al-Hajj’s son 
Sidi Abdallah, who would become governor of Salé.194 The treaty is succinct, 
consisting of only eight articles. It included, inter alia, rights to access the ports of the 
other party for the purposes of trade (article 1); safe passage for the vessels of each 
party (article 3); protection of the subjects of each party from verbal abuse and ill 
treatment (article 6); and access for the warships of each party to provisioning at the 
ports of the other (article 7). In the balance it provides between the rights and 
obligations of the parties, if not the detail, it mirrors the preliminary treaty negotiated 
with Mawlay al-Asghar in 1637, as opposed to the one-sided document that was 
eventually settled upon. In this respect, these two treaties represent a departure 
from the approach which was adopted in other treaties between European and North 
African states, at least from the 1650s, which provided a general advantage to the 
Europeans. 195 It indicates that the English who negotiated these documents not only 
possessed a desire at this time to establish a viable peace with the Moroccans, but 
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recognised, as did their predecessors, that the only means to do so was by attempting 
to ensure that the interests of both parties were satisfactorily accommodated.196 
 
Conclusion  
 
Anglo-Moroccan relations were maintained following Mawlay al-Mansūr’s death, but 
were inconsistent, and at times uncertain.  In correspondence and treaties over the 
following decades the commerce and amity which prevailed between the two 
countries in the late sixteenth century was frequently evoked, but could not be 
replicated. This is because key parameters had changed. Trade continued to be 
important to both sides, but no longer were they bound as strongly by a common 
fear and antipathy toward Spain. But, most importantly, as state authority contracted 
in Morocco, the English were challenged by a far more complex political terrain, 
uncertain as to what direction to take, or which path would provide the best 
commercial and strategic outcomes. Although they would seek to do so, they found 
they could not profit from the disunity in Morocco without consequence. 
 
It was war with Spain that helped encourage an English ruler to once again reach out 
to Morocco for assistance. The king’s agent, John Harrison, was no stranger to the 
country, and it is his accounts which best demonstrate that the political conditions in 
Morocco during the period over which this chapter ranges not only affected 
diplomatic and commercial relations, but could also deeply impact the perceptions 
and responses of Britons who came in contact with the country at this time. 
Harrison’s perceptions, particularly of Islam and Islamic government, were 
conditioned by the circumstances which prevailed in Morocco, characterised as they 
were by bloody disputes over control of territory and resources, and the associated 
                                                        
196 There is another document which J. A. O. C. Brown has interpreted to be a renewal of the treaty, 
dating it to 1661. However, both documents were negotiated on behalf of Oliver Cromwell, and both 
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the undated document, and a right that ‘ships of the fleete have the liberty to abroad’ is included in a 
notation at the end. All other rights and obligations are essentially the same. See BL, Sloane MS 3509, 
ff. 2–3; J. A. O. C. Brown, 'Anglo-Moroccan Relations and the Embassy of Aḥmad Qardanash, 1706–
1708', The Historical Journal, 51 (2008), pp. 604–605.  
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propaganda bruited by partisan interests. He interpreted his personal interactions, 
events he experienced, and stories which he heard through the filter of his strong 
Protestant faith and millenarian beliefs, but he also manifested responses which 
reveal tensions arising from his adherence to more fundamental Christian and 
humanistic convictions; in these respects, his disposition, ideas, and actions very 
much reflect the general anxieties of his particular age, and which by the 1660s were 
subsiding, marking the beginning of a new age which would become more ordered, 
more assured, less divided, and far less zealous.197    
 
In the extent to which he reveals his attitudes to what he found in Morocco, Harrison 
stands apart from others examined in this chapter, who provide little direct insight 
into their thoughts and feelings beyond those aspects which were of immediate 
importance to their interests. This variance is undoubtedly due to differences in a 
range of factors, including personality, the purpose for which they were in Morocco 
— most were there for specific business, not as casual sojourners — their 
experiences, and the nature of the sources they left, which, apart from several 
personal journals, largely consist of official correspondence and reports. 
Nevertheless, some general observations can be made. Firstly, religious and 
ethnological differences elicited little critical attention. In fact, they were given little 
attention at all, and, moreover, the men expressed no marked general prejudice 
against Moroccans, or conveyed a sense they considered themselves culturally 
superior. Even Harrison had little to say on these issues aside from his sympathetic 
observations about Jews and Moriscos, and his traditionally framed polemic against 
Islam; like Rainsborough, he tended to direct his prejudice toward specific individuals. 
If anything, they appeared to be unconcerned by such differences, and, like the 
Britons residing in Salé and elsewhere in the country, displayed a surprising degree 
of pragmatism and adaptability, dispositions which other Britons also amply 
demonstrated in their activities in the wider Mediterranean region.198 
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While the subjects examined in this chapter may not have revealed their inner-most 
thoughts, what they do clearly demonstrate is that they acquired considerable 
knowledge and, to some degree, understanding about Morocco, or at least about 
those aspects which were of most use to them. They also show how this knowledge 
and understanding influenced their thinking about the opportunities which the 
country could afford them personally, their nation, and their religion. Of particular 
concern to the men were issues affecting trade and national strategic interests. It has 
been argued by others that the proposals developed by Harrison and Blake for the 
acquisition of enclaves in Morocco were the products of British imperial aspiration 
and a change in ideology from a focus on trade to conquest of land and control of 
natural resources.199 But, as discussed in chapter 1, there is no evidence of a 
normative imperial ideology directing such proposals at this time; they were 
essentially the products of individual men, and specific circumstances. Furthermore, 
these proposals, if anything, were demonstrably self-conscious and delimited; I 
believe that they can better be regarded as renderings of a more traditional 
understanding of a ‘colony’ as ‘the plantation of nucleated settlements within a 
foreign landscape’, not the ‘exploitation and cultural domination’ that are implicit in 
the much later concept of ‘colonialism’.200 
 
What men like John Harrison, Stephen Scott, George Carteret, and the merchant 
Robert Blake were expressing were not imperial aspirations, but rather means by 
which England could navigate the challenges of an unstable political environment and 
external military and commercial threats, to establish new forms of engagement to 
address geo-political concerns and capitalise on commercial opportunities in 
Morocco. Their various plans did not directly pre-figure subsequent colonial thinking 
in Morocco or elsewhere. They were idealistic in their ambition, but their responses 
were ostensibly pragmatic, conceived under the confluence of general anxieties 
about competition, opportunistic circumstances, and, notably, in the belief they 
would be accepted by Moroccans on the basis of recognised mutual benefits. 
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200 David Armitage, 'Literature and Empire', in Nicholas Canny, ed., OHBE, 5 vols, vol. I. The Origins of 
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While possessing different motivations and aims, Harrison, Scott, Giles Penn, and the 
Barbary merchants who opposed the schemes of Bradshaw and Blake, realised that 
England could no longer just limit its diplomatic engagement to the increasingly 
fragile Sa’dian regime. During the late 1620s and the 1630s, the king and his advisors 
had vacillated over issues relating to trade and diplomatic policy for Morocco, torn 
between opposing positions within the seafaring and trading communities,201 
uncertain about convention and direction, but eventually they resigned themselves 
to the realities of the Moroccan political situation. However, by this time England was 
concerned with its own internal problems, and its merchants were left to their own 
devices in their dealings in Morocco until the late 1650s, when an English government 
once again courted Morocco in response to war with Spain. 
 
The treaty between England and the Dilā’ regime in 1657 was a promising re-start of 
a relationship which had spanned over a century. Characterised as it had been for 
much of that time by general accommodation of mutual interest, if not open amity, 
instead of recrimination and hostility, up until the beginning of the 1660s it 
demonstrated a very different dynamic from the relations England had with the other 
Barbary States. The promotion of mutual benefit and the exercise of realpolitik by the 
English had in the past helped align the interests of the parties and marginalise the 
effects of religious, cultural, and ethnic difference in interactions between Britons 
and Moroccans. But this modus vivendi would be compromised when England finally 
succumbed to temptation and sought to establish a permanent presence in Morocco, 
and in doing so ceased being seen as a trading partner and potential ally, and, instead, 
became an invader.  
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174 
 
 
  
Fig. 7 A contemporary plan of English Tangier showing its defences and the disposition 
of English and Moroccan forces on 27 October 1680. 
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4. Aspiration (1661–1666) 
 
Our main designe in puting our self to this great charge for this 
addition to our dominions, being to gaine our subjects the trade of 
Barbary, and to enlarge our dominions in that sea, and advance 
thereby the honour of our crowne and the general commerce and 
weale of our subjects. (Charles II, 6 September 1661)1 
 
At the beginning of 1662 the English took possession of the town of Tangier — located 
on the Moroccan coast adjacent to the Strait of Gilbraltar — from the Portuguese. 
Tangier was England’s first colony in the Mediterranean region, although it was not 
its first in an area dominated by Islam.2 The occupation of Tangier represented a 
fundamental break with the generally pragmatic and cooperative approaches to 
commercial and diplomatic activities pursued by Britons and successive English 
monarchs in Morocco over the preceeding 110 years, and has become the most 
studied period of Anglo-Moroccan relations due to the dramatic developments which 
ensued in Tangier over the following two decades. Within an admittedly limited 
corpus, much has been written about the political and commercial thinking, and 
European diplomatic machinations, associated with the acquisition of the town by 
Charles II, as well as the subsequent development of the colony and the daily life of 
the inhabitants.3 It is not the intention of the present author to examine these issues 
                                                        
1 ‘Instructions for the Earle of Peterburgh’, 6 September 1661, TNA, CO 279/1, f. 29r.  Copies of the 
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life in, the settlement under English rule, see John Davis, History of the Second Queen’s Royal Regiment 
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Atlantic Outpost; W. B. T. Abbey, Tangier Under British Rule, 1661–1684  (Channel Islands, 1940). On 
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in detail, except to the extent they help to enlighten the impact that an encounter 
with Morocco had on Britons at this time, in terms of differences in attitude and 
response, not only compared with their compatriots at home, but also how they 
varied over time as a result of subsequent developments which affected the fortunes 
of the colony. In this respect it is important to understand that the English occupation 
of Tangier intersected with major developments in Morocco, within Europe, and 
within the British Isles, all of which would influence, to various degrees, and often in 
interrelated ways, the development and fate of English Tangier, and contribute to 
shaping the attitudes, behaviours and self-perceptions of Britons residing there.  
 
Before proceeding to examining these events, it is useful to make some observations 
concerning the historiography and sources relating to this particular period of English 
activity in Morocco. As discussed in the introduction to this thesis, scholarship from 
the late Victorian and Edwardian periods has cast a long shadow over the the study 
of how Britons interacted with the Islamicate societies of the Mediterranean in the 
early modern period. Despite their evident subjectivity and insularity, these works 
remain valuable sources but they have bequeathed a legacy which has been long-
lived and influential, about which any scholar undertaking a study of this kind must 
be cognisant. Because of the didactic and symbolic importance ascribed to it by 
earlier historians, nowhere is this more evident than in the reconstruction and 
interpretration of events and personal interactions associated with the English 
occupation of Tangier.4  
                                                        
1662): Colonial Urban Fabric as Cross-Cultural Skeleton (Peterborough, Canada, 2013). See also 
Budgett Meakin, The Land of the Moors: A Comprehensive Description  (London, 1901), pp. 120–131; 
P. G. Rogers, A History of Anglo-Moroccan Relations to 1900  (London, [197?]), chap. 4; Linda Colley, 
Captives: Britain, Empire, and the World, 1600–1850  (New York, 2004), chap. 1; Matar, Britain and 
Barbary, chap. 5; Karim Bejjit, ‘Introduction’ in Karim Bejjit, ed., English Colonial Texts on Tangier, 
1661–1684: Imperialism and the Politics of Resistance, Transculturalisms, 1400–1700 (Farnham, UK, 
2015). In addition to Davis and Abbey, the connection between English Tangier and British military 
history has also attracted the attention of a number of other authors, notably Noel T. St John Williams, 
Redcoats and Courtesans: The Birth of the British Army (1660–1690)  (London, 1994); A. J. Smithers, 
The Tangier Campaign: The Birth of the British Army  (Stroud, UK, 2003). 
4 For instance, see Malcolm Elbl’s critique of the historiography of the built environment of English 
Tangier in Portuguese Tangier, pp. 66–74. On the treatment of interactions with, and representations 
of the Moor, in late Victorian and Edwardian scholarship see Karim Bejjit, 'Encountering the Infidels: 
Restoration Images of the Moors', in Working Papers on the Web, vol. 7 (2004), at 
http://extra.shu.ac.uk/wpw/morocco/Beljjitt/Beljjitt.htm, under I–From Dramatic to Colonial Space. 
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As Karim Bejjit discerns, there are two dominant attitudes which emerge from the 
traditional historiography. The first is a sense of nostalgia, in which the eventual 
surrender of Tangier is conceived as having been both unfortunate and perhaps 
unnecessary, an ill-considered decision which deprived England of a potentially 
important asset. The second, he characterises as ‘an apologetic tendency’ which 
stresses the ability of the English to ‘adapt to an unfamiliar and hostile environment’ 
supported by their patriotism.5 While I agree with Bejiit concerning the first, with 
respect to the second I do not believe that it is so much adaptation that someone like 
Enid Routh was concerned about; in fact, like many of her early modern forbears, she 
possibly felt that the prospect of an English man or woman adapting to a foreign 
environment was anathema. Rather, in my view, the traditional historiographical 
narrative of English Tangier, viz. Routh, is based on a belief that a stout Englishman 
was not only capable of overcoming the challenges presented by an unfamiliar and 
hostile environment, but could do so without compromising those personal, cultural, 
and religious beliefs and values which defined their essential Englishness. Moreover, 
the general standards by which she judged the actions of Britons of the period were 
in fact anachronistic, being those set by British imperialists some two centuries later.6 
 
However, as has been shown in the preceding chapter, signs of positive acculturation, 
if not cultural adaptation, are in fact amply evident among Britons who had 
experiences in Morocco before the Tangier period, and surviving records reveal that 
Britons continued to experience positive attititudinal and behavioural responses to 
the new geographic and socio-cultural environment in which they found themselves, 
even as occupants of an isolated and frequently beleaguered settlement. Routh 
remarks that the story of the English occupation is recorded in hundreds of letters 
and documents from the period. While most only concern public affairs, occasionally 
they contain a ‘chance remark’, which, together with a number of contemporary 
diary accounts, ‘affords a glimpse of the daily life of the English inhabitants’.7 While 
                                                        
5 Bejjit, ‘Introduction’, p. 40. 
6 See, for example, Routh’s reference to Sir Henry Lawrence and Sir Harry Lumsden, who were 
instrumental in establishing the Corps of Guides in India in the mid-nineteenth century. See Routh, 
England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, pp. 21–22. 
7 E. M. G. Routh, 'The English at Tangier', The English Historical Review, 26 (1911), p. 469. 
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Routh and others have used these fragmentary accounts to attempt to reconstruct a 
picture of the quotidian lives of Britons residing in the settlement, the archival and 
published sources for this period as a whole provide a richer and more diverse range 
of accounts than for any time up to that point concerning the engagement of Britons 
with Morocco.8 They allow us to not only acquire understanding of what they did, but 
also provide a means to gain insight into what they thought and felt, and thereby 
challenge the ideologically inspired interpretations implicit in the traditional 
historiography of the Tangier period.  
 
This chapter challenges the generally accepted view that Charles II initially acquired 
and developed Tangier to be a bridgehead to an African empire. Instead, it is argued 
that from the very beginning the king and his advisors had more benign plans in which 
cooperation with Moroccans was seen as being pivotal to the success of the colony. 
It also re-examines the dynamics of encounter between the new occupants of Tangier 
and the indigenes in the light of this revisionist perspective. Notably, it finds that 
rather than their often violent confrontations increasing hostility and prejudice, they 
in fact helped foster respect for the Moroccans, and that throughout the period 
Britons maintained a willingness to engage with the people and learn more about 
them. It also reveals that in the turmoil of this initial stage of English Tangier’s 
establishment there are also the first hints of the important role which European 
principles of honourable conduct could play in relations between Britons and 
Moroccans at this time. 
 
4.1. A Divisive Issue: The Birth of English Tangier 
 
As has been shown in chapters 1 and 3, Morocco had very much been a contested 
space since the beginning of the sixteenth century, the locus at which a wide range 
of political, religious, diplomatic, commercial, and geopolitical interests converged 
                                                        
8 The vast majority of the manuscript sources for the Tangier period of English activity in Morocco are 
found in the State Papers (SP) 71 series, or the Colonial Office (CO) 279 series. As G. E. Aylmer has also 
observed in 'Slavery Under Charles II: The Mediterranean and Tangier', The English Historical Review, 
114 (1999), p. 381, n. 4, many of the volumes in the latter series are, in fact, boxes of loose papers 
covering six-monthly periods, but are not necessarily arranged by date or by item number. They are 
also in generally poor condition. 
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and intersected. In addition to persistent internal political conflict, and Ottoman 
interference, Morocco also began to attract increasing attention from the European 
powers. While Portugal, and then Spain actively staked territorial claims, and in doing 
so attracted the enmity of the Moroccans, the English, Dutch and French had, mostly, 
been satisfied to seek to establish profitable trading arrangements, and to this end 
maintained generally cordial relations with the various factions which controlled 
Morocco. Though divided among themselves concerning the best way in which to 
manage their commerce with the country, their essentially pragmatic approach had 
paid significant dividends for the English, and Britons more generally. However, all of 
this was to change  with the occupation of Tangier. Not only would the decision of 
Charles II to accept Tangier as part of his dominions raise the ire of the Moroccans, 
but it would also incur the jealousy and suspicion of the Spanish, Dutch, and 
eventually the French, adding to existing geopolitical tensions, and contribute to 
domestic political intrigues, all of which increased the risks faced by an already 
speculative venture. 
 
Contrary to the impression sometimes given in the literature,9 the way in which the 
settlement fell into the hands of the English was more serendipitous than planned; it 
was a product of the dynastic machinations of the European powers rather than an 
initiative of the newly crowned king, although interest in Tangier by the English was 
not new. As noted in the previous chapter, it was during the Anglo-Spanish war in 
1656 that Oliver Cromwell had demonstrated a strong desire to establish a 
permanent base in the Mediterranean near the Strait of Gibraltar from which to 
support English naval operations in the region until it had been decided that an 
arrangement with Tétouan was more expedient. However, General Monck had also 
suggested to Cromwell that Tangier be used as a base through a treaty with Portugal, 
and it is possible that Monck shared this advice with the king.10  
 
                                                        
9 See, for example, Meakin, The Land of the Moors, p. 120; Colley, Captives, pp. 23–25; Matar, Britain 
and Barbary, p. 133. 
10 Cited in Budgett Meakin, The Land of the Moors, pp. 119–120. Routh in England's Lost Atlantic 
Outpost, p. 6, states that Charles II was aware of Monck’s advice to Cromwell but does not provide a 
source to support this assertion. 
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The Spanish had taken possession of Tangier in 1580 following the Portuguese 
succession crisis which had been precipitated by the Battle of Alcazar. The settlement 
was eventually recovered by the Portuguese in 1643 after they had regained their 
independence from Spain, but Spain continued to lay claim to Tangier and the 
inhabitants found themselves hemmed in by the Spanish from the sea, and by the 
Moroccans on land.11 Under these circumstances, Tangier was a costly and 
expendable possession, but not without value as a bargaining chip. In need of support 
against Spain, the Portuguese king John IV had offered Tangier to the French in 1648, 
and in 1656 Louis XIV had promised military assistance in exchange for the town.12 
But what the Portuguese required was a more substantial alliance sealed through a 
marriage treaty, and Charles II’s accession in 1660 provided a timely means to achieve 
this aim. However, the Portuguese were not alone in seeking to capitalise on Charles’ 
eligibility in order to achieve their own dynastic plans.  
 
Already suffering from years of war, the Treaty of the Pyrenees in 1659 further 
exposed Portugal to the threat of invasion by Spain, so following Charles’ restoration, 
the Queen Regent of Portugal sought to resurrect plans for a marriage between him 
and her daughter.13 However, at this time there existed a clear expectation by the 
Spanish, and within the broader European diplomatic community, that the king 
would give preference to an alliance with Spain.14 But within a year of his return to 
England, Charles had repudiated such an arrangement by entering into a marriage 
alliance with Portugal. The Spanish were not only incensed by the unexpected turn, 
but the alliance also frustrated Philip IV’s plans to recover Portugal and negotiate the 
return of Dunkirk and Jamaica from the English.15 The Dutch were also antagonistic 
toward an arrangement which threatened their commercial interests.16  
                                                        
11 Meakin, The Land of the Moors, p. 119; Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, p. 11; Rogers, Anglo-
Moroccan Relations, p. 42. 
12 Bejjit, ‘Introduction’, pp. 18–19. 
13 Corbett, England in the Mediterranean, II, p. 301; Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, p. 2. 
14 Stradling, 'Spanish Conspiracy', p. 270; Belcher, 'Spain and the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance', pp. 68–
71. 
15 Stradling, 'Spanish Conspiracy', pp. 270–271; Belcher, 'Spain and the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance', pp. 
70–71; Ronald Hutton, Charles the Second: King of England, Scotland, and Ireland  (Oxford, 1989), pp. 
158–160. 
16 Corbett, England in the Mediterranean, II, p. 303; Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, p. 3. 
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The outcome had been helped by offers of assistance to Charles from Louis XIV who 
supported the match to frustrate Spain, but it had ultimately been sealed by an 
exceedingly attractive dowry.17 In exchange for providing the Portuguese with 
military support, in addition to a bride, Charles was to receive specie and goods with 
a value equivalent to about £500,000, possession of Bombay and Tangier, and the 
right to trade with Brazil and the Portuguese East Indies.18 Gerald Belcher argues that 
in accepting the offer Charles had his eye on his domestic political needs rather than 
diplomatic expediency: the commercial and financial benefits which an alliance with 
Portugal promised were simply too great to refuse, providing a means both to placate 
the merchants of London, and of overcoming the financial restrictions imposed by 
Parliament, thereby helping secure the restored monarchy.19 
 
Although it is unclear as to how much interest Charles had in Tangier before the 
Portuguese proposal, it evident that he quickly attempted to gain some appreciation 
of Tangier’s potential, seeking advice as to its suitability as a naval base from two of 
his admirals, the earl of Sandwich and Sir John Lawson.20 Despite the recent 
experience of the Portuguese, Lawson, if the account can be relied upon, proffered a 
hyperbolic assessment. He argued that it was of such importance that if possessed 
by the Dutch they would quickly, and easily, construct a mole to protect their vessels; 
by doing so they could readily defend the place, and impose their will on 
Mediterranean trade. Perhaps understandably, the earl of Clarendon notes that 
                                                        
17 Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, pp. 3–4; Belcher, 'Spain and the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance', 
pp. 72–73; Hutton, Charles the Second, pp. 159–160. Hutton also draws attention to the prodigious 
inducements provided to the king’s counsellors by the Portuguese ambassador as a contributing 
factor.  
18 The marriage portion was in fact two million Portuguese crusados, which has been variously 
converted as being equivalent to amounts ranging from £300,000 to £500,000.  See, for example, 
Edward Hyde, earl of Clarendon, The Life of Edward, Earl of Clarendon, in which is Included a 
Continuation of His History of the Grand Rebellion, 3 vols., vol. I (Oxford, 1827), p. 491; Corbett, 
England in the Mediterranean, II, p. 301; Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, p. 3; Belcher, 'Spain 
and the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance', p. 74; Hutton, Charles the Second, p. 160. Using the highest of 
these figures, the marriage portion alone would have been equivalent to around £64,940,000 in 2016 
in terms of relative purchasing power (based on the calculator provided by MeasuringWorth.com at 
https://www.measuringworth.com/ppoweruk/, accessed 5 June 2017). 
19 Belcher, 'Spain and the Anglo-Portuguese Alliance', pp. 72–74. 
20 Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, p. 6. 
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following this discussion ‘his majesty seemed very much affected’.21 It was, therefore, 
with some basis for optimism that on 8 May 1661, the king assured members of both 
houses of Parliament that they would find that the treaty contained ‘many great 
advantages to the kingdom’.22 There were Britons who could have perhaps offered 
other perspectives, but, according to one account, the king and his courtiers may not 
have been receptive to dissenting voices,23 and once the treaty had been signed in 
June, Charles lost no time in claiming his prize. By September a fleet had been 
dispatched to secure Tangier until the arrival of a garrison, and a governor had been 
appointed, the earl of Peterborough.24  
 
But a key question is, with what intent did the fleet embark? Clarity on this issue is 
important because it is critical to ensuring proper understanding of the motivations 
and responses of the inhabitants of the colony. Much has been made by some 
scholars of Peterborough’s commission and instructions as evidence of the 
emergence of a new expansionist and assertive colonial and mercantile agenda 
among the English, in which the Mediterranean and North Africa figured heavily.25 
Like the instructions issued by the king to his new ambassador to Portugal around 
this time,26 these documents, admittedly, reveal that the king possessed imperial 
aspirations inspired by his deal with the Portuguese. But to what extent do they in 
fact represent a ‘bold and ambitious policy which contained the elements of success’ 
for Tangier, a ‘well-designed plan of commercial and colonial expansion’ as claimed 
                                                        
21 Clarendon, The Life of Edward, Earl of Clarendon, I, p. 494. 
22 'House of Lords Journal Volume 11: 8 May 1661', in Journal of the House of Lords: Volume 11, 1660–
1666, BHO ed. (London, 1767–1830), accessed 15 July 2016. See p. 241 in printed edition. 
23 Gilbert Burnet, A Supplement to Burnet's History of My Own Time, ed. H. C. Foxcroft  (Oxford, 1902), 
p. 80. 
24 Corbett, England in the Mediterranean, II, pp. 306–307; Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, p. 9. 
25 See, for example, Corbett, England in the Mediterranean, II, pp. 311–312, 325–326; Routh, England's 
Lost Atlantic Outpost, pp. 17–18; Matar, Britain and Barbary, p. 134; Bejjit, ‘Introduction’, pp. 3, 7–8. 
Linda Colley in Captives, p. 28, does not cite either document but states that from the start the official 
vision for Tangier included an agenda of ‘expansion, commerce and anglicisation’. In a notable 
departure from this view of the king’s plans, Walter Frewen Lord argued, unconvincingly, that Charles 
placed no great value on Tangier, and initially ‘considered it merely as a nursery for a standing army 
by whose aid he might subvert the liberties of England’. See Walter Frewen Lord, England and France 
in the Mediterranean, 1660–1830  (London, 1901), pp. 22–25, 62. The quotation is from p. 62. 
26 ‘Charles II to Richard Fanshaw’, 23 August 1661, Historical Manuscripts Commission: Heathcote MSS 
(London, 1899), pp. 18–20. 
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by Routh?27  Certainly, at face value, statements such as that which appears as the 
epigraph to this chapter and the following extract from Peterborough’s commission 
can be interpreted as being part of such a policy or plan:  
Whereas we intend forthwith to settle and secure our citty of 
Tanger and the territories and dominions adjacent in or neere the 
coastes of Barbary or the kingdomes of Sus, Fez, and Morocco … 
and for the purpose have resolved to [provide] such forces 
[necessary] for our service in the defence of our said citty of Tanger, 
and our dominions and territorities in or neere the said kingdomes 
of Sus, Fez, and Morocco.28 
  
But such an interpretation overlooks the fact that it is difficult to obtain a clear 
understanding of Charles’ thinking directly from the documents. Any vision and 
direction for practical action beyond Tangier’s becoming a free port and the 
investigation of the construction of a mole29 is vague in its scope and intent: the 
wording of the documents is formulaic, and informed by the contemporary language 
of royal imperiousness, and by necessity they provide for a wide range of real and 
imagined contingencies.  
 
The king’s optimism for the future of Tangier and expectation concerning the 
opportunities which it could provide were certainly shared by many of his subjects, 
and they were reinforced by reports such as the one prepared by the English consul 
in Lisbon, Thomas Maynard, at the end of 1661. Purportedly based on his discussions 
with Portuguese who had resided there, Maynard provides an adulatory assessment 
of Tangier, and the prospects for the colony:  it is as situated ‘as convenient for trade 
as any place in the world, and may be made a magazine for all the Levant’; it could 
attract Spain’s West Indies fleet; and it had strategic value in the event of war. 
Furthermore, Tangier ‘stands in as fertill soyle as any in the world’ and, though the 
Portuguese had not done so, through peace or war the adjoining land could be 
cultivated to enable the garrison to be provisioned at lower cost there than in 
England, ‘being the most plentiful cuntry in the world for corne and cattell’. He also 
                                                        
27 Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, p. 17. In her assessment Routh appears to be echoing 
Corbett. See Corbett, England in the Mediterranean, II, p. 325. 
28 Charles II’s commission to the Earl of Peterborough, 6 September 1661, TNA, CO 279/1, f. 25r. 
29 See ‘Instructions’, ibid., f. 29v. 
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provided reassurances about security, remarking that the Moors were a ‘very 
efeminate people’, so that the Portuguese had been able to defend the town with a 
relatively small garrison, and claimed that with ‘1000 horse and 6000 foote’ it would 
be possible ‘to keep all the cuntry in subjection, that the Moors will not dare to come 
out’.30 Maynard’s assessment is so positive and at odds with the experience of the 
Portuguese that it gives cause to believe that he had been deliberately deceived by 
his informants.   
 
However, at the same time there was also concern in England about the recent turn 
in the nation’s foreign policy.31 In response to the naysayers, a  lawyer by the name 
of John Brydall felt compelled to launch a spirited defence of the king’s plans by 
publishing, in early 1662, a pamphlet in which he sought to demonstrate ‘by cleere 
political reasons how much [Dunkirk, Tangier, Bombay, and Jamaica] may conduce to 
the honor, security, and advantage of this nation’.32 He was not alone in defending 
the Portuguese alliance. The principal architect of what would, arguably, become the 
defining project of the English occupation of Tangier, Hugh Cholmley, observed that 
those who supported the alliance ‘were not wanting to cry up the acquest [of Tangier] 
with all imaginable circumstances of advantage; and those who were engaged in 
contrary designs, as sedulous, to lessen it by all the ways they could’.33 The acquisition 
of Tangier was seen by many as the greatest benefit of the alliance, but even among 
those who did so, there were significant differences in how they thought this new 
possession could best be used to achieve national (and personal) interests.  
                                                        
30 Consul Maynard to [Secretary Nicholas], 8/18 December, 1661, TNA, SP 89/5, f. 73. 
31 Undoubtedly, this was stirred by the controversial public distribution by the Spanish ambassador 
the previous year of material intended to undermine the Portuguese alliance. See the earl of 
Clarendon’s account of this episode in Clarendon, The Life of Edward, Earl of Clarendon, p. 515. 
32 John Brydall, Tangier in A Short Discourse of the Late Forren Acquests which England holds, viz., of 
Dunkirk in Flanders, Tangier in Barbary, Boombay in the East Indies, Jamayca in the West Indies…In 
Answer to some Pamphlets which have bin Obtruded to the World, both at Home and Abroad, cited in 
CSPD: Charles II, 1661–1662, ed. Mary Anne Everett Green, 28 vols., vol. 2 (London, 1861), p. 327 (my 
interpolation). Brydall is most notable for his jurisprudential works. See Michael de L. Landon, 'Brydall, 
John (b. c.1635, d. in or after 1705?)', in David Cannadine, ed., ODNB, Online ed. (Oxford, 2004), 
accessed 15 June 2017. 
33 Hugh Cholmley, An Account of Tangier  (unpublished, 1787), p. 10 (my interpolation). Cholmley 
outlines the points put forward both for and against the acquisition of Tangier on pp. 10–14. The text 
is available from the British Library General Reference Collection, shelfmarks 614.k.15.(2.) and 
G.2179.(2.) (imperfect), and bound with the Cholmley Memoirs. Cholmley’s original manuscript, 
written in about 1672, can be found in BL, Lans. MS 192. 
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Tangier’s position and harbour provided it with both strategic significance, and 
commercial potential, but the settlement also came with a wide variety of intrinsic 
issues which would marginalise its viability and test the commitment of both the king 
and Parliament to its maintenance. It was not long before signs of one of the 
problems which would regularly trouble the colony to emerge: the threat of assault 
by the native people.  On 12 January a Portuguese foraging party of 140 mounted 
troops returning to Tangier with their plunder, which included captured women and 
children, had encountered a large contingent of Moroccans and had suffered heavy 
losses.34 The Portuguese governor was sufficiently alarmed by this development that 
he sought assistance to protect the town from the earl of Sandwich, whose fleet was 
stationed in Tangier Bay awaiting the arrival of Peterborough.35  
 
Only a short time after, the English, with the consent of al-Khadr Ghailan, who 
controlled much of northern Morocco, were collecting wood near the town.36 It was 
on this occasion that one of the sailors, Edward Barlow, had the opportunity to closely 
observe the Moroccans. The son of a poor husbandman, Barlow had left home at 
thirteen, taught himself to write, and maintained a carefully written and illustrated 
journal of his life at sea. He was not yet twenty when he arrived at Tangier.37 His 
experience contrasts vividly with the recent encounter between the Portuguese and 
the local people, which he was aware of when writing. As well as having received 
                                                        
34 Edward Montagu, The Journal of Edward Montagu: First Earl of Sandwich, Admiral and General at 
Sea, 1659–1665, ed. R. C. Anderson  ([London], 1929), pp. 114–115. See also 'A Short Narration of the 
Affairs of Tanger' in Accounts of Voyages and Travels by T. Fisher, 1661–63, BL, Sloane MS 505, ff. 87–
88. Routh in England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, p. 9, claims that the sortie was in response to local 
Moroccans ‘pressing round the town hoping to take possession of it before it changed hands’, but she 
cites no source and it is contradicted by Sandwich’s account.  
35 Edward Barlow, Barlow's Journal of His Life at Sea in King's Ships, East and West Indiamen and other 
Merchantmen from 1659 to 1703, ed. Basil Lubbock, 2 vols., vol. I (London, 1934), p. 70; Montagu, The 
Journal of Edward Montagu, pp. 115–116. Montagu had been keen to get men into the town to secure 
it, and had already made an offer to provide assistance. See the earl’s journal entries for 4 and 6 
January 1662 on p. 114.   
36 It was not the first time that the English had been permitted to go ashore to obtain supplies of water 
and wood — they had been doing so since early December the previous year. See Montagu, The 
Journal of Edward Montagu, pp. 110–111. 
37 Basil Lubbock, 'Introduction', in Basil Lubbock, ed., Barlow's Journal of His Life at Sea in King's Ships, 
East and West Indiamen and other Merchantmen from 1659 to 1703, 2 vols., vol. I (London, 1934), pp. 
11–12. 
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permission to land and gather firewood, a concession not afforded the Portuguese, 
he recounts people coming to observe them and offering to sell livestock and 
produce. He provides a description of the Moroccan men which is notably unmarked 
by fear, animosity or prejudice; on the contrary, he was obviously impressed by them, 
reflecting on the quality of their horses, the intricacies of their clothing, and their 
martial skills and horsemanship.38 It was a promising start to a new era of Anglo-
Moroccan relations, but an episode of a kind that would not be repeated for some 
time, although not for lack of want by the English; for, as will be shown in the 
following section, they clearly arrived in Tangier seeking peaceful trade, not to 
subdue the people and pillage their land. 
 
 
4.2. Entrepôt or Bridgehead to Empire? 
 
On 30 January 1662 the English garrison, consisting of just over 2,700 foot-soldiers 
and almost 100 mounted troops — accompanied by the families of two to three 
hundred of the soldiers — marched into Tangier, and Peterborough formally took 
possession of the town.39 Routh provides a vivid picture of the problems arising in 
the early days of the English occupation, providing a sense of the decrepitude of the 
town, and the hardships faced by the newly arrived Britons.40 There was insufficient 
accommodation and some two-thirds of the troops had to be quartered in the homes 
of the existing inhabitants, adding to the resentment already felt by the Portuguese 
toward the English. Tensions between the two communities were further heightened 
by claims of theft and damage caused by the soldiers, and concerns among the 
Portuguese about how the soldiers fraternised with their wives and daughters.41 
Despite efforts by Peterborough to address these concerns, and an invitation from 
                                                        
38 Barlow, Barlow's Journal, pp. 66–67. Bejjit provides an extract of this episode from Barlow’s account 
in English Colonial Texts, p. 14. 
39 Montagu, The Journal of Edward Montagu, p. 117. The estimate for the number of families is 
provided by Routh in England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, p. 12. On the composition of the garrison during 
the period of occupation see ibid., chap. XVI.  Routh notes that while the nominal initial establishment 
was 3,100 men, excluding officers, the first muster shows only a total of 2,723 foot, and 98 mounted 
troops. See ibid., p. 310. 
40 Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, pp. 14–16. 
41 Ibid., p. 14. 
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him for them to stay, most of the Portuguese decided to leave, taking with them 
everything they could carry, including, according to Peterborough, ‘all other materials 
of economic and household subsistance, to the very ffloers, the windowes and the 
dores’.42 Peterborough describes the general condition of the town as having been 
left ‘very little better than a ruine of walls’, and even the artillery left by the 
Portuguese was largely unserviceable. 43  
 
Of the original inhabitants, all that remained behind were a small number of 
Portuguese settlers, some six Catholic priests, and a number of Jewish families, ‘a 
kinde of retayling dealers’, who ‘in the infancie’ of the settlement proved ‘not 
unuseful’, given the men of the garrison ‘were altogether ignorant and helpless as to 
furnish themselves with any of those accomodacions necessary to human life’.44 As 
Routh notes, with the departure of the bulk of the Portuguese population the English 
had lost both the services of necessary trades-people as well as valuable knowledge 
and experience concerning the conduct of general trade and relations with the 
Moroccans.45 Cholmley attributes this outcome and the other early problems in the 
town to what he believed to be an excessively large garrison, which he blamed on the 
intriguing of the Portuguese ambassador, whom he suspected had hoped that a large 
detachment of English troops across the Strait would distract the Spanish.46  
 
Whether the garrison’s establishment was too large is a moot point. Peterborough 
was not convinced that he could secure the town with the forces he possessed. 
Undoubtedly aware of the problems which had been experienced by the Portuguese, 
                                                        
42 Ibid., pp. 14–15. The quotation provided, partly reproduced by Routh, is from a report ‘Peterborough 
to the Lords of the Council’, Tangier, 17 February 1661[2], TNA, CO 279/1, f. 97v. 
43 Report of the Council of Officers, Tangier, 12 February 1661[2], TNA, CO 279/1, f. 112r , which 
accompanied Peterborough's report of the 17th, but is no longer filed consecutively with it as it was 
in Routh's time. 
44 A survey of Tangier and its prospects, n.d., TNA, CO 279/33, f. 142v. A further, rougher, copy of the 
survey can be found at ibid., ff. 134–137. They appear in a volume with manuscripts from 1684–1735 
but definitely predate this period. Stein in 'Tangier in the Restoration Empire', p. 996, n. 40, has 
suggested this document is probably the report that Peterborough was ordered to draw up for the 
earl of Teviot who succeeded him in 1663. See ‘Instructions for the earl of Teviot’, n.d., BL, Harl. MS 
6844, f. 90, article 3. 
45 Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, p. 15.  
46 Cholmley, An Account of Tangier, pp. 14–19. 
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even at this early stage the governor and his officers recognised that it was necessary 
to make a peace with the local people if development of the settlement was to 
succeed.47 In fact, the prospects for a peace looked promising. Following an approach 
from a local tribal chief ‘expressing a desire to have trade and commerce with us’, 
the earl of Sandwich had already commenced communication with Ghailan even 
before Peterborough’s arrival, with the admiral remarking on the civility of the 
treatment of his men by the Moroccans, and even entertaining Ghailan’s 
‘majordomo’ on board his ship for several nights.48  
 
Sandwich’s disposition in his dealings with Moroccans stands in contrast to his 
approach with the Algerines. Faced with intransigence over negotiation of new 
treaties with Tétouan and Algiers a few months earlier, in the case of the former he 
departed and left the matter in the hands of the consul, asking that the governor be 
informed ‘that I went away with intentions of friendship and good correspondence’; 
whereas in the case of Algiers he launched an attack on the harbour.49 There are a 
number of possible reasons to explain these different responses, in particular the 
legacy of past Anglo-Algerine relations and the forthcoming occupation of Tangier, 
but these contrary outcomes further highlight the importance of differentiating 
between the attitudes and responses of Britons to Morocco and the other Barbary 
states. 
 
Charles II may not have been prepared to entertain advice which questioned the 
value of Tangier, but he was not oblivious to the state of affairs in Morocco; in fact, 
the English were reasonably well informed about current developments while 
preparing for the expedition. Sandwich had used his time waiting for the arrival of 
the garrison to collect intelligence and had been providing regular reports concerning 
‘the state of Barbary, of the government, present wars, of the nature of the people, 
                                                        
47 Report of the council of officers, TNA, CO 279/1, f. 111. 
48 See the earl’s journal entries for 13 and 28 November 1661, 2 and 10–13 December 1661, 19 January 
1662, and 8 February 1662 in Montagu, The Journal of Edward Montagu, pp. 107, 109–111, 115, 119. 
49 Journal entries for 29 July-5 August, and 25 August 1661 in ibid., pp. 91-94, 96-97. 
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and condition of the soyle’.50 Shortly before the occupation, he prepared a further 
detailed report which would have given the king cause to temper any expectations 
he might still have possessed about extending his territorial dominions there; in it can 
be seen considerations concerning diplomatic relations and trade which clearly 
prefigured subsequent English strategy in Morocco.51 Moreover, contrary to Routh’s 
assertion that most Englishmen at the time would have known ‘nothing at all of the 
Moors’,52 as shown in preceding chapters of this thesis, it was not a case of tabula 
rasa; given the long history of trade, diplomatic relations, maritime conflict, and 
captive-taking between the two nations, it is unlikely that many of the key 
protagonists associated with the occupation had not acquired at least a modicum of 
generally reliable knowledge of the land and its people, albeit together with many 
popular misconceptions. 
  
Aside from concerns expressed about the condition of the town and the scarcity of 
basic equipment and commodities, initial perceptions among the arrivals of their new 
home were not all negative. Among the first to record their thoughts was the 
governor himself, Henry Mordaunt, the second earl of Peterborough (bap. 1623, d. 
1697). Of noble birth, he had been educated at Eton College and in France, and had 
been described by one of his tutors as a ‘noble and hopefull … cavalier’.53 In 1643, 
after initially commanding a horse troop in the parliamentary army, Peterborough 
defected to the royalist cause. He remained committed to the Stuarts, and following 
Charles II’s restoration, was rewarded with the governorship of Tangier for what 
Julian Corbett described as ‘his heroic but hare-brained plotting against the 
Protectorate’.54  
 
                                                        
50 'A coppie of a discourse of Barbary sent his royal highness by my Lord Sandwich’, 1662, BL, Sloane 
MS 3509, f. 26. Cf. Matar, Britain and Barbary, p. 135. 
51 See BL, Sloane MS 3509, ff. 25-27. 
52 Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, p. 22. In his book The Moorish Empire: A Historical Epitome  
(London, 1899), on which Routh draws on for Moroccan history, Budgett Meakin gives scant attention 
to the diplomatic and commercial ties which existed between Morocco and England before the 
occupation of Tangier. This may help explain why Routh appears oblivious to this extensive heritage. 
53 Victor Stater, 'Mordaunt, Henry, Second Earl of Peterborough (bap. 1623, d. 1697)', in David 
Cannadine, ed., ODNB, Online ed. (Oxford, 2004), accessed 21 June 2017. 
54 Ibid.; Corbett, England in the Mediterranean, II, p. 307. 
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Routh draws attention to a hopeful and brief statement made in a letter penned by 
Peterborough in which he asserted his belief that if the necessary resources were 
provided Tangier could become ‘soe considerable as to pay back all’.55 However, a 
more revealing insight into the governor’s thoughts is provided in a report a few 
months later, in which he observes how protective the Moroccans were of their land 
and attributes this to its evident qualities: ‘Jealous they are beyond all measure of 
there land, the goodnesse whereof I confesse I think capable to invite all the world’.56 
Peterborough had obviously acquired an appreciation of the strength of Moroccan 
sentiment against European encroachment, but he does not appear to have 
recognised their right to feel aggrieved, let alone grasped the religio-nationalistic 
dimensions of the issue.57  
 
While the governor anticipated a bright future for Tangier, it was an outcome that 
was unlikely to have been envisaged by many others in the town. In October he 
reported on the deleterious effects of poor accommodation and the change of 
climate on the garrison, noting that there had been many deaths and desertions.58 
Peterborough was beset with problems which required his urgent attention, but 
perhaps the most pressing one was relations with Ghailan.59 The need to settle a 
peace with the Moroccan leader had earlier been recognised, and while the state of 
the town and its fortifications added urgency to the matter, it is clear that there was 
a growing realisation that the success of Tangier, if not its very survival, depended on 
establishing a mutually beneficial relationship with the local people; skirmishes with 
Ghailan’s forces had already commenced, and as many as thirty members of the 
                                                        
55 Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, p. 16. No source cited.  
56 Peterborough to [?], 2 April 1662, TNA, CO 279/1, ff. 128r–v. Much of the detail in this manuscript 
is also provided in Peterborough to Sandwich, 1 April 1662, Bodl., Carte MS 75, ff. 36–37. See also 
Peterborough to Lord [?], Tangier, n.d., BL, Sloane MS 1956, ff. 107–109; John Luke to Lord [?], Tangier, 
29 March 1662, BL, Sloane MS 3509, ff. 16–17. 
57 On the significance of religion in resistance to European colonisation in Morocco see chap. 1 of this 
thesis. B. A. Mojuetan provides a very good overview of the role of religion in Moroccan politics in the 
seventeenth century, particularly during the Interregnum in Mojuetan, 'Legitimacy in a Power State: 
Moroccan Politics in the Seventeenth Century During the Interregnum', International Journal of Middle 
East Studies, 13 (1981), pp. 347–357.  
58 Peterborough to Sandwich, Tangier, 27 October 1662, Bodl., Carte MS 75, f. 80. 
59 Bejjit in ‘Introduction’, p. 13, notes a number of common contemporary renderings of Ghailan’s 
name by Britons: Gayland, Guylan, Guyland, and Guilan. A further variation is Guiland, with another 
derivation being Cid Kader from Sidi al-Khadr. 
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garrison had already been killed.60 The governor’s report at the beginning of April, in 
which he outlines the progress of negotiations, provides an early indication of the 
problems the English would face in their dealings with Ghailan over the following 
years.  
 
Peterborough had written to Ghailan on several occasions, but had only received 
‘dilatory answers’ until 24 March, at which time two messengers arrived with a 
message that their master was ready to meet. The governor affirmed his desire to 
conclude a peace such that it provided ‘security unto both parties’.61 Ghailan then 
dispatched ‘three very considerable persons’ to conduct the negotiations, claiming 
that once concluded all that would be left for him and Peterborough to do was to 
‘shake hands and imbrace and have no further ocasion for dispute’.62  
 
Unfortunately, it would not be that straightforward. The negotiations broke down 
over the issue of access to wood, with Ghailan’s envoys refusing to allow the garrison 
to collect it within nine miles of the town. As Peterborough noted, not only was this 
inconvenient, but it would expose them to the risk of attack. Knowing it to be 
foolhardy to risk hostilities given the condition of the town, the governor and his 
officers proposed a six-month peace as a compromise so as to begin trade ‘and to 
show the Mores by practice … we were men of such manners and dealing, as might 
cause a love and confidence’.63 This was agreed, and they then proceeded to mark 
out the area to which the English were entitled so that disputes might be avoided. 
However, Ghailan then claimed that his people would not accept the concessions he 
had made, and put forward his own demands,64 which included fifty barrels of 
gunpowder; that should he require the use of English ships they would be made 
available; the prohibition of trade with Tétouan and the recall of the English consul 
residing there; use of  English ships on their way to Salé to deliver supplies to his 
forces there; and, the English were to refuse entry to Tangier to any Moroccan 
                                                        
60 BL, Sloane MS 3509, f. 16. 
61 Peterborough to [?], Tangier, 2 April 1662, TNA, CO 279/1, ff. 127r–v. 
62 Ibid., f. 127v. 
63 Ibid.,  
64 Ibid., f. 128r. 
192 
 
seeking refuge. Peterborough acceded to each of the terms except the second and 
third. With respect to use of vessels, he undertook to intercede with any admiral with 
vessels in Tangier, or the king himself, when Ghailan had such need. On the issue of 
Tétouan, he explained that it was not possible until such time as trade in Tangier was 
sufficient to replace the use of that port.  
 
Ghailan subsequently decamped with his army, providing no response to the 
governor before he left.65 Peterborough notes that the  army not only consisted of 
‘about 5000 horse’, but that they were ‘able, dexterous, sober, valiant and 
comparably well armed, and clothed, and horsed to very much use, if they were not 
the fairest that I ever saw’.66 He was clearly impressed by what he had seen, but also 
alarmed and suspicious of Ghailan’s motivations for he goes on reflect: ‘But for 
themselves it must be a greate feare, or an exceeding interest, that brings them to 
bee kinde to any stranger, especially to a Christian’.67 As Routh suggests, it is possible 
that Ghailan simply used the pretext of negotiation to assess his new foe.68 But 
Peterborough not only suspected Ghailan had plans other than peace; because of 
intelligence which had been provided to him, he also had cause to believe that 
Ghailan was conspiring with the Spanish.69 
 
It was perhaps natural for the English to suspect the Spanish were working with 
Ghailan, knowing their resentment towards the Anglo-Portuguese alliance and their 
concern about the English occupation of Tangier. However, it demonstrates that they 
lacked understanding of the Moroccan political landscape, and Ghailan’s motivations 
and aspirations. In this context it made little sense for Ghailan to simply help another 
group of Christians occupy the town. As Jerome Weiner has argued, Ghailan had his 
own agenda, with the aim of consolidating his rule across north-western Morocco. 
To achieve this, he did what other Moroccan pretenders had done for over a century 
                                                        
65 'Guylan's demands and my answers thereunto', [April 1662], ibid., f. 129r–v, which accompanied 
Peterborough’s letter at ff. 127–128.  
66 Ibid., f. 128r. 
67 Ibid.,  
68 Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, p. 25. 
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and a half, and allied himself to the various European powers. By doing so, he sought 
both to avoid hostilities with them, and, more importantly, obtain military supplies 
and other support to prosecute his campaigns against his domestic competitors. But 
it was a risky strategy, given that the achievement of political legitimacy was 
dependent on the ability of a leader to free the land of Christian occupation. Any 
concessions granted to the Europeans had to be seen to be sufficiently advantageous 
to Moroccan interests. Moreover, Ghailan was not at this stage desperate, in fact he 
had every reason for confidence; in June of the previous year he had won a decisive 
victory against the Dilā’īs, leaving just Salé and Tétouan to be conquered.70 Ghailan’s 
rise to power following the death of his mentor, Muhammad al-ʻAyāshī, had been 
slow but by the mid-1650s, he had been able to attract sufficient supporters to begin 
to seriously challenge Dilā’ī hegemony in the region and launch an attack against 
Portuguese-occupied Tangier.71 The figure of Ghailan looms large over the early 
history of English Tangier. He would at first represent an existential threat to the 
colonists, but over time their relationship would change and their fates would 
become intertwined.  
 
Peterborough provides few insights into his thoughts about Ghailan in his reports and 
correspondence, but a description of him appears in a pamphlet published a few 
years later:  
His person looks handsomer than his condition; his look is fat and 
plain, but his nature close and reserved. He is plump, yet 
melancholy; valiant yet sly; boisterous, yet of few words; watchful, 
and lustful; careful and intemperate; a contradiction in nature. 
Although he hath a sadness and a heaviness by nature, that 
becometh a priest, yet he hath gained a complaizance by art that 
becomes a prince. He hath two qualities that may do anything: 1. 
perfidiousness, and 2. cruelty.72  
                                                        
70 See Weiner, 'Anglo-Moroccan Relations', pp. 65–66. 
71 Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period  (Cambridge, 1987), p. 226; 
Weiner, 'Anglo-Moroccan Relations', pp. 64–65; Bejjit, ‘Introduction’, p. 13. 
72 A Description of Tangier, the Country and People Adjoyning. With an Account of the Person and 
Government of Gayland, the Present Usurper of the Kingdome of Fez, and a Short Narrative of the 
Proceedings of the English in those Parts  (London, 1664), pp. 12–13. The provenance of the content 
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presumably excluding the separate narrative of developments since the arrival of the English, given 
that it is written in the first person, and evidently by someone who was present there at the time. 
Bejjit provides an abridged transcript of the pamphlet, and discusses its peculiarities in English Colonial 
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The picture painted of Ghailan is certainly not flattering but it is also not totally 
prejudicial, and possibly not totally fictitious. Ghailan did, indeed, possess a 
contradictory nature. Ghailan could be belligerent and cunning, but as Britons would 
also find he could be surprisingly affable and open, and despite, and perhaps because 
of, the death and misery for which he was responsible, he managed to earn some 
measure of respect from the garrison. But, not only were Britons uncertain about his 
character and motivations, they were also unclear about his status, often according 
him the title of prince or emperor rather than recognising him for what he was, simply 
an ambitious tribal leader.73 
 
Ghailan’s men continued to harass the settlement and small melees ensued. But on 
3 May Lieutenant-Colonel Fines led five hundred men into the field in pursuit of the 
Moroccans.  Over confident, they pursued the enemy far beyond their own lines and 
were ambushed in the hills surrounding Tangier, losing almost 400 men.74 The 
incident not only had a marked impact on the morale of the young colony,75 it became 
a portentous day for both the garrison and Ghailan, leading to one of the most 
traumatic events experienced by the settlement in its short and troubled history.76 
Further skirmishes followed, and within less than nine months the garrison had lost 
605 men, more than a fifth of its initial establishment.77 Reliable estimates of 
Moroccan losses are not provided in English accounts for this period, but clearly such 
a rate of attrition could not be sustained by the garrison.78 
                                                        
Texts, pp. 62–77. Similarities between at least one section of the Short Narrative at pp. 27–29, and 
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‘Introduction’, p. 13.  
73 The uncertainty about his status may have been encouraged by Ghailan himself. He is alleged to 
have even claimed descent from Mohammed. See A Description of Tangier, p. 12.  
74 Draft of a long narrative of affairs at Tangier, extending from December 1661 to May 1664, Bodl., 
Rawl. MS D.916, ff. 76v–77v; Cholmley, An Account of Tangier, p. 39. 
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76 ‘Colonel Roger Alsopp to Sir Richard Fanshaw’, 13 June 1664, Heathcote MSS, p. 156.  
77 Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, p. 27. 
78 Such estimates are notoriously unreliable, but accounts from 1664 and 1666 put the number of men 
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a campaign beyond three months due to logistical constraints. See Lancelot Addison, West Barbary, 
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Peterborough was aware that a forced peace with Ghailan was not the only option 
available to him. In late April, the governor wrote to Sidi Abdallah, son of the Dilā’ 
leader Muhammad al-Hajj Abū Bakr, who was frequently referred to by Britons as the 
Saint because of his religious devotion.79 Peterborough’s reasons for doing so are 
unclear; it could have been a bluff to encourage Ghailan to settle a favourable peace, 
or been a genuine attempt to investigate the possibility of an alliance with the Dilā’, 
who were just as troubled by Ghailan.80 In any event, an approach to them is not 
surprising given that Muhammad al-Hajj had entered into a treaty of peace and 
commerce with the English as recently as 1657.81 Abdallah responded 
enthusiastically to Peterborough’s letter: he professed his desire for peace and 
friendship, criticised Ghailan, undermined his achievements, asserted that the Dilā’īs 
were close to victory, and requested that the English hold ‘no commerce with our 
enemys either of Arzilla or Salley’ claiming that both were ‘lost and undone’.82 The 
Dilā’ had been besieged in the fortress at Salé for some time, and it has been claimed 
that in his desperation, Abdallah had even offered to handover the fortress to the 
English in return for assistance against his enemies.83 Certainly the English developed 
an expectation of such an outcome, with Admiral Lawson maintaining a vigil before 
Salé a few months later ‘with hopes of having the castle delivered to him’.84 It is 
uncertain what specific interest they had in possessing the fortress at this time: while 
it appears to have been an opportunistic endeavour, the site’s position held many 
benefits, not least of which was the ability to control both trade and the activities of 
corsairs in the port.85 More generally, the English began to openly favour the Dilā’ 
                                                        
or, A Short Narrative of the Revolutions of the Kingdoms of Fez and Morocco with an Account of the 
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79 Muhammad al-Hajj was also referred to by Britons as Ben Bucar, with variant spellings of Ben Boukir, 
Ben Buker, Ben Bowcar, and Benbooker. 
80 Cf. Matar, Britain and Barbary, p. 136.  
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85 Cf. Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, p. 46. 
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over Ghailan, with instructions given to the navy to ‘countenance the affairs of 
Benbucar’ at Salé, a move ostensibly calculated to frustrate both Ghailan and the 
Spanish.86 
 
The prospect of an Anglo-Dilā’ alliance does indeed appear to have given Ghailan 
cause to rethink his position. In a letter the following month to Peterborough, who 
had returned to England for consultations, Captain James Wilson advised the 
governor of developments concerning Ghailan, noting that he hoped to take both Fez 
and the fortress at Salé, but would not take the latter until ‘he had secured himself a 
peace with us’.87 Whether this was due to Ghailan expecting naval assistance from 
the English, or an undertaking from them not to support the Dilā’, Wilson does not 
say,88 but the circumstances had obviously changed sufficiently to make a peace with 
the English much more desirable. 
 
A cessation of hostilities was accompanied by a noticeable improvement in 
conditions in the town. The inhabitants once again had access to supplies from the 
local area, and Spanish vessels commenced trading with the town despite a 
prohibition against doing so, issued by the governor of Andalusia, the Duke of 
Medinaceli, a decision which they believed had been encouraged by Ghailan.89 The 
only thing they required, according to Captain Wilson, was more men for the 
depleted garrison.90 In a report to the king following his return to England in late 
September, Peterborough was more circumspect about the situation.  While he 
noted that the condition of the garrison had improved and assured Charles that 
Tangier ‘will be a great place if you majesties designs proceed’, he predicated this 
assessment on the ‘constant attendance of ships’ in the harbour, which, he observed, 
was threatened by the Spanish embargo and their efforts to prevent Ghailan from 
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finalising a peace.91 But unbeknown to Peterborough, the quick and ostensibly 
successful occupation of Tangier by the English had also given cause for anxiety to 
another European power; despite his initial support of the Portuguese alliance, Louis 
XIV now feared that the English would use Tangier to control navigation through the 
Strait of Gibraltar.92 French concerns about the increasing influence of the English in 
the Mediterranean added a further level of complexity to the issues which they would 
face in attempting to secure their presence in Tangier. 
 
The king’s designs alluded to by Peterborough were soon made clear. On 16 
November 1662, a proclamation was issued by Charles which confirmed his 
intentions. In it he states that by gaining Tangier his principal aim was ‘the 
advancement and security of’ the general trade and commerce of his subjects. To this 
end the settlement ‘shall be a port free to all merchants, as well as foreigners as 
others’, only excluding ships sailing from other English colonies or beyond the Cape 
of Good Hope.93 What is more revealing and pertinent to this study is the debate 
which had preceded the proclamation, which was grounded in the same issue that 
had divided the English merchant community in the 1580s and the 1630s; this was 
the question of what was the best model for the conduct of trade with Morocco: free 
trade or corporate monopoly.  
 
Around the time Sandwich departed England to secure Tangier, a patent had been 
granted authorising the incorporation of a Morocco Company with exclusive rights to 
trade from the north-western tip of Morocco down the coast as far as Salé. However, 
the company never became operational, quite possibly as a result of concerted 
opposition from officials and merchants who were concerned it would directly 
compete with Tangier for trade with Morocco, and thereby not only compromise the 
town’s potential to become a entrepôt, but also undermine the king’s prestige and 
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authority.94 But this was not the only concern. Whereas in the 1580s, corporatisation 
of trade with Morocco had been seen as a means of improving England’s political and 
commercial leverage in overseas markets, and in the 1630s was promoted as a way 
to also control the activities of the king’s subjects, the debate in 1661 points to an 
emerging recognition of the importance of developing approaches to trade which 
were sensitive to prevailing local political conditions in order to promote peaceful 
commerce.95 In the view of those who argued against the Morocco company, if 
Tangier was to be secured as a centre of trade, it was necessary to not only actively 
engage Moroccans in commercial relations, but also to avoid actions that would 
provoke concern and incite hostility.96 It was understood that any attempt to 
establish further fortified trading centres would require Moroccan support, as the 
country was populous, and the people were well armed and belligerent, or else they 
would believe ‘the designe of the English to bee the same with that formerly of the 
Spaniards and Portungals’.97 Similarly, another group of merchants warned:  
[T]o erect and build new forts and castles … is the only way to create 
and stir up jealousies and provoke the people of that country to 
believe, that the English nation intends to enslave them and make 
a conquest of their country, and by these means cause the people 
to become implacable enemies of the whole nation’.98  
 
More optimistically, Thomas Povey, a member of the council of trade and the 
secretary of the committee for foreign plantations, was confident that the Moroccans 
would ‘surely bidd us welcome more or less according to the good they are to expect 
to their city and them by our arrival there’.99  
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The English had underestimated the difficulties they would face when they took 
possession of Tangier, particularly the resistance of the Moroccans. But it is evident 
that they came to Tangier with the intention from the very beginning of nurturing 
peaceful trade. While Elizabeth Games has contended that English plans for Tangier 
drew on ‘coercive habits of colonization and commerce’ learned from their activities 
in the Atlantic and Indian Oceans, as Tristan Stein has shown, the issue which 
preoccupied the English authorities was not territorial acquisition in North Africa, but 
how trade in the region should be organised and whether it should be managed by 
the crown or a corporate body.100 In this respect, rather than the king’s proclamation 
being an acknowledgement of the failure of plans for a territorial empire in North 
Africa, as claimed by Nabil Matar, it was in fact a formalisation and elaboration of his 
original designs encompassed within his instructions to Peterborough;101 it clarified 
Tangier’s proposed place within England’s expanding maritime trading empire. This 
view is further tellingly evidenced by the Privy Council’s decision to decline 
Peterborough’s request for more mounted troops, citing that ‘their intentions were 
not to make a warr with the Moores but a peace, which they no waie questioned but 
the great appearances of advantage by trade would sooner doe than any hostility’.102  
 
The response of the earl of Sandwich to a proposal presented by a merchant, James 
Wilson, in October of 1661 is also revealing of the thinking at the time. Wilson 
outlined a plan which encompassed a colonial vision that extended as far as Tripoli in 
the east and Safi, or even the Gambia, in the south. Wilson proposed a program of 
conquest and subjugation that extended along the coast in both directions, and as 
far inland as Fez, together with a recruitment program for colonisation. In Wilson’s 
view, North Africa could provide profits which exceeded those to be derived from 
                                                        
closely involved in fitting out Cromwell’s ‘western design’ fleet, was an investor in colonial trading 
schemes, and considered an expert on colonial matters. See Barbara C. Murison, 'Povey, Thomas (b. 
1613/14, d. in or before 1705)', in H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison, ed., ODNB, Online ed. (Oxford, 
2004), accessed 6 July 2017.  
100 Alison Games, The Web of Empire: English Cosmopolitans in an Age of Expansion, 1560–1660  
(Oxford, 2009), pp. 293–294, 298; Stein, 'Tangier in the Restoration Empire', pp. 987,  
101 See Matar, Britain and Barbary, p. 136. 
102 ‘Mr Lukes reasons against erecting of a Marocco Company’, BL, Harl. MS 1595, f. 13r. A copy of 
the memorial can also be found in BL, Sloane MS 1956, f. 45. 
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either the East or West Indies. He emphasised the potential of the land for 
agriculture, and claimed knowledge of a silver mine which he believed could even 
rival Potosi, and like that site, could be worked by slaves.103 In a report to the king, 
the earl of Sandwich dismissed the proposal as unrealistic:  
[T]he designes proposed, meethinkes are ill considered, for, to 
propose the possessing Africa from Gamboa to Tripoly is a vast 
thing, and one that sees what charge & trouble a towne is possest 
that is given and delivered up, will conceive a great deale more 
difficulty to posses townes we must fight for, and not vary certain 
to prevaile neither.104 
 
As observed by Stein, it was not that the English eschewed the use of force, 
particularly in pursuit of the nation’s maritime interests; rather, the issue was the 
way in which it should be wielded, and who possessed authority to sanction its use.105  
A desire for peaceful trade with Moroccans and a limitation of their territorial claims 
to what was sufficient to sustain and secure the colony was stressed by successive 
governors of Tangier. Nevertheless, just as the English were using naval blockades to 
suppress the corsairs of Algiers, Tunis, Tripoli, and Salé, there was a commonly held 
conviction that blockading Moroccan ports was an option to encourage peace or 
trade with Tangier.106 In Peterborough’s view, ‘obstructing the trade of Salley and 
Tittuan will bring a want upon the people of the commodies they neede’, which ‘may 
shew them the errors of their govenours and procure a change’.107 
 
                                                        
103 ‘Mr James Wilson: Account of Tangier and Barbary’, 5 October 1661, BL, Sloane MS 3509, ff. 11–14. 
On Wilson’s proposal see also Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, p. 21; Matar, Britain and 
Barbary, pp. 134–135; Games, The Web of Empire, pp. 13–14, 295–296. The source cited by Routh, 
Harl. 1595, f. 23b, is anonymous, but clearly concerns the same proposal. Games cites her source as 
Add. 4191, but this appears to be an error. Based on a comparison of the handwriting, the James 
Wilson in question is almost certainly the same person as Captain James Wilson whom also appears in 
other sources from this period.  
104 BL, Sloane MS 3509, f. 26r. 
105 Stein, 'Tangier in the Restoration Empire', p. 995. 
106 See ibid., pp. 995–996. In the sources cited by Stein relating to Peterborough (TNA, CO 279/33, f. 
136r) and Belasyse (Sloane MS 3509, f. 104r), both governors are in fact proposing the use of a 
blockade to encourage Ghailan to negotiate a treaty, rather than forcing the inhabitants of the towns 
to trade with Tangier as the principal aim. On use of blockade as a method of coercion, see also 
Middleton to Hon. Mr. Wren, Tangier, 10/20 July 1672, TNA, CO 279/15, f. 207r–v, and Middleton to 
Arlington, Tangier, 12 October 1673, BL, Sloane MS 3511, f. 218v.  
107 Peterborough to Charles II, Tangier, 27 September 1662, BL, Harl. MS 6844, f. 105. 
201 
 
4.3. Promising Developments 
 
Recognition of the importance of good relations with the local people in order to 
secure Tangier and enhance trade and commerce, or at least acceptance of this 
mandated policy, inevitably played a role in shaping the behaviour of Britons in 
Morocco, and determining how the English managed their affairs during the period 
of Tangier’s occupation. But while the governors were accorded a wide range of 
powers and a significant amount of discretion under their commissions, activities in 
Tangier were closely overseen by the king and his advisors in London. A particularly 
influential figure on matters pertaining to Tangier until 1674 was the recently 
appointed Secretary of State, Henry Bennet, later ennobled as Lord Arlington.108 In 
the same month as the proclamation, the king adopted a further measure to secure 
his interests in the new colony by establishing a ‘Committee for the Affairs of Tangier’. 
Accountable to the Privy Council, from which its principal members were drawn, it 
was responsible for regulating the administration of Tangier, financial management 
of the colony, and establishing supply contracts for the garrison. Among the 
committee’s notable members were the Duke of York; the Earl of Sandwich; George 
Monck, Duke of Albemarle; George Carteret; and Thomas Povey.109 The committee 
also included Samuel Pepys, who, through his membership, not only influenced 
decisions made concerning the colony, but also left a useful record of the 
committee’s deliberations, perceptive assessments of many of the key developments 
and protagonists, and a detailed account of his own later experiences in Morocco. 
 
In May 1663 Andrew Rutherford, the newly created Earl of Teviot (b.?, d.1664), 
arrived in Tangier to replace Peterborough as governor. Peterborough was recalled 
for reasons which were never made public,110 but his replacement was seemingly well 
                                                        
108 Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, p. 32; Alan Marshall, 'Bennet, Henry, First Earl of Arlington 
(bap. 1618, d. 1685)', in H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison, ed., ODNB, Online ed. (Oxford, 2004), 
accessed 11 July 2017. 
109 Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, pp. 31–32. 
110 Ibid., p. 36. Corbett asserts that given the problems experienced with Ghailan it was decided that a 
more experienced officer was required. However, he presents no evidence to support this belief. 
Cholmley’s account of the episode is somewhat ambiguous, but implies that Peterborough’s decision 
to resign his commission was voluntary. See Corbett, England in the Mediterranean, II, p. 328; 
Cholmley, An Account of Tangier, p. 40. On Teviot’s instructions for the handover, see ‘Instructions for 
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qualified to lead the troubled colony. Scottish by birth, Teviot was the youngest son 
of an Edinburgh merchant. He attended the University of Edinburgh, and then 
entered French military service in which he served with distinction, rising to the 
colonelcy of the gardes écossaises regiment. He returned to Scotland in 1660, and in 
January 1661 was created Lord Rutherford, before being appointed governor of 
Dunkirk until its sale in 1662.111 Pepys provides his own perceptions of the man, 
which paint a picture of a complex and contradictory character. In a rather apt 
testimonial following Teviot’s death in 1664, Pepys recounts William Coventry stating 
that he was ‘the boldest adventurer of his person in the world’, noting that while he 
came from humble origins he had quickly achieved greatness, but had done so ‘only 
by the death of all his officers, he many times having the luck of being the only 
survivor of them all, by venturing upon services for the King of France that nobody 
else would’.112  
 
Pepys did not at first support Teviot’s appointment for confessional reasons, noting 
that like almost all the other officers of the garrison Teviot was a Catholic; his only 
saving grace was being Scottish, thereby preventing the Irish from having complete 
control of the place. Finding him ‘careful and thoughtful’, Pepys also believed Teviot 
to be ‘cunning’ and avaricious, using his appointments at Dunkirk and Tangier to 
                                                        
the earl of Teviot’, n.d., BL, Harl. MS 6844, f. 90, article 2. Later perceptions of Peterborough’s poor 
performance as governor have perhaps been informed by an account provided by Lancelot Addison, 
the garrison chaplain who accompanied Teviot to Tangier. But he was not an impartial commentator; 
there is reason to question Addison’s assessment given his evident admiration for Teviot, and desire 
to enhance the governor’s legacy following his untimely death. See Lancelot Addison, The Moores 
Baffled: Being a Discourse Concerning Tanger, Especially when it was Under the Earl of Teviot  (London, 
1681), pp. 3–6. Addison’s account of the conditions in the town when Peterborough departed certainly 
contrasts markedly with those provided in Captain C. Harbord to Sir C. Harbord, Tangier, 6 March, 
1663, TNA, CO 279/2, f. 16, [Nathaniel Luke?] to [Henry Bennet?], Tangier, 11 April 1663, ibid., f. 36, 
and A Description of Tangier, pp. 28–29. The Moores Baffled was also published under the title of A 
Discourse of Tangier Under the Government of the Earl of Teviot in 1685, and once again using the 
original title in 1738. Bejjit discusses the tract and reproduces the document in English Colonial Texts, 
pp. 85–101. He believes that the original title of the pamphlet is pejorative, one perhaps chosen by 
the publisher and not Addison given that the content is not particularly prejudicial towards Moroccans. 
However, it is more likely the term ‘baffled’ is being used to convey that the Moroccans had been 
foiled in their efforts to take Tangier, rather than implying that they were bewildered. 
111 David Parrott, 'Rutherford , Andrew, earl of Teviot (d. 1664)', in H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison, 
eds., ODNB, Online ed. (Oxford, 2004), accessed 12 July 2017. 
112 Samuel Pepys, The Diary of Samuel Pepys: A New and Complete Transcription, eds. Robert Latham 
and William Matthews, 11 vols., vol. 5  (London, 1970–1983), p. 170, entry for 4 June 1664. 
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enrich himself.113 But his estimation of the governor evidently improved over time, 
remarking after hearing news of his death, that he had been a ‘great man’.114 Teviot’s 
time as governor would be a defining period in the history of English Tangier, and 
provides among the most detailed insights into the attitudes of Britons toward 
Moroccans in the early modern period, and how they were influenced by events and 
their experiences. 
 
Routh has characterised Teviot’s tenure as having been ‘the most hopeful period of 
the English Occupation’,115 and his arrival and actions over the following weeks did 
elicit expressions of admiration, and optimism for the future of English Tangier. The 
instructions issued to Teviot confirm Charles’ desire to establish Tangier as a polyglot 
entrepôt: the governor was to promote the town as a free port in accordance with 
the king’s earlier proclamation, ensure equal justice was accorded to all people, and 
provide freedom of religious observation (articles 3–6). The instructions go on to 
state that orders could not be provided concerning the issues of restraint of trade 
with Tétouan and Salé, or peace or war with Ghailan without further information on 
these matters, but Teviot was given ‘latitude’ in the exercise of his powers to deal 
with them in the meantime (article 7). Finally, he was to reduce the establishment of 
the garrison to two thousand men, excluding officers, and reform it into two 
regiments, one English, the other Irish (article 10). 116 Scots were incorporated into 
both, although the regiments were later remodelled to diminish national distinctions 
within the garrison.117 
 
Teviot immediately set about making an assessment of the condition of the town and 
its needs, reorganising the garrison, and commenced work extending its 
fortifications.118 The attention which Teviot gave to the fortification of the town at 
                                                        
113 Parrott, 'Rutherford , Andrew'; Pepys, Diary of Samuel Pepys, 4, p. 408, entry for 8 December 1663. 
114 Pepys, Diary of Samuel Pepys, 5, p. 166, entry for 2 June 1664. 
115 Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, p. 37. 
116 BL, Harl. MS 6844, f. 90. Routh cites instructions for Teviot dated 27 April 1663, ‘sent by Mr Luke’ 
being found in CO 279/2, f. 66: this folio has not been sighted, but it is likely that the instructions in 
the former folio are a copy of these cited by Routh. See Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, p. 310, 
n. 3. 
117 Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, p. 310. 
118 Addison, The Moores Baffled, pp. 4–6. 
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this time is remarked upon in a number of accounts, and the priority he accorded to 
this work was perhaps due to intelligence received a few months earlier of 
preparations being made by Ghailan to mount a siege.119 Within a fortnight the first 
of five redoubts had been completed, entrenchments and lines of communication 
prepared, and land cleared, providing the town with a more secure external 
perimeter, and, as a result of the pasture land that it encompassed, the promise of 
increasing self-sufficiency.120 
 
Teviot’s arrival also marked the start of the much mooted mole. While the concerted 
efforts embarked upon to fortify the settlement attest to the resolve of the English 
to establish themselves securely in a potentially hostile environment, the most 
tangible demonstration of their aspirations for Tangier is represented by the ambition 
evident in plans for a mole. As the project’s resident engineer, Hugh Cholmley, noted, 
‘mole’ in Latin can mean ‘a great heap’, and from that derived its contemporary usage 
denoting an artificial structure ‘making land into the sea, to gain within the shelter of 
it, a secure station for ships’.121  
 
It is not intended to dwell on issues concerning the construction of the mole except 
to comment on its significance. It was a massive, and demanding project. Having 
achieved a length of 1,436 feet, a ‘mean breadth’ of 110 feet, and a height above low 
water of 18 feet, even after fifteen years of work and some three to four hundred 
thousand pounds had been expended it had still not been completed by the time the 
English abandoned Tangier.122 Consequently, it is unsurprising that there has been 
much significance accorded to this project in the historiography of the English 
occupation. As a result of its sheer scale and the vicissitudes experienced in its 
construction, the mole has been conceived of by some scholars as the reification of 
                                                        
119 TNA, CO 279/2, f. 16. 
120 A Description of Tangier, p. 29; Addison, The Moores Baffled, pp. 6–7; Cholmley, An Account of 
Tangier, pp. 63–64; Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, pp. 36–37. 
121 Cholmley, An Account of Tangier, p. 44. 
122 Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, pp. 357–358, 361–363. Routh provides a useful overview of 
the construction of the mole in chap. XVII. 
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Restoration imperial aspiration.123 Certainly, as Bejjit observes, Cholmley himself 
envisioned an imperial destiny for England, a ‘great empire’ which would be ‘the envy 
of the world’, and conceived of the mole as a tangible expression of that aspiration,124 
but the extent to which the king and others attributed such symbolic value to the 
mole is unclear. It was undoubtedly appreciated as a major piece of engineering,125 
but ever since the project’s inception during the king’s conversation with Admiral 
Lawson, its fundamental rationale was practical rather than symbolic; it was 
conceived as an essential piece of infrastructure to support the success of the colony, 
creating a harbour which afforded protection from tide, wind and enemy attack, a 
purpose which it ultimately failed to fully achieve. 
 
Chomley’s contribution to this study is not his work on the mole, but rather his 
observations and thoughts during the period he was engaged on the project, and his 
reflections following his return to England in 1672. Among the principal characters 
on whose accounts this study draws, Cholmley, like his colleague and successor, 
Henry Sheres, and the garrison chaplain Lancelot Addison, is somewhat exceptional, 
for like them he was not a military man, a government official, or a merchant; they 
were men of different backgrounds, vocations, experiences, and sensibilities, who 
provide different perspectives as to how Britons perceived Morocco and 
developments in Tangier, and the way they responded to them.  
 
                                                        
123 Colley, Captives, pp. 31–32; Bejjit, ‘Introduction’, pp. 20, 27. On issues concerning the general 
significance of the mole, see also Corbett, England in the Mediterranean, II, passim. 
124 Bejjit, ‘Introduction’, p. 27; Cholmley, An Account of Tangier, pp. 40–43, 95. Quotation is from p. 
95. 
125 See, for example, the adulatory assessment of the almost completed mole by ‘G[eorge] P[hilips]’ in 
The Present State of Tangier: In a Letter to His Grace, the Lord Chancellor of Ireland and One of the 
Lords Justices There. To which is Added the Present State of Algiers  (London, 1676), pp. 31–32. The 
text is available from the British Library General Reference Collection, shelfmark 583.a.33. A 
transcribed copy of the text is also provided in Bejjit, English Colonial Texts, pp. 111–127. The 
bibliographic details for one of the versions of the document in EBBO states that the initials G. P. are 
‘sometimes attributed to George Philips’. However, given the subject and nature of the text, and the 
date of the letter on which it is based, the author is almost certain to have been George Philips, 
secretary to Lord Inchiquin, the governor of the colony. Evidently unaware of the identity of its likely 
author and oblivious to its obvious biases, Routh identifies the letter as the most detailed 
contemporary account of Tangier. See Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, pp. 292–293. 
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Cholmley, Teviot, and Sir John Lawson had entered into a contract for the 
construction of the mole in March 1663, and Cholmley arrived in Tangier in June to 
commence work.126 Born in 1632, he was the youngest son of Sir Hugh Cholmley of 
Whitby, first baronet. Hugh junior attended St Paul’s school in London until he joined 
his family in exile in France in 1645. In 1649 he returned to England, became involved 
in the family’s new alum business, and was privately tutored by his cousin, a Fellow 
of Trinity College.127 Cholmley’s only previous experience with the construction of a 
mole, or any major engineering project for that matter, appears to have been his 
work on rebuilding the old Whitby west pier.128 Concerned with the ease with which 
the terms of the contract for the project were agreed to by the Tangier 
commissioners, Pepys appears to have been initially suspicious of Cholmley, but over 
time he came to appreciate both his moral character and industriousness.129 Like his 
father, he demonstrated a propensity for speaking his mind, however unwisely: on 
one occasion he proffered the view that he expected that Britain would once again 
become a commonwealth because of the moral and financial excesses of the Stuart 
regime.130 
 
In keeping with his opinionated nature, Cholmley was highly critical of the conditions 
in the town during the early days of English occupation, but he evidently developed 
an admiration for the land in which it was situated. Writing a decade later, he states 
that the region possessed a ‘common excellency’, and commented favourably on its 
climate, air, water, and the fecundity of its fields and coastal waters. He also 
                                                        
126 Hugh Cholmley, A Short Account of the Progress of the Mole at Tangier, From the First Beginning of 
that Work  ([London], [1680]), pp. 2–3; Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, pp. 343–344. 
Cholmley’s text is available from the British Library General Reference Collection, shelfmark 
583.i.3.(1.). A transcribed copy of the text is also provided in Bejjit, English Colonial Texts, pp. 153–
160. 
127 Hugh Cholmley, 'Preface', in The Memoirs of Sir Hugh Cholmley, Knt. and Bart. Addressed to His Two 
Sons (Unpublished, 1787), pp. ii–vii, xxi; Jack Binns, ‘The Memoirs: Introduction’, The Memoirs and 
Memorials of Sir Hugh Cholmley, ed. Jack Binns (Woodbridge, UK, 2000), pp. 41–42; Jack Binns, 
'Cholmley, Sir Hugh, first baronet (1600–1657)', in H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison, eds., ODNB, 
Online ed. (Oxford, 2004), accessed 17 July 2017.  
128 See Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, p. 344. The pier in question was not the current west 
pier, which dates to 1814. Cholmley’s efforts to improve the old pier were either not particularly 
effective or remained unfinished. See George Young, A Picture of Whitby and Its Environs  (Whitby, 
UK, 1824), pp. 184–186. 
129 Bejjit, ‘Introduction’, pp. 19–20. 
130 Pepys, Diary of Samuel Pepys, 8, pp. 377–388, entry for 9 August 1667. 
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emphasised that he did not regard the people as being significantly ethnically or 
culturally different, observing that while ‘dark and swarthy’, they were not ‘black’ like 
the people of sub-Saharan Africa, and ‘in features and in manners more resembling 
some of their neighbours, inhabitants of Europe’.131  
 
Contrary to Cholmley’s assessments of the town, Teviot is reported to have been 
‘highly contented with the place’.132  Indeed, by this time general conditions in 
Tangier were improving, partly assisted by trade with Moroccans,133 although the 
settlement seems to have acquired such a poor reputation among Britons that people 
were deterred from coming.134 But these positive developments were tempered by 
continuing hostile encounters with Ghailan’s men,135 and while Teviot accepted the 
advice of those who counselled against ‘acts of hostility’ against the Moroccans, he 
was concerned about the likelihood of an imminent major attack provoked by the 
construction of the second redoubt in a strategic location on a hill overlooking the 
town: 
It giveth such jealousie and inquitetude to Guyland that this three 
dayes bypast, by the intelligence we receive from his fugitives, we 
have been under armes all night, he having 4000 horse and 2000 
foot to attaque our little new fort, at this instant I expect his falling 
on us.136 
 
Teviot was particularly concerned about avoiding such a confrontation, given he 
believed that the forces of Tétouan had joined with Ghailan’s army after that city’s 
recent capitulation to him. 
 
 
                                                        
131 Cholmley, An Account of Tangier, pp. 3–6. 
132 ‘Sir Richard Fanshaw to Sir Henry Bennet’, 7/17 June 1663, Heathcote MSS, p. 110. 
133 Capt. Charles Harbord to Sandwich, Tangier, 14 March 1663, Bodl., Carte MS 75, f. 102; TNA, CO 
279/2, f. 16; ‘Captain B. Gilpin to Sir Richard Fanshaw’, 8 June 1663, Heathcote MSS, p. 111; A 
Description of Tangier, p. 28. 
134 Cholmley, An Account of Tangier, p. 18; Chomley, A Short Account, p. 2. 
135 Bodl., Carte MS 75, f. 102; TNA, CO 279/2, f. 36r; A Description of Tangier, pp. 27–28; Cholmley, An 
Account of Tangier, pp. 63–64. 
136 Report by Teviot, Tangier, 15/25 June 1663, TNA, CO 279/2, f. 98r. The date on the letter is 
incorrect. See the following footnote. 
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4.4. Learning to Respect the Enemy 
 
Teviot’s concerns were well founded. Ghailan attacked the redoubt the following day, 
Sunday 14 June around midday.137 While many of the officers and men were inside 
the town having their meal, the Moroccans launched a surprise assault against the 
unfinished redoubt and other outposts. The men who held the latter retreated in 
disarray, but a relief party was quickly dispatched, and with the Moroccans already 
hampered by caltrops which had earlier been distributed in the area, successfully 
repelled them from the entrenchments and forced them to retreat.138  Moroccan 
casualties possibly exceeded one hundred killed and wounded, with around twenty 
bodies left on the field, some of whom ‘were of a very good quality’, while the English 
lost about twenty, with a further twenty wounded.139 The significance of this 
encounter is not what happened on the field, but rather its aftermath, for 
immediately after the battle Teviot wrote to Ghailan. What transpired is a notable 
exchange, for it provides insights into the character of the two men and heralded the 
beginning of a promising relationship between them. The correspondence includes 
the usual courteous flourishes, but what is intriguing is the approach adopted by 
Teviot.140 Despite having only been in the country less than three months, in his initial 
                                                        
137 There is an inconsistency between the date that Addison provides on p. 8 for the day preceding the 
attack, Saturday, the 15th, and the dates of the subsequent correspondence between Teviot and 
Ghailan, being the 14th, 15th and 16th. If the attack occurred on the Sunday as claimed by Addison, 
under the Julian calendar this would make it the 14th of June, not the 16th, and the account is then 
chronologically consistent. 
138 Broadly consistent accounts are provided in John Luke to [?], Tangier, 14 June 1663, TNA, CO 279/2, 
ff. 102–103r; BL, Sloane MS 505, ff. 97–101; A Description of Tangier, pp. 30–32; Addison, The Moores 
Baffled, pp. 8–9. See also Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, p. 39. 
139 Estimates of casualties do vary between accounts. Quotation is from TNA, CO 279/2, f. 102r. 
140 Copies of the original correspondence in Spanish can be found at ibid., ff. 100–102. Translations of 
the letters are provided in A Description of Tangier, pp. 32–34; Addison, The Moores Baffled, pp. 9–
11; Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, p. 40; Rogers, Anglo-Moroccan Relations, pp. 45–46. Rogers 
has only included the first two letters. All the translations are broadly consistent except for the 
following differences: in Addison’s translation of the first letter Teviot claims the disturbance of a meal 
was contrary to local custom (see following footnote), whereas the other three simply have him stating 
that it was not usual to do so; in Addison’s translation of the second letter Ghailan claims he did not 
welcome him because he was not aware of his arrival, as opposed to the others in which Ghailan states 
that it is him that has cause for complaint; in the translation of the second letter in A Description of 
Tangier Ghailan’s attribution of blame for the failure to have already achieved a peace to 
Peterborough is absent; Addison’s translation of the third letter omits Teviot’s reference to earlier 
discussions which Peterborough had with Ghailan. As Addison was present during the event, 
preference has been given to his translations, but acknowledging his clear bias against Peterborough. 
See also the brief account of the exchange provided in BL, Sloane MS 505, ff. 101–102. 
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overture to Ghailan he admonishes him in a way that appears to be an attempt to 
engage with his adversary on his own cultural terms: ‘But instead of giving me the 
parabien [welcome], you have disturbed my hour of eating, which according to your 
own customs, ought to be secured from visits’.141  
Teviot goes on to say that notwithstanding the discourtesy shown to him, if Ghailan 
wishes ‘better correspondence’ — pointedly adding that it could be achieved ‘either 
by peace or war’ — he will be similarly inclined. Identifying himself as not only a 
soldier, but an honourable one, the governor offers to bury any of Ghailan’s men left 
on the field, or give leave for them to be collected so they may be buried ‘in your own 
manner’.142 In his response the following day, Ghailan admonishes Teviot in turn for 
not formally announcing his arrival, and for his building works and use of resources 
outside of the town walls. However, he assures him that a soldier who had been 
captured had been well-treated, thanks Teviot for his treatment of the dead, blames 
Peterborough for what has transpired, and offers to open negotiations.143 The day 
after, Teviot subsequently acknowledges that if he was at fault ‘in not observing the 
rites of your country’, it was simply as a result of ‘a sin of ignorance’, for which he has 
been ‘sufficiently chastized’. He expresses appreciation for the treatment accorded 
to the soldier, promises to reciprocate the gesture, and accepts Ghailan’s offer to 
treat.144 Through the use of a combination of cultural sensitivity, placation, 
congeniality, and assertiveness Teviot attempted to establish a rapport with Ghailan 
to encourage the Moroccan to negotiate a peace. Nevertheless, Addison notes that 
Teviot, still uncertain of Ghailan’s intentions, continued building new fortifications.145  
 
Teviot’s concerns were reinforced by Ghailan’s ambivalent behaviour, with Addison 
remarking that ‘[e]veryday brought him from Gayland a present or an ambush’. He 
                                                        
141 Addison, The Moores Baffled, p. 9 (my interpolation). As noted in the preceding footnote the 
reference to a custom, whether Muslim or specifically Moroccan, appears to be a later addition. The 
most likely reason for the inclusion of this post hoc addition is that Addison wished to clarify the 
implicit meaning of Teviot’s statement, of which he was aware. There appears to be little reason for 
him to have done so otherwise. But, an alternative explanation, which is more consistent with the 
other sources, is that Teviot regarded the timing of the assault as a breach of honourable conduct.   
142 Ibid., p. 10. 
143 Ibid.  Ghailan does not elaborate on why he believed Peterborough was responsible, simply stating 
‘as you may inform your self’. 
144 Ibid., p. 11. 
145 Ibid.  
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describes the relationship between the two men at this time as ‘a sort of amicable 
hostility’ and suggests that there was nothing but their own pride that kept them 
from establishing a friendship.146 However, on 15 July there was a serious escalation 
of hostilities when some of Ghailan’s men were found hiding near the outer lines. The 
ferocity of the engagement was such that the garrison had to be reinforced by more 
than five hundred sailors from a visiting fleet. In the fighting which ensued over the 
course of the day the Moroccans suffered significant casualties and by the early 
evening they had been forced to withdraw. Shortly after, Ghailan sent an envoy to 
Teviot offering a peace.147  On the following afternoon, against the counsel of his 
officers, Teviot rode out from the town to meet with Ghailan in his camp to 
commence discussions on the terms of a peace. Articles for a six-month peace were 
finally executed by the parties on 23 July. A copy of the articles does not appear to 
have survived, but they evidently required the cessation of construction of further 
defensive works and restrictions on what the English could source from outside the 
town.148 Nevertheless, it was described by the English consul in Lisbon as ‘a very 
honourable peace’,149 and was an outcome which seems to have been warmly 
welcomed by both the inhabitants of Tangier and Ghailan’s supporters.150 
 
Following the signing of the treaty, pleasantries and gifts continued to be exchanged 
between the two leaders, and the turn in the relationship was such that Addison 
optimistically opined that the ‘English and Moors seem’d to differ in nothing but 
religion’.151 In fact, while their engagements with the Moroccans may have inspired 
confidence in some Britons in their abilities to defeat them and secure their place in 
                                                        
146 Ibid., p. 15. 
147 BL, Sloane MS 505, ff. 103–109; Addison, The Moores Baffled, pp. 15–17. The involvement of the 
naval crew is only mentioned in the former source. There is also a brief, and more partisan, account 
provided in A Description of Tangier, pp. 34–35.  
148 See Cholmley, An Account of Tangier, p. 65; Articles of Peace Concluded and Agreed Between His 
Excellency the Lord Bellasyse, His Majesties Governour of His City and Garrison of Tangier in Affrica, 
&c. and Cidi Hamlet Hader Ben Ali Gayland, Prince of West-Barbary, &c. The Second of April, 1666  
(London, 1666), p. 7. 
149 Maynard to Sandwich, Lisbon, 8/18 August 1663, Bodl., Carte MS 75, f. 116r. 
150 Addison, The Moores Baffled, pp. 17–18. See also the response of Moroccans recounted in BL, 
Sloane MS 505, f. 109. 
151 Addison, The Moores Baffled, p. 18. On the exchange of gifts, cf. BL, Sloane MS 505, f. 110. 
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Morocco,152 they did not elicit a general antipathy among Britons in Tangier toward 
them. Invective or prejudice directed at the Moroccans is notably absent in personal 
accounts around this time. They are occasionally referred to as ‘barbarians’, but the 
context in which the term is used does not imply that it was intended as a slur, but 
rather the result of convenient conflation.153 The absence of the pejorative use of the 
term by inhabitants of Tangier contrasts with, for example, the description of 
Moroccans as ‘barbarous people’ by the English consul in Cadiz.154 Situations where 
comparisons are being made on the basis of religious difference may have occasioned 
the use of ‘infidel’.155 More often though Moroccans are simply given the arguably 
neutral appellation 'the Moores'.  
 
When some characterisation of Moroccans is made, it is predominantly 
complimentary, in particular Britons noted and admired their bravery and, as 
mentioned earlier, their martial and riding skills. Addison refers to meeting an envoy 
from Muhammad al-Hajj, whom he describes as a ‘strict, zealous Moor’, who 
possessed a ‘grave and reserved carriage’, yet could also participate in ‘very obliging 
conversation’.156 He also acknowledges their ‘great resolution and courage’ in 
battle.157 One observer, a Thomas Fisher, who recorded the events of this period in a 
section of his journal entitled ‘Affairs of Tangier’, similarly expresses admiration for 
their valour.158 Even in A Description of Tangier, a collection of accounts which was 
probably compiled to defend the colony against its detractors, the editor retained an 
admission from a British commentator that Moroccans ‘are men of order and 
resolution, and have the most excellent firearms and lances’.159 The Moroccans that 
these men observed were definitely not the effeminate Moors envisaged by Thomas 
Maynard. However, although free from obvious prejudice, the extent to which new, 
                                                        
152 See A Description of Tangier, pp. 34–35. 
153 Teviot uses the term ‘Barbaroni’ in Teviot to [?], Tangier, 11/21 July 1663, TNA, CO 279/2, f. 108r. 
Perhaps it was an affectation acquired while he was residing on the Continent.  
154 Wescombe to Fanshaw, Cadiz, 15 March 1665, Heathcote MSS, p. 182. 
155 For example, see BL, Sloane MS 505, f. 105. 
156 Addison, The Moores Baffled, p. 12. 
157 Ibid., pp. 8–9. 
158 BL, Sloane MS 505, ff. 100–101. Cf. Matar, Britain and Barbary, p. 136. 
159 A Description of Tangier, p. 31. On p. 25 it provides a much more fanciful account of the capabilities 
of Ghailan’s men obtained from another source. 
212 
 
informed perceptions of Moroccans among Britons in Tangier could fully develop was 
limited by the nature of the contact they had with them; unfortunately, over the 
following two decades the substantive mode of encounter for many inhabitants and 
visitors would be restricted to the conflictual. But it is important to reinforce the point 
that it was by no means the only one. 
 
As a result of the resolution of tensions with Ghailan, Teviot returned to England for 
consultations on 27 August. However, before doing so, according to Addison, he ‘took 
all opportunities to caress the Moors’.160 It appears that Teviot enjoyed some success 
in establishing amicable relations with his neighbours, aside from Ghailan, including 
a father-in-law to Ghailan, the sheikh of Anjera (Anjra), and the governors of Tétouan. 
Ghailan also wrote to Charles II, praising Teviot’s character and his efforts at 
concluding a peace, and offering his support to the king.161 Addison also stresses that 
Teviot attended to two other issues as part of his diplomatic strategy. Firstly, he 
sought to maintain good relations with the Moroccan Jewish community. His 
motivations for this were predominantly practical: they were part of Moroccan 
society and therefore could influence perceptions about the English, and they also 
conducted trade with Tangier.  Both men appear to have possessed at the least a 
jaundiced view of Jews, but Addison also asserts that Teviot was ‘inclined to an 
impartial justice’ by both nature and religion, and did not wish the Moroccans to think 
otherwise about either him or his religion. Second, he claims that Teviot wished: 
to remove from the Moors all suspicion of any intended invasion of 
their country, with which they seem’d sturdily possessed. To this 
end, he let then plainly and sincerely know, that the king his master 
had not sent him to conquer, but to rent their land: that the chief 
design of his being sent thither was not to make war, but to settle 
a peace: and to promote such a friendly and safe traffique, as might 
conduce to the advantage of both.162 
 
                                                        
160  Addison, The Moores Baffled, p. 18. 
161 Ibid., pp. 18–22. Letters from all three are reproduced by Addison. A manuscript of Ghailan’s letter 
to the king can be found at TNA, CO 279/2, f. 118. 
162 Addison, The Moores Baffled, pp. 20–21 (underlining by me). If Teviot did use the word ‘rent’ it is 
most likely he was simply referring to the land outside the walls of the town, and not questioning the 
king’s sovereignty over the town itself.  
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By the careful nurturing of relationships and provision of reassurances concerning 
English intentions, Teviot hoped to win both the trust and regard of Moroccans.  
 
As well as improving access to supplies of local produce, the peace allowed Britons, 
for the first time since their arrival, to safely venture from the town to explore the 
countryside and civilly interact with the people.163 Among those to do so was 
Addison, who visited the house of the Sheikh of Anjera.164 He recounts in detail not 
only the furnishing of the room in which they dined, what they ate and drank, and 
how it was presented, but also their customs — removing one’s shoes, eating without 
the use of utensils, reclining around a short table — and explains why they followed 
these practices. He also records listening to ‘Moresco music’ and having the company 
of their host’s son, ‘a debonair gentile person’. The impression he provides is of a 
pleasant and interesting evening, with the only thing that offended his English 
sensibilities being the confined communal sleeping arrangements with a group of 
Moors and Jews.165  
 
The attention given by Addison to this experience is not surprising given his life before 
Tangier. A contemporary of Henry Stubbe and a fellow Oxonian, Addison attended 
Queen’s College where he had been a member of a group of students who shared an 
interest in Oriental studies during a period of increasing academic interest in Islam 
and Islamic culture. After graduating and gaining a master of arts in 1657, he was 
secretly ordained as a minister of the Church of England. He subsequently became a 
member of the Anglican underground in the final years of the Interregnum, and in 
1660 was appointed as the chaplain to the English garrison in Dunkirk. Addison’s 
education and seven years’ experience in Tangier provided him with an 
understanding of Morocco and its society and culture that is unlikely to have been 
rivalled by many of his contemporaries. But while he possessed some familiarity with 
Arabic, he does not appear to have been proficient in the language. In addition to 
                                                        
163 A Description of Tangier, p. 36; Addison, The Moores Baffled, p. 18. 
164 The text is also reproduced as ‘An Account of West Barbary’ in John Pinkerton, ed., A General 
Collection of the Best and Most Interesting Voyages and Travels in all Parts of the World, 17 vols., vol. 
15 (London, 1814), pp. 403–441. 
165 Addison, West Barbary, pp. 123–126. Cf. Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, p. 42. 
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West Barbary (1671), which concerns the recent political history of Morocco, the 
natural resources of the country, and the people and their customs and beliefs, 
Addison also produced a number of notable works on Moroccan Jewry and Islam. Like 
John Harrison before him, he was strongly influenced by religious faith and ideology, 
and was concerned about the status and treatment of Jews in Morocco — although 
he demonstrates more ambivalence in his attitude towards them. He was critical of 
some aspects of Islam, but, like Stubbe, he also sought to correct the many 
misconceptions about the religion, and possessed a generally sympathetic 
perspective about the Moroccan people themselves.166 It has been argued that 
Addison was ‘an agent of empire’ and that his work was co-opted for the purposes of 
advancing the interests of the English church and state,167 nevertheless, it has also 
been observed that he was notably open-minded in the type of information he used 
as the basis for his work.168  
 
Teviot’s absence coincided with growing concerns about Spanish plotting against 
Tangier and their efforts to enlist the assistance of Ghailan to that end.169 As some in 
Tangier suspected at the time, there was little likelihood of such an outcome; after 
all, it was not in Ghailan’s interest to enter in an alliance with the Spanish, but it would 
enrich him with the money and armaments he required by keeping them guessing.170  
Nevertheless, despite continued displays of mutual amity, there remained deep 
suspicion among the English about his objectives.171 It was amidst this concern and 
the imminent expiry of the treaty, with no idea when Teviot would return, that the 
                                                        
166 On Addison, see Alistair Hamilton, 'Addison, Lancelot (1632–1703)', in David Cannadine, ed., ODNB 
Online ed. (Oxford, 2004), accessed 12 July 2017; William J. Bulman, Anglican Enlightenment: 
Orientalism, Religion and Politics in England and its Empire, 1648–1715  (Cambridge, 2015), passim, 
esp. chaps. 1 and 2; Simon Mills, 'Learning Arabic in the Overseas Factories: The Case of the English', 
in Jan Loop, Alastair Hamilton, and Charles Burnett, eds., The Teaching and Learning of Arabic in Early 
Modern Europe (Leiden, 2017), p. 284.  
167 Bulman, Anglican Enlightenment, pp. 42–44. 
168 Hamilton, 'Addison, Lancelot'; Bulman, Anglican Enlightenment, pp. 45, 80–84. Addison’s attitudes 
to Muslim and Jewish Moroccans, and their cultures and religions are examined further in chap. 5 of 
this thesis, as are the factors which may have influenced the way in which he wrote about them. 
169 Consul Wescombe to Bennet, Cadiz, 27 and 29 October 1663, and Fitzgerald to Bennet, Tangier, 25 
November 1663, TNA, CO 279/2, ff. 145, 162, 165–166. See also Corbett, England in the 
Mediterranean, II, pp. 330–331; Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, pp. 49–52. On the visit of the 
Spanish envoy to Ghailan at this time, see also Addison, West Barbary, pp. 106–111. 
170 Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, pp. 52–53. 
171 Fitzgerald to Bennet, Tangier, 9/19 December 1663, TNA, CO 279/2, ff. 173–174. 
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lieutenant-governor, Colonel John Fitzgerald, negotiated a two-month extension with 
Ghailan.172  
 
However, Teviot returned to Tangier on 14 January 1664, shortly before the expiry of 
the Articles of Peace, and advised Ghailan that he could not agree to an extension, 
stating that he was under instructions from the king not to renew the treaty unless 
he was permitted to further develop the town’s fortifications.173 Ghailan in turn 
advised he could not accede to this condition because it was forbidden by Islamic law 
for Christians to erect fortifications in Africa.174 The further fortification of Tangier 
proved to be an intractable issue, with neither party prepared to give ground, and on 
11 February hostilities recommenced; not open warfare, but rather ‘ebuscades and 
surprizes’.175 Regular skirmishes continued over the following two months, but there 
were two major encounters during March, and it was following the last of these that 
Teviot once again demonstrated surprising sensitivity, by having the bodies of two of 
the slain Moroccans washed, shrouded, and returned to Ghailan with a military 
escort. Addison asserts it was simply diplomatic canniness on Teviot’s behalf to 
contrast his treatment of the Moroccan dead with that of the Moroccans toward slain 
Britons.176 Perhaps it was a gesture intended to elicit reciprocity.  But equally, it could 
                                                        
172 Fitzgerald to Bennet, Tangier, 31 December 1664, ibid., ff. 190–191. 
173 Tevoit was perhaps being disingenuous on this point. While obviously intent on achieving a peace, 
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instructions from the king concerning the renewal of a peace and fortification of the town see 
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175 Memorial by Teviot, 16/26 February 1664, TNA, CO 279/3, ff. 22–23. 
176 Addison, The Moores Baffled, pp. 24–25. See also Addison to Williamson, Tangier, 14 March 1664, 
TNA, CO 279/3, ff. 32–33; [Muddiman], A Brief Relation, pp. 4–7; Routh, England's Lost Atlantic 
Outpost, pp. 61–66.  
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also have been to signify a soldier’s respect for a valorous enemy, in accordance with 
Teviot’s evidently strong sense of honour. 
 
In the meantime, Muhammad al-Hajj’s commander was still holding the fortress at 
Salé. Teviot had been visited by emissaries from al-Hajj in June the previous year to 
congratulate the earl on his arrival, to seek his assistance in the relief of Salé, and to 
settle a ‘fair correspondence’, and Teviot had responded by providing a shipment of 
supplies to the beleaguered troops.177 The English remained hopeful that the fortress 
would be surrendered to them. In his latest instructions, Teviot was advised that if he 
was in a position to do so he should accept the offer, subject to suitable terms and 
conditions. The principal concern by this time was not what the fortress could offer 
the English, but how its possession by Ghailan might strengthen him.178 However, by 
this time he was sufficiently challenged in securing Tangier without the distraction of 
also defending the fortress. Ghailan finally captured it in October, and with the loss 
of the stronghold went any real hope the English may have possessed of working with 
the Dilā to help check Ghailan’s ascendancy.  
 
As also observed by Bejjit, the religious and political dimensions of the civil war in 
Morocco were complex; they were never fully comprehended by the English, at least 
at the official level, and, as they would discover, neither were the forces at play 
readily amenable to manipulation by them.179 Unlike their experiences in the 
Americas, the English in Tangier faced indigenous adversaries who were not only 
zealous, but also reasonably well organised, disciplined, and armed. Their recent 
successes against Ghailan’s forces and Teviot’s leadership did inspire confidence in 
the English garrison, but a belief that ‘European canines and gun powder would 
inevitably prove victorious’, as the Spanish had demonstrated with the Indians, as 
claimed by Matar, is not evident in the accounts for this period.180 The confidence of 
                                                        
177 Addison, The Moores Baffled, p. 12. See also Teviot’s report, Tangier, 15/25 June 1663, TNA, CO 
279/2, f. 99r; BL, Sloane MS 505, ff. 91, 101–102; A Description of Tangier, p. 36. 
178 TNA, CO 279/2, f. 183v (article 5); Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, p. 47. 
179 Bejjit, ‘Introduction’, p. 11. 
180 See Matar, Britain and Barbary, p. 137. On the prevailing sentiment of the garrison concerning their 
position, see, for example, ‘A relation on the state of Tanger received from the Earle of Teviot from 
14th of January to 21st of March 1664’, TNA, CO 279/3, f. 41; Teviot to Wescombe, Tangier, 15/25 April 
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the garrison did not diminish their general respect for the conduct and capabilities of 
Moroccans as adversaries, and what they did come to put their faith in, other than 
their commander, was the extensive system of fortifications which was emerging 
around the town. 
 
In fact, the tenuous position of the English was starkly highlighted by an event that 
would have a significant and long term effect on the morale of the inhabitants of the 
colony.  The need for the fortifications and the vulnerability of the English outside 
them was amply demonstrated on 3 May when Teviot led a party of around 460 
officers, gentlemen, and soldiers out from the town which was subsequently 
ambushed, with the loss of the governor and 430 of his men.181 Linda Colley has 
opined that Teviot’s approach in Tangier was ‘ultimately unwise’, with the foray that 
led to his untimely death motivated by a desire ‘to prove that Charles II’s imperial 
power’ could extend beyond the walls of the colony.182 However, as has been shown, 
this interpretation of Teviot’s governorship does not accord well with contemporary 
evidence.183 Admittedly, he did have a reputation for reckless valour, and there does 
appear to have been a symbolic element associated with the timing of the expedition, 
but the reasons for it appear to be far more prosaic.  
 
The day was the second anniversary of the defeat of Lieutenant-Colonel Fines and his 
troop, and it is evident that its significance was not lost on Teviot, who had perhaps 
decided that a show of force, or even a successful encounter with the Moroccans, on 
this occasion would help redress the legacy of the incident in the memory of both the 
garrison and the Moroccans.184 But while he may have been imprudent, the governor 
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had certainly not been incautious. As well as being accompanied by a sizeable force, 
he had ordered that the area be carefully reconnoitred, and been assured that it was 
clear. As contemporary accounts reveal, Teviot’s main aim in venturing outside the 
town appears to have been to clear some nearby woods to reduce cover afforded 
enemies approaching the town, and, perhaps, to also collect firewood.185 
Nevertheless, if these were his reasons, the outcome left the town even more 
vulnerable and disconsolate than it had been.  
 
Aside from the huge loss of life and the death of a high-ranking and esteemed English 
official, what is significant about this event is the nature of the responses which it 
elicited. There was sufficient concern about the impact that the episode may have 
had on support for the colony, that ‘a kind of prohibition’ on reporting had been 
imposed following the event, ‘lest, by scribbling, things might be falsely 
represented’.186 Possibly, it is for this reason that the response of the printed media 
was more muted than that following later major events in Tangier, when the political 
environment encouraged public reporting for propagandist purposes. But it could 
also support the view held by some historians that the English public was generally 
indifferent, if not opposed, to their country’s colonial endeavours during the 
seventeenth century.187 In England the incident occasioned the publication of two 
pieces of doggerel praising Teviot and lamenting his death.188 While evoking a 
traditional image of the cruel and deceitful Moor, the authors reserved their harshest 
criticism for Ghailan. Moreover, they both adopt a defiant tone, affirming that the 
English will obtain retribution for what they portray as a treacherous act: ‘We are not 
conquer’d yet, the sooty Moore … Yet we shall make this bold usurper bow’, 
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proclaimed one,189 while the other exclaimed that ‘No blade of grass grow near that 
fatal wood, till it be dung’d with Mauritanian blood’.190  
 
But the responses of the men of the garrison and other inhabitants of Tangier were 
markedly different, or at least far more nuanced, than those of their compatriots at 
home. They were dismayed and disheartened by the loss of their comrades and 
beloved commander and governor. Addison was unable to narrate the details of that 
day, finding the experience too painful.191 Cholmley, writing many years later, 
describes how with Teviot’s death Tangier acquired a sense of ‘loss almost 
irreparable’.192 Furthermore, the event appears to have reinforced within the soldiers 
respect for their Moroccan antagonists: while not personally subscribing to their 
sentiments, one commentator claims that the major defeats experienced by first, 
Fines’ company, and then Teviot’s, ‘have struck a great terrour into our English 
hearts, and caused us to look upon a Moor as an excellent souldier.’193 Matar has 
claimed that Teviot’s death marked a turning point in the way Moroccans were 
viewed by Britons, with ‘subhumanization and animalization of the Moors’ becoming 
part of the general discourse.194 However, such tropes were already long established 
in the pejorative depths of the Barbary discourse. Undoubtedly, there were 
recriminations, abuse, and vows of revenge, but there is no evidence that the incident 
precipitated a prolonged turn to increased general prejudice against Moroccans.  
 
The soldiers’ assessment of the Moroccans was undoubtedly one that would have 
been shared by their late commander. Despite their different cultures and religions, 
he and Ghailan had much in common. Both were proud and charismatic leaders who 
revelled in warfare. Their dealings over a short period had fostered between them a 
mutual respect, which, as Addison suggested, may have developed into a genuine 
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friendship given time and a change in circumstance.195 It was a sentiment also 
seemingly shared by Ghailan.196 In any event, the relationship demonstrated the 
possibility for an affinity between an English governor and a Moroccan leader that 
would not be repeated again for many years. The engagement on 3 May had exacted 
a heavy cost on the Moroccans as well, so much so that Ghailan did not pursue his 
advantage against the lightly defended lines of the town. In fact, the encounter 
appears to have had such an adverse impact on Ghailan and his supporters, perhaps 
compounded by earlier losses, that he never again attempted an all-out assault on 
the colony.197  
 
4.5. Imperatives for Peace 
 
However, hostilities did not entirely abate, with regular skirmishes with Ghailan’s 
forces occurring over the following months.198 In response, the English officers set 
about further strengthening the colony’s defences,199 although the acting governor, 
Colonel Fitzgerald, and his successor, Lord Belasyse were both specifically instructed 
not to extend the perimeter of the colony beyond an area that could be safely 
maintained. While the instructions issued to Fitzgerald and Belasyse clearly indicate 
that the English authorities were concerned with ensuring the security of the town, 
that imperative was by no means intended to compromise its principal function as a 
free port, with the men required to ensure that they promoted everything that was 
conducive to improve trade and commerce.200 To this end, there was a desire to 
normalise relations with the local people, with Colonel Bullen Reymes charged with, 
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among other things, assessing ‘the disposition of Gayland and other neighbouring 
potentates towards a further peace or truce’.201  
 
The first steps toward re-establishing a peace commenced in July at Fitzgerald’s 
instigation, and exchanges between him and Ghailan on the subject continued into 
August. While the tone of the correspondence was cordial and Ghailan was receptive, 
the sticking point remained the issue of the fortifications, with the Moroccan insisting 
that unless the English pulled them down ‘there was noe other way’ to proceed, 
insisting that he had explored all other options.202  By early October a peace had still 
not been finalised, but with work on the town’s defences now having been 
completed, Fitzgerald felt unconcerned whether there was peace or war with the 
Moroccans, although he affirms that for the reputation of the town and in the 
interests of trade ‘he will endeavour to bring them to a good correspondency’.203 
However, the English officers in Tangier still failed to accept that Ghailan’s issue was 
with the maintenance of the outer defensive works, instead preferring to believe that 
he was colluding with the Spanish, and expecting him to be amenable to peace once 
England had resolved its affairs with Spain.204  
 
The new governor, Lord John Belasyse (bap. 1615, d. 1689), arrived in Tangier on 8 
April, only a month after the commencement of the second Anglo-Dutch War; a 
conflict in which the port and its developing mole would play some part, helping 
justify the expense incurred by the king on the project.205 Belasyse was born into a 
noble family, raised as a Catholic, educated at home, and for a brief period in Paris. 
He became a member of Parliament shortly before the English civil wars in which he 
served as a Royalist army officer. He distinguished himself during the first civil war, 
being created Baron Belasyse in January 1645, and actively conspired against the 
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Commonwealth during the Interregnum.206 Belasyse was a close friend of Sir Henry 
Bennet, who described him as ‘as a very gallant man’, and who was instrumental in 
Belasyse gaining the governorship.207 However, Bennet’s high opinion of Belasyse 
was not shared by Pepys, who found him to be self-centred, dishonest, corrupt, and 
cunning.208 
 
Belasyse was clearly impressed with what he found when he arrived in Tangier, 
providing the most effusive description of the place of any English governor. 
Highlighting ‘the nobleness of its cituation and greate importance to the crowne’, he 
goes on to add: 
His majesty who understands and delights in all curiossityes both 
by sea and land this place is capable off would possess a greater 
esteame off it than any off his dominions weare he heare to see the 
prospects off the Streights uppon Spain, the shipps that pass, the 
frutefull mountagnes off Affrique, the fragrant perfumes off 
flowers, rare frutes and sallads, excellent ayre, meats and wines, 
which this place most seamingly affords, or shall doe.209 
 
Later that year, he wrote that regardless of what transpired with Ghailan, he had no 
doubt that ‘Tanger will prove advantageous to the Crowne of England, as [?] it was 
hoped for’, as it was presently demonstrating in the war with the Dutch.210 At around 
the same time, others also observed with satisfaction the colony’s condition and 
prospects. Hugh Cholmley reflected on its importance as a supply depot for the 
European powers when they were at war with each other, and a safe harbour for 
English vessels threatened by Muslim corsairs. Furthermore, he notes that there were 
‘all sorts of delicacys’ available and fresh produce was plentiful and cheap. He also 
states that things were such that he could discern ‘no difference between this place 
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and England’, and nor did he ‘ever know it so well’.211 Early the following year a naval 
officer, Thomas Browne, the son of the well-known physician and author of the same 
name, visited Tangier and provides a more independent assessment. He remarks that 
while the town had been ‘of little force and lesse profit’ under the Portuguese, it was 
‘now very much mended as to the former, and in great hopes of raising the latter’ for 
the protection of merchant vessels.212 But, whatever way Tangier might have 
reminded Cholmley of home, it was certainly no ‘little England’. Charles’ dream of 
Tangier becoming a cosmopolitan trading centre was being realised, for despite his 
subjects’ troubles with Ghailan and Barbary corsairs, Muslims were not excluded 
from the town, with Cholmley proudly proclaiming to the English ambassador to 
Portugal and Spain, Sir Richard Fanshaw, that ‘wee daly entertaine Christians and 
Turks that come to see us’.213  
 
Furthermore, unimpeded by territorial disputes, relations with the people elsewhere 
in Morocco continued to be favourable, with the English entering into a treaty of 
peace and commerce with the governor of Santa Cruz in the south of the country in 
November. Interestingly, the treaty states that the citizens of Santa Cruz ‘shall enjoy 
reciprocally the same privileges in the King of England’s dominions’ (article 12).214 
The treaty had been negotiated by a London merchant, Thomas Warren, who had 
been commissioned, apparently at Warren’s suggestion, by Charles II in 1665 to 
‘conclude a peace with the King of Morocco, the Governor of Santa Cruz, the people 
of Sallee or one or any of them’.215 While Warren had evidently been unable to 
conclude the other two treaties, he did contract with Abdul-Karin al-Shabbani, the 
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last member of the Sa‘dī dynasty to rule Marrakesh, for the supply of seven hundred 
barrels of gunpowder, an arrangement which had been sanctioned by the English 
government, at least post hoc.216 
 
Despite these developments, Tangier effectively remained under siege from the land, 
with Belasyse noting that no Britons had travelled beyond the lines for ‘a long time’, 
nor would they do so, ‘for our going out is useless and dangerous’.217 The third of 
May had become such an inauspicious date for the garrison that Belasyse delayed 
contacting Ghailan until the day had passed, having been ‘informed they have a 
designe to attaque us then’.218 Confident they could repel any assault, he was more 
concerned at the time about the possibility of a blockade of the port by the Dutch.219 
The day passed without incident,220 but like his officers he believed Ghailan 
maintained his hostile stance against the English because he was being incited to do 
so by Spain. Under these circumstances, Belasyse thought that the only means 
available to resolve the issue was to send two frigates to blockade Tétouan and Salé 
‘where theire trade being obstructed, they will importune Guylan as author of theire 
misfortunes to make a peace with us’;221 it was the same coercive approach adopted 
by the English in earlier disputes with Salé and the other Barbary States, but on this 
occasion it is clear that the intention was to prevent English and Dutch vessels trading 
with these ports in order to force Ghailan’s hand. The war with the Dutch added to 
the garrison’s general anxieties and contributed to suspicion of collusion between 
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Ghailan and European powers intent on frustrating their occupation of Tangier, 
believing that the Dutch were now also preventing him from settling a peace. 222 
 
The real issue is not whether or not the Spanish and Dutch were encouraging Ghailan 
to continue hostilities against the English. As Jerome Weiner points out, while the 
English were preoccupied with explaining Ghailan’s obstinacy in conspiratorial terms, 
they failed to address the actual stumbling block that he had consistently raised, that 
is, the removal of the external fortifications.223  But the English may have simply 
considered this an unfeasible option. Based on their past experiences with Ghailan, 
they had every reason to fear a concerted assault, a belief which was further fuelled 
by a deep mistrust of Ghailan which appears to have had little to do with ethnological 
or religious prejudice towards Moroccans, but rather was the consequence of 
prevailing tensions between England and the other European powers which were 
translated to Morocco. For these reasons, the destruction of the fortifications may 
not have been a concession the English were willing to make, but they do appear to 
have failed to recognise that Ghailan’s demand was more than a personal whim, 
when, in fact, it was associated with a deeply-felt and long-standing general antipathy 
to European colonial activities, with the actions of the English directly challenging 
Ghailan’s authority and status in Moroccan society. 
 
A more likely factor explaining Ghailan’s intransigence up to this point was the 
relative strength of his position: he was not under any immediate threat from other 
Moroccan factions, and consequently was not dependent on obtaining supplies or 
support from the English.224 The situation in fact held a number of potential benefits 
for him. He could play off the divisions between the Europeans to obtain what he 
could from them, and any concessions by the English on the fortifications or, more 
importantly, the capture of the town, would have added greatly to his prestige.225 
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Given the impasse, it was fortunate for the English, at least in the short term, that 
circumstances began to change very shortly after Belasyse’s arrival. In April and May 
there were reports that Muhammad al-Hajj was advancing on Ghailan with a large 
army, and in August Belasyse revealed that Ghailan’s problems had escalated: ‘He is 
so “hard put to his defence against the armies of Ben Bowcar [al-Hajj, Muhammad] 
and the King of Taffaletta [Mawlay al-Rashīd] … as he may soon lose all his holds … 
and Sally and Tituan will revolt from him most certainly when Ben Bowcar is master 
of the campania”’226 These new circumstances forced a change in Ghailan’s 
disposition toward the English, with Belasyse also advising in the same report that 
‘Guyland has sent me a present of fresh provisions and overtures tending to a peace’. 
 
The English had perhaps overestimated the severity of the immediate threat to 
Ghailan because he appeared to be in no hurry to conclude a peace. Belasyse 
reported in late October that contrary to other intelligence, Ghailan had not been 
defeated and slain, and had himself been advised that Ghailan ‘was in no way inclined 
to a peace with us, being courted by the Duke of Medinaceli and the Hollanders to 
the contrary’. While he believed they ‘lay many designs to engage him to attack or 
distress us’, Belasyse claimed he was unconcerned, confident in the garrison’s ability 
to repel any attack by land or sea.227 However, once again the English had either been 
misinformed or had misjudged Ghailan, and it was, in fact, the Spanish against whom 
he turned, attacking Larache in early 1666. The assault was unsuccessful and Ghailan 
had suffered considerable losses. Hearing of the incident, Belasyse offered to reopen 
negotiations, and on 2 April 1666 a treaty between Belasyse and Ghailan was finally 
signed, to the governor’s evident joy.228 
 
The treaty differed from that negotiated by Teviot in a number of ways, as Belasyse 
keenly highlighted. Most importantly, for the English it was perpetual, and allowed 
the English to complete their defensive works, but not extend them beyond the 
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existing perimeter. It provided the colonists with greater access to fresh produce, 
firewood and building supplies, use of a larger area outside the perimeter for grazing 
and cropping, the promise of assistance against attack by ‘all Christian enemies’, and 
protection from attacks by corsairs on vessels in the vicinity of the town. In return 
Ghailan was to receive 200 barrels of gunpowder and, in a significant concession by 
the English, whatever assistance could be provided by any of their vessels in Tangier 
against his enemies not at the time at peace with England, when required. The parties 
were to forgive past injuries, return offenders seeking refuge, and permit free trade 
in their respective ports.229 In addition, Belasyse provided Ghailan with a quantity of 
guns and pistols.230 
 
By entering into the long-awaited treaty, the English had hoped to achieve the 
security they required for peaceful trade and improve the self-sufficiency of the 
colony, thereby establishing a sound foundation for its long-term future. For a short 
time at least, the alliance showed promise, with Ghailan cooperating with the English 
on developing plans to respond to a feared attack by a French fleet, and the 
commencement of a pattern of exchange of correspondence and supplies between 
the parties which would define the relationship for the following two years. At this 
point in time they shared a common interest in their mutual security.231 However, 
the questionable long-term value of the treaty to the English, and Ghailan’s reasons 
for insisting on access to use of English vessels, soon become apparent. Following a 
decisive victory by Mawlay al-Rashīd against his forces toward the end of June, 
Ghailan and his remaining supporters were forced to flee to his stronghold of Asilah.  
From there he wrote to the recently appointed lieutenant-governor, Colonel Henry 
Norwood, requesting a surgeon to tend his wounds, a ship to remain moored off 
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Asilah should he require assistance, and sanctuary for any of his supporters who 
arrived in the town.232 In turn, Norwood offered his condolences and assured Ghailan 
that he would comply with the recently signed Articles of Peace and provide refuge 
for his allies and followers.233 For the following two years, Ghailan remained largely 
confined to the town, able to do little to support the English, other than providing 
fresh supplies from time to time and, by his continued resistance, distracting al-
Rashīd from focussing on Tangier as his next conquest.234 
 
Tangier’s situation toward the end of 1666 was aptly summed up by Colonel 
Norwood. Discussing a conflict between his obligations under the treaty with Ghailan 
and entreaties for assistance from ‘Abd el-Krim en-Neksis, governor of Tétouan, he 
sardonically quipped that ‘I am now like a horse betweene 2 bottles [bundles] of hay, 
ready to starve for not being able to chuse the best’.235 Despite its light-hearted 
nature, Norwood’s statement seems to reflect a recognition that the fate of the 
English colony remained uncertain, and ultimately dependent on factors outside his 
direct control. 
 
Conclusion  
 
In this chapter it has been argued that understanding of events relating to the English 
occupation of Tangier and the meaning of the encounter between Britons and 
Moroccans during this period has been strongly influenced by the historiographical 
legacy of late Victorian and Edwardian scholars. However, returning to the 
contemporary sources and reviewing them with a more critical and objective eye 
reveals a number of important aspects about the foundation of English Tangier that 
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challenge the received wisdom of earlier historical interpretations, allowing 
subsequent developments and the responses of the inhabitants of the new colony to 
be considered in a very different light. 
 
Many of the king’s subjects did enthusiastically embrace the manifold opportunities 
presented by Tangier. However, proposals publicly bruited following the 
announcement of the marriage alliance with Portugal were nothing more than 
unofficial, often self-seeking, expressions of national aspiration, and were certainly 
not endorsed by all Britons. The king and his advisors, in fact, quickly adopted an 
ostensibly pragmatic vision for his new dominion. Tangier was not to be the 
bridgehead for imperial expansion into North Africa, rather the colony was to play a 
key role in England’s developing maritime empire. Central to fulfilment of this vision 
was the requirement that Tangier be a self-sustaining free port, which they felt 
confident would be supported by the Moroccan people once they had been assured 
of the character of the English and recognised the mutual benefit of peaceful trade. 
But the English authorities had not anticipated the practical and political challenges 
that would be encountered in maintaining the colony. 
 
In particular, they failed to appreciate the traditional resentment that Moroccans felt 
towards the colonial activities of the Europeans, both Catholic and Protestant, and 
the critical role that resistance to European encroachment played in establishing 
political legitimacy in Moroccan society. The English, for their part did not see the 
occupation of Tangier as a hostile act of territorial sequestration: the site had been a 
Portuguese possession for almost two hundred years which, from the perspective of 
the English, had been legally ceded to Charles II. They, therefore, had no reason to 
question the legitimacy of the king’s sovereignty over this piece of land. Furthermore, 
mistrust of Ghailan, exacerbated by a belief that he was colluding with other 
European powers, made it impossible for the English to concede to his demands for 
the destruction of the external fortifications which provided them with so much 
reassurance. This left a forced peace as the only option to resolve the impasse 
available to the English until the arrival of the ‘Alawīs encouraged Ghailan to 
reappraise his position. 
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Nevertheless, what is remarkable about this period of the occupation is that despite 
the bloodshed and significant loss of life that transpired over the course of the first 
four years, those Britons who were present during this time and committed their 
experiences to writing, maintained an essentially balanced view of the enemy. Their 
perceptions were heavily influenced by the nature of their encounters, but despite 
this, there was a distinct lack of animosity and prejudice directed toward the 
Moroccans in the sources, and these men also demonstrated a continuing willingness 
to engage with them during periods of peace. Moreover, the inhabitants of Tangier 
were also attempting to gain an understanding of the country; they did not simply 
seek to learn about its resources and military capabilities, but were also inspired by 
a genuine interest in its history and culture. Evidence of this engagement is provided 
in the accounts on which this chapter has drawn, in particular those by Cholmley and 
Addison, who both attribute their knowledge to direct contact with Moors and 
Jews.236 The observations and attitudes of both men are explored further in the 
following chapter. 
 
The ability of Britons to overcome prejudice and hostility, and apply their cultural 
learning in an attempt to forge positive relationships with the local people, is well 
demonstrated in the efforts made by Teviot to establish a peace with Ghailan, and in 
the rapport these two men developed. The actions of Teviot also draw attention to 
the importance given by early modern Britons to adherence to principles of 
honourable conduct in their interactions with others, friends and enemies alike; a 
subject that is considered further in the following chapter. Teviot’s death is 
instructive of how knowledge and experience can alter attitudes, and shape 
responses. The reaction of the garrison to the event stands in marked contrast to that 
of the few polemicists who responded to it in the English media, highlighting, more 
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generally, the risk of extrapolating the views expressed by a small group of domestic 
commentators to generalise about the attitudes of all Britons.  
 
Routh, Colley, and Matar have seen Teviot’s death as a signal moment in shaping 
English policy toward Morocco, marking the end of English aspiration for a territorial 
empire in North Africa.237 But as has been shown in this chapter, Charles II did not 
possess such expectations by the time he enacted his plans for the occupation of 
Tangier in late 1661. The disaster of 1664 did have a deep impact on Britons both in 
the colony and at home and gave them pause to reflect on their situation in Morocco, 
but the English government remained steadfast in its desire that Tangier succeed as 
a free port and naval station. By 1667, Britons demonstrated more realistic 
expectations about how it could contribute to their enrichment, but with conditions 
in the town improving and the recent treaty with Ghailan, there was some basis for 
hope for Tangier’s future, although tempered by uncertainty concerning the threat 
posed by the ‘Alawīs.  
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5. Hope (1667–1677) 
 
If [Tangier] could be wall’d and fortifi’d with brass, it would repay 
the charge: and I doubt not, if our misfortunes or sins do not 
prevent it, but posterity, in the annals of our history, shall read the 
acquisition and improvement of Tanger among the felicities of his 
majesty’s reign whom God almighty prosper, and send us a happy 
meeting; which is [my] constant prayer. (Henry Sheres, Tangier, 20 
October 1676)1 
 
By the late 1660s, any expectations which had been held by perspicacious Britons 
that Tangier could be the bridgehead for a territorial empire in North Africa would 
have been dashed. A concerted resistance mounted by Ghailan to even limited 
expansion of the colony to better meet its defensive needs and sustain its population, 
had amply demonstrated the martial capabilities and zeal that Moroccans could bring 
to bear to prevent further European encroachment. Even those Britons who 
continued to subsribe to a more realistic vision of Tangier as a lucrative entrepôt and 
useful naval station would have held reservations about achieving those ends, in light 
of the ongoing difficulties faced by Charles’ government in adequately financing and 
supplying the colony, and the continuing political instability in Morocco. 
Nevertheless, well into the following decade there were people who continued to 
hold out hope that long-term amicable relations with the indigenes could be achieved 
and that Tangier would finally realise its perceived potential as the brightest jewel in 
the king’s overseas dominions, ‘a jewel of so many extraordinary virtues, and so 
peculiar to the use and service of the English nation’.2  
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Rendred the Crown. 2. What Service it May Render it, if Improv'd. 3. The Mischief it May Do Us, if 
Possess'd by any Other Powerful Prince. 4. Some General Observations Touching Trade. In a Letter to 
a Person of Quality  (London, 1680), p. 53 (my interpolation). Authorship of the pamphlet is attributed 
to Sheres in the British Library Catalogue. Sheres is sometimes rendered as Shere or Sheeres. A 
transcription of the text is provided in Karim Bejjit, ed., English Colonial Texts on Tangier, 1661–1684: 
Imperialism and the Politics of Resistance, Transculturalisms, 1400–1700 (Farnham, UK, 2015), pp. 
129–145. 
2 Quotation is from Sheres, A Discourse Touching Tanger, p. 31. Sheres also used the jewel analogy 
when describing Tangier’s value in Henry Sheres, A Discourse Concerning the Mediterranean Sea, and 
the Streights of Gibraltar  (London, 1705), p. 20. The original text of the later was probably written 
around 1674–75. See Julian S. Corbett, England in the Mediterranean: A Study of the Rise and Influence 
of British Power Within the Straits, 1603–1713, 2nd ed., 2 vols., vol. II (London, 1917), p. 366, n. 2. 
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Such hope was not unfounded: with peace finally established with Ghailan, and 
Mawlay al-Rashīd preoccupied with suppressing domestic resistance within his 
expanding dominions, after five turbulent years, the inhabitants of Tangier finally 
enjoyed an extended period of relative peace, and the English could now focus on 
improving the operation of the colony and the development of its infrastructure. 
With time, its supporters believed, Tangier could not only start to repay the 
considerable sums of money which had been outlaid by the king for the project, and 
become self-sustaining; but of equal importance, the English could convince 
Moroccans of their good intentions and of the mutual value which could be derived 
from the colony. However, while Tangier enjoyed a reprieve at the beginning of this 
period, a long-term peace was not guaranteed and the domestic civil conflict was far 
from resolved. Hostile relations with the indigenes were not only costing the king’s 
exchequer scarce funds to secure the colony, but also stifling its commercial 
development. Consequently, more concerted efforts began to be made from this 
time to achieve a long-term diplomatic solution.  
 
This diplomatic activity was not only a notable aspect of the English occupation of 
Tangier between 1667 and 1677 in itself, but, importantly for this study, it provided 
many Britons with diverse opportunities to travel within the country and, therefore, 
to closely observe the Moroccan people and their society outside the limitations of 
hostile encounters. Reflecting increasing popular interest in Islam and other cultures, 
the sources from around this time begin to offer not just richer levels of detail about 
general observations and attitudes. Commentators also demonstrate a greater 
preparedness to commit to writing their own reflections about the impact that their 
experiences had on them; they even make comparisons which go beyond perceptions 
of equivalence, of recognition of a shared humanity, and offer assessments of their 
discoveries which reflect poorly on the state of their own society and culture. Some 
of the most profound examples of how intercultural experience can provoke such 
comparisons are found in the didactic musings of the garrison chaplain, Lancelot 
Addison. Through such frank admissions they provide not only greater insight into 
how acculturative change may have affected them, but also into the factors which 
influenced such change. However, while cultural understanding, and even genuine 
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feelings of amity which it helped foster, supported attempts to achieve an accord 
with their neighbours, recourse to basic pragmatism continued to be important to 
England’s efforts to reach an accord with the Moroccans. But another factor, 
separate to acculturation, and whose influence on inter-cultural relations is identified 
for the first time through this study, can also be seen to play an increasingly 
significant role in the behaviour of Britons in their dealings in Morocco, and that is 
the concept of honour, particularly as it is manifested in various military contexts. 
 
5.1. Reconciling Honour and Expediency 
 
By May 1667 the prospects for trade were promising and good progress was being 
made with construction of the mole. However, the lieutenant-governor, Colonel 
Norwood, had two concerns. The first was that Tangier, in his view, was not receiving 
adequate attention from Whitehall, believing it to be due to the colony being ‘farr 
from the heart’. The second was the challenge in meeting Ghailan’s demands for 
supplies sufficient to feed ‘at least 5000 mouths’. Peace for the colony had been 
achieved for the past year, but only at ‘great expense’.3 Norwood was anxious about 
the situation, and for good reason. The governor, Lord Belasyse, had left for England 
very soon after the signing of the treaty and had not returned,4 and Norwood had 
been having difficulty obtaining timely responses on important issues from the 
principal Secretary of State, Lord Arlington, since the previous August.5 Critically, the 
strategic situation had not only changed considerably but also quickly, since the 
treaty had been concluded. The desirability of a peace had been premised not only 
on a cessation of hostilities but also as a means to provide the town with local 
                                                        
3 Colonel Norwood to Lord Arlington, Tangier, 22 May 1667, Bodl., Carte MS 75, ff. 548–549. 
Quotations are from ff. 548r, 549r, 549v, respectively. On Ghailan’s dependence on the English, see 
also Jerome B. Weiner, 'Anglo-Moroccan Relations in the First Decade of the Occupation of Tangier, 
1662–1672', Hespèris Tamuda, 18 (1979), p. 71. On improvement in trade and commerce at this time, 
which was largely as a result of the war with the Dutch and French, see also Hugh Cholmley, An Account 
of Tangier  (unpublished, 1787), pp. 72–73. 
4 Less than a week later Belasyse was in Seville, and by the end of the month had landed in England. 
See ‘Consul Westcombe to Sir Richard Fanshaw’, Cadiz, [8]18 April 1666, Heathcote MSS (London, 
1899), p. 246; 'Charles II – volume 154: April 17–30, 1666', in  CSPD: Charles II, 1663–4, ed. Mary Anne 
Everett Green, BHO ed. (London, 1864), accessed 26 September 2017, entry for 24 April. See p. 363 in 
printed edition. 
5 Norwood to Arlington, Tangier, 31 August 1666, TNA, CO 279/6, ff. 110–111. 
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supplies of fresh produce and materials, and to create an environment conducive to 
development of trade. The rapid ‘Alawī expansion into the north-west of the country 
presented a new threat and required a change in strategy.  
 
The approach adopted by the English in Morocco at this time, which appears to have 
been heavily influenced by Norwood, was framed by several considerations. What 
they sought to do for the first time was make a concerted effort to influence the 
dynamics of the Moroccan civil conflict through providing overt material aid to 
Ghailan in an attempt to achieve a balance of power in the region, between the 
warring factions. By supporting Ghailan at Asilah, Norwood hoped that the Moroccan 
chief could continue to resist al-Rashīd, and thereby prevent him turning his forces 
on Tangier.6 They were also hedging on the outcome. There were risks in so closely 
aligning themselves with Ghailan, but these were mitigated in Norwood’s mind by 
the value of demonstrating consistency in their support for an ally.  Such a show of 
good character, Norwood believed, would facilitate negotiation of terms with the 
‘Alawīs should the need arise.7 However, Norwood and some of his colleagues also 
possessed a less mercenary view of their relationship with Ghailan. It was neither 
expediency nor friendship which bound them so closely to the Moroccan at this time, 
but rather a deeply-held sense of honour.  
 
Despite the depredations he had visited upon the colony, some of the key inhabitants 
of Tangier felt morally-obliged to adhere to the terms of their treaty.  Hugh Cholmley 
acknowledged that the English ‘were bound up by the treaty, so that they could not 
forsake Gayland in honour’.8 Lancelot Addison believed that Norwood’s dogged 
adherence to the treaty was a means for him to affirm to the Moroccans a direction 
issued by the king for his ministers to observe all commitments made in his name, as 
well as ‘vindicate the honour of the English nation’ from accusations which had been 
                                                        
6 Ibid., ff. 99, 110r; E. M. G. Routh, Tangier: England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, 1661–1684  (London, 
1912), p. 92; Weiner, 'Anglo-Moroccan Relations', p. 72. 
7 Norwood to Arlington, Tangier, 3 July 1667, TNA, CO 279/8, f. 104v; A Short and Strange Relation of 
some part of the Life of Tafiletta the Great Conqueror and Emperor of Barbary by One that hath lately 
been in His Majesties Service in that Country  (London, 1669), p. 25; Weiner, 'Anglo-Moroccan 
Relations', p. 72. 
8 Cholmley, An Account of Tangier, p. 31. 
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made by Ghailan against the late Earl of Teviot about the reasons for the 
commencement of hostilities between them, a view to which he himself evidently 
ascribed.9  Even by the middle of 1667, when it became demonstrably clear that 
providing further support to Ghailan was pointless, Norwood remained resolutely 
committed to supporting him.10 Advising Arlington of his intentions, he explains: ‘I 
will take care to observe all points of honour on his majesty’s behalf as far as I can 
made a judgement, and will not leave him [Ghailan] till himself confesse the 
reasonableness thereof’.11 
 
As a result of this self-imposed moral constraint, the English could not establish 
relations with the ‘Alawīs if it meant abandoning Ghailan. But that did not prevent 
Norwood attempting to advance the possibility of a peace by seeking to ‘ingratiate’ 
himself with the sultan, and appealing to what he thought was their common interest 
in trade.12 The situation required deft diplomacy, and, according to Addison, 
Norwood enjoyed some success. Addison notes that the English were invited by al-
Rashīd to trade with Tétouan — that town by now under his control — and Norwood 
quickly responded positively to the offer.13 Around this time the lieutenant-governor 
was also consulted ‘in matters of moment’ by the governors of Tétouan and ‘other 
grandees of the country and chief ministers of the king [al-Rashīd]’.14 Addison asserts 
that Norwood was able to negotiate these relations such: 
that the continuance of his friendship [with Ghailan] could not be 
suspected by the one, nor want of disposition to contract a new one 
by the other. Tafilete [al-Rashīd] could not so much esteem him his 
enemy as Gaylan’s freind; and his fidelity to a distressed 
confederate removed all suspicion of being otherwise to a 
prosperous.15 
 
                                                        
9 Lancelot Addison, West Barbary, or, A Short Narrative of the Revolutions of the Kingdoms of Fez and 
Morocco with an Account of the Present Customs, Sacred, Civil, and Domestick  (Oxford, 1671), pp. 59–
60. 
10 Norwood to Arlington, Tangier, 13 June 1667, TNA, CO 279/8, f. 91r; Addison, West Barbary, p. 69; 
Weiner, 'Anglo-Moroccan Relations', p. 72. 
11 Norwood to Arlington, Tangier, 19/29 June 1667, TNA, CO 279/8, ff. 103v–104r. 
12 Norwood to Arlington, Tangier, 13 June 1667, ibid., f. 91r. 
13 Addison, West Barbary, p. 68. Another source refers to al-Rashīd attempting to entice the English 
with ‘great promises of rewards and priviledges’. See A Short and Strange Relation, p. 24. 
14 Addison, West Barbary, pp. 68–69 (my interpolation) 
15 Ibid., p. 69 (words italicised as in the original text, my interpolation). 
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However, if such exchanges did occur they can be seen as providing further evidence 
of the agency of the Moroccans and their adeptness in their dealings with Europeans, 
as much as it perhaps was a testament to Norwood’s own diplomatic skills. Through 
this contact the ‘Alawīs were undoubtedly learning about the English, and assessing 
their strengths, weaknesses, and interests. Moreover, despite Addison’s optimistic 
assessment, the actual amount of goodwill between the parties was evidently far 
less. In his report to Arlington of 13 June, Norwood requested that some frigates be 
sent as a demonstration of English naval power to encourage al-Rashīd to settle a 
peace or risk the disruption of trade.16 In a report less than a week later, he reveals, 
with obvious embarrassment, that while the garrison had been prepared for an 
imminent attack, a party of Moroccans had entered the lines and killed four workmen 
and wounded five others.17 
 
But Norwood appears to have possessed the requisite skills and experience to 
provide the type of leadership the colony required at this critical juncture. The son of 
a member of the English minor gentry, little is known of his early years. He fought for 
the Royalist cause during the Civil Wars, and in 1649 he travelled to Virginia, and was, 
for a time, the treasurer for the colony. In 1653 he was implicated in a Royalist plot 
and was imprisoned for several years. But his fortunes changed with the restoration 
of Charles II. He obviously enjoyed the new king’s favour, being admitted as an 
esquire of the body in 1660, and in early 1661 was commissioned as a lieutenant-
colonel in the then Lord Rutherford’s regiment in Dunkirk, where he also served as 
deputy-governor.18 
 
As well as having gained experience both in the military and colonial administration, 
by the time of his appointment as lieutenant-governor of Tangier in February 1666, 
Norwood was also no stranger to the town. He had arrived there with Rutherford in 
1663, although he did not stay long, leaving shortly after the earl’s death to return to 
                                                        
16 TNA, CO 279/8, f. 91r–v. 
17 Ibid., f. 103r. 
18 J. H. Trye, 'Colonel Henry Norwood of Leckhampton, Co. Gloucester', Transactions of the Bristol 
and Gloucestershire Archaeological Society, 47 (1925), pp. 113–117. 
238 
 
North America to participate in the expedition to take New Amsterdam. In late 1665 
he was charged with recruiting soldiers for Tangier, before returning to Morocco in 
late March the following year, only days before the signing of the treaty with 
Ghailan.19 While his principled treatment of Ghailan was lauded, views among his 
compatriots about his character and disposition were mixed.  Addison clearly 
admired him, as he had Teviot, and described him in similar terms: ‘that excellent 
person’, and one ‘whose honourable proceedings rendered him so esteemed among 
the Moors’.20 In contrast Hugh Cholmley thought little of him, and convinced Samuel 
Pepys that Tangier would be no better managed under Norwood than it had been 
under Belasyse, believing both men were only concerned with their own interests.21 
However, Cholmley’s professed opinion of Norwood may have been influenced by his 
own desire to obtain the governorship, and he sought to undermine Norwood for this 
reason.22 In any event, his low estimation was later compounded by the lieutenant-
governor’s critical appraisal of progress with the mole.23 Norwood’s relationship with 
the civic leaders of the town was also fractious, and Pepys’ views about his 
unsuitability for the post were reinforced by what he saw as the poor treatment he 
accorded them.24 These different perspectives of Norwood and insights provided by 
his correspondence convey the sense that he was a man of principle, who was prone 
to intolerance, possessed of an acerbic wit, and, despite his apparent diplomatic 
astuteness, one who could also be intractable in his dealings with others. 
 
Ghailan held on for a further year, but by the middle of 1668 it had become obvious 
that nothing was going to stop the ‘Alawīs, with Norwood acknowledging this fact in 
a letter in July in which, among other disturbing developments, he reported that 
Ghailan had fled Asilah.25 After having alienated the people in the hinterland of the 
                                                        
19 Ibid., p. 118. 
20 Addison, West Barbary, pp. 57, 66. 
21 Samuel Pepys, The Diary of Samuel Pepys: A New and Complete Transcription, eds. Robert Latham 
and William Matthews, 11 vols., vol. 7  (London, 1970–1983), p. 99, entry for 14 April 1666. 
22 Ibid.  
23 Ibid., 9, p. 455, entry for 22 February 1669; Bejjit, ‘Introduction’, pp. 24–25. 
24 Pepys, Diary of Samuel Pepys, 9, pp. 392, 430–431, entries for 14 December 1668 and 29 January 
1669. 
25 Norwood to Arlington, Tangier, 19 July 1668, TNA, CO 279/10, ff. 145–148. The folio numbering for 
this document is in reverse order, with f. 148 being the first folio of the letter. 
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town as a result of foraging raids,26 and recently learning that his remaining allies, the 
Dilā’īs, had been decisively defeated, Ghailan began to suspect the loyalty of those 
around him, and finally abandoned his stronghold with the help of Algerine corsairs. 
He subsequently sailed directly to Algiers, with Norwood pointedly noting he did so 
without even bidding ‘us farewell’.27 However, he did not have to wait long to find 
out what had transpired when the majority of Ghailan’s entourage of around 190 
men, women, and children was temporarily deposited in Tangier. The lieutenant-
governor graciously admitted them and ‘gave them houses to repose themselves 
much for their contentment’.28  
 
The inhabitants took a great interest in the new arrivals, particularly the women — if 
Norwood’s response is any indication. Usually restrained in his correspondence, apart 
from the odd quip, he reveals he was rather excited by what he observed. Describing 
them as ‘ladyes of orange and tawny complexion’ from ‘divers nations’, he notes that 
while many of them are ‘old and ill-favoured’, others were ‘young and tolerable’. He 
was especially taken by Ghailan’s sister, whom he thought to be ‘very fayre and 
lovely, and a co[u]sin as amiable as herselfe’. With propriety obviously eluding him 
under the circumstances, he remarks to the Secretary of State that Ghailan’s 
‘concubines possessing here are enough to people this place with a little help of our 
soldiers’.29 It was perhaps not an entirely flippant observation, given the difficulties 
which had been experienced in attracting settlers to the colony and the prevailing 
gender imbalance. Notably, while attentive to their skin colour, there is no indication 
he discriminated between them on that basis.30 While Norwood does not appear to 
have attempted to entice any of the women to remain, he did contentiously agree to 
the release of a Portuguese girl who had been captured and sold into slavery, and 
                                                        
26 Addison notes this in his own account of the episode in West Barbary, pp. 70–71. 
27 TNA, CO 279/10, ff. 147r–148v. 
28 Ibid., f. 147r. 
29 Ibid., f. 147v.  
30 While Norwood states that Ghailan’s sister was ‘fayre’, it is unclear whether he is referring to her 
skin colour or using the word with its more traditional meaning relating to beauty. Even if he was 
commenting on her complexion, it was not necessarily the factor that Norwood thought made her 
‘lovely’.  
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who wished to return to her parents, earning him the resentment of Ghailan, despite 
his previous unwavering support for the Moroccan leader.31 
 
With the defeat of Ghailan and the Dilā’īs the English had lost two important buffers 
against the ‘Alawīs. In his report to Arlington, Norwood again turned to the progress 
made by Mawlay al-Rashīd to emphasise the dire threat to which Tangier was now 
exposed: ‘Every day we get newes of Taffaletta’s successes, and every success a new 
instance of his mortall hatred of Christians’. Despite the promise hopefully gleaned 
from earlier contact, Norwood’s assessment was that there was now little prospect 
for a peace treaty ‘during his reigne who now will have no kind of division to limit his 
attempts uppon the Christian garrisons’ unless he was distracted by a ‘warre with the 
Algerines’.32 Norwood also understood that al-Rashīd was not only religiously zealous 
but also ‘very formidable, and the more because he is the first potentate of Barbary 
that for a 100 years past has kept an army in pay’.33 The irony of the present situation 
was possibly not lost on some of the inhabitants of Tangier; while al-Rashīd was 
expelling European Christians from towns he had conquered under the threat of 
‘payne of death’ if they did not depart,34 the English in Tangier were providing 
sanctuary to some three hundred Moroccans, many of whom had been the most 
high-ranking men of the region,35 and undoubtedly complicit in earlier hostilities 
against the colony.  
 
Enid Routh argued that 1668 was the year that the fate of English Tangier was 
decided. In Routh’s view, the conditions at the time were propitious for the English 
to advance further into Morocco and consolidate their colonial presence: England 
was at peace with the Dutch, relations with Spain were normalising, trade was 
expanding, a treaty with Ghailan had been signed, and the ‘Alawīs had yet to fully 
establish their authority in the north. In a counterfactual and anachronistic 
assessment informed by later British imperial ideology and practice, Routh asserts 
                                                        
31 Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, pp. 95–97. 
32 TNA, CO 279/10, ff. 146r–147v. 
33 Ibid., f. 146r. 
34 Ibid., f. 147v. 
35 Ibid., f. 146r. 
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that if the English had only committed greater military resources, Mawlay al-Rashīd 
might ‘have been induced to listen attentively to the proposals of an English 
Ambassador, for the Moorish Court was always ready to agree to just so much as the 
English were prepared to enforce’. Furthermore, the people ‘had a deep-rooted 
contempt for all foreigners, and a strong-belief in their own self-sufficiency’; 
consequently, ‘an effective demonstration of power was the only possible way of 
winning their respect’.36 She sees the crux of the problem as an aversion to risk, which 
arose from the disastrous events of 1664, with ‘Teviot’s daring policy’ giving way to 
‘one of inaction, almost of timidity’ under Belasyse.37  
 
Even on the basis of historical fact, Routh’s assessment is wrong-headed on several 
counts. First, it is likely that fiscal constraints and political concerns would have 
precluded the establishment of a larger garrison. Second, no Moroccan leader to that 
time had been forced to concede anything to the English simply on the basis of 
coercion; in fact, they had instead demonstrated canniness in extracting generous 
concessions from the English at little cost to themselves. Third, Routh failed to 
understand that the cause of the deep antipathy felt by many Moroccans towards 
European Christians had been the very colonial activities which she proposed. Fourth, 
Teviot was not promoting a program of colonial expansion. As argued in the 
preceding chapter, it had already been decided at the beginning of the occupation 
that pursuit of a territorial empire in North Africa was not practical, and that the 
future of Tangier lay in peaceful trade as part of an expanding maritime empire. The 
year 1668 would be a pivotal one for the colony, but not for the reasons given by 
Routh. It was the year that the ‘Alawīs affirmed their dominance in Morocco, 
introducing a new dynamic to Anglo-Moroccan relations, and it also ushered in 
substantial change in the administration of Tangier. 
 
 
 
                                                        
36 Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, pp. 113–114. 
37 Ibid., p. 114. 
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5.2. Time for some Housekeeping: Developing Tangier 
 
While the English policy of appeasement and emphasis on promotion of peaceful 
trade in Morocco had been well considered, plans for Tangier had suffered from 
conflict with Ghailan, war with the Dutch, tensions with Spain and France, and 
maladministration. Despite the potential benefits afforded by Tangier’s status as a 
free port, as a result of the ongoing attacks on the town and the interruption of trade 
and supplies, Britons remained reluctant to settle there, and, consequently, the 
economy of the town stagnated, and it continued to be a significant drain on the 
exchequer.38  Tangier had had its detractors ever since the announcement of the 
acquisition of the settlement, but as time went by, even its staunchest supporters 
began to become disillusioned. In 1663 Pepys had agreed that Tangier was ‘likely to 
be the most considerable place the King of England hath in the world’.39 Yet less than 
four years later, he and other members of the Tangier Committee began to voice 
concerns about the future of the colony amid claims of mismanagement, corruption, 
discord, and immorality. With a tangled web of personal rivalries and vested interests 
it is difficult to distil the truth of some of the claims made by Pepys, but it was agreed 
by the Committee that reform of the financing and administration of Tangier was 
necessary. It was during this period of introspection and recrimination that Lord 
Belasyse, who was still in England, appears to have been forced to resign his 
commission as governor.40  
 
                                                        
38 The financial pressures on Charles’ government had been exacerbated by the recent war with the 
Dutch, and the catastrophic plague and fire in London. On issues concerning the funding of Tangier at 
this time see ibid., pp. 115–116.   
39 Pepys, Diary of Samuel Pepys, 4, p. 319, entry for 28 September 1663. 
40On Pepys’ views about Tangier, and details of the concerns and deliberations of the Tangier 
Committee, around this time, see ibid., 7, p. 109, entry for 24 April 1666; ibid., 8, pp. 60–61, 160, 201, 
207, 210, 215, entries for 14 February, 10 April, 5 May, 9 May, 11 May, 14 May, 1667. On Pepys’ 
changing views about Tangier see also Margarette Lincoln, 'Samuel Pepys and Tangier, 1662–1684', 
Huntington Library Quarterly, 77 (2014), pp. 418–420. Other insights into Pepys’ treatment of matters 
pertaining to Tangier are provided by Adam R. Beach in 'Satirizing English Tangier in Samuel Pepy's 
Diary and Tangier Papers', in Goran V. Stanivukovic, ed., Remapping the Mediterranean World in Early 
Modern English Writings (New York, 2007), see esp. pp. 230–233. Beach overreaches in his 
characterisation of Pepys observations and opinions as being satirical in nature, but provides some 
interesting perspectives on the diarist’s views about Tangier and its administration, and on attitudes 
to colonial activity in English society in the seventeenth century. 
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While the principal reform proposed by the committee was the establishment of a 
civilian government, rather than the military authority under which the colony had 
been managed, Routh, not unreasonably, asserts that the singular objective of the 
committee was to identify means to put Tangier on a sustainable financial footing. A 
municipal authority, the commissioners believed, would facilitate better financial 
control and provide a legal framework much more conducive to trade and 
settlement, both of which would contribute to the financial viability of the colony.41 
In addition, the garrison would be reduced from two regiments with a nominal 
establishment of two thousand men and a troop of horse, to one regiment of sixteen 
hundred men and a reduction in the number of horse of more than half. These 
changes were given effect by order of the king in March 1668. 42 The decision to make 
such a substantial reduction to the strength and capability of the garrison appears to 
be short-sighted, given Ghailan’s tenuous position by this time, however, it had not 
been unilaterally imposed. In fact, the restructuring had been based on a plan 
prepared and presented to the Committee by Belasyse in October 1666, and 
Norwood had earlier that year also put forward his own plan involving even deeper 
cuts, which had been rejected.43 When these proposals were first considered they 
may have been appropriate in light of the recent peace signed with Ghailan, but over 
the ensuing year, while the measures were debated, the situation on the ground had 
changed significantly. The risks of the move were increased by likely delays in 
obtaining suitable reinforcements in response to illness, death, or an escalation in 
hostility, at least partly due to the poor reputation that Tangier had developed.44 
 
Tangier was incorporated as a free city in June 1668, and the associated reforms 
which were implemented around this time promised fundamental change to the 
                                                        
41 Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, pp. 114, 117. 
42 Ibid., pp. 116, 312–314. 
43 Ibid., pp. 311–313. 
44 On problems with recruitment, see ibid., pp. 314–317. The aversion that prospective recruits had 
toward service in Tangier is well evidenced in the following advice from Portugal concerning the 
forthcoming embarkation of soldiers for Tangier: 'And now that I mention the soldiers, I cannot but 
acquaint you with the greate feare their officers have, that many of them will turn away rather than 
goe unto Tanger, of which place there is a strange ill opinion among them bread by some who have 
formerly fledd from thence but I use the best meanes I can to have them undeceived in that matter’. 
See Sir Robert Southwell to Joseph Williamson, Lisbon, 20/30 July 1668, TNA, SP 89/9, ff. 87r–v. 
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nature of the colony, transforming it from what was little more than a military 
outpost to a cosmopolitan trading centre. Under its royal charter, voting and other 
legal rights were accorded to all ‘the inhabitants thereof as well our native borne 
subjects, also aliens and strangers being Christians’, Protestant or Catholic.45 
Tangier’s remaining Portuguese population, and the town’s situation and function, 
had always dictated the need for some level of religious toleration, but this 
acceptance did not extend to providing suffrage or other codified rights to either 
Muslims or Jews who also inhabited the city.46  
 
In August, the Earl of Sandwich arrived in Tangier to formally deliver the charter and 
oversee its enactment. But the earl’s visit was also intended to investigate wider 
concerns held by the Tangier Committee about the state of the colony and tensions 
which existed between the garrison and the civilian community, as well as assuage 
the concerns of the military which were anticipated as a result of the change in 
governance and the associated loss of long-standing perquisites.47 The earl’s work in 
Tangier was also preparing the way for another important change to the governance 
of Tangier. In May, John, Earl of Middleton had been commissioned to replace 
Belasyse as governor,48 but was not immediately dispatched to assume his new role. 
In light of concerns about the way in which previous governors had acquitted 
themselves, it had been resolved that a replacement would not be installed until 
someone had been ‘sent to put the garrison in order, so as that he that goes may go 
with limitations and rules to follow’.49 The Committee clearly intended to limit the 
discretionary authority of future governors, and exercise more control over the 
affairs of Tangier. Pepys had dismissed the plan of sending a commissioner in advance 
                                                        
45 ‘A Copy of the Charter Granted by His Ma[jes]ty to the city of Tanger’, 4 June 1668, Bodl., Rawl. MS 
A.341, f. 194r. On the changes to governance arising from the charter and their significance, see Routh, 
England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, pp. 117–120; Tristan Stein, 'Tangier in the Restoration Empire', The 
Historical Journal, 54 (2011), pp. 999–1000. Cholmley provides an interesting discussion on 
considerations given to the system of law which should apply to Tangier given its unique position as a 
personal possession of the king in the Mediterranean in An Account of Tangier, pp. 73–76. 
46 On religious toleration in Tangier, see William J. Bulman, Anglican Enlightenment: Orientalism, 
Religion and Politics in England and its Empire, 1648–1715  (Cambridge, 2015), pp. 210–219. 
47 Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, pp. 120–121; Bejjit, ‘Introduction’, pp. 27–28. 
48 'Charles II: May 1668', in CSPD: Charles II, Addenda 1660–1685, ed. F H Blackburne Daniell and 
Francis Bickley, BHO ed. (London, 1939), accessed 6 October 2017, entry for 15 May 1668. 
49 Pepys, Diary of Samuel Pepys, 8, p. 160, entry for 10 April 1667. 
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as a waste of time, and to the extent that Sandwich resolved the hostilities between 
the garrison and civilian authorities, he was vindicated.50 While a brief peace was 
achieved, the new arrangements created new points of tension which festered over 
the following year until a partial reconciliation between the parties was achieved by 
Middleton. But Tangier remained a deeply divided community.51 
 
While his subjects squabbled amongst themselves in Tangier, the king was seeking to 
establish peaceful relations with Salé. On 30 July 1668, Charles signed a letter 
addressed to ‘the most illustrious lords, the governors and commanders in chief of 
the castle citty and towne of Salley’. It is an intriguing document. In it, the king opens 
with the admission that ‘there be frequent vexations and hostilities committed 
reciprocally’ by the inhabitants of Salé and his own subjects, which has occurred ‘for 
want of that good understanding and correspondence’ that had formerly existed 
between their respective predecessors. Appealing to common interests, Charles 
proposed the negotiation of ‘an alliance and friendship as may be for the security and 
advantage of both parts’, delegating full authority for his envoy, Commander Richard 
Rooth, to conclude such an agreement.52 This initiative was a marked departure from 
past practice. While Charles I had implicitly acknowledged the culpability of his 
subjects in perpetuating a cycle of maritime hostility, he had refused to enter into a 
formal peace with the leaders of the town, due to advice that it was inappropriate to 
do so.53 But his son went further, not only offering the prospect of a formal treaty 
but doing so in an overtly conciliatory and unusually intimate manner, concluding the 
letter with ‘Your good friende’.54 
 
                                                        
50 Ibid., p. 207, entry for 9 May 1668. 
51 See Major Palmes Fairborne to Williamson, Tangier, 22 September 1668, TNA, CO 279/10, ff. 112–
113; Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, pp. 121–127. Cf. Cholmley, An Account of Tangier, pp. 76, 
78. 
52 Charles II to the governors and commanders of Salé, Whitehall, 30 July 1668, TNA, SP 71/13/Pt. 2, f. 
158. 
53 See chap. 3 of this thesis. 
54 TNA, SP 71/13/Pt. 2, f. 158. The mission may have been initiated in response to a proposal sent to 
the king five months earlier from a merchant by the name of Thomas Warren. See ‘A remonstration 
to the king by his late agent for South Barbary, Thomas Warren’, 25 February 1667/68, ibid., f. 157. On 
Warren and his interests, see below. 
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The royal charter for Tangier and the king’s letter to the governors of Salé reveal an 
ambivalence about Moroccans within the English government. On one hand there 
existed prejudicial attitudes, but on the other an overriding desire for peaceful 
relations, and recognition that this outcome could not necessarily be achieved 
through intimidation, but preferably through understanding and accommodation. In 
this respect, England’s general diplomatic position concerning Morocco appears to 
differ little from that which prevailed under Charles I, except to the extent that his 
son, quite possibly with an eye to his own interests in the country, demonstrated a 
greater desire to resolve hurdles to peaceful coexistence and trade in the region. 
Supporting this view is a draft of what appears to be a letter of introduction for Rooth 
from the king, dated the day before, which states: 
Whereas we have resolved and determined nothing more 
constantly, than that for the renowne of our kingdom, and the good 
of our subjects, we may every where not onely timmely keep the 
peace already established with our friends that are our neer 
neighbours as well as those that are farther off but allso, by what 
humble meanes we can, binde and renew again the peace which 
hath been interrupted and is ready to decay.55 
 
It reflects a sentiment which, once again, stands in marked contrast to the views of 
scholars who have argued that the second-half of the seventeenth century witnessed 
an increasingly aggressive diplomatic posturing by the English in Morocco and 
elsewhere in the Mediterranean.  However, previous diplomatic initiatives with the 
Salétins had achieved mixed results, and the king’s efforts to establish a new peace 
with the corsair enclave were perhaps further complicated by the fact it was now 
under the control of the ‘Alawīs. Rooth’s mission was obviously unsuccessful because 
he was subsequently given the responsibility by Admiral Thomas Allin of mounting a 
blockade of the port, which also achieved no tangible results in preventing further 
attacks on English vessels.56 It would be another eight years before the English were 
finally successful in negotiating a maritime treaty with Salé. 
 
                                                        
55 Letter of introduction from Charles II, 29 July 1668, Westminster, BL, Sloane MS 3509, f. 255. 
56 John Charnock, Biographica Navalis; Or, Impartial Memoirs of the Lives and Characters of the Officers 
of the Navy of Great Britain, 4 vols., vol. I (London, 1794), pp. 28–29; Corbett, England in the 
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In October 1669 the Earl of Middleton finally arrived to take up his new post. He was 
a controversial figure as a result of his actions during the Civil War and in the 
aftermath of the Restoration, but he continued to enjoy the support of the Duke of 
York.  Middleton was born into the Scottish gentry and had begun his career as a 
soldier of fortune in France. In 1639, he returned to Scotland to fight for the 
Covenanter cause. He subsequently joined the parliamentary army in which he 
distinguished himself. Perhaps disillusioned by a more radical political direction being 
adopted by his fellow officers, Middleton defected to the Royalists in 1649. For his 
services to the cause, Charles II made him an earl, and following the king’s restoration 
he was appointed to several important posts, including lord high commissioner to the 
Scottish parliament. However, his strong advocacy of pro-episcopalian and absolutist 
reforms led to discord with members of the court, and in 1663, the loss of his 
offices.57  
 
Views about Middleton among his contemporaries were mixed. His supporters spoke 
of a man who was courageous, modest, prudent, trustworthy, and noted for his 
sobriety and moderation.58 Unaware he ‘was the Great Major-Generall Middleton’, 
after meeting him for the first time, Pepys found the earl ‘a shrowd [shrewd] man, 
but a drinking man I think’. He thought him worldly, and well informed, yet 
diminished by partaking of excessive ‘drinking and other pleasures’.59 Similarly, 
Gilbert Burnet voices claims that Middleton’s time as lord high commissioner was 
characterised by ‘much excess’, and ‘madness of frolic and intemperance’. But his 
antagonism toward Presbyterians also attracted charges of imperiousness, and 
overseeing ‘a reign of much violence and injustice’.60 However, despite his propensity 
for intemperance, he proved to be a reasonably competent governor and 
commander, albeit during a period of relative peace for the colony. 
 
                                                        
57 Edward M. Furgol, 'Middleton, John, first earl of Middleton (c.1608–1674)', in David Cannadine, ed., 
ODNB, Online ed. (Oxford, 2004), accessed 10 October 2017. 
58 Ibid.  
59 Pepys, Diary of Samuel Pepys, 9, pp. 325–326, 328, entries for 12 October and 13 October 1668. 
60 Gilbert Burnet, Burnet’s History of My Own Time, new ed., ed. Osmund Airy, 2 vols., vol. 1 (Oxford, 
1897), p. 363. 
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Tangier’s new charter had reaffirmed that the clear intention of the king was to 
develop Tangier both as a free port, and an open city, and this position is reiterated 
and elaborated upon in instructions which had been issued to Middleton prior to his 
departure.  The instructions emphasized that the king had incorporated the city ‘as 
the most likely meanes to advance our free-port, diminishe our charge, and invite 
inhabitants and comerce thither: Which were the only ends aimed at by us in 
possessing that place, and making a mould there’. Furthermore, determined to 
reverse the flagging fortunes of his possession, the king expected the governor to 
‘discountenance all persons, or interests’ that seek to frustrate the achievement of 
these objectives.61  
 
5.3. A Reluctant Envoy: Extremes of Acculturation 
 
While references to relations with their Moroccan neighbours are notably absent in 
Middleton’s instructions, the issue had not been overlooked. Lord Henry Howard had 
preceded the governor to Tangier to undertake a special embassy to Mawlay al-
Rashīd. His arrival in August followed a series of skirmishes with the sultan’s forces 
within the defensive perimeter of the city in the preceding months, after a long hiatus 
in hostilities. The attacks had caused concern that a more concerted assault may 
follow.62 But Howard’s mission was not a direct result of this development. Planning 
for a mission to settle a peace with the Alawids had followed shortly after the 
proclamation, and was clearly part of a carefully considered and orchestrated 
strategy to deal decisively with the various problems which had plagued the colony.63 
The importance accorded the mission is evidenced by the status of the person chosen 
to lead it — Howard being the most high-ranking envoy that had been sent to 
Morocco by an English monarch — as well as the attention given to preparations: 
with Norwood liaising with the ‘Alawīs from as early as February concerning the 
                                                        
61 ‘Additional Instructions which may bee given to the Earle of Middleton’, [August? 1669], TNA, CO 
279/12, f. 93r–v. 
62 Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, pp. 98–99; Bejjit, ‘Introduction’, p. 28. Signs of possible 
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impending embassy,64 and Howard taking personal charge of the acquisition of gifts 
worth four thousand pounds.65 This episode in Anglo-Moroccan relations highlights 
not only how Britons could be seriously challenged by inter-cultural encounters, but 
also points to systemic problems in later-Stuart diplomatic practice which militated 
against effective outcomes. 
 
One of the original objectives of the English was for the colony to act as a focal point 
for their trade with Morocco, an outcome which had been frustrated by both the 
political dislocation within the country, and Moroccan hostility towards the English 
occupation. Given the need to invigorate Tangier’s economy, and with al-Rashīd’s 
regime in the ascendancy, the embassy was a critical initiative to secure the future of 
English Tangier.  In a letter to the sultan to be delivered by the ambassador, Charles 
clearly outlines what he was seeking: 
Wee pray you to admitt and heare him [Howard] favourably in all 
things, and particularly in what he shall on our part propose to you 
for the settleing a firme and lasting peace and amity between our 
persons and subjects, in such a true trade and commerce with the 
Coast of Barbary…as hath been practised in times past … As also, if 
it shall be found fit, with our Citty of Tangier, which … we desire 
may entertaine a free entercourse and correspondence with the 
neighbouring parts of your dominions.66 
 
In addition, he sought the release of any of his subjects held in Morocco, in exchange 
for any Moroccans held in his own dominions. 
 
Howard was a surprising choice for such an important mission, given that he 
possessed no diplomatic experience. His only qualification appears to have been his 
family connections, and the status which they conferred on him for the purposes of 
representing the king. Shortly prior to his departure he was created Baron Howard, 
                                                        
64 Norwood to Arlington, Tangier, 10 March 1668/69, TNA, CO 279/12, f. 241; ibid., f. 250r. 
65 CSPD: Charles II, October 1668–December 1669, ed. Mary Anne Everett Green, 28 vols., vol. 9 
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but more importantly he was next in line to succeed to the dukedom of Norfolk,67 an 
association highlighted in the king’s earlier letter of introduction, and by Howard 
himself in his initial correspondence with al-Rashīd.68 The mission turned out to be 
an abject failure, at least partly due to Howard’s unsuitability for the role. While 
professing impatience ‘for the spedier progress of his majesyes commands’ before 
his departure,69 he made no concerted personal effort to do so once he was safely 
ensconced in Tangier. It soon became apparent that Howard’s desire to quickly 
complete his mission was more to do with his discomfort with being in Morocco, and 
he began to sow the seeds to explain his hesitancy in leaving Tangier.70 In early 
September he again wrote to Arlington to apprise him of reports of instability in the 
country, and his fear that al-Rashīd’s hold on power was tenuous, the people 
despising him because of ‘his extraordinary bloody severity and sudden crueltys’.71 
 
The ambassador would not leave until his safety was assured.  In the meantime, he 
sent two members of his party, his secretary, Thomas Warren, and a Mr Burghill, to 
make arrangements ‘for my reception’ at the sultan’s court ‘in such style of honour 
to both crownes’, and to ensure his personal security ‘whether by hostage or 
otherwise’.72 However, despite receiving assurances in September and November 
that al-Rashīd had given permission for him to proceed, and being provided with 
documents for safe passage, Howard continued to stall, citing a variety of problems.73 
Among the reports he provided to London during this time, in which, among other 
things, he attempted to explain the factors which had delayed him, was an account 
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in which he described at length the perilous conditions which prevailed in the 
country, and emphasised the danger to which he would be exposed in ‘venturing in 
amongst these barbarians’.74 Contrary to his continued reassurances of imminent 
success and feigned bravado, his increasingly voluminous reports to London reveal 
both a growing paranoia and an awareness of the likely (self-fulfilling) failure of his 
mission. 
 
Howard expressed strongly prejudicial views about Moroccans even though he 
appears to have had little direct contact with them. His one recorded encounter in 
Tangier was quite positive and should have given him cause to reassess his jaundiced 
attitudes.75 However, the experience ultimately appears to have little effect on his 
views. Not only were they barbarians, according to Howard, but he frequently 
represents them as deceitful, duplicitous and mercurial. He justified his caution by 
asserting that it was commonly accepted that ‘all these Moores are … a subtle kynde 
of faithlesse rogues’,76 that they were a ‘capritious people’,77 ‘veary fikle’,78 and ‘of a 
jelous and changeable disposition’.79 Accordingly, he condescendingly concludes that 
they were a people ‘that must be veary carefully and tenderly handled’, and who 
lacked ‘our old inglish innate honesty’.80 But he also makes a frank admission that 
reveals his state of mind, an acknowledgement that he was experiencing difficulty in 
adjusting to being in an unfamiliar environment. Less than two months after his 
arrival he admits he is ‘beginning to be a little weary of my long stay here in this 
excessive changeable place’.81 It was more than a delay in settling in though. 
Throughout his stay in Morocco, Howard demonstrates an incapacity to positively 
embrace the experience and view what he found there other than through the 
delimiting filter of his own preconceptions and fears. 
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He reasonably suggested that the sultan’s invitation to treat was nothing but a 
‘wheedle’, but also continued to insinuate that it may be a more serious conspiracy, 
‘a darke designe to entrap me’.82 While his pronounced fears and negative 
representations of Moroccans were undoubtedly grounded in pre-existing 
prejudices, which were reinforced by his growing anxiety about residing in an alien 
land beset by real and imagined dangers, their inclusion in his reports must also be 
recognised as part of a shrewdly deliberate act, to emphasise the imminent danger 
he faced of being held hostage or meeting with other misfortune should he proceed 
to Fez, and providing him with further plausible excuses for delay and possible failure. 
Yet despite the general paranoia and xenophobia manifested by their leader, there 
were at least some men in Howard’s entourage (which numbered around seventy) 
who reveal no such extreme disposition and demonstrated a marked capacity for 
positive acculturation.  Among the delegation were Howard’s two principal men, 
Burghill and Warren, who appear to have acquitted themselves well in their work on 
his behalf despite having had to defend the embassy in the face of Moroccan 
suspicion and frustration arising from Howard’s demands and prevarication. 
 
Warren was no stranger to Morocco. He had extensive trading interests in Santa Cruz 
and Salé, and, as discussed in the preceding chapter, he had led a mission in 1665–
66 to negotiate several treaties. It was undoubtedly for these reasons that he had 
been asked to join the embassy, but he had his own motivation for wanting to 
participate. His deal with Abdul-Karin al-Shabbani in Marrakesh for the supply of 
gunpowder had not been fulfilled due to a delay in the delivery and the death of al-
Shabbani, and the merchant was now seeking to negotiate a sale with al-Rashīd. The 
problem, Warren alleged, was that he was unsure of the fate of the original 
consignment. Cleverly, he used the situation to his advantage by arguing that if the 
government advanced to him twenty-five tons of gunpowder he would carry it to 
Morocco to prevent the issue of the missing gunpowder compromising the embassy, 
as well as holding out the prospect of effecting the release of captured Britons.83  
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It was an attractive opportunity for Warren; by tying his business transaction into the 
treaty negotiations he could overcome any misgivings the government may have had 
about the supply of gunpowder to a party that was already a recognised threat to 
Tangier. The government’s acquiescence in Warren’s suggestion, and the 
questionable value to England of his earlier mission, testify to the way in which 
commercial self-interest and corruption could compromise broader national 
interests during the later Stuart period. Howard, though, complicated the situation 
further by preventing Warren from negotiating separately with the sultan, insisting 
that the matter be incorporated into the business of the embassy and seeking to use 
it as leverage until he was more certain of al-Rashīd’s disposition.84 The problem was 
that the gunpowder had already been offered to the sultan, with just the terms of 
the sale to be finalised. 
 
Little is known about Burghill other than that Howard had long been acquainted with 
him, and admired his ‘discretion and ingenuity’.85  It was Burghill who was given the 
lead role of liaising with the sultan’s court, requiring him to traverse what he 
described as ‘a damned contrey to travayle in’.86 While he found his first journey 
challenging, he was obviously satisfied with the hospitality accorded his party upon 
their arrival, and the reception given to him by the sultan, although he reveals little 
of his thoughts about the experience. He does reflect on how reliant al-Rashīd and 
his counsellors were on the advice of the governors of Salé concerning diplomatic 
protocol, but passes no judgement on their evident awkwardness, although he did 
note with a hint of amusement the sultan’s pleasure at being ‘treated as the Grand 
Signior’.87 Burghill was left to placate the sultan over the delay in the embassy, while 
Howard continued to prevaricate and his paranoia grew.88 
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Routh is scathing of Howard’s conduct, but her assessment is perhaps overly critical, 
overlooking or underestimating some of the difficulties he faced. Burghill reveals the 
challenges of travel in the country, and of the logistical problems in transporting the 
ambassador in comfort and style.89 Major Palmes Fairborne of the Tangier garrison 
also presents a very different perspective, both of Howard personally and as an 
ambassador. Writing to Joseph Williamson in January 1670, Fairborne notes that 
Howard is well liked by both the military and civilian communities of Tangier, and ‘his 
behaviour all along in this embassy hath been very prudent and cautious’. He goes on 
to explain that Howard’s mission had ‘mett with severall delays and difficulties’, but 
he did not doubt that it would be successful. 90 He also reported that it had been al-
Rashīd himself who had not allowed the embassy to proceed during a recent uprising, 
as he could not guarantee the ambassador’s safety. Fairborne also expresses support 
for Howard’s decision to send Warren to seek the sultan’s agreement to proceed, by 
the appointment of commissioners or for the sultan himself to come to Tangier.91 
Furthermore, Howard was not alone in harbouring concerns about leaving Tangier; 
even John Luke who had been in the colony for seven years later reflected on his good 
luck at having avoided the need to accompany Howard to Fez.92 
 
Despite Fairborne’s positive assessment, Howard had clearly made up his mind; he 
wished to return home and had no intention of travelling to Fez under any 
circumstance. In April he dismissed a report from Burghill that conditions were 
favourable to conclude the negotiations. In response, in a report to Arlington, he 
claimed that the Moroccans had from the start no other agenda than to take him 
captive, and launched into a tirade against the sultan and his courtiers. His 
desperation was such that he even undermined Burghill, to support his case for the 
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cessation of the embassy.  According to Howard, the Moroccans were irrational 
‘brutes’, there was no certainty that al-Rashīd would prevail, and the sultan was a 
crazed, drunken tyrant. He argued that Burghill was motivated by self-interest, was 
misinformed, and had been corrupted from his time at the court. Howard alleged 
that Burghill slept little, drank and smoked excessively, and talked incessantly — 
‘feares and disorders had partly crackt his braynes’.93 Howard had given up all 
pretence of stoicism by this time, he simply wanted to convince the king in no 
uncertain terms that it was futile to seek a peace with the Moroccans. In doing so, 
Howard went further than questioning their moral integrity, he also highlighted their 
ethnic and religious differences; they were not simply rogues and barbarians, but 
‘tawny rogues’, and al-Rashīd was a ‘mighty Mohemetan foe’.94  
 
Finally, in May 1670, after having been forced to agree to supply the gunpowder to 
secure the release of his men who were being held hostage, and still waiting for a 
response from the sultan concerning his proposal to appoint commissioners, Howard 
received, with palpable relief, permission to return home.95 In July, eleven months 
after arriving, he left Morocco,96 having achieved nothing more than providing al-
Rashīd with a large supply of gunpowder, and, undoubtedly, tarnishing the sultan’s 
perceptions of the English. However, blame for the failure of the embassy should not 
be accorded to Howard’s conduct. Howard did not live up to Routh’s standards for 
Englishmen, but ultimately, as observed by Routh herself, the sultan does not appear 
to have been genuinely disposed to treat with the English; at the very least he was 
indifferent, more concerned with acquiring Warren’s gunpowder and suppressing 
revolt, than settling a peace.97 More critically though, as discussed in the following 
chapter, the antipathy of the ‘Alawīs to European colonisation made any peace with 
the English, on terms that would have been acceptable to them, impossible. 
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What makes Howard an interesting character for this study is not that he succeeded 
or failed, but, rather, the impact that his experiences in Morocco had on him. His 
quick transition from reluctant, but confident, diplomatic envoy to a seemingly 
delusional xenophobe testifies to the way in which people, other than captives, could 
become disoriented and negatively affected through immersion in an unfamiliar 
location and culture. Howard had enjoyed a privileged upbringing and a sheltered 
life. He commenced his embassy with the expectation that his rank and role would 
accord him respect and influence, and that he would be able to quickly conclude 
negotiations and return home.98 But he found the realities of Morocco a shock. Not 
only was travel in the country difficult, but his status as an English noble and royal 
representative did not guarantee deference. With this realisation came anxiety. 
Rather than seeking to understand the people he was charged to negotiate with, and 
allowing his preconceptions to be challenged, he instead turned to them to help 
rationalise to himself, and others, why he should not travel, and could not succeed. 
Over time, general anxiety and deliberate obfuscation developed into paranoia and 
delusion, and rejection of any information or experience which conflicted with his 
self-confirmed beliefs.  
 
And Howard was not the only high-born English envoy around this time to have failed 
to acquit his duties in North Africa due to fear, ignorance, and arrogance. In 1660, 
Lord Winchelsea, the recently appointed ambassador to the Sublime Porte, had been 
charged with negotiating a treaty with Algiers. Like Howard he lacked knowledge of 
the place, was culturally intolerant, refused to leave his ship, resented having to 
remain there, and finally departed without having concluded his work, leaving the 
task to a subordinate. 99 The significance of the problems which could arise from the 
use of aristocrats such as Howard and Winchelsea to conduct culturally-sensitive 
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257 
 
missions was not lost on one contemporary. Musing on the need for greater 
understanding of Morocco and its people, and the possibility of obtaining a treaty, 
the author of The Present Interest of Tangier insisted that anyone sent on such a 
mission ‘must not be a noble-man; for they care not to see any greater state amongst 
them than they observe’. Rather, they should be ‘ingenious’ and familiar with the 
local language, but also a clergyman, for the princes of Morocco ‘have a great respect’ 
for them.100 
Aside from Warren and Burghill, there were other gentlemen in Howard’s party who 
also demonstrated more courage and commitment. Among them was a man known 
only by the initials ‘S.L.’, who in November 1669, while residing in Fez, wrote a letter 
to a friend about his experiences; the letter was published the following year. In it, 
S.L. notes that he is writing in response to the addressee’s ‘earnest request’ for 
information and assures him that he has provided ‘a full account of the estate of this 
country, as much as I have received from very good hands’. He also highlights that 
much of the information currently available about the country is ‘mixed with fables 
and tales’, or else no longer current. 101 Despite his professions, S.L. reveals that when 
he departed for Tangier he possessed certain preconceptions, and he was not 
immune to the influence of hearsay, but he does demonstrate objectivity in many of 
his own observations.  
 
He begins by recounting tales of Muslim Moroccan cruelty, perfidy, and persecution 
of both Christians and Jews, to stress the dangers of travelling in the country, yet 
admits, ‘I have seen some French merchants riding abroad without fear, and return 
safely’, adding that the people recognise the value of relations with other nations, 
understanding them to be ‘very necessary for their more convenient subsistance’.102 
His ability to reflect upon his experiences in a way that did not reinforce his prejudice 
is also evident when he recalls his alarm when first entering the camp of their 
Moroccan escort to observe aggressive posturing among the troops. At first thinking 
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that they intended to attack the party, he learned that it was due to a disagreement 
between the men about a tenet of Islam. In response to this episode he wrote:  
So general is that madness amongst men, not to allow what nature 
cannot refuse a freedom of judgement…I’l warrant you if those two 
nasty Moors had but had a little more breeding, and a little more 
authority, they would have been content to have made a schism 
about trifles and endangered mens lives in the maintainance of 
their mistakes.103 
 
The incident obviously had a powerful effect on S.L., but not as evidence of Moroccan 
bellicosity. His observation was, in fact, a pointed critique of his own society, of the 
corrupting influence of power and hubris: ‘This particular I could not forget, because 
it relates to our own condition at home’.104 
 
Within the comfort and familiarity afforded by Tangier, S.L.’s first impressions of the 
country were highly favourable, as was generally the case with newly arrived Britons. 
He judged it to be ‘a most pleasant seat as in the world’, the air was ‘pure and 
refined’, the land was ‘good and fruitful’, and ‘the climate very moderate’.105 
However, while treated with civility by his Moroccan hosts, S.L. clearly found his first 
day and night outside the city unsettling. He considered the food to be unpalatable, 
and the ‘pitiful tent’ shared with the ‘stinking Moors’ no less objectionable. It rained 
that night, he was beset by mosquitoes, and wished he was with his friend back in 
the ‘Kings-Head’ in London. He was also perturbed that the Moroccans conducted 
themselves with the same arrogance as the Spanish.106 Either conditions or S.L.’s 
disposition improved for the remainder of the journey, for he makes no further 
complaints. His only reproach was due to the party having been accorded less ‘pomp’ 
on their arrival at Asilah than he obviously expected.107 The lack of recognition and 
deference shown to the English clearly troubled him. Much more to his liking was the 
greeting they received in ‘Alcazar’ (Ksar el-Kebir) where ‘many persons of quality 
flock’d together to bid us welcome’, affirming his belief that not only did the 
                                                        
103 Ibid., p. 14. 
104 Ibid.  
105 Ibid., p. 11. 
106 Ibid., pp. 14–15. 
107 Ibid., p. 16. 
259 
 
Moroccans wish to establish good relations, but also that the English were favoured 
above all other nations for their behaviour and Protestant faith.108 It was a conviction 
that had also been strongly held by John Harrison some four decades earlier. 
Cholmley too liked to think that the Moroccans were more favourably disposed to 
the English, but rather than religious affinity, he believed it was because of 
recognition of the long history of diplomatic and commercial relations between the 
two countries.109 
 
Also, like Harrison, S.L. reserved his harshest criticisms not for the Moroccan people 
in general, but rather their leaders, whom he thought mistreated them, and none 
more so than Mawlay al-Rashīd. Based on stories he had been told, S.L. painted an 
image of al-Rashīd as being duplicitous, avaricious, and merciless. But unlike some 
other commentators, who characterised the people as disloyal and rebellious by 
nature, S.L. stresses their ‘great respect and submission to their princes [al-Rashīd’s] 
judgement and actions’.110 Not only could they give unquestioning commitment to 
their leaders, but they were also uncritical of their religion. Without recognising the 
culpability of his own society, and inspired by Christian self-righteousness, S.L. 
explained that their prejudice against Christians was nurtured in them from birth, 
giving them ‘an inveterate hatred of the truth, and its professours, unto which their 
reason might otherwise incline them’.111 Nevertheless, he began to admire their 
religious devotion and praised the system he blamed for perpetuating ‘the Divels 
policy’ of keeping the people in ignorance. He observed with approval that they ‘have 
that good instinct to set apart a place for the worship of God’.112 Furthermore, their 
system of education and religious instruction:  
is the cause that every one is so devout, and that prophaness finds 
such little entertainment amongst them. It were to be wisht that 
our English clergy would practice the same custom … We might 
then hope that the next generation of men would be … more 
devoted to the service of God, and their Prince.113 
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Like many of his compatriots, S.L. considered Moroccan Arabs and Berbers to be a 
‘lazy’ people,114 but genuinely committed to their religion. The example the people 
and their religious leaders set in this regard caused him to reflect once again on his 
own society. Through his own observations, S.L. came to believe that Muslims 
provided a benchmark for education and religious devotion to which the English 
clergy should aspire, as a means to both dispel widespread ignorance and raise the 
standing of the Church. 
 
But conversely, S.L.’s account also reveals the critical importance of the means by 
which cultural encounter and understanding is mediated. In Ksar el-Kebir the Britons 
were visited by a ‘famous negromancer [necromancer]’, who wished to show his 
respect by entertaining them with ‘dance and music’. However, according to S.L., 
shortly after the man began he was joined by an ‘ill shap’d rogue as black as the Devil, 
followed by a furious goat and dog’, who all began to dance. He had enjoyed the 
performance until informed that the three ‘shapes were not real, but that they were 
devils or evil spirits’. S.L. goes on to explain that the revelation disturbed him and his 
colleagues, and once their discomfort became evident ‘these appearances vanish’d’, 
leaving behind them a ‘horrible stench’ to ‘punish our contempt’.115 The incident 
unsettled them and made them ‘fall to our prayers’ and strengthened their Christian 
devotion.116 Given the occultist overtones of the performance and contemporary 
concerns about witchcraft, their apprehension is understandable, but what S.L. 
observed was a performance by a Sufi mystic demonstrating his power to pacify and 
exorcise spirits (jinn). However, the religious nuances of the ritual were lost on the 
Britons because of the lack of anyone who could properly explain its meaning to 
them.   
 
It has been claimed that S.L.’s aim in preparing the account was to ‘redirect the 
imperial gaze to the wealth of the region’ and provide Britons with assurance that 
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the land could be conquered and exploited.117 However, such an interpretation 
reflects a misreading of the content of the letter.118  The author makes it clear that 
he simply wrote to satisfy his friend’s previously expressed curiosity about Morocco, 
and, accordingly, as was becoming increasingly commonplace, sought to provide him 
with more than just an account of the places he visited and his experiences; he also 
wished to provide him with ethnographic insight. He understandably devotes much 
attention to the political instability which had plagued Morocco, and the detrimental 
impact that this has had on the people and the land, but incorporates this into an 
extended discussion of the ethnic divisions in the country between Arabs and 
Berbers, and Moroccan customs and beliefs.119 While in places he wrote disparagingly 
of the people, and lamented their inability to exploit the resources available to them, 
it is evident that he was also trying to understand them, and was able on occasions 
to see beyond the bias of his preconceptions. S.L. finished his journey obviously more 
comfortable and enlightened than when he began. He was able to appreciate the 
hospitality of itinerant Arabs, with carpets for seats and the ground as a table, before 
arriving at Fez where he marvelled at the ‘abundance of rare things’ he discovered 
there.120 The account is interesting, and rare, because in its detail and strict 
chronological sequence, and through its ambivalence, it provides insight into the 
ways in which an Englishman began to experience the effects of positive 
acculturation, reinforcing the influence that intercultural engagement could have on 
reframing preconceptions. 
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5.4. Profound Learnings: Morocco as a Conceptual Model 
 
The author of The Present Interest of Tangier could very well have been thinking of 
Lancelot Addison when he described the type of person who should be sent among 
the Moroccans to negotiate a peace. As well as being a clergyman, he was intelligent, 
relatively knowledgeable about their religion and culture, and had some familiarity 
with their language. Given these attributes, it is, therefore, perhaps surprising that 
Addison appears to have played no role in Howard’s embassy. In any event, his 
potential diplomatic utility was lost to the colony when he returned to England early 
in 1670, after seven years in Morocco. A rectorship in Wiltshire provided him with 
the means to pursue his scholarly interests, including a number of projects that would 
draw on his experiences in Morocco and the information he had collected there.121 
The first of these was West Barbary, published the year after his return, in which he 
examined the political history and natural resources of Morocco, and discussed the 
country’s people, and their customs and beliefs. In writing the text he combined what 
he found of relevance in existing sources, including Leo Africanus’ A Description of 
Africa, with his own observations and interpretations, and information he had 
gleaned from Moroccans themselves.122 Addison’s aim in writing West Barbary was 
not only to entertain his readers, but also to edify them; he sought to demonstrate 
that even a people judged to be ‘barbarous, rude, and savage’ recognised that 
attention to religious devotion and the principles of justice were necessary ‘to 
suppress vice and encourage virtue’, so as to ensure social harmony.123 It is notable 
within the corpus of early modern English writing about North Africa both for the 
original detail it provides and its relative cultural sensitivity. While the work served 
an evidently ideological purpose, it also reveals a man who sought to gain an 
understanding of another people, and in the process developed a genuine affinity for 
them. The text provides one of the most vivid demonstrations of the possible effects 
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of intensive and prolonged cultural immersion on Britons residing in the region during 
this period.  
 
In keeping with his didactic purpose, Addison’s exposition of the political and social 
upheaval in the country since the early sixteenth century is more than a simple 
history. In a not entirely inaccurate account, he attributes Morocco’s problems to the 
founder of the Sa‘dian dynasty, a man possessing ‘high pretensions to piety and 
fervent zeal for their law’, which he manifested in his rigidity of opinion and 
sanctimonious behaviour.124 By claiming to be a descendant of the Prophet, he 
increased his popularity and the approbation of the people fostered in him the 
ambition to be ruler of Morocco. The people were receptive because they were tired 
of being oppressed by their rulers and foreign powers. Taking advantage of the 
prevailing civil discontent, the Sa‘dis began to insinuate themselves into positions of 
influence until they were able to overthrow the Wattasids.125 It was then that they 
revealed themselves to be hypocrites, who ‘took up armes, not out of love to their 
country and zeale for their religion, but out of a desire to rule’.126 According to 
Addison, the way in which the Sa‘dis first usurped power set an example for their 
descendants which led to the subsequent prolonged period of internecine conflict.127 
Notably, Addison also did not attribute the political instability to a general 
belligerence or rebelliousness possessed by the people. Rather, like Harrison and S.L., 
he saw them as victims of self-serving men who used religion as a means to realise 
their personal ambitions.128 What they were guilty of though, claimed Addison, was 
a lack of moral fortitude, given that they possessed a ‘genius’ for assessing the 
fairness of an act in accordance with its personal value, and using religious precepts 
to validate the decision.129 But it is an assessment which is discordant with evidence 
he presents elsewhere of their piety and adherence to principles of justice. 
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Addison begins the second part of the text with a relatively concise description of the 
geography, natural resources, farming practices, and economy of Morocco. The 
inclusion of this information was not incidental, but rather consistent with his belief 
that a proper understanding of the political history of the country could only be 
achieved by synthesising information derived from a variety of fields. The information 
was not particularly significant in itself, but he used it to support his arguments 
regarding more important issues.130 He agreed with Africanus that much of the land 
was unattractive, but that this was ‘recompensed in the fertility’.131 However, he 
refuted reports concerning the abundance of gold and livestock in the country, and 
in doing so highlighted the value of his own empirical approach.132 Another issue 
which these two chapters appear to have been intended to illuminate was the 
people’s poor husbandry of the land, and the reasons for this; according to Addison, 
they did not exploit the riches available to them because they suffered from 
‘ignorance, idleness, or fear’.133  
 
It is in the remaining chapters of the book, concerning the Muslim peoples of 
Morocco and their culture, where Addison clearly struggles most with aligning his 
observations and other learnings with his ideological intent, and where his 
ambivalence is most marked.  He recognised the ethnological differences between 
Berbers and Arabs, and possessed a more favourable opinion of the Berbers than the 
itinerant, and not ‘so civilised’ Arabs,134 but judged, perhaps to simplify his task, that 
they possessed the same ‘general character of body and humour’.135 He could not 
fault the physical character of the men, and admired their martial skills, but noted 
their propensity for extremes of activity. He also found the women generally 
handsome, yet also modest and proper.136 Like S.L., he thought Moroccans possessed 
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a serious demeanour. He accused them of being overly suspicious of strangers, but 
found they were not lacking in civility.137  
 
But what particularly struck Addison, as it had S.L. and countless other Christians who 
had observed it across Islamdom since the Middle Ages, was their commitment to 
their religion. He was clearly impressed by their piety, could not fault their religious 
practices, and commented favourably on their benevolence to their places of 
worship, and the respect they accorded their religious leaders, although he was 
suspicious of their maraboutic traditions.138 He also evidently approved of their 
system of justice, and was aware that Moroccan civil law was inextricably linked to 
the tenets of Islam.139 Addison admired much about Islam and the social benefits he 
believed derived from it, but he was not seeking to legitimise the religion. Not 
surprisingly, he maintained that Muhammed was an imposter,140 although he could 
find little from the Prophet’s teachings which he could criticise. He clearly 
disapproved of polygamy and concubinage, and essentially attributed what he 
believed was the Moroccans’ disposition toward jealousy and vengefulness to their 
religious beliefs.141 
 
In remarking upon the general ignorance of Moroccans, Addison was not implying 
that it was due to some innate failure in their character. He acknowledges their 
former renown as a ‘race of literati’,142 and observes that there are numerous schools 
throughout the country which provided a rudimentary education.143 He notes, 
though, that they no longer have centres of higher learning, and suggests this ‘may 
be a main reason of their growing stupidity and barbarism’.144 However, his view on 
the cause and desirability of this situation is ambiguous. On the one hand, he argues 
that the people are too busy eking out a living to study the arts and sciences, and that 
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without such learning any civilised people ‘will soon degenerate into ignorance and 
rusticity’.145 On the other hand, he provides a seemingly alternative explanation that 
he alleges was proffered by his Moroccan interlocutors: since the beginning of the 
revolutions the people had rejected ‘bookish inclinations’ for more practical pursuits 
in the interests of avoiding the nurturing of sedition, and promoting civil peace.146 
However, to resolve this and other apparent contradictions in West Barbary, and 
better appreciate his attitude towards Moroccans, it is necessary to consider what 
Addison was attempting to achieve through the text.  
 
It has been claimed that West Barbary provides further evidence of English imperial 
ambition concerning North Africa,147 but, once again, this appears to be a misreading 
of the document: aside from being contrary to Addison’s stated purpose, nowhere 
does he encourage the conquest of the country and subjugation of its people. 
Admittedly though, West Barbary and Addison’s other published works are nuanced, 
and, as William J. Bulman states, it is necessary to read them in different registers to 
reveal his ‘scholarly practices, foundational ideas, pastoral and political agendas, and 
public interventions’.148 While I do not fully subscribe to all of Bulman’s conclusions, 
he does provide many useful insights concerning Addison’s works. He confirms that 
while Addison sought to provide a more up to date cosmographical and historical 
account of Morocco, he also imposed ideological slants in his portrayal of people and 
events aligned to his own political and religious agenda.149 His writing was informed 
by belief not simply in the value of studying the past, but the history of all peoples, 
to elucidate historical truth, and he did so to help address the anxieties arising from 
the religious and political tensions of the period.150 In this respect, his account of the 
civil discord in Morocco was intended to be read as an allegory for the English Civil 
Wars, warning of the dangers of puritanism,151 and his observations of Muslim and 
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Jewish piety were intended to promote reflection on the standard of contemporary 
Protestant religious commitment.152 What he observed and learned about the recent 
history of political turmoil and conflict in Morocco seemingly also reinforced in him 
concerns which he had developed during the course of the English Civil Wars, about 
the potentially dangerous relationship between literature and social disorder.153 But 
Addison was not necessarily endorsing Saavedra Fajardo’s paraphrased assertion that 
‘all knowledge was superfluous’ beyond that required to meet the needs of the 
state.154 He clearly believed in the value of higher learning, attributing many of the 
problems in Morocco to its absence. Rather, what he appears to be offering is a 
warning about the risks of scholarly excess.155  
 
Whereas earlier commentators, such as John Harrison, had viewed the civil wars in 
Morocco in providential terms, Addison applied his learnings in Morocco to consider 
the general preconditions for social civility, those universal factors that would 
promote peace and order in any society. In Addison’s political schema, social 
harmony was the product of ‘the interplay of prudence and education’. Asserting that 
the disposition of a nation could be influenced by what the people were taught 
allowed him to marginalise the importance of unique cultural traits and universalise 
the applicability of reasonable and useful customs he identified in Morocco.156 But 
critically, his case for universal learning from Morocco was premised on acceptance 
of the essential equivalency of Moroccan and European societies. Addison dismissed 
the traditional prejudicial distinction made between barbarism and civilisation, 
stating that ‘[i]t was one of the pedantic vanities of the Grecians’, and noting that 
some people continue to hold such an opinion about things that diverge ‘from the 
manners and customs of their own country’. Instead, he appealed to the reader to 
keep an open mind: ‘Yet those who acknowledge humanity in all its habits, may in 
perusing the remarks made upon these barbarians [within the book], meet with 
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something that that may civilize the title, and induce them to think, that which is 
commonly call’d barbarous, is but a different mode of civility’.157   
 
While Bulman acknowledges Addison’s works as exemplifying ‘the relatively open-
minded orientalism of his day’,158 he argues that the gathering of historical and 
ethnographic knowledge by him was driven not so much by a desire for empirical 
truth per se, but rather to affirm that the foundation of high church Anglicanism was 
based on universal principles of a natural religion, thereby providing proof of its 
superiority over other confessional options.159 In effect, Bullman argues this 
ideological cause provided Addison with not only the motivation to enquire about 
other cultures, but also the epistemological framework with which he interpreted 
these encounters. This may well be the case. But the existence of a higher purpose in 
Addison’s work does not diminish the obvious revelatory impact of his experiences; 
the genuine depth of the relationships he developed with Moroccan Muslims and 
Jews; the strength of his conviction that Moroccan society was not only civilised, but 
in many ways superior to his own; and the fact that he was able to acknowledge a 
common humanity despite his first-hand experience of the depredations wrought on 
Tangier by these very same people, including the loss of his beloved Lord Teviot. 
 
5.5. Looking beyond the Walls 
 
Despite the failure of Howard’s embassy, the inhabitants of Tangier continued to 
enjoy a period of relative peace, which allowed them to turn their attention to things 
other than the threat of attack. The prevalence of mundane records of quotidian life 
in Tangier in the Colonial Office archives dating from the late 1660s, has led Nabil 
Matar to conclude that the inhabitants, safely ensconced within the walls of the 
colony, became totally indifferent to the ‘North African world around it’, ceased to 
acknowledge the existence of their Moroccan neighbours, and were oblivious to 
events in the region, except in times of conflict. This disengagement, and associated 
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‘lack of geohistorical awareness’, by the Tangerines, according to Matar, was a result 
of their disdain for Moroccans and their culture. 160 However, this assessment ignores 
numerous other manuscript and published sources which testify to the ongoing 
engagement of some of the inhabitants with Morocco and the wider region, as has 
been demonstrated in the sources cited in this chapter to this point. Far from cutting 
themselves off from the world, their circumstances dictated they could not do so; the 
success of Tangier, and indeed its very survival, were, in fact, dependent on the 
gathering of intelligence from throughout Morocco and the Mediterranean, using a 
network of merchants, consuls, seafarers, and other informants, including local 
Arabs, Berbers, and Jews. Indeed, before he departed England, Belasyse had been 
advised that Tangier was ‘a place suited most advantageously for all the variety of 
intelligence imaginable’.161 A few months later, in an account of his achievements, 
the Tangier Committee was informed that the new governor had ‘erected a post 
office with instructions for a correspondency and intelligense from all parts’.162 But 
Tangier was also a colony, home to some two thousand people,163 so it is not 
surprising that the archives are heavily weighted in favour of mundane financial 
accounts, requests for supplies, legal proceedings, and other routine administrative 
matters, as well as various civil issues. 
 
The majority of the inhabitants may have never had the opportunity to travel outside 
the lines, but that is not evidence that they had no interest in doing so; nor does it 
mean that they had no exposure to Moroccans.  They were regular visitors to Tangier 
as messengers, envoys, and traders. Some were even long-term residents: aside from 
                                                        
160 Matar, Britain and Barbary, pp. 140–141, 147–148, 158. Quotations are from pp. 147 and 148. The 
indifference, or at least ignorance, of the inhabitants of Tangier to what lay outside the walls of city is 
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161 ‘Proposals delivered unto the Lord Belasyse’, 5 January 1664/65, BL, Sloane MS 3509, f. 84v, point 
3. 
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April the eighth in order to a good settlement of his majesties garrison of Tanger, 16 July 1665, ibid., 
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a community of Jews and a sizeable number of Moroccan slaves belonging to private 
individuals and, later, the king, for several years Tangier had also been home to a 
group of native guides who served the garrison.164 Tangier also occasionally provided 
sanctuary to Moroccans seeking to avoid persecution or punishment.165 Interest in, 
and contact with, Moroccans was obviously sufficient for some Britons in Tangier to 
become proficient in their language, with Burghill remarking that ‘Capt Jones and 
yonge Mascall both speak the language very perfectly’.166 Addison wrote about his 
experiences and learnings, and, keen to validate the authenticity of his sources, 
describes some of his meetings with Moroccans in Tangier.167 Others, such as the 
author of A Short and Strange Relation (1669) concerning the rise of ‘Tafiletta’, also 
sought to inform their compatriots about the country in which they had lived.168 
Furthermore, Britons continued to conduct business in Tétouan and Salé.169  In fact, 
rather than turning their backs on their neighbours, the English were actively 
encouraging them to visit the city and trade.  
 
Around the same time that Middleton proclaimed his intention to force the ‘African 
Jewes’ to leave Tangier170 — because he was concerned some might be spying for the 
‘Alawīs — he proudly reported that Moroccans were entering the city ‘with all the 
freedome imaginable’, and stated that it was his desire to 'confirme them of my good 
intentions'.171 He hoped that ‘from correspondency and trade … they will every day 
grow more and more friendly’, and assured them that his king ‘hath noe designe on 
their land’, his only interests being peaceful relations, commerce, and security for his 
                                                        
164 Ibid., p. 273. The number of Moroccan and Turkish slaves held in the city increased significantly to 
around 100, or perhaps more, from late 1672 with the stationing of oared galleys at Tangier to provide 
support to regular naval vessels in engagements. See ibid., pp. 22, 141, 273. 
165 On Moroccans seeking refuge in Tangier at this time, see also Luke, Tangier at High Tide, p. 162. 
166 Quoted in Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, p. 101. 
167 Addison, ‘Preface’ in West Barbary, sig. [a5]r–[a7]v. 
168 The author described himself on the title page as ‘one that hath lately been in His Majesties Service 
in that Country’, but admits had not travelled beyond Tangier, and relied on information provided by 
a French merchant who had lived among the Moors. See A Short and Strange Relation, p. 26. 
169 Luke, Tangier at High Tide, p. 43, 156, entries for 8 January 1671 and 14 September 1672. 
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MS 3511, f. 168. The Moroccan Jews were not expelled from the city until 1677, as a result of fear of 
treachery, but some were later readmitted. See Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, pp. 162, 276.   
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subjects.172 Middleton clearly was seeking to win the hearts and minds of the 
Moroccans. News of this new period of entente was well received in England, with 
the London Gazette in May 1673 enthusiastically reporting that the peace which 
prevailed had given rise ‘to very good effects, by the friendly intercourse between 
the inhabitants of Tangier and the Moors, who converse together, as if they were of 
one nation’.173 
 
The journal of John Luke has been cited by some scholars as evidence of how insular 
the inhabitants had become, and their consequent preoccupation with the minutiae 
of their own lives.174 Luke, the secretary to the governor, had first arrived in Tangier 
with Peterborough in 1662 and had served there continuously since.175 His journal, 
which covers the period from December 1670 to February 1673, admittedly devotes 
much attention to everyday internal affairs — both administrative and social — of 
the city. But Morocco and its people were definitely not overlooked by him; the 
journal contains many references to developments in the country and the activities 
of Moroccans both within and outside the walls during this period. What he does not 
do, though, is reveal his thoughts and feelings about them; he simply states what he 
heard and observed, but the details he offers do help to supplement those available 
from other sources. 176 A preoccupation by Luke and other Britons with the social 
intrigues of their closely knit, and frequently isolated community, and a desire to 
replicate familiar social and cultural elements in their new home, should by no means 
be seen in itself as indifference to, or a rejection of, Morocco and its people.  
 
Luke’s entries reveal that Middleton’s efforts to promote peaceful trade were not 
reciprocated by al-Rashīd. During December 1670 there had been signs that the 
‘Alawīs were preparing for an assault on Tangier. Large contingents of troops had 
                                                        
172 Ibid., p. 160v. 
173 Cited in Lincoln, 'Samuel Pepys and Tangier', p. 421. 
174 Matar, Britain and Barbary, pp. 146–148; Bejjit, ‘Introduction’, p. 32. 
175 On Luke, see the introduction to the published version of his journal, Tangier at High Tide. The 
original manuscript can be found in BL, Add. MS 36528. 
176 The editor of his journal also comments on its contribution to understanding of Anglo-Moroccan 
relations, and the general tendency toward repression and detachment in Luke’s entries. See Helen 
Andrews  Kaufman, 'Introduction', in Helen Andrews Kaufman, ed., Tangier at High Tide: The Journal 
of John Luke, 1670–1673 (Geneva, 1958), pp. 12, 18–19. 
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been observed in the vicinity of the colony, and there had been incursions within the 
defensive perimeter.177 There had also been intensive efforts made by the Moroccans 
to plant crops in close proximity to the lines, with the English apparently so concerned 
that these areas could provide cover for an encroaching force that they considered 
burning them. 178  But only a month later, al-Rashīd was struggling to hold onto power 
in the face of an assault by forces from ‘Tremisan’ (Tlemcen) and Algiers. In his 
desperation he reached out to the English to provide cannons, powder, and arms as 
a prelude to progressing a peace. Middleton prevaricated on the request but issued 
an invitation for the sultan’s subjects to come to Tangier and trade. According to 
Luke, the governor was confident that the Moroccans would soon find it 
advantageous to settle a peace with the English.179 But this conviction must have 
been tested when the ‘Alawīs quickly recommenced testing Tangier’s defences, with 
small skirmishes and incursions occurring over the following weeks, followed by 
reports that al-Rashīd was preparing to mount a concerted campaign against the 
Christian garrisons.180 Middleton obviously held some reservations himself because 
he embarked on a project to further fortify the city, despite it not being sanctioned 
by the Tangier Committee.181 Nevertheless, despite these contrary indicators, the 
English remained positive about the prospects of establishing a peace with the 
‘Alawīs.182 
 
News of al-Rashīd’s death in early 1672 was welcomed by the English, who, believing 
that his successor, his brother Ismā‘īl, had more respect for them and a greater 
                                                        
177 Luke, Tangier at High Tide, pp. 25, 30, entries for 13, 21, and 22 December 1670. 
178 Ibid., pp. 21, 32, entries for 9 and 23 December 1670. Cf. Matar, Britain and Barbary, p. 148. 
179 John Luke, Tangier at High Tide, p. 43, entry for 8 January 1671. 
180 Ibid., pp. 49, 61, 68,  entries for 18 and 19 January, and 7, 22, and 23 February 1671. 
181 Ibid., pp. 84–85, entry for 25 June 1671. On this issue, see also Luke to Middleton, London, 6/16 
May 1671, BL, Sloane MS 3511, ff. 3r–4r. Interestingly, Luke’s letter reveals that Middleton also 
proposed taking more land into the English lines to provide a source of stone for the mole, and to 
enhance the general viability of the colony. While it was a practical suggestion, the proposal was 
considered unnecessary by members of the Tangier Committee, and the king considered it foolish to 
think of taking more ground without having the men to defend it. It was one of several occasions when 
the king and his counsellors adopted a more prudent position than a governor. 
182 Luke, Tangier at High Tide, p. 99, entry for 10 February 1672.  
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interest in developing trade, started work on drafting articles of peace.183 The Alawīs 
domestic enemies also saw al-Rashīd’s passing as propitious for achieving their own 
aims. By the autumn of that year, there were reports of wide-spread revolt, as well 
as news of the imminent return of the indefatigable warrior al-Khadr Ghailan.184 
Ismā‘īl’s accession indeed proved to be a pivotal event which would have significant 
repercussions for both his enemies and his would-be English suitors, but not of the 
kind envisaged by either of them at the time.  
 
These developments did mark the beginning of a period of more positive relations 
between Tangier and neighbouring Moroccan communities as their traditional 
leaders once again reasserted their authority. During this period, the Tangerines 
witnessed and welcomed a succession of visits from Moroccan traders, and 
messengers and emissaries from Ghailan and other local magnates.185 But once again, 
the English were confronted with the dilemma of choosing sides. Middleton was 
aware that the situation in Morocco had been ‘upon very ticklish termes’ since 
Ismā‘īl’s ascension.186 He was encouraged by the rebels’ amicable disposition and 
willingness to provide the city with much needed fresh provisions, as well as their 
initial successes against the new sultan, and quickly made up his mind to support 
them. He provided them with ‘powder and armes, with what else they want; and 
promising them all the countenance and protection this place is able to afford’. The 
governor also hoped that Ghailan would agree to resume their earlier treaty until one 
more advantageous to trade could be negotiated. But Middleton was also wary, 
assuring the commissioners that he intended to keep all the inhabitants within the 
lines ‘as if we were engaged in a most active warre’.187  
 
At the end of November, Middleton sent a delegation to meet with Ghailan to discuss 
a treaty. One of the members, a clerk, quite possibly experiencing the Moroccan 
                                                        
183 Ibid., p. 120, entry for 23 April 1672. At least one of Luke’s sources from Salé he refers to was 
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countryside for the first time, wrote to Luke the following day to advise of the party’s 
progress. He noted, with a hint of relief, that they had been treated very civilly, and 
his only complaints were that they could not eat the meat because it ‘stunck of 
garlick’, and the Moroccans had eaten from the platter with ‘their dusty hands’.188   
The negotiations progressed smoothly except for two sticking points: Ghailan was still 
alleging that Norwood had stolen some of his possessions which had been sent to 
Tangier when he fled Asilah, and demanded a resolution of the issue;189 and he would 
not agree to a perpetual treaty.190 Nevertheless, in a sign of their mutual desperation, 
in early January 1673 a new treaty was agreed with an initial term of only six months, 
but with the (potentially worthless) provision for it to be renewed every six months 
thereafter.191 It did, however, provide a means to address their respective immediate 
needs, with Middleton later admitting to Charles II that the outcome had been 
influenced by Tangier’s need for access to fresh provisions, and Ghailan’s need for 
material support to prosecute his war against the Alawīs.192 The English did their best 
to meet Ghailan’s regular, and at times unreasonable, requests for assistance.193 
However, once again, the benefits they obtained from the treaty and considerable 
investment were short-lived; in September of that year Ghailan was killed in battle 
and his army defeated, and resistance to ‘Alawī rule in north-western Morocco 
subsequently collapsed.194  
 
                                                        
188 John Wollaston to Luke from Asilah, 21 November 1672, ibid., f.176. 
189 This issue was not only a point of contention with Ghailan, but, as Luke reveals in his journal, also 
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also complained that Norwood had broken into his chests and stolen jewellery and gold. Norwood 
later claimed that he had confiscated some items only to cover costs incurred by Ghailan and his 
followers in Tangier which Ghailan had refused to pay. But Norwood’s real motivation remains unclear. 
See Luke, Tangier at High Tide, pp. 159, 178–179, 184, 190–191, entries for 30 September, 2, 4 and 27 
December 1672, and 8 and 9 January 1673; Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, pp. 96–97; Weiner, 
'Anglo-Moroccan Relations', pp. 73–74. 
190 Luke, Tangier at High Tide, pp. 181–184, 189,  entries for 21, 23, 25, 27, and 31 December 1672. 
191 ‘Article of Peace’, 2 January 1672/73, TNA, CO 279/16, ff. 314–315. 
192 Cited in Weiner, 'Anglo-Moroccan Relations', p. 74. The situation in Tangier at the time was 
sufficiently parlous that Middleton even threatened to resign his commission if the city’s supply needs 
were not adequately addressed. See Luke, Tangier at High Tide, p. 194, entry for 28 January 1673. 
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Mawlay Ismā‘īl (r. 1672–1727) built on his brother’s legacy by continuing to 
consolidate ‘Alawī authority across the country. In a departure from his predecessors, 
Ismā‘īl not only conceived of his political power as being based on his religious 
authority, but was also careful not be seen to favour any one ethnic or cultural group. 
For this reason, he attempted to ensure that his soldiers owed loyalty only to him, 
rather than their tribal groups, and incorporated them into a formal military 
structure.195 However, a major military and social innovation introduced by Ismā‘īl 
was the establishment of a large army of black Africans, the ‘Abid al-Bukhari.196 He 
was known for his harsh and cruel treatment of those who he considered guilty of 
some transgression,197 and such claims were often cited, and undoubtedly 
embellished by European commentators.198 With Ismā‘īl, the English faced an 
increasingly powerful foe who began to marshal the considerable resources of a large 
centralised state against them and the other Christian enclaves, continuing the 
movement which had begun some 150 years before. 
 
Immediately following Ghailan’s death, Middleton adopted a multifaceted and 
contradictory approach to relations with the Moroccans. He went to great efforts to 
impress a group of visiting merchants from Tétouan, seeking to convince them of the 
benefits of trading with Tangier, and that his king has no designs for their country 
beyond peaceful trade and what was necessary to maintain the city. Yet he held 
another group of Moroccans hostage, hoping to use them to force Ismā‘īl into 
agreeing to a treaty. He also proposed that some frigates be dispatched to curtail the 
activities of the corsairs of Salé, and believed that, somehow, it would also ‘bring 
Ismā‘īl to some reasonable terms for Tanger’. With no clear path to follow, Middleton 
was determined to ‘leave nothing untryed which I can imagine will conduce to a 
                                                        
195 Ibid., pp. 230, 232. 
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treatment of Ismā‘īl, see Bejjit, ‘Introduction’, pp. 46–47. 
276 
 
peace with our neighbours’.199 Over the following months he dispatched envoys to 
attempt to negotiate a treaty with the sultan, but his efforts proved to be in vain.200  
 
In July 1674, Middleton passed away and was replaced by Lord Inchiquin in March 
1675.201 Inchiquin had been born into the Irish nobility but raised in London. As a 
young man he had served in the French military, seeing active service in Spain and 
Portugal. In 1660, he was captured by an Algerine corsair from a vessel off Lisbon, 
losing an eye in the preceding skirmish. He was taken to Algiers, where he remained 
until being ransomed the following year. He became a member of the Irish privy 
council in 1671, and succeeded to the earldom of Inchiquin following the death of his 
father in 1674.202 Given his lack of experience, he was, arguably, the least qualified of 
all English Tangier’s governors, and during his tenure continuing problems in the 
colony would contribute to increasing debate in England concerning its future. 
 
Early in the new year, in order to promote the development of trade, the king had 
issued a proclamation which sought to assuage the concerns of foreign merchants in 
Tangier that their interests would be protected in the event of war with their home 
countries. Charles also declared that the city, ‘through the blessing of God’, was now 
‘in a flourishing condition’.203 However, the king’s assurance belied the reality of life 
in Tangier for its inhabitants. Despite the efforts of the English authorities to reform 
the governance of the city, they had done little to improve the prosperity of the 
colony or the living conditions. The affairs of the colony continued to be plagued by 
division between the military and civil authorities, with vested self-interest at the 
root of many of Tangier’s problems. While there was some improvement in trade 
following the end of the Third Anglo-Dutch War in early 1674, it was patchy, and 
                                                        
199 Middleton to Arlington, Tangier, 12 October 1673, BL, Sloane MS 3511, ff. 218r–v. 
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revenues remained disappointing. Arrears in payments to the garrison were a 
continuing problem, which not only adversely affected the morale of the troops, but 
also the city’s economy.204 
 
Concerns about the value of Tangier that had earlier only been prudently voiced in 
private began to enter the public sphere from the early 1670s. But while Tangier had 
its detractors, it also continued to have its equally strident supporters, who presented 
the city and its prospects in sanguine terms, and whose writings often resurfaced and 
were published years after they were written, joining those of new apologists 
expressing support for Tangier as the city became the focus of increasing criticism.  
 
In the account of his experiences in, and thoughts about, Tangier and Morocco, which 
he commenced shortly after his final departure from Tangier in 1672, Hugh Cholmley 
felt compelled to include a detailed defence of Tangier in response to ‘objections … 
from some men, who argue against the keeping of Tangier’.205 Cholmley 
acknowledged the problems which had plagued the colony, but provided some 
reasonably sensible proposals to help address them, and to enable Tangier to realise 
what he believed to be its considerable potential to contribute to England’s 
developing maritime empire.206 Among the problems he identified was a lack of land, 
arguing that ‘a little more elbow-room’ was required if Tangier was to be more self-
sufficient and less costly to maintain. More ambitiously, Cholmley suggested that an 
attempt be made to coerce the people of Salé to agree to terms of peace: such a 
‘war’, he assured, was ‘not likely to be of much expence or duration’ and believed 
that the resultant maritime treaty could help open up trade into the country.207 
Strangely, despite clearly being intended as an intervention in the emerging debate, 
the account was never published in Cholmley’s lifetime. Having invested a decade of 
his life to the project, it is clear that his concern at the time was as much about the 
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future of his beloved mole, and protection of his legacy, as it was about Tangier per 
se, although for Cholmley all three were inextricably linked. 208  
 
However, Cholmley’s work was possibly not wasted. Some four year later, his 
successor as surveyor-general of the mole, Henry Sheres, wrote a letter to a friend 
‘with an abstract of my judgements and observations’ concerning Tangier.209 While 
Sheres appears to have simply been responding to a long-standing commitment to 
satisfy his correspondent’s curiosity, the letter’s preparation was quite possibly 
informed by renewed criticism of the colony, and certainly by a recent claim that the 
king had agreed to sell Tangier to the French.210  In it, he provides a detailed and 
spirited explication of the benefits of retaining Tangier. For Sheres, Tangier was of 
inestimable value to England, and no cost was too high to protect it: ‘Can anything 
then challenge a greater share in our esteem, than the means to insure this mighty 
benefit to us’.211 From the numerous similarities in the issues addressed and solutions 
presented in the letter, it is reasonably apparent that Sheres’ defence was influenced 
to some degree by Cholmley’s.212 One aspect in which they do differ is the greater 
clarity Sheres provides on his thinking about relations with Salé. While also 
advocating a ‘war’ — principally conducted through blockade of trade to and from 
the port — to awe and coerce the Salétins into accepting peace, for Sheres at least, 
the ultimate aim was to have them recognise the benefits which could be achieved 
through friendship with the English, and a peace based on ‘equal terms’.213 Sheres’ 
assertive approach was informed by his belief that the policy of buying peace had 
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made the English look weak and the Moroccans contemptuous of them for this 
reason.214  
 
As had been amply demonstrated in the past, without a treaty, or at least a serugo, 
Britons were at considerable risk if they went beyond Tangier’s lines, even in force, 
and both residents and visitors were well aware not to stray too far from the security 
of the walls.215 Nevertheless, unable to purchase fresh provisions from Portugal or 
Spain, by the early autumn of 1675 the situation had become so desperate that 
Inchiquin authorised a raid to obtain cattle. A party of over five hundred under the 
command of Palmes Fairborne left Tangier on 19 September, and met the same fate 
as their plundering Portuguese counterparts fourteen years earlier. During the 
march, the advance guard was ambushed by a large contingent of Moroccan cavalry, 
and the English lost some two hundred men in that initial encounter and the 
subsequent retreat of the main body of troops.216 The outcome was potentially 
disastrous not only for the governor, but also for Tangier.  
 
In response, Inchiquin sent his secretary, George Philips, to London to placate the 
commissioners.217 However, in the interim, in an obvious attempt to limit the 
damage, Philips quickly dispatched an extensive letter to Inchiquin’s uncle-in-law, the 
Lord Chancellor of Ireland, which was published early the following year. In it he 
extolls the virtues of Tangier and its governors, including Inchiquin, but overlooks 
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many of the colony’s problems. Philips asserted that it was not the governors who 
were responsible for the losses suffered by the garrison, but rather the treachery of 
the Moroccans, and on this occasion they had been betrayed by a trusted Moroccan 
collaborator known as ‘James Hamet’. Nevertheless, he insisted, something had been 
gained, for through the ‘honourable’ retreat mounted by Fairborne the Moroccans 
had learned even greater respect for the English.218 However, the Moroccans had 
not, in fact, been deterred; only months later they launched an attack within the 
lines, and large contingents of troops were again scouting around the perimeter of 
the colony.219   
 
Although Sheres demonstrates that the English remained interested in finding a 
pragmatic solution to avoid continuing conflict based on meeting mutual needs, it is 
also evident that he and others underestimated both the capability and the 
conviction of the Moroccans to resist the presence of Europeans in their country, 
except on those occasions when the needs of the two sides aligned. One such 
commentator was the anonymous author of The Present Interest of Tangier.220 
Writing about the same time that Philips was penning his letter, the author also 
emphasises Tangier’s potential, describing in florid terms the advantages it possesses 
in terms of climate, fecundity, trade and strategic position. But his purpose is not to 
eulogise the city, rather to explicate why it had not achieved its latent promise. The 
reasons, he argues, include impiety, avarice, corrupt leadership, ill-treatment of the 
soldiers and citizens, and the toleration of Catholicism; poor management and moral 
                                                        
218 P[hilips], The Present State of Tangier, pp. 37, 39–40. The letter is dated 29 September, only ten 
days after the raid. On the letter, see also Bejjit, English Colonial Texts, pp. 111–112. Bejjit provides a 
transcript of the text on pp. 112–127. Fairborne also accused Hamet of betraying the English. Hamet 
appears to have been acquired as a slave by Belasyse and later given to the Duke of York, who arranged 
for his education in London and baptism. He was returned to Tangier to assist with relations with the 
Moroccans, and subsequently sent on a tour of Europe. He did not return to Tangier following the 
ambush, and it is claimed that he later used the skills and knowledge he had acquired during his time 
with the English in the service of the ‘Alawīs. On Hamet, see John Ross, Tangers Rescue; or A Relation 
of the Late Memorable Passages at Tanger  (London, 1681), pp. 20–21; Luke, Tangier at High Tide, p. 
53, entry for 25 January 1671; Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, pp. 168–169. 
219 Wollaston to Luke, Tangier, 17/27 January 1676, BL, Sloane MS 3512, f. 233v. 
220 While published in 1679, internal dating evidence suggests that the original text was probably 
written between late 1675 and early 1676. See Bejjit, English Colonial Texts, p. 147. 
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corruption discouraged good people from settling there.221 But the author also 
attributes Tangier’s plight to what he claims to be a legacy of unwarranted fear of the 
Moroccans. They have been successful, he opines, not because of their valour and 
martial skills, but rather because of the garrison’s own ‘weakness and 
unpreparedness’; after all, he explains, the Moroccans lacked organisation, discipline, 
and proficiency in modern weapons and tactics. For this reason, he assured his 
readers that the ‘interest of Tangier’ could readily be achieved ‘either by peace or 
war’ but believed that to do so, it was necessary to learn more about the Moroccans 
and their interests. 222 
The author of The Present Interest of Tangier appears to have given no thought to the 
possibility that the military balance may change in time. Cholmley, on the other hand, 
openly addressed the issue, stating his belief that it was unlikely that the Moroccans 
would be able to acquire the discipline and methods of European armies because 
they were too uncivilised, poor, and preoccupied with their own internal conflicts, 
although he did not rule out the possibility of the Moroccans doing so.223 
 
Peace, however, remained the preferred course, and a peace with Salé had long been 
seen as critical to the success of Tangier, as well as to the safety of English navigation. 
On 28 August 1676 a two-year maritime truce was finally agreed. Exactly what 
brought about the change in Ismā‘īl’s disposition is unclear, the sultan having 
previously demonstrated little interest in formalising a peace. Both Julian Corbett and 
Routh credit coercion applied by John Narborough’s fleet on its return from finalising 
an enforced peace with Tripoli.224 However, differences between a draft treaty 
prepared for Narborough’s initial, unsuccessful, negotiations and the final form of the 
truce indicate otherwise.  
                                                        
221 Present Interest of Tangier, pp. 2–3. See also Bejjit, English Colonial Texts, pp. 147–148. Similar 
concerns were expressed at the time by the mayor of Tangier, John Bland, who believed that ‘[n]o 
place was ever possessed by any prince more useful then this [Tangier], or more comodious for 
greatness toe a nation’, but that the city’s prospects were diminished by the prevalence of greed and 
corruption. See Bland to Williamson, Tangier, 29 November 1675, TNA, CO 279/17, f. 123. Given the 
similarities in expression between Bland’s letter and the pamphlet, it is quite plausible that Bland was 
also the author of the latter. 
222 Present Interest of Tangier, pp. 3–4. Cf. Matar, Britain and Barbary, pp. 153–154. 
223 Cholmley, An Account of Tangier, pp. 82, 86. 
224 Corbett, England in the Mediterranean, II, p. 382; Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, pp. 143–
144. 
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The draft treaty provided for a general peace for one year, which included Tangier, 
modelled on the articles recently agreed with Tripoli. The document was heavily 
weighted in England’s favour, with thirteen of the twenty-one articles concerned with 
the rights of the English.225 However, the final truce, negotiated by envoys from 
Tangier appointed by the newly commissioned lieutenant-governor, Palmes 
Fairborne, is quite different.  It excluded any specific protections for Tangier, but 
provided for a two-year peace at sea between the parties. As had been the case with 
earlier English treaties in Morocco, the final document provides reciprocal rights to 
the sultan’s subjects for trade and provisioning of vessels, and was otherwise 
generally more favourable to Moroccan interests.226 But the article which perhaps 
explains the sultan’s change of heart, and, conversely, demonstrates how desirous 
the English were of finalising an agreement, is one which generously permitted the 
‘Alawīs to purchase up to one hundred barrels of gunpowder, and ‘also firelocks and 
other utensills of warre’ whenever one of their vessels called at Tangier.227 While 
Routh argues against the significance of the concession, the fact is that it was seen as 
significant by the Moroccans, as Routh herself observes, because, in effect, it did not 
impose any absolute limit on munitions or weapons that could be purchased.228 
Nevertheless, the truce was a promising development for Tangier, and a significant 
achievement for Fairborne. 
 
Fairborne had assumed command of the garrison from Inchiquin in May 1676, after 
the governor departed for England the previous month. Inchiquin did not return for 
two years, and it was Fairborne who had responsibility for managing the affairs of 
Tangier during his absence. Like Inchiquin, Fairborne had served as a mercenary in 
                                                        
225 ‘Articles of peace and commerce’, 6 August 1676, BL, Add. MS 17021, ff. 6–8. See articles 2, 5, 8–
19. On the 1676 treaty with Tripoli, see Articles of Peace & Commerce between ... Charles II ... and 
the ... Lords the Bashaw, Dey, Aga, Divan, and Governours of the ... Kingdom of Tripoli Concluded by 
Sir John Narbrough ... the First Day of May, 1676  (London, 1677). A treaty had been agreed on 5 March 
1676, and was published that year, but needed to be ratified due to a change in government in Tripoli 
precipitated by Narborough’s actions against the regency. The English took the opportunity to add an 
addendum to the treaty. 
226 Copies of the articles can be found in TNA, SP 71/14/Pt. 1, ff. 149–152; TNA, CO 279/19, ff. 82–84; 
BL, Sloane MS 3512, ff. 259–263; Bodl., Rawl. MS A.185, f. 267. 
227 See ibid. article 14. 
228 Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, p. 161. 
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his youth, fighting for the Venetians during the siege of Candia. In 1661 he obtained 
a commission as a captain in the Tangier regiment, and embarked with Peterborough 
for Morocco in 1662. Although he acquitted himself sufficiently well in the garrison 
to be promoted to major in 1664, and was knighted in 1675, he was prone to 
impetuousness and belligerence which often affected his relationships with 
superiors, peers, and those under his command. His failure to win preferment was a 
continuing source of frustration for him. But despite his flaws, he proved to be a 
conscientious administrator and capable commander, doing much to improve the 
defences of the colony, and lobbying London persistently in the interests of his men 
and the city.229 
 
In response to the increasing activity of ‘Alawī troops in the area, Fairborne set about 
preparing for a possible assault: drilling the garrison and city militia, implementing 
measures to prevent ambushes, repairing and improving the fortifications. Early in 
1677, he also sequestered and fortified a large portion of land beyond the existing 
lines to better integrate the city’s defences. Fairborne did what he could to prepare 
Tangier but received little material support from London; although his efforts were 
rewarded with promotion to lieutenant-colonel.230 Morale among the soldiers and 
other residents declined, with Sheres despondently observing: ‘The towne is very 
poore, and the people very mutinous for want of pay and provisions. God grant some 
vice may not ensue from our want of the latter, for that people may live without 
money, but not without bread'. He also acknowledged the wavering interest in 
Tangier in England, expressing his appreciation to ‘the few that lay our conditions to 
heart’.231 The colony’s situation was further compromised by illness among the 
soldiers and inadequate recruitment, leaving Fairborne with insufficient men to 
properly defend the expanded lines.232 
 
                                                        
229  J. D. Davies, 'Fairborne, Sir Palmes (1644–1680)', in H. C. G. Matthew and Brian Harrison, ed., ODNB, 
Online ed. (Oxford, 2004), accessed 27 November 2017. See also Routh, England's Lost Atlantic 
Outpost, pp. 155–160. 
230 Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, pp. 159–160. 
231 Sheres to earl of Anglesey, Tangier, 16 July 1676, Bodl., Rawl. MS A.342, p. 24. 
232 Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, p. 160. 
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However, the inhabitants still held out hope of achieving an accommodation with 
Ismā‘īl, and even the usually pragmatic Sheres was eager to find something that 
affirmed the possibility. In a surprising admission, he welcomed news of the sultan’s 
recent victory over Ghailan’s former ally, and one of the last major sources of 
resistance to his reign, ‘his nephew, Muli Hamet, that mutinous young man, in a great 
battaile’, a development which he believed ‘may possibly begett a peace with these 
people’.233 Once again, Sheres’ declaration demonstrates that Britons were not 
disengaged from local developments, they maintained interest in, and possessed 
knowledge of, what was occurring outside the city, and had many reasons for doing 
so. 
 
Fairborne pursued negotiations for a peace through the commander of the sultan’s 
forces in the region, Qā’id Omar ben Haddū Hamami,234 sending envoys to Ksar el-
Kebir with instructions to draw up a treaty. But the ‘Alawīs, as their predecessors had 
done, were exploiting the rivalries between the Europeans, playing the English off 
against the French, who were also courting Ismā‘īl, to obtain what they could from 
both.235  In response to Fairborne’s concerns about the activities of the French, Omar 
assured him that in the event that any other Christian nation attacked Tangier, he 
would be ready to assist the English, and that he would seek to dissuade the sultan 
from an alliance with France. There were two reasons, he explained: the first was that 
the English were not ‘Roman Catholics’, and the second was that they ‘were people 
of commerce’ from who the Moroccans could ‘buy what they had occasion for’.236 
But despite Omar’s professions about England’s favoured status, a peace was not 
concluded, and by late 1677 the ‘happy meeting’ which Sheres had prayed for only a 
year earlier, appeared an unlikely possibility. Conflict now appeared inevitable, and 
                                                        
233 Sheres to Lord Coventry, Tangier, 16 July 1676, Bodl., Rawl. MS A.342, p. 26. 
234 Commonly referred to by the English as the Alcaide or governor of Alcazar 
235 Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, pp. 160–161. 
236 ‘Extract from the Governor of Alcasars letter to Sir P Fairborne with his reasons for preventing a 
league between the French and his imperial majesty’, 19 June 1677, TNA, CO 279/20, f. 419. As Routh 
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in December of that year Fairborne finally expelled the Jews from Tangier in 
preparation for war.237 
 
Conclusion 
 
The inhabitants of Tangier greeted the 1670s with cautious optimism. After the initial 
excitement which accompanied the acquisition of Tangier had abated in the face of 
the realities of maintaining a colonial presence in North Africa, the English authorities 
and the inhabitants began to turn their attention to practical means of managing and 
improving the outpost, and make what they could of the opportunities which it might 
provide. Relatively peaceful relations with their Moroccan neighbours, combined 
with improving living conditions and trade were cause for hope that the fortunes of 
the colony were entering a new, positive phase. 
Nevertheless, a long-term peace with the Moroccans — the key to securing the future 
of Tangier — remained elusive. The English employed a variety of approaches to 
achieve one, but their core diplomatic strategy to engage them remained generally 
consistent with the one established at the beginning of the occupation: 
demonstration of their good character, good intentions, and the mutual benefits 
which could be obtained through trade. Admittedly, their approach to relations with 
Salé could be seen as being inimical to these ends. The situation with Salé was 
complicated, because the English were seeking to address two different, but related, 
issues: one was the threat that its corsair fleet posed to English navigation, while the 
second was that the town was a competitor for trade. It was also viewed at times as 
a lever to exert pressure upon whatever faction controlled the town, to encourage 
them to a general peace. Aside from being a means to manage the corsairs, the logic 
underpinning the use of coercion against Salé to achieve other objectives was always 
ill-defined, and hopeful. Nevertheless, as demonstrated in the treaty of 1676, the 
English came to realise, once again, that diplomacy rather than coercion was the only 
solution, and that the benefits of peace had to be shared with the Salétins and their 
overlords.238 
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Efforts by the English to achieve a lasting peace were frustrated by a dynamic political 
environment, making it impossible for them to determine with whom they should be 
dealing. The uncertainty led to ambivalent responses, particularly concerning the 
‘Alawīs, who promised political stability, but also presented a military risk. But their 
failure to seal a peace was due to a more fundamental problem, the significance of 
which the English failed to fully grasp.  They continued to emphasise the benefits of 
trade in framing their diplomatic strategies, in the belief that it held as much 
significance for Moroccans as it did for them. However, trade was not a sufficient 
incentive for their warring leaders to compromise their authority and legitimacy to 
settle a long-term peace with the English, or any other European nation. Any peace 
concerning the Christian enclaves in Morocco could only ever be temporary, and on 
terms that were both advantageous to their cause and acceptable to their 
supporters.  
 
Pragmatic considerations and even feelings of amity influenced the behaviour of the 
English in their relations with Moroccans. But, what is surprising is the importance 
that they also accorded to honourable conduct, even when it was ostensibly to their 
disadvantage, as was well demonstrated by Norwood’s dealings with Ghailan; and 
concern with honourable conduct also underpinned the actions of Teviot before him. 
The behaviour of these men does not appear to have been simply platitudinous, or 
affected in a cynical attempt to influence Moroccan sentiment, but rather the 
product of a deeply held sense of national and personal honour. With its origins in 
the chivalric social codes of the Middle Ages, the concept of honour had become 
firmly internalised as a ‘sense of honor’ in England by the middle of the seventeenth 
century.239 While the practice of honour was not uniquely English, it had played an 
important role in governing relations between the warring parties during the English 
                                                        
239 Frank Henderson Stewart, Honour  (Chicago, 1994), chaps. 2–5. The term ‘honour’ defies simple 
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Civil Wars, and in subsequent social recovery and reconciliation. Its prevalence in 
English society was not delimited by background or status, but military honour 
differed from civilian honour in so far as the former was concerned with 
circumstances and rules which applied specifically to soldiers. Furthermore, honour 
did not supplant, but could coexist with, other personal beliefs, and was grounded in 
both idealistic notions of morality as well as pragmatism. 240 Despite its importance 
in early modern English society, remarkably, the role of honour has not previously 
been identified as an important factor governing relations between the English and 
North Africans during the early modern period, but it is certainly one that warrants 
more attention.  
 
The appropriate exercise of honourable practice contributed to feelings of self-worth 
and personal reputation,241 and for these reasons among others, Britons continued 
to place great store on how they were perceived by Moroccans. Their moral 
character, Protestant faith, and the long history of amicable relations between the 
two countries, were all factors that they believed separated them from their 
European rivals, and the reasons that Moroccans held them in special regard. This 
belief, perhaps grounded in truth, or cultural and religious chauvinism, informed their 
expectations of favourable treatment in Morocco. But, conversely, the attention they 
gave to drawing this distinction, and the sensitivity they exhibited when their 
expectations were not realised, perhaps underscores the existence of deep-seated 
anxiety, or at least self-consciousness, among Britons, about their place in the world. 
 
While the often poor leadership provided by governors, infighting between the 
civilian and military communities, and inadequate support from London did not 
compromise diplomatic efforts, they certainly affected Tangier’s development as a 
place of settlement and commerce, and contributed to growing criticism of the 
colony from the late 1660s. However, it was also during this time that trade and 
diplomacy exposed many inhabitants and visitors to Tangier to direct contact with 
Moroccans and the country outside the walls. The accounts of their experiences 
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vividly demonstrate the diverse ways in which Britons responded to contact with 
Morocco: from Howard’s growing suspicion, anxiety and desire to return home; to 
S.L.’s initial bewilderment, disorientation, and nostalgia, and eventual adjustment; to 
Addison’s fascination and enthusiasm. 
 
Britons did not necessarily maintain their prejudices in the face of evidence to the 
contrary; some were capable of reassessing and changing their preconceptions about 
Maghribis. Personality, background, what they observed or experienced, and the 
context of encounter all influenced their responses. Howard evidently possessed a 
nervous disposition and strong prejudices, was pompous, and lacked worldly 
experience, all of which made him averse to even casual engagement with the 
people. S.L. was more receptive, but his experience demonstrates the importance of 
cultural mediators who could assist Britons to understand aspects of belief, custom 
and practice that would otherwise be inexplicable or subject to misinterpretation. In 
this way, Addison’s positive acculturation was facilitated not only by his 
inquisitiveness and education, but also by the relationships he developed with 
Moroccan Muslims and Jews; which aided his cultural learning and acquisition of 
necessary social skills. While his very presence in Morocco only reinforced Howard’s 
ethnocentric attitudes, the experiences of S.L. and Addison not only allowed them to 
acquire a more informed understanding of Moroccans and their customs, beliefs, and 
religion, it destabilised their preconceptions, leading them to make comparisons 
between what they discovered with things they were more familiar with, which in 
turn forced them to confront questions about the fundamental nature of their hosts 
and the superiority of aspects of their own nation’s society and culture.  
 
Tangier enjoyed a measure of peace and prosperity between 1667–1677. This 
development enabled Britons to acquire a greater knowledge and understanding of 
Islam and North Africa that further challenged traditional perspectives grounded in 
ignorance and bigotry. With its inhabitants equipped with these learnings, and with 
the mole nearing completion, Tangier was now better placed than ever to achieve its 
much vaunted potential. However, there were other forces at play that had also been 
slowly evolving during this time, in both Morocco and England, which eventually 
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would coalesce around the colony and determine its fate over the coming years, and 
the course of Anglo-Moroccan relations.  
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6. Despair, Crises, and Resignation (1678–1684) 
 
‘For my owne part I know not wheather it has beene the intereste 
or error, or both, in my predecessours, who have charm’d the 
ministers at home into soe lowe an opinion of theise people that 
we make noe account of them. But my lords I think I may modestly 
say I [have had more experience of them in both war and peace] — 
and I must ingeniussly aver, that I thinke this beliefe hath beene of 
great prejudice to his majesty’s service’ (Lieutenant-Colonel 
Edward Sackville, Tangier, 1 January 1680/1)1 
 
Mawlay Ismā‘īl’s success against his nephew in the summer of 1676 had marked the 
beginning of a new phase of Anglo-Moroccan relations, but not of the kind which had 
been hoped for by Henry Sheres. It did, indeed, represent another significant step in 
the consolidation of ‘Alawī hegemony in Morocco, which was further advanced in 
1678 when the sultan overcame the last major source of resistance to his rule. 
However, the increasing political stability which the ‘Alawī successes provided did not 
promise greater security for English Tangier. On the contrary, having finally put a stop 
to Turkish-sponsored resistance, Ismā‘īl could now focus on removing the Europeans 
from their coastal enclaves.2 Accommodations with the Christians were no longer as 
critical to his mission, nor tenable, if he was to successfully establish the legitimacy 
of his reign. 
 
It was during the period between 1679 and 1680, while Tangier was effectively under 
permanent siege, that Britons experienced or heard about some of the most 
desperate and bloodiest encounters with Moroccans that had occurred up to that 
point. Prolonged sieges can provide insights that battles often cannot: they can reveal 
how cultural norms are affected by changes in prevailing conditions, and differences 
which exist between the military and civilian communities.3 Therefore, considerable 
attention is given in this chapter to the details of these engagements in order to 
                                                        
1  Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Sackville to Tangier Commissioners, Tangier, 1 January 1680/1, TNA, CO 
279/27, f. 2r. 
2 Jamil M. Abun-Nasr, A History of the Maghrib in the Islamic Period  (Cambridge, 1987), p. 232. 
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better appreciate the impact which they had, particularly on both personal sentiment 
and decision making by the English. 
 
The conflict elicited jingoism and belligerent rhetoric from some commentators in 
response to the loss of both British lives and national pride. But conversely, both the 
conflict and diplomatic initiatives which followed occasioned some of the most 
unexpectedly frank, insightful, and positive reflections by Britons resident in Morocco 
about the people and their culture and society; a vivid testament to the influence 
that experiential engagement can have on attitudinal development. Furthermore, 
Tangier’s governors and the English government continued to exercise a pragmatic 
approach to diplomacy with the ‘Alawīs, despite the existential threat they posed to 
the colony. Their endeavours in this respect brought some reprieve for the 
beleaguered city, aided by the continuing ability of Britons to overcome ethnological 
and religious prejudice and establish close personal relationships with some of the 
key Moroccan protagonists. This chapter reinforces findings identified elsewhere in 
this thesis: there was no common perception about Moroccans held by Britons, 
attitudes toward them varied considerably and could be enhanced as much as 
dimished by conflict; Britons possessed a capacity to reappraise and modify their 
preconceptions as a result of what they learnt about them; and their general conduct 
towards Moroccans on the battlefield was modelled on the same practices and 
principles which they would apply to any Christian European adversary, which was 
testimony to both their recognition of a shared humanity with Moroccans and 
respect for their martial skills.   
 
But just as perceptions of Moroccans varied among Britons, from the very beginning 
English Tangier had had its supporters and detractors: the former emphasising its 
commercial, logistical, and geopolitical potential, while the latter questioned the 
colony’s value against the significant subsidies required to maintain it. However, 
Tangier’s status as a crown possession, and dependence on public funds made it 
vulnerable to public sentiment and domestic political developments.  For this reason, 
the Popish Plot of 1678 and the subsequent Exclusion Crisis between 1679 and 1681 
further complicated efforts to secure the colony’s future. Ultimately though, Tangier 
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was a place of contestation of claims of sovereignty by two monarchs for whom it 
held more than material value; it was also a symbol of personal and national 
aspiration. The fate of Tangier would be determined by just how important a symbol 
it was to the two rulers and their subjects. 
 
6.1. Tangier under Siege 
 
A long period of relative peace came to an abrupt end in January 1678 when Ismā‘īl’s 
forces attacked several of the city’s forts. The ground was regained and the forts 
rebuilt, but the attack was a serious concern for the garrison, not least because of the 
sophisticated tactics and equipment which had been employed. Furthermore, even 
though an attack had been anticipated, men and stores remained inadequate.4 As a 
measure of the anxiety felt by the English, even before news of the incident had 
reached London, instructions had been dispatched to the lieutenant-governor, 
Palmes Fairborne, to conclude a treaty with the ‘Alawīs on terms they had earlier 
offered. However, Fairborne was loath to do so until he could rebuild and repossess 
the forts which had been destroyed.5 Despite the city’s dire situation, Fairborne 
wished to avoid negotiating from a position of apparent weakness. 
 
The governor, Lord Inchiquin, finally returned to Tangier in April, and in turn 
Fairborne departed for leave in England. In a report Inchiquin later prepared for the 
Tangier Committee, he provided an account of the events of the previous two years 
and the challenges he faced during this time. Despite its retrospective and self-
justificatory nature, the report provides useful insights into the governor’s concerns 
and hopes, and the circumstances faced by the English in Morocco at this time, 
particularly given the paucity of relevant archival sources for much of this period.6 
Inchiquin found that there had been little improvement in the city’s preparedness, 
                                                        
4 E. M. G. Routh, Tangier: England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, 1661–1684  (London, 1912), pp. 162–164. 
5 Ibid., p. 164. 
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afflicted as it was with ‘greate wants in many respect’. Reinforcements were 
desperately required, facilities for the garrison were poor, the fortifications required 
repair, and stocks of equipment and munitions were deficient.7 Fairborne had 
succeeded in concluding a treaty for six months with Omar ben Haddū Hanani, Qā’id 
of Alcazar and commander of ‘Alawī forces in the region, but real or feigned 
differences in the interpretation of some of its clauses necessitated its renegotiation.8  
 
While men were sent to strengthen the garrison, it remained vastly outnumbered, 
and illness further depleted the ranks.9 Under these circumstances renegotiation of 
a peace was highly desirable, and it is advice on relations with the Moroccans that 
the commissioners appear to have been principally interested in when they 
requested the report.10 The key Moroccan intermediary for the English was Qā’id 
Omar, and Inchiquin prefaces his account of his efforts to achieve a peace with an 
assessment of the character of the qā’id. In the governor’s estimation, Omar was 
‘very subtle’, a disposition not only in keeping with what he believed was Moroccan 
custom, but also affected in the pursuit of his own ‘ambitions’, which were ‘not 
without a great tincture of avarice’.11 Furthermore, through his artfulness and 
diligence he had won the respect and admiration of the sultan, but in doing so had 
also made powerful enemies. Inchiquin believed the qā’id to be the main instigator 
of hostility and stumbling block to peace, alleging he used the conflict as a means of 
maintaining Ismā‘īl’s favour and a pretence for retaining a sizeable force under his 
command.12 
 
Based on ‘the best intelligence’, Inchiquin reported in May 1678 that he expected 
that a large-scale assault was imminent. Despite believing that there was little 
likelihood of Fairborne’s treaty continuing to be honoured, Inchiquin claims he 
maintained the pretence that Omar would do so.13 His reasoning for doing this 
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reveals that English strategy concerning relations with Moroccans had changed little 
since the beginning of Tangier’s occupation. The principal reason he provides is that 
he saw ‘it was a meanes of some trade betweene the merchants of this place’ and 
their Moroccan counterparts, ‘which I think might bee as advantageous to us as to 
them’. This was important because he was: 
not altogether without hope that the profitts arising to both sides, 
might by degrees begett inclinations to a more continued good 
understanding betwixt us, which I always looke on as his majestyes 
greatest designe and interest at Tangier.14 
 
Despite past experience, and growing fear and distrust, the English continued to 
believe that if they could just convince Moroccans of their good intentions and the 
value of amicable relations they could still secure Tangier’s future.  
 
At the beginning of June, Moroccan troops commenced exploring the city’s defences, 
and in early July they laid several ambushes.15 However, there were no further 
significant developments until October when Omar unexpectedly encouraged 
Inchiquin to renew negotiation of a treaty. The governor was not confident of success 
but managed to effect the release of a group of merchants and some sailors, and 
conclude what he believed to be a new treaty.16 Sheres thought that the treaty was 
‘likely to come to little’. Observing that a recent outbreak of plague in Salé had 
resulted in a significant increase in trade through Tangier, he advocated an option 
which had previously been suggested by others, that a ‘warr well managed’ with the 
town could have the same effect.17 In resurrecting the idea, Sheres not only 
overlooked the political situation in Morocco, but also Tangier’s own vulnerability. In 
any event the respite and trading opportunities that the treaty promised were short 
lived. Early in the new year, sporadic attacks recommenced, and in March 1679 the 
                                                        
14 Ibid., f. 23v. 
15 Ibid., f. 24r. Routh in England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, p. 165, refers to this episode commencing in 
June 1680, which is clearly an error. 
16 BL, Sloane MS 1952, f. 24v. 
17 Sir Henry Sheres to Colonel Palmes Fairborne, Tangier, 5 December 1678, Bodl., Rawl. MS A.342, p. 
379. 
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Moroccan army ‘came again into the field with a very considerable force’, against 
which Inchiquin could only muster ‘800 serviceable’ men.18  
 
Estimates provided in contemporary reports of the size of the Moroccan army vary 
widely, but it is likely to have numbered at most around six thousand, including a 
considerable contingent of mounted troops.19 Whatever the precise number, the 
army clearly outnumbered the English garrison. With his forces assembled, Qā’id 
Omar launched a general assault in the evening of 3 April. After hours of heavy 
fighting, the Moroccans withdrew, leaving two redoubts destroyed. During the 
encounter the Moroccans lost at least 150 men, while at least thirty-five Britons were 
either killed or taken captive, and many were wounded.20 With insufficient troops to 
man Tangier’s system of fortifications, and new tactics being employed by the enemy, 
the governor realised he had to revise the city’s defensive strategy and abandon a 
number of the forts.21 
 
Surprisingly, no further attacks were forthcoming over the following few months, but 
Tangier was by now effectively under permanent siege and its inhabitants began to 
be gripped by fear and despair. Inchiquin used the lull to incessantly lobby London 
for help, reminding them of the disparity in the respective forces and the garrison’s 
want for all manner of things.22 Rumours that the French were also making 
preparations to take Tangier provided further incentive for people to leave the city 
                                                        
18 BL, Sloane MS 1952, ff. 24v–25r. Inchiquin does not elaborate on the details of the earlier attacks. 
19 Compare the estimates provided in ‘'Madrid, April 20', The London Gazette, 24–28 April 1679 
(London), p. 1; An Exact Journal of the Siege of Tangier from the First Sitting Down of the Moors before 
it on March 25, 1680 to the Late Truce, May 19, following. In Three Letters Written by Three Eye-
Witnesses of the Whole Transaction  (London, 1680), p. 10; and, E. M., The Present Danger of Tangier: 
or, An Account of its being Attempted by a Great Army of the Moors by Land, and Under Some 
Apprehensions of the French at Sea ... To a Friend in England  ([London], 1679), p. 2. The Present Danger 
is available from the British Library General Reference Collection, shelfmark 583.i.3.(2). Transcriptions 
of The Present Danger and An Exact Journal are also provided in Karim Bejjit, ed., English Colonial Texts 
on Tangier, 1661–1684: Imperialism and the Politics of Resistance, Transculturalisms, 1400–1700 
(Farnham, UK, 2015), pp. 161–163, 167–182. The author of The Present Danger was not present in 
Tangier at the time, and was merely relaying information from reports circulating in Cadiz. 
20 'Madrid, April 20', p. 1. 
21 BL, Sloane MS 1952, f. 25r. 
22 Ibid., ff. 25r–v. 
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and take their assets with them, contributing to the city’s decline.23 In June, Qā’id 
Omar — for reasons which are unclear — agreed to a two-month truce,24 by which 
time the inhabitants were ‘in some distress … for they complain lamentably they are 
very ill furnisht in case of a siege’.25 Sheres also highlights the feeling of foreboding 
felt within the city. While Tangier was no stranger to hostility, he reflected on the 
unusual nature of the current situation: ‘We never had such an enemy before now, 
moreover in a war so constant to make our defense’. At this point he was no longer 
pondering the destruction of Salé but the colony’s own demise and hoping that ‘some 
speedy resolution will be taken for our reliefe’.26 Sheres’ plea was answered in 
September when the long-awaited reinforcements finally began to arrive.27  
 
It was not until 25 March 1680 that Qā’id Omar’s forces renewed their assault by 
beginning to methodically reduce Tangier’s defences. The qā’id’s plan was not 
unexpected, but what surprised the garrison was the speed and proficiency with 
which it was executed. The Moroccans dug a complex of entrenchments to isolate 
forts from both the city and from each other, thereby cutting lines of resupply, 
communication, and retreat. They also began to construct tunnels to mine Charles 
and Henrietta Forts, and despite sustained fire and heavy casualties, they continued 
their work throughout April with tenacity and discipline.28 
 
Fairborne returned in early April, around the same time that four companies of 
Scottish troops arrived from Ireland. In a report written shortly after, he offered a 
frank assessment of the situation clearly intended to shock the government into 
action: 
                                                        
23 Ibid., f. 25v; John Ross, Tangers Rescue; or A Relation of the Late Memorable Passages at Tanger  
(London, 1681), p. 1. 
24 BL, Sloane MS 1952, f. 26r. 
25 E. M., The Present Danger, p. 2. 
26 Sheres to Secretary Coventry, Tangier, 6 July 1679, Bodl., Rawl. MS A.342, p. 457. 
27 BL, Sloane MS 1952, ff. 26r–v; Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, p. 166. 
28 See An Exact Journal, pp. 1–4, 10, and Palmes Fairborne’s reports from Tangier of 13–17 and 24 April 
in TNA, CO 279/25, ff. 183–184, 191–192. On the background to the resumption of hostilities and 
preparations, see also BL, Sloane MS 1952, ff. 26v–28v, and 'Tangier, January 18', The London Gazette, 
19–23 February 1679[/80] (London). Routh provides a reasonable account of key developments during 
the siege in England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, Chap. X. 
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I must needs confess I never have saw a place more ruinous than 
this, not one thing being in a condition fit for defence and what is 
worse, not one spare arme in the store excepting a few 
blunderbusses that is come at this time with me. I beseech you to 
dispatch with all speed at least 1200, the Scotch companys being 
very ill armed, and if we come to a brisk [action] we shall be in great 
distress.29 
 
Furthermore, he warned that without two thousand more foot-soldiers and three 
hundred cavalry, they were at risk of losing both Charles and Henrietta Forts.30 By the 
end of April he remained hopeful that the forts could hold on until reinforcements 
and supplies arrived, but also recognised that the conflict had reached a critical 
point.31 His concerns would have been reinforced the following day, when he 
received a letter from Omar in which the qā’id advised that despite the failure of his 
army to take the forts and the losses it had incurred, he was committed to continue 
the siege until his ‘intention is fullfilled’.32 
 
The crisis deepened when on 9 May the commander of Henrietta Fort advised that 
the fort had been undermined, the walls had been breached, and that he could not 
hold his position for much longer. It was determined that the men could not be 
recovered ‘without palpable hazard of looseing the whole party’.33 Instead, the 
governor sought to negotiate an honourable surrender of the fort, but Omar ‘refused 
all proposalls, but their surrendering att his mercy’34 — for a European commander 
under siege in the second-half of the seventeenth century, a negotiated surrender 
with ‘honours of war’ was perfectly acceptable, but as well as providing no surety of 
safety, surrender ‘at discretion’ was an affront to his personal honour, and that of his 
garrison, and the worst possible outcome. 35  The qā’id also clarified his orders: he 
                                                        
29 TNA, CO 279/25, f. 183v (my interpolation). On the embarkation of the reinforcements, see 
'Limerick, March 1', The London Gazette, 1–4 March 1679[/80] (London), p. 2. 
30 TNA, CO 279/25, f. 183r. 
31 See ibid., f. 191; Fairborne to Sir Leonell Jenkins, Tangier, 29 April 1680, ibid., ff. 202–203. 
32 Qā’id Omar to Fairborne, 30 April 1680, ibid., f. 205. 
33 Fairborne to Jenkins, Tangier, 11 May 1680, ibid., f. 209r. 
34 Ibid.  See also An Exact Journal, p. 11. 
35 John A. Lynn, 'Introduction: Honourable Surrender in Early Modern European History', in Holger 
Afflerbach and Hew Strachan, eds., How Fighting Ends: A History of Surrender (Oxford, 2012), p. 107. 
On the subject of sieges and honourable surrender, in addition to the overview provided by Lynn at 
pp. 99–110, see also John Childs’ chapter in the same book, ‘Surrender and the Laws of War in Western 
Europe, c. 1660–1783’, pp. 153–168. 
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was not to leave until all the fortifications had been destroyed. It was at this time that 
a drastic option to resolve the impasse appears to have first been openly proposed: 
Fairborne bluntly advised the Secretary of State, Leonell Jenkins, that unless the 
garrison’s needs were met soon, ‘his majesty had better entertaine the thought of 
blowing it [Tangier] up, so that it may neither be fit for Christian nor Moore’ to use it 
to trouble England.36 
 
Close to mutiny, the men in Charles Fort were given the choice of continuing to 
defend their position or attempting to retreat to the city. They agreed on the latter, 
and Inchiquin resolved that a contingent of almost five hundred men would advance 
to cover them. On the morning of 14 May all was ready, but Omar appears to have 
learned of the plan following the surrender of Henrietta Fort the night before, so 
when the men of Charles Fort commenced their flight, the Moroccans were prepared. 
Hindered by a series of deep, muddy trenches and enemy fire, fewer than fifty 
soldiers reached the city; some 120 were killed, and fourteen were captured. A 
further twelve were taken captive following the surrender of Giles Fort the same day. 
The garrison lost another fifteen or so men covering the retreat.37  
 
Later in the day, Omar sent Inchiquin a message in which he reiterated his terms: if 
the English wished to end the war, they would have to abandon all the remaining 
forts, and ‘keepe the place as the Portugalls had it’. Fairborne was inclined to advise 
the governor to agree to this if an ‘honourable peace’ could be concluded. He was 
well aware of the consequences, for ‘the next business will be the towne, for since 
the enemye are both skillfull in mineing and great guns we cannot hold out for long 
                                                        
36 TNA, CO 279/25, f. 209v (my interpolation). Julian Corbett insists that the option was being discussed 
as early as the year before, but does not identify a source. See Julian S. Corbett, England in the 
Mediterranean: A Study of the Rise and Influence of British Power Within the Straits, 1603–1713, 2nd 
ed., 2 vols., vol. II (London, 1917), p. 389, n. 2. 
37 See the various accounts provided in Fairborne to Jenkins, 14 and 15 May 1680, Tangier, TNA, CO 
279/25, ff. 211–212r; An Exact Journal, pp. 5–8, 11–12; A True Relation of a Great and Bloody Fight 
between the English and the Moors before Tangiere  ([London], 1680); Francis Povey to Colonel George 
Legge, Tangier, 18 May 1680, Dartmouth MSS, 3 vols., vol. I (London, 1887), pp. 50–51. Routh 
considered Povey’s account to be ‘less reliable’ due to some inaccuracies and exaggeration. See Routh, 
England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, p. 176. Povey was highly critical of the way the retreat had been 
conducted. 
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if they proceed after the rate they have done’.38 The qā’id also gave leave for the 
bodies which remained on the field to be collected. It is perhaps a measure of the 
hostility felt towards the English by some Moroccans, that when a party was sent out 
to collect the dead, they purportedly found not only had the corpses been 
decapitated, but they had also been mutilated in other ways.39 
 
Inchiquin thanked the qā’id for ‘his civility’ in permitting the recovery of the bodies, 
but refused his terms, explaining that ‘it did not consist with honor of his majesty, 
nor his owne’. He acknowledged the remaining forts were vulnerable, but intended 
to ‘sell them as deare as he could’.40 The assault resumed the next day, and although 
the garrison continued to inflict heavy causalities, the strategic and tactical 
advantages enjoyed by the Moroccans had improved considerably with the fall of the 
forts and capture of their ordnance. They proceeded in their work against the town’s 
defences in such a manner, observed Fairborne, ‘so they leave nothing undon that 
may gain advantage upon us’.41  ‘All the advantages are on the enemy’s side’, another 
officer later opined.42 
 
On 19 May, Qā’id Omar sent a messenger to again reiterate his terms for a peace. 
The offer was considered by a council of war in which it was agreed that the 
remaining outer forts were unlikely to hold for much longer. It was decided that the 
only realistic option was to negotiate the ‘best articles they could’. A four-month 
truce was subsequently concluded. It required the English to abandon Pole and 
Norwood Forts; the Moroccans were to remove their guns and destroy their battery 
positions; and no new works were to be undertaken by either side.43 While the truce 
did provide the English with grazing rights, it left the colony less self-sufficient, and 
                                                        
38 TNA, CO 279/25, f. 211v. 
39 An Exact Journal, p. 12; Dartmouth MSS, I, p. 50. While there are both Qur’anic and historical 
precedents for the beheading by Muslims of unbelievers in warfare, that does not explain the other 
reported damage done to the bodies. It is, of course, possible that the wounds in question were 
incurred in battle and exaggerated.  
40 TNA, CO 279/25, f. 212r. 
41 Ibid., f. 212. On the Moroccan position at this time, see also An Exact Journal, pp. 8–9, 12–13. 
42 Major John White to Colonel Legge, Tangier, 25 June 1680, Dartmouth MSS, I, p. 51. 
43 Fairborne’s report, 21 May 1680, Tangier, TNA, CO 279/25, f. 217r. 
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more exposed to attack that it had been at any time since the first days of the 
occupation.  
 
The stated intent of the truce was to allow time for ‘the better adjusting of such a 
peace which may be to satisfaction of both partyes’.44 But Fairborne was by no means 
hopeful of such an outcome and was concerned about the long-term security of 
Tangier. Without adequate fortifications he believed the colony would remain at 
risk.45 He was suspicious of Omar’s motives: ‘the enemy have not granted this 
concession out of affection but designe’, he surmised.46  The qā’id’s refusal to allow 
the English to repair the city’s defences, while at the same time permitting them, 
‘upon a small consideration [of gunpowder]’ to obtain stone to progress the mole, 
was evidence, according to the lieutenant-governor, of the Moroccan commander’s 
intent to renew the assault once the mole was ‘good enough for them’.47 The 
principal purpose of the truce from Fairborne’s perspective was to give the Tangier 
commissioners sufficient time to convince the king to send reinforcements to 
undertake a counter-offensive. But if this force was not provided he once again 
warned, the king ‘had better be resolved to quit and leave both the towne and mole 
in a ruin’.48 He also shared his concerns with his friends, including Samuel Pepys, 
impressing upon them ‘what I forsee must be the end’ if no action is taken.49 He later 
advised another correspondent, ‘the enemy we have to deal withall are no more the 
silly Moors we had to do with fifteen years ago, but expert diligent enemy that will 
require provisioning accordingly’.50 
 
                                                        
44 Ibid.  
45 On English thinking on fortification of overseas settlements between 1608 and 1759, see I. Bruce 
Watson, 'Fortifications and the “Idea” of Force in Early English East India Company Relations with 
India', Past & Present, 88 (1980), pp. 70–87. Although concerned with developments in India, there 
are some parallels with the situation the English found in Morocco. 
46 Fairborne’s report, 24 May 1680, Tangier, TNA, CO 279/25, f. 218. 
47 Ibid. (my interpolation). 
48 Ibid., f. 217r. 
49 Fairborne to Samuel Pepys, 24 May 1680, Tangier, The Manuscripts of J. Eliot Hodgkin  (London, 
1897), pp. 176–177. 
50 Quoted in Sari R. Hornstein, The Restoration Navy and English Foreign Trade, 1674–1688: A Study in 
the Peacetime Use of Sea Power  (Aldershot, UK, 1991), p. 157, n. 2. Source is Huntington Library, EL 
8483, Fairborne to Bridgewater, 3 July 1680, Tangier. 
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Fairborne and other observers came to realise what Colonel Norwood had 
understood eleven years earlier: that they not only faced a determined adversary, 
but one capable of becoming far more militarily sophisticated. While it may have 
been politically convenient — or a salve to assuage wounded racial, cultural or 
religious pride — for some Britons to attribute this development to the treachery of 
Christian European renegades,51 others were prepared to acknowledge the capacity 
of Moroccans and other Muslims to acquire the knowledge, skills, and discipline to 
meet Europeans on the battlefield on equal terms. The ‘Alawīs undoubtedly 
benefited from the experience of European renegades and captives, but their 
capabilities were supplemented by the contribution of Turkish gunners and engineers 
who had participated in the successful siege of Candia,52 as well as by their own 
learnings from years of civil war and conflict with Europeans.53 Moroccans were 
beginning to be recognised, not only for their bravery and basic martial skills, but as 
formidable a foe as any Christian army.54 As discussed later in this chapter, while the 
events of this period meant that the perceptions held by Britons of Moroccans 
continued to be heavily influenced from a perspective of conflict, they also did much 
to raise the general esteem in which they were held. Moreover, acceptance of their 
enhanced military capability would become a decisive factor in deciding the fate of 
English Tangier. 
 
                                                        
51 See discussion on the sources of such claims later in the chapter. 
52 Dartmouth MSS, I, p. 51. Another correspondent refers to the presence of ‘dextrous miners from 
Algier and the Levant (as is said)’. See An Exact Journal, p. 9. See also Corbett, England in the 
Mediterranean, II, pp. 395–396. Cf. The assessment of the author of The Last Account from Fez, in a 
Letter from One of the Embassy to a Person of Honour in London Containing a Relation of Colonel Kirk's 
Reception at Mequinez, by the Emperour, with Several Passages in Relation to the Affairs of Tangier  
(London, 1682), pp. 1, 2. Based on the details of the activities on which he bases his assessment, and 
his possible identity, as discussed in n. 157 below, it is questionable whether the author was present 
during the siege, and therefore capable of fully assessing Moroccan military capability. 
53 In a rather interesting case of cultural exchange, the former Moroccan collaborator, James Hamet, 
introduced in chap. 5 of this thesis, appears to have participated in the siege, and may have 
contributed knowledge of European siege techniques he had acquired during a tour of Europe which 
had been sponsored by his patron, the Duke of York. See Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, p. 
168. Routh does not cite a source, but Hamet’s presence at the time is attested to by the author of 
Tangers Rescue, pp. 21–22. On development of Moroccan military capability, see also Routh, England's 
Lost Atlantic Outpost, pp. 163–164. 
54 Fairborne first makes this direct comparison in TNA, CO 279/25, f. 209v. See also Dartmouth MSS, I, 
p. 51; An Exact Journal, p. 13. 
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Inchiquin was recalled to London in June 1680, leaving the defence of Tangier in the 
hands of Fairborne. In late August the lieutenant-governor finally received word that 
a relief force was being prepared. By this time, one of the king’s principal advisors, 
the Secretary of State, Lord Sunderland, appears to have concluded that Tangier 
‘would certainly be lost’, but advised the king that it was still necessary to 
demonstrate that they had done what they could to preserve it so Charles could 
defend himself from criticism.55 However, the conclusion of a treaty remained a 
possibility: Qā’id Omar had sent a proposal to the king, but a response had not yet 
been provided. Despite his earlier scepticism, Fairborne was clearly eager to expedite 
the matter.56 After all, as one of his own officers, a Major White, pointed out, and as 
the English were similarly finding in their dealings with the North African regencies, 
concluding a peace was a cheaper option than the use of military force.57 According 
to at least one source, the cost of reinforcing and fortifying Tangier, together with 
the death of the Earl of Ossory at the end of July, who was to replace Inchiquin and 
lead the relief expedition, had finally made Charles amenable to a treaty which was 
not conditional on the re-fortification of the city.58 
 
As the crisis in Morocco was unfolding during 1679 and 1680, Charles II had also been 
dealing with a series of political crises at home which had not only distracted him, 
but prevented him from responding in a meaningful way to the desperate requests 
from Tangier. In June 1679, he had been forced to send an army to Scotland to quell 
another rebellion of the Covenanters. At the same time a more serious problem was 
developing as a consequence of the emergence of the Popish Plot the year before. 
                                                        
55 John Evelyn, The Diary of John Evelyn, 2 vols., ed. William Bray, vol. II ([London], 1901), pp. 145–146, 
entry for 26 July 1680. 
56 Fairborne to Jenkins, 26 August 1680, Tangier, TNA, CO 279/26, f. 43r. 
57 Dartmouth MSS, I, p. 51. 
58 James Halkett, 'Tangier – 1680: The Diary of Sir James Halkett', The Journal of the Society of Army 
Historical Research, 1 (1922), pp. 5–6. Halkett was a major in Dumbarton’s Regiment which had been 
dispatched as part of the relief force, and had served earlier in Tangier under Teviot. He and the 
regiment remained in Tangier until the garrison left in 1684. Despite being an important contemporary 
source concerning events relating to Tangier from around the middle of 1680 to the end of 1682, as 
also noted by Captain McCance who prepared the article in which Halkett’s account is reproduced, the 
diary does not appear to have been known to Routh when she wrote her seminal book on the colony. 
The major was also the author of another account, concerning events which took placed on 27 October 
1680, and published under the name ‘Major J. A. Hacket’, which is cited below. 
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This concocted conspiracy to assassinate the king and replace him with his Catholic 
brother, the Duke of York, together with the revelation of secret negotiations 
between the English government and France, further fuelled anti-Catholic sentiment, 
and hardened Parliament’s resolve to exclude the duke from the succession in what 
became known as the Exclusion Crisis.59 The colony’s association with the king, and 
the dominance of Catholics within its garrison and civil administration, and among its 
foreign residents, meant that Tangier was inevitably drawn into the political concerns 
and intrigues which ensued.60  
 
Unable to rely on Parliament to authorise necessary funds, the king found himself 
torn between saving his colony and his own self-preservation.  In response to the 
suggestion of drawing troops from the army for service in Morocco around the 
middle of 1679, Charles was forced to declare that ‘tho’ he loved Tangier well he 
loved himself better’, and refused the proposal.61 Nevertheless, the latest news out 
of Tangier, reinforced by public sentiment, finally convinced him to act. The relief 
force that was finally dispatched was smaller than Fairborne had requested, but by 
late August 1680, just over one thousand reinforcements had either arrived or were 
on their way to Tangier, including mounted troops, bringing the establishment to 
more than three thousand officers and men.62 In addition, the garrison was 
supported by Admiral Herbert’s fleet, and some five hundred seamen.63 Ironically, 
after having repudiated the English occupation and actively scheming against it, but 
                                                        
59 On the general impact of these events to October 1680, see, for example, John Miller, Charles II  
(London, 1991), pp. 288–333; Ronald Hutton, Charles the Second: King of England, Scotland, and 
Ireland  (Oxford, 1989), pp. 360–395. 
60 On the impact of these events on Tangier see Corbett, England in the Mediterranean, II, pp. 388–
395; Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, pp. 238–239; Tristan Stein, 'Tangier in the Restoration 
Empire', The Historical Journal, 54 (2011), pp. 1006–1007. 
61 Sir Robert Southwell to the Duke of Ormonde, 24 June 1679, Calendar of the Manuscripts of the 
Marquess of Ormonde, 8 vols., vol. IV (London, 1906), p. 527. 
62 'Charles II: August 1680', in CSPD: Charles II, 1679–80, ed. F. H. Blackburne Daniell, BHO ed. (London, 
1915), accessed 19 January 2018, entries for 13 August. On the background to the establishment of 
the relief force, see Corbett, England in the Mediterranean, II, pp. 398–399; Routh, England's Lost 
Atlantic Outpost, pp. 181–184, 317–319. 
63 Halkett, 'Tangier – 1680', p. 7, cf. Ross, Tangers Rescue, p. 5. 
304 
 
with a shared interest in the outcome, the Spanish also contributed a much needed 
cavalry unit.64 
 
Hostilities immediately resumed following the expiry of the truce on 15 September.65 
Five days later, the English marched out of Tangier and, catching the Moroccans 
unprepared, quickly took the site where Pole Fort had stood and commenced building 
a palisade. Over the following days the two sides skirmished while the English rebuilt 
the fort, and the Moroccans responded by digging new trenches.66 However, on 7 
October a messenger arrived from Omar with an offer to renew negotiation of a 
treaty. In a council of war, it was agreed that Fairborne should accept the offer. The 
stumbling block as always was the issue of the fortifications. The English requested 
use of the ground in which Charles Fort had been situated,67 the return of all their 
redoubts, and agreement to the rebuilding of Pole Fort. The English representative, 
Lieutenant-Colonel Tollemache, was optimistic that the Moroccans would accept 
their conditions, except the one relating to Pole Fort. Indeed, Tollemarche’s 
Moroccan counterpart fervently declared that under no circumstances would the 
rebuilding of the fort be tolerated, and refused to negotiate further.68 If there had 
remained any doubt, the position of the Moroccans on the issue of fortifications had 
now been made abundantly clear.  
 
                                                        
64 Halkett, 'Tangier – 1680', p. 13; Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, p. 185. With both their 
interests in Morocco under threat, in June the Spanish and English kings had put aside their long-
standing differences and entered into a ‘defensive alliance’. See Jenkins to Ormonde, 12 June 1680, 
Calendar of the Manuscripts of the Marquess of Ormonde, 8 vols., vol. V (London, 1908), p. 334. 
65 Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, p. 187. 
66 Sheres’ report, 29 October 1680, Tangier, TNA, CO 279/26, 93r–96r; Halkett,'Tangier – 1680', pp. 8–
11. A more sensationalised, but more detailed, account of these proceedings is provided by Ross in 
Tangers Rescue, pp. 9–19. An account of the events of 20–22 September is provided in A Particular 
Relation of the Late Success of His Majesties Forces at Tangier against the Moors. Published by 
Authority  ([London], 1680). A transcription of the latter pamphlet is also provided in Bejitt, English 
Colonial Texts, pp. 183–186. Sheres wrote his report at the request of Lieutenant-Colonel Sackville. 
See Sackville to [Sunderland], 30 October 1680, Tangier, TNA, CO 279/26, f. 188. 
67 The requirement for this land may be related to directions sent to the governor by the Privy Council 
in August ‘to prolong the peace with the Moors and to agree with them for a certain parcel of ground, 
which they may encompass by cutting a passage into the Jures river’. This may have seen as a means 
to secure the coastal area between the ‘Jews River’ and the city using the natural topography of the 
area, without the need to build fortifications, and thereby overcoming the objections of the 
Moroccans on this issue. See 'Charles II: August 1680', entries for 7 August. 
68 Halkett, 'Tangier – 1680', pp. 11–12; TNA, CO 279/26, ff. 96r–v. Cf. Routh’s interpretation of the 
negotiations in England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, p. 192. 
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Contrary to the impression of common purpose and enthusiasm among Tangier’s 
defenders at this time (as conveyed in a contemporary pamphlet, Tangers Rescue), 
and the emphasis given to this interpretation by Routh,69 the senior officers of the 
garrison were, in fact, deeply divided as to how best to deal with the situation. A 
group under the newly arrived Lieutenant-Colonel Edward Sackville were critical of 
the way the war had been conducted and concerned at the possible outcome under 
Fairborne’s leadership. Sackville had been disappointed with the failure of the recent 
treaty negotiations. He believed that Tangier ‘could never be made steadable to the 
king in no fashion’, and concurred with those ‘judicious men, that understand Tangier 
well’ and ‘thinks that the charge and expence the king is at there might be better 
imployed in England’.70 Nevertheless, with the Moroccan entrenchments moving 
closer to Pole Fort, and the risk of it being undermined or cut off, a decision had to 
be made. Fairborne proposed a counter-offensive to drive the Moroccans from the 
fields. Sackville and his supporters argued against the plan, but it was carried by vote. 
However, the following day, 24 October, Fairborne was mortally wounded while 
overseeing work outside the town, and Sackville himself was required to take charge 
of the garrison.71 
 
Despite his misgivings about the counter-offensive, Sackville found that he was out-
voted once again by his fellow officers. So, on the morning of 27 October he gathered 
a force totalling fifteen hundred infantry and three hundred cavalry, and sallied out 
to confront the Moroccans,72 who numbered between two and three thousand.73 
                                                        
69 See Ross, Tangers Rescue, esp. pp. 2–9; Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, pp. 187–188. 
70 Halkett, 'Tangier – 1680', p. 12. 
71 Ibid., pp. 13–14. On the general position of the English, and Fairborne’s wounding, see also TNA, CO 
279/26, 96v–97r; Ross, Tangers Rescue, pp. 19–20; [Henry Sheres], A Particular Narrative of a Great 
Engagement Between the Garison of Tangier, and the Moors, and of the Signal Victory which His 
Majesties Forces Obtained Against Them on the 27th of October Last. Published by Authority.  
([London], 1680). The latter pamphlet is a published version of Sheres’ account of 29 October. A 
second edition was published the same year. The text is available from the British Library General 
Reference Collection, shelfmark 583.i.3.(5), and a transcript is also provided in Bejjit, English Colonial 
Texts, pp. 187–193. 
72 TNA, CO 279/26, f. 97r; [Sheres], A Particular Narrative of a Great Engagement, p. 4. Sheres notes 
that the garrison’s establishment had once again been significantly depleted by illness. 
73 Halkett, 'Tangier – 1680', p. 14. The figure of around three thousand was confirmed by Moroccan 
prisoners. See ibid., p. 19; J. A. Hacket, A Full and True Relation, of the Fortunate Victory Gained Over 
the Moors by the Garrison of Tangier, upon the 27 of October, 1680  (not stated, 1680), p. 4. Cf. the 
figures variously cited by Sheres and Halkett/Hacket for the size of the two forces with the clearly 
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Henry Sheres, who was present, later reflected in his official report that the ‘attack 
proved a hot and very bloody piece of service’ with ‘the enemy disputing every line 
and trench’, and the men ‘coming to push of pike and handy-blows in several 
places’.74  By late afternoon, the garrison had driven the Moroccans from their 
positions and destroyed their entrenchments and mines, but both sides suffered 
heavy losses. 75 Despite the success of the English in forcing the Moroccans to retreat, 
and the jingoistic rhetoric with which it was later hailed, it was a hollow victory.  
 
But it had been a significant win for the English, and a cause for optimism for some 
that the outcome would make the Moroccans amenable to concluding a peace on 
more advantageous terms.76 But the proceedings of the past eighteen months had 
also amply demonstrated to more hard-headed Britons the vulnerability of the 
colony. Tensions created by these two positions became apparent when soon after 
the routing of the Moroccans, Qā’id Omar offered to enter into a peace treaty, and 
Sackville eagerly accepted the opportunity. Under the circumstances this turn of 
events is surprising, and has not been adequately explained. Shortly before he made 
the offer, the qā’id was apparently incensed to learn how his men who had been 
taken prisoner had been mistreated, and had vowed not to deal further with the 
English.77 Sackville, on the other hand, had been aware that an ambassador had been 
dispatched from England to negotiate a treaty and would be carrying instructions 
from the king to this end.78  
 
It has been asserted that the impact of Moroccan losses during the siege had been so 
great that they were forced to seek a truce.79 However, this seems implausible as 
they were not facing any immediate threat from the English. Much more likely, Omar 
                                                        
exaggerated ones presented by Ross in Tangers Rescue, p. 27. On the disposition of the Moroccans 
around Tangier on the day, see fig. 7 in this thesis. 
74 TNA, CO 279/26, f. 98r; [Sheres], A Particular Narrative of a Great Engagement, p. 5. Cf. the more 
partisan account of Ross in Tangers Rescue, pp. 24–28. Halkett provides detailed and reasonably 
balanced accounts in 'Tangier – 1680', pp. 15–19 and A Full and True Relation, pp. 1–4. 
75 TNA, CO 279/26, ff. 98v, 100r; [Sheres], A Particular Narrative of a Great Engagement, p. 8. 
76 See, for example, Ross, Tangers Rescue, p. 31; Halkett, 'Tangier – 1680', pp. 20–21. 
77 Halkett, 'Tangier – 1680', p. 19. 
78 Ibid., p. 20; Sunderland to Fairborne, Whitehall, 1 November 1680, BL, Add. MS 19872, f. 57. 
79 Corbett, England in the Mediterranean, II, p. 401; Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, p. 198; 
Matar, Britain and Barbary, 1589–1689  (Gainesville, FL, 2006), p. 157. 
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and the sultan saw an opportunity associated with the receipt of the long-awaited 
response to the proposal the qā’id had forwarded to Charles months earlier.  In his 
reply to the king he states: 
As soon as I received your majesty’s letter, I went from the [sultan’s] 
court to the camp of Tanger, and … quitted the war between the 
Moors and your majesty’s subjects … in consideration of your 
majesty’s letter and they of Tanger desiring me to give them peace 
for six months in consideration of the said letter, I complyed with 
what they desired.80 
 
Whether the king offered concessions is unclear, as a copy of his letter does not 
appear to have survived, but it was obviously of sufficient interest to warrant further 
consideration. Omar also welcomed news that Charles was intending to send an 
ambassador. However, the celerity with which Sackville concluded the ceasefire on 
the terms he agreed to, in full knowledge of the impending arrival of an ambassador, 
is harder to explain. While he may have been concerned with the garrison’s readiness 
to repel a further siege, as suggested by Routh,81 it appears more likely he was 
seeking to prefigure the terms of the final treaty. The openness with which he 
responded to the qā’id, his desire to conclude what is in effect an interim treaty 
before the arrival of the ambassador, and the concessions which he made, were of 
great concern to his fellow officers, yet he persisted despite their misgivings.82  
 
Apart from a short stint in the Parliament, Sackville had been a career army officer 
since 1667. In addition to having developed a reputation for severe discipline, one 
contemporary found him to be ‘naturally most peevish and passionate’ and ‘proud’,83 
                                                        
80 'Letter I: Qā’id Omar ben Haddū to King Charles II, 29 November 1680', in Bejjit, English Colonial 
Texts, p.221. The original manuscript can be found in TNA, CO 279/26, f. 238. The letter from Charles 
was dated 14 September 1680. It is not clear if there had been a delay in dispatching it from England, 
or the qā’id had delayed replying, or both. 
81 Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, p. 198. 
82 Halkett, 'Tangier – 1680', pp. 20–21. The terms were far from ‘humiliating’ from the perspective of 
the Moroccans, as claimed by Matar in Britain and Barbary, p. 157, and were clearly not seen that way 
by the officers of the garrison.  
83 B. M. Crook and John. P. Ferris, 'Sackville, Edward (c.1640–1714), of Bow Street, Covent Garden, 
Westminster', in B. D. Henning, ed., The History of Parliament: the House of Commons 1660-1690 
(London, 1983), at http://www.historyofparliamentonline.org/volume/1660-1690/member/sackville-
edward-1640-1714, accessed 29 January 2018. It during his time as an MP in 1679 that Sackville had 
been caught up in the Popish Plot by having been provoked by Titus Oates into denouncing the veracity 
of the conspiracy. 
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a disposition which goes some way to explain his frequently testy relationship with 
his fellow officers in Tangier. Nevertheless, while he had only recently arrived, 
Sackville clearly possessed a more realistic understanding of the colony’s situation 
than some of his compatriots, and, like Fairborne had been, he was pessimistic about 
its future. He not only understood that the Moroccans were a formidable enemy, but 
that it was pointless to continue to stubbornly insist on the right to fortify the colony 
in defiance of their repeated objections, unless the king was prepared to make a 
substantial investment in its defence.84 In the absence of such a commitment, all the 
English could do was either leave, or ensure that the terms of any treaty were 
sufficiently advantageous to the Moroccans and trust that they honoured it. It is 
evidently with these considerations in mind that Sackville concluded his agreement 
with Omar in late November. Among other things, it provided the inhabitants of 
Tangier with access to fresh provisions and forage, and allowed them to graze their 
livestock, cut wood, and quarry stone (articles 2–8, 10). While precluded from re-
establishing fortifications, the English were permitted to undertake any works within 
the town walls (article 1). Of obvious appeal to the merchants on both sides, it also 
provided them with freedom to trade their merchandise (articles 12, 13). In return 
Omar was to be supplied with one hundred bolts of cloth, one hundred and twenty 
barrels of gunpowder, and parts for two hundred muskets. While the truce was 
ostensibly only intended to be a stop-gap measure, its scope, and the reference to 
annual limits (articles 6, 17), indicates that it was negotiated with an eye to the 
future.85 The terms were far from ‘humiliating’ for the Moroccans, as claimed by one 
scholar,86 and were clearly not seen that way by the English.  
 
The ambassador, Major Sir James Leslie, while waiting in Cadiz to embark for Tangier, 
was surprised to learn of Sackville’s presumptuousness and was highly critical of the 
                                                        
84 Sackville to Tangier Committee, Tangier, 1 January 1680/1, TNA, CO 279/27, ff. 2r–v; Corbett, 
England in the Mediterranean, pp. 401–402. 
85 ‘Articles of Truce and Commerce’, 25 November 1680, BL, Add. MS 17021, ff. 49–52. The document 
is broadly similar to, but expands on the provisions contained in, a version of the treaty dated 16/26 
November 1680 which can be found in TNA, CO 279/26, f. 259. The latter may have been a summary 
prepared to inform the ambassador of the direction of negotiations, as it was contained in his 
subsequent report cited below, prepared while waiting to complete his journey to Tangier.   
86 See Matar, Britain and Barbary, p. 157. 
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terms which had been agreed. Aside from being affronted, Leslie also believed, like 
Sackville’s colleagues, that they were not sufficiently advantageous, but was not 
prepared to renounce them until he had received further instructions.87 The evident 
resentment felt towards Sackville for what one officer described as ‘condescending 
to such mean and disadvantageous things’ following what was perceived as a great, 
and hard-won, victory,88 and the associated difference in attitude toward relations 
with the Moroccans, beg the question as to what effect the tumultuous events in 
both Tangier and in Britain which had occurred since the beginning of the siege 
eighteen months earlier, had had on the attitudes of Britons towards Tangier, 
Morocco and Moroccans. 
 
6.2. Propaganda, Public Opinion, and Local Responses 
 
Nabil Matar has concluded that by 1680, as a result of England’s military 
achievements in Morocco and across the Western Mediterranean, Britons possessed 
‘a national self-image bursting with assertiveness, assuredness and superiority’. 
Furthermore, he claims that ‘[m]ilitary pride was now dictating the ideology of the 
conflict with the Moors’, and that the encounter ‘with the Moors has become 
completely grounded in colonial desire and religious difference’.89 Some of the 
evidence and arguments Matar has put forward to support these conclusions have 
been discussed in the preceding chapters of this thesis. However, it is his analysis of 
public sentiment for the period 1679 to 1680 that is relevant at this point, and for 
this purpose he turns to a range of contemporary published reports and pamphlets. 
While he correctly identifies the influence that growing disaffection about Tangier 
played in the production of some of these texts, he fails to fully contextualise the 
sources, adequately distil the aims of the authors, and explain how they represent 
prevailing normative attitudes. Moreover, he also overlooks the personal 
perspectives afforded in letters and accounts left by other Britons who were present 
                                                        
87 Sir James Leslie to Tangier Commissioners, Cadiz, 6/16 December 1680, TNA, CO 279/26, ff. 258–
259. See also Bejjit, ‘Introduction’, p. 36. Leslie is sometimes rendered as Lesley or Lashly in some 
sources. 
88 Halkett, 'Tangier – 1680', p. 21. On Halkett’s feelings toward Sackville, see also p. 22. 
89 Matar, Britain and Barbary, pp. 156, 158. 
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in Tangier, as well as insights which can be gleaned from the pronouncements and 
actions of the English government.90 Only by considering the milieu in which these 
publications were written can their real meaning and significance be deduced; and 
only by considering the other available sources can some measure of the impact that 
developments at this time had on attitudes, behaviour, and British self-identity be 
properly ascertained. 
 
The occupation of Tangier had never received unanimous support in England, and 
over the years dissenting voices had become more emboldened as the colony lurched 
from one crisis to another.  By 1679, pessimism about the value of Tangier was 
supplemented by concerns following the Popish Plot and commencement of the 
Exclusion Crisis that the colony would provide the foundation for a Catholic uprising. 
It was around this time that the possibility of abandoning Tangier began to be actively 
canvassed both to avoid the cost of maintaining it, and to mitigate the perceived 
threat to Protestant England.91 In an increasingly polarised political environment, a 
series of pamphlets, sometimes based on earlier works, were initiated over the next 
few years both by private citizens and the government to respond to the growing 
debate about Tangier’s future, and to counter perceptions of the deteriorating 
military situation. 
 
Among the apologias to appear were three written several years earlier and discussed 
in chapter 5: the anonymous The Present Interest of Tangier in 1679; Henry Sheres’ 
A Discourse Touching Tanger, which was published in at least three editions the 
                                                        
90 See ibid., pp. 153–158. Matar also argues that John Dryden’s play The Spanish Fryar reflects the 
celebratory mood following the English victory on 27 October by evoking events from the siege. 
However, given that much of the play is thought to have been written during the summer of 1680, and 
was already being performed by the time reports of the counter-offensive were filtering into London, 
it appears implausible that these same reports could have inspired details of the play cited by Matar 
on p. 157. See the chronology for the play provided in David Womersley, 'Dryden's The Spanish Fryar: 
Modernity and Exclusion', in Claude Rawson and Aaron Santesso, eds., John Dryden (1631–1700): His 
Politics, His Plays, and His Poets. A Tercentenary Celebration Held at Yale University, 6–7 October 2000 
(Newark, NJ, 2004), p. 81, n. 2.  
91 Corbett, England in the Mediterranean, II, p. 389; Margarette Lincoln, 'Samuel Pepys and Tangier, 
1662–1684', Huntington Library Quarterly, 77 (2014), pp. 422–424. 
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following year, with one of those being accompanied by The Present Interest;92 and 
George Phillip’s letter to the Lord Chancellor of Ireland also appeared in the same 
year as The Present State of Tangier. Lancelot Addison even made a contribution in 
1681 with the publication of The Moors Baffled, in which he provided his own 
formulation to foil the Moroccans and ensure the commercial success of Tangier: 
adopt the policies for peace and security which had been advocated by the Earl of 
Teviot.93 Despite their dated assessments, these commentaries remained germane, 
providing attractive assessments of Tangier’s potential, and assurances that a 
resolution to the problem of Moroccan hostility and intransigence could be found, 
either by mutual accommodation or by force, if necessary.94 They were joined by a 
succession of accounts which provided commentary on the current events in 
Morocco, including a number published by royal authority.95 Many of these, 
according to a member of the garrison, Major James Halkett, were so filled with ‘lyes, 
partialities and mistakes that it is hard for the king to find out the truth’.96 
 
While not all of these tracts are patently propagandistic in nature, even the more 
factually-based, less sensationalised accounts were likely to have been published 
with the aim of influencing sentiment toward Tangier, and for this reason they are 
                                                        
92 Two of the editions of Sheres’ Discourse carried the same title, and it is to one of these that The 
Present Interest was appended. 
93 Lancelot Addison, The Moores Baffled: Being a Discourse Concerning Tanger, Especially when it was 
Under the Earl of Teviot  (London, 1681), pp. 25–27. Cf. Matar, Britain and Barbary, p. 155; William J. 
Bulman, Anglican Enlightenment: Orientalism, Religion and Politics in England and its Empire, 1648–
1715  (Cambridge, 2015), pp. 52, n. 46, 236; Bejjit, English Colonial Texts, p. 86. See also various 
references to the details of this publication in the footnotes in chap. 4 of this thesis. 
94 To remove any doubt about its relevance, someone even went to the trouble to revise the date of 
Sheres’ letter in two of its editions. 
95 E. M., The Present Danger; An Exact Journal; A Particular Relation; A Faithful Relation of the Most 
Remarkable Transactions which have Happened at Tangjer; Since the Moors have Lately Made their 
Attacques upon the Forts and Fortifications of that Famous Garrison  ([London], 1680); [Sheres], A 
Particular Narrative of a Great Engagement; Great and Bloody News from Tangier, or a Full and True 
Relation of a Great and Dreadful Fight Which Happened on the 3d of this Instant November Between 
the English and the Moors  (London, 1680); Hacket, A Full and True Relation; Ross, Tangers Rescue. A 
Faithful Relation was republished in 1681. As also noted by Bejjit, the dating of the events described 
in Great and Bloody News to 3 November, rather than 27 October, is clearly an error and, together 
with other inaccuracies, indicates that the account was prepared by someone who had not been 
present. See Bejjit, English Colonial Texts, p. 195, and a transcription of the text on pp. 195–197. Cf. 
Matar, Britain and Barbary, p. 157. 
96 Halkett, 'Tangier – 1680', p. 3. While Halkett appears to have been a generally reliable reporter of 
events, he was not beyond interposing some of his own partiality in his assessments, particularly 
concerning Sackville. 
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more than simple reflections of prevailing attitudes. Nevertheless, they still provide 
valuable insights into the views of their authors and perhaps other protagonists to 
which they refer, as well as shedding light on details of contemporary events. 
Furthermore, the number of these works and the republication of several of them 
attests to the level of interest the public had in the subject, so undeniably they would 
have been influential to some degree in informing public opinion.  In reporting the 
proceedings of the siege, these accounts highlight, among other things, the 
enthusiasm and bravery of the defenders, and the competence of their leaders. 
Through their publication, those who wrote or commissioned them sought to appeal 
to national pride to engender public support for Tangier, and variously reassure 
Britons that the government remained committed to the colony, that it could be 
secured, and far from being a threat to Protestant England, the garrison was loyal 
and an asset to the nation.97 What is notably different between them though, apart 
from their varying level of detail and accuracy, is their treatment of Moroccans to 
achieve these ends. 
 
In the more jingoistic, triumphalist accounts the authors malign the character of 
Moroccans and disparage their military success and capabilities. In one such report 
they are nothing but ‘barbarous infidels’ who have become ‘tearful Moors’ when 
exposed to ‘English valour’, having been ‘shamefully repulsed with great slaughter’ 
and ‘forced to retreat in confusion’.98 ‘Barbarians’ was an appellation given to them 
by another author, who reported that it was thought they had acquired their 
‘stratagem of war’ from ‘French and Spanish mercenaries’.99 In another, they were 
described as cowardly, disordered, and, once again, dependent on European 
renegades.100 Nevertheless, these reductive, negative allusions are sparse in the 
                                                        
97 See also the assessments of Corbett, England in the Mediterranean, II, pp. 392–395; Bejjit, 
‘Introduction’, pp. 35–36. Cf. Matar, Britain and Barbary, p. 154. 
98 A Faithful Relation, pp. 1–2. 
99 A True Relation of a Great and Bloody Fight, pp. 1, 4. The sultan is also accused of using ‘fraud’ in his 
efforts to gain Tangier. This appears to be an allegation that he had been underhanded in his dealings 
with the English, not necessarily that he had conspired with the French and Spanish as maintained by 
Matar in Britain and Barbary, pp. 155–156.  
100 Great and Bloody News, pp. 1–3. 
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tracts in question, and, overall, they are not particularly bellicose or polemic in 
nature.  
 
John Ross, the author of Tangers Rescue, the only report of this kind from the period 
which appears to have been actually written by an eye-witness, also attributes the 
success which the Moroccans enjoyed to the assistance provided to them by 
renegades.101 He charges the Moroccans with ‘barbarous cruelty’ and ‘rude 
inhumanity against measure’, claiming they were hypocrites, as their actions were 
contrary to their professed ‘civil and moral duties’, presumably a reference to their 
religious beliefs.102 In fact, Ross is the only contemporary commentator on the siege 
that draws attention in any significant way to religious difference: he configures the 
conflict as being one between ‘the Mores’ and ‘the Christians’, although he does not 
dwell on the issue beyond this.103 He goes on to claim that the Moroccans were 
treacherous, and that they had been ‘most shamefully beat’, having retreated in fear 
from the Christian advance. He also suggests the possibility that they used 
enchantments so that some men died of otherwise minor wounds. 104 But beyond 
these few references in the body of the tract, Ross’ treatment of the Moroccans is 
not overly hostile or disparaging.  
 
Perhaps the most intriguing part of Tangers Rescue is the poem appended to the 
account, which is intended to provide the reader with a ‘description of the Mores, 
their nature and the country’.105 It is not clear whether it was written by Ross. What 
it relates is at times abstruse, but it clearly presents a much more nuanced 
perspective on Moroccans than the preceding text. The martial skills of the ‘Morish 
horse’ have been acclaimed since the time of Hannibal, declares the author, 
‘esteem’d to be gallant in a superlative degree’, but they treat their foot soldiers 
                                                        
101 Ross, Tangers Rescue, pp. 2, 18–19. Whether Ross was a member of the garrison is not clear. He 
describes himself as a gentleman, but does not appear in the English army lists and commission 
registers for the period, although he may have been a volunteer. Further, his account does not give 
the impression he was an active participant in the fighting. 
102 Ibid., p. 2. 
103 See ibid., pp. 9, 11, 14, 15, 16, 19, 24, 28, 34. 
104 Ibid., pp. 20, 26–28. 
105 Ibid., title page. 
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harshly, instilling such fear that they ‘charge with fury, and in mad despair’.106 The 
Arabic-speaking people of the mountains, like the Irish, are indolent, according to the 
author; yet there were also ‘gentlemen and citizens’ in the country who ‘are more 
sublime, and higher civilized’, and the writer notes that they have engaged in 
‘commerce and trade’ with other nations over ‘many years’.107 In this respect 
Morocco had much to offer; it is described as being fertile and rich in natural produce 
and other resources, the proverbial land of ‘milk and hony’.108 Yet, the land was also 
dangerous, warns the writer, because it was infested with ‘a curs’d, dismal crew of 
little nigroes’,109 evidently a reference to Mawlay Ismā‘īl’s army of black soldiers, the 
Bukhari, who were present during the siege, but drew little attention in reports at the 
time.110 The Bukhari formed the backbone of the Moroccan army and being intensely 
loyal to the sultan were used to suppress insurrection in the country.111 The author 
demonstrates an intense loathing for these men, charging them with contemptable 
savagery, and presenting them as a common enemy. The author was perplexed as to 
why, in such an otherwise idyllic country, such ‘venom breeds’, as it also did in 
Ireland.112 For the author of the poem the issue of concern was not religious 
difference, but rather racial difference.113  
  
But such partisan assessments of Moroccans were certainly not the rule in public 
reporting of the siege. Articles in the official London Gazette celebrated the ‘most 
signal victory’, which had been achieved by the garrison by quoting exaggerated 
estimates of the size of the Moroccan army and its losses without seeking to 
disparage, or promote feelings of antipathy towards, them.114  The authors of other 
pamphlets which provided first-hand accounts allowed the actions of the two sides 
to essentially speak for themselves, providing relatively unvarnished descriptions of 
                                                        
106 Ibid., p. 35. 
107 Ibid., p. 36. 
108 Ibid., pp. 35–36. 
109 Ibid., p. 35. 
110 More correctly they were known as ‘Abid al-Bukhari. On the presence of the Bukhari, see 
Fairborne’s report in TNA, CO 279/25, f. 202v. 
111 Abun-Nasr, History of the Maghrib, pp. 230–231; Aomar Boum and Thomas K. Park, Historical 
Dictionary of Morocco, 3rd ed.  (Lanham, MD, 2016), p. 21; Bejjit, ‘Introduction’, p. 46. 
112 Ross, Tangers Rescue, p. 35. 
113 Cf. Matar’s interpretation of the poem in Britain and Barbary, pp. 156–157. 
114 'Malaga, Nov. 22', The London Gazette, 22–25 November 1680 (London), p. 2. 
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events which demonstrated little overt prejudice. In these cases, Moroccans were 
referred to as nothing more than ‘the enemy’, or ‘the Moors’.115 However, two 
correspondents went further than simply not demonstrating animus toward them. 
One acknowledged that the Moroccans had over recent years been transformed 
‘from a cowardly and inconsiderable enemy’ to ‘a puissant and formidable foe’, ‘a 
formidable enemy, being improved in all the arts of war’.116 The other, Major Halkett, 
who had served under Lord Teviot, felt compelled to not only ‘render justice’ to the 
officers of the garrison for their ‘conduct and courage’, but also ‘to the Moors’, who 
had ‘fought most bravely’, and ‘especially their horsemen’ who had performed the 
‘hardest and boldest things that ever was seen done’.117 Even in preparing the official 
report on the events of 27 October, which was published shortly after, Henry Sheres 
saw fit to acknowledge the valour of the Moroccan cavalry, and adds, after noting 
that many of the Moroccan dead had been buried in their own trenches, that they 
had ‘very bravely lost their lives in defence of them’.118 In concluding his report, 
Sheres does not attribute responsibility for the outcome against an opponent whom 
he describes as ‘vigilant, industrious and dareing’ to English military superiority, but 
rather solely to God’s ‘divine providence and protection’.119 
 
However, not all Britons who participated in the conflict appear to have been as 
charitable towards the enemy. In its article on the action on 27 October, the London 
Gazette reported that every soldier ‘that took a Moor prisoner had him for his 
encouragement, there was about 20 taken, and 300 hundred bodies of Moors were 
dragged together in one heap, and as many heads into another pile’.120 The author of 
Great and Bloody News similarly notes that the soldiers ‘had free leave to make the 
best of [the prisoners]’, but it refers to the bodies being placed into several piles, and 
                                                        
115 A Particular Relation; An Exact Journal; Hacket, A Full and True Relation; [Sheres], A Particular 
Narrative of a Great Engagement 
116 An Exact Journal, p. 13. 
117 Hacket, A Full and True Relation, p. 4. 
118 TNA, CO 279/26, ff. 98r–v; [Sheres], A Particular Narrative of a Great Engagement, p. 5. 
119 TNA, CO 279/26, ff. 98v–99r. The description of the Moroccans provided in the report is omitted in 
the published version. See [Sheres], A Particular Narrative of a Great Engagement, p. 6. 
120 'Malaga, Nov. 22' 
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makes no mention of their decapitation.121 Ross in Tangers Rescue provides the most 
graphic account report of mutilation of the Moroccan dead. He writes: 
It was thought a great matter before, and an act of signal courage 
to bring off one of the Mores dead bodies … But at this time about 
a hundred and fifty dead bodies were brought off and thrown in a 
heap: cutting off their privitees to make purses, which I have seen, 
and their ears hung up and dryed to be monuments, as trophies of 
this famous victory.122 
 
They were not the first reports of such behaviour. A few years earlier a ship’s captain 
on a visit to Tangier had been shown ‘the skinne of a More, very well tanned, with his 
Mahomitans lock upon the crowne of his head’, who had been found hiding within 
the lines and killed.123 That prisoners were mistreated following the siege was 
confirmed by Omar, although only a handful may have been taken alive.124 However, 
the extent of despoliation of bodies described in some accounts appears to have been 
exaggerated to emphasise the extent of the English victory and regain lost pride. 
According to Sheres’ official report, the bodies of slain Moroccans which remained 
within the English lines were collected and placed in a stockade outside the town. 
Some had indeed been beheaded, but they numbered no more than around forty.125   
 
There appear to have been no specific sanctions against the mistreatment of 
captured enemy soldiers or corpses in the general orders for the garrison, although 
that does not mean it was acceptable, even against infidels.126 Certainly bodily 
                                                        
121 Great and Bloody News, p. 3. 
122 Ross, Tangers Rescue, p. 23. 
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Rawl. MS C.353, p. 25,  entry for 19 May 1674. 
124 TNA, CO 279/26, f. 98v; Hacket, A Full and True Relation, p. 4. 
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mutilation and trophy-taking during times of conflict were not uncommon in the early 
modern period, nor are they today, with perpetrators motivated by hatred, desire for 
revenge, and racial prejudice, inflicting various types of disfigurement and removing 
parts possessing different personal or cultural significance.127 In the case of some 
Britons in Tangier, these acts were, at the very least, seen as just retribution for 
similar treatment accorded to their fallen comrades (lex talionis), and a means to 
procure a meaningful memento of a hard-fought battle.128 However, while it is clear 
that this behaviour was not officially sanctioned, it had to be tolerated in this 
instance. Sackville wrote to the Moroccan commander following the final battle, 
giving him permission to retrieve his dead, and, according to Sheres, the lieutenant-
colonel apologised ‘for the ill usage of the bodyes … wherein noe order whatsoever 
could restrain [the men]’ from their action. Reinforcing his personal view on the 
matter, he added that it was his hope that such ‘barbarity’ ‘for the future might if 
possible be prevented’.129  
 
Such displays of extreme animosity against the Moroccans, however, appear to have 
been an exception, and in general the conduct demonstrated by Britons was in 
accordance with normal European conventions of war.130 Furthermore, 
notwithstanding the brutality of the fighting which had occurred in May, in the days 
immediately after the agreement of the four-month truce there are no signs of 
recriminations, with one soldier reporting  that ‘we had free intercourse with the 
Moors, they coming freely into us, and we going securely among them’.131  Somewhat 
ironically, as was the case during periods of conflict in the past, it is the men who 
                                                        
in informing conduct to avoid reprisals in war in the early modern period. See pp. 128–132 and p. 55 
in the respective texts. 
127 Brian Sandberg, War and Conflict in the Early Modern World, 1500–1700  (Cambridge, 2016), pp. 
13–14; Lawrence H. Keeley, War before Civilization  (New York, 1996), pp. 99–103. 
128 See TNA, CO 279/26, f. 99r; Ross, Tangers Rescue, pp. 23–24. 
129 TNA, CO 279/26, f. 99r.   
130 Donagan in War in England, p. 196, observes that while ‘Turks’ might have been regarded as being 
outside accepted ‘international conventions of conduct’, the English, nevertheless, established no 
alternative standards of behaviour for relations with them. Cf. Geoffrey Parker’s claim that Europeans 
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applied. See Parker, 'Early Modern Europe', pp. 55–57.  
131 An Exact Journal, p. 12. He also notes that during this time two boys from the garrison, a seaman, 
and a soldier had all absconded and ‘turn’d Moor’. 
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actually confronted the Moroccans on the battlefield who provide some of the most 
unbiased, and favourable assessments of them.  
 
Despite his claim to the contrary which appears in the epigraph to this chapter, 
Sackville was not the first garrison commander or governor in Tangier to openly 
acknowledge the military abilities of the Moroccans — Fairborne, in particular, had 
been forthright on the issue — but he was perhaps the most emphatic in declaring 
his views, as well as expressing his admiration for them. In January the following year, 
Sackville wrote to the Tangier Committee to defend his actions, advising the 
commissioners that the Moroccans should not be underestimated, and impressing 
upon them the futility of seeking to negotiate access to more ground, and its 
fortification. Reflecting on his observations of Moroccans he advised the committee: 
To speake of them as enimies, I never saw men bolder in the field 
when they finde it reasonable to fight, nor more prudent to avoid 
it, when it was wisdome to decline it; nor is there I believe in the 
whole race of mankind a more vigilint, hardy, patient and laborious 
people, all quallities necessary to a soldier — in soe much had they 
the discipline of Europe, there would not bee a more formidable 
enimy in the world. In their treaty’s they discourse and debate 
matters calmly and judiciously, and therefore I see not where the 
reason of this contempt of them lyes’.132 
 
Sackville had an incentive to provide an inflated assessment, but his plea appears to 
be unfeigned. In his estimation Moroccans were not only worthy opponents, but 
civilised and rational people. His assessment demonstrates neither colonial 
covetousness toward Morocco, nor religious or ethnic prejudice toward its people; 
and neither are such sentiments generally evident in the views expressed by other 
Britons, which have been examined in this chapter. The concurrency of the siege of 
Tangier, the Popish Plot and the Exclusion Crisis drew the colony into a highly-charged 
environment of domestic politics, and much of what was published about the colony 
and the conflict there at this time has to be considered in this context, together with 
the growing scepticism about the value of Tangier. Britons undoubtedly felt pride at 
the success of the garrison in their efforts in repelling the Moroccan forces, and the 
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events perhaps elicited various levels of hostility towards them and nationalist 
fervour among the general population, but for many of those actually present in 
Tangier at the time their encounter with the North Africans only heightened the 
esteem with which they were held as warriors.133  
 
6.3. Diplomacy, Personal Encounters, and Ambivalent Friendships 
 
Perceptions of Moroccans remained heavily influenced by conflict, but the period of 
peace which followed the siege provided Britons with opportunities to develop other 
insights concerning them, and their society and culture.134 Despite the elation, or at 
least relief, felt following the garrison’s success, there was also recognition that the 
Moroccans had not been decisively beaten and would not give up in their endeavours 
to take Tangier, and that the king’s decision to seek peace with them was prudent.135 
As a demonstration that friendly and productive relations were possible, Mawlay al-
Asghar’s reverent letter to Charles I from 1637, in which he proposed an alliance with 
the king against their common enemies, was published in 1680, and again in two 
editions in 1682.136  
 
The possibility of a long-term peace with Mawlay Ismā‘īl, however, initially appeared 
unlikely as a result of the English ambassador’s insistence on the rebuilding of 
fortifications. Qā’id Omar wrote to Sackville following his meeting with Leslie, 
advising the commander that what the ambassador had proposed ‘cannot be 
                                                        
133 On these points, see also Lincoln, 'Samuel Pepys and Tangier', 423–424. Cf. Karim Bejjit, 
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320 
 
obtained upon no consideration in the world’, and reminded Sackville that unless the 
ambassador ratified the truce, as required under its terms, it would lapse; each party 
would then be free to ‘prosecute what shall seem to us most convenient.137 Sackville 
was convinced the qā’id was not bluffing, and set about to also persuade the king and 
his counsellors of this fact. In order to do so, he appears to have been intent on 
marginalising the ambassador. Leslie, who was, in fact, no stranger to Morocco, 
having served in the garrison previously and been employed as an envoy on a number 
of occasions,138 either did not share Sackville’s views about Tangier’s situation, or was 
determined to follow his orders to the letter, or both. 
 
It is evident that the meeting had not gone well. Possibly concerned about how Leslie 
would report on it, in his own report to the Tangier Committee, Sackville vouched for 
Omar’s integrity: he had conducted himself in a manner which ‘declares him to be a 
man furnished with qualities which the most civilised nations rank amongst their 
prime virtues’, he assured the commissioners.139  Sackville presents himself as the 
central figure in the process, smoothing over the fractious relationship between the 
two men, and noting that Leslie had finally endorsed the truce. He confided to them 
that he thought the sultan would eventually permit the refortification of Tangier, but, 
quoting a Moroccan proverb, in the meantime he counselled them to be patient. 140 
Sackville understood that it was not just a matter of obtaining Ismā‘īl’s approval; such 
concessions would be opposed by his people — ‘religious men and others’. He 
explained that to win their support, it was necessary to establish trust through ‘a 
good peace and mutuall offices of friendship’, and cautioned against any pre-emptive 
work. Such action would ‘begett a religious warr’, he warned, which would not only 
be costly and have an uncertain outcome, but would confirm to the people that the 
English had no ‘other desire but to conquer’.141 It was preferable for the king to revise 
the ambassador’s orders to allow him to negotiate the best terms possible, and bide 
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his time to ‘compass all his desires’.142 In any event, Leslie had announced that he 
would not depart Tangier until the king’s gifts for the sultan had arrived, deeming it 
inappropriate to present himself without them. In the interim, it had been agreed 
that a ‘principal gentlemen’ should be dispatched to the sultan’s court to provide an 
apology for the delay, and Sackville selected Colonel Percy Kirke as his envoy for this 
purpose.143 
 
At face value, Sackville’s decision to select Kirke seems a somewhat odd choice. While 
he was a senior officer with a distinguished military career, he had no experience in 
Morocco, having only arrived after the conclusion of the siege, and had not served 
outside Northwest Europe.144 More significantly, he does not appear to have 
possessed the disposition of a promising diplomat, if Samuel Pepys’ later 
observations of him are to be believed. Pepys describes a man with a quick and 
violent temper, vindictive, overbearing, ill-mannered, and corrupt; an assessment not 
inconsistent with his behaviour both before and after his time in Morocco.145 Despite 
Kirke’s seeming unsuitability, his mission and subsequent dealings with Omar and 
Ismā‘īl provide some of the most intriguing insights into inter-cultural engagement 
and the effect of acculturation on a Briton in Morocco in the early modern period.  
 
Shortly after departing Tangier on his journey to visit the sultan, Kirke wrote to 
Sackville from Omar’s camp. In his report he provides the following fulsome 
assessment of his hosts: 
I am among the most sevilisde pepell in the worlde and iff ever I 
have a sone I will rather choose to send him hether for breadin then 
to the corte of France. I am shuer he may learne more [?] for of all 
                                                        
142 Ibid., ff. 2v–3r. 
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the nations I was ever in I never had that kindnes mixt with sevelety 
and trewe friendship as I have received heare.146 
  
He goes on to comment that he found the people in the countryside were as equally 
civil to them.147 Kirke appears to have held no general prejudice against Moroccans 
at this time, even describing one of their escorts as ‘the best man in the worlde’, 
remarking that he could not have expected the kindness the man has given them, 
even if they had been brothers.148 He reassures Sackville that there is a good prospect 
that they will be granted everything they reasonably ask for, but only if Leslie ‘takes 
the right way to doe itt’; counselling that ‘kindness will doe more heare then anything 
else’.149 Aside from the adulatory nature of his initial impressions, what is equally 
notable is that Kirke does not appear to have suffered the kind of cultural dislocation, 
or ‘culture shock’, experienced by some of his predecessors. He seems to have not 
just taken the whole experience in his stride, but to have enthusiastically embraced 
it: Kirke was not so much surprised that the people were not savages, as suggested 
by Routh, rather he was processing his experiences with a surprising degree of open-
mindedness.150 
 
In mid-February Kirke arrived in Meknes, the sultan’s new capital, where he was 
greeted warmly by him.151 Shortly after, Sackville was undoubtedly pleased to be able 
to report to London that Kirke’s mission was proving to be more successful than 
expected. While Leslie had still not left Tangier, being delayed awaiting new 
instructions, not only had Kirke been very well received, he had been advised by the 
sultan ‘that for his sake (since he had pleased to come to waite on him) he would give 
him foure years peace for Tanger’ and was provided with many ‘expressions of 
friendship’. Sackville took the opportunity to point out that this outcome had justified 
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his decision concerning the truce, proving that his detractors had been wrong to 
criticise him.152 
 
In a subsequent report to Sackville, Kirke wrote effusively about the treatment 
accorded to him. He describes Ismā‘īl in terms that stand in stark contrast to the 
sultan’s reputation as a capricious and vicious tyrant. The colonel expresses his 
gratitude for the kindness and generosity shown to him by Qā’id Omar and the sultan, 
and proclaimed that he ‘must doe them the justice to tell the holle worlde I have mett 
with a kinde prince and a just general in Barberey’.153 He recounts that Ismā‘īl 
encouraged him to convert to Islam, but took no obvious offence at the suggestion, 
unlike one of his companions.154 Perhaps most significantly, he claims that the sultan 
professed his love and friendship for Kirke, crediting the colonel with having done 
something that no other Christian had done before, ‘which was to trust him and com 
and see him upon noe secquerety [security] but his word’, vowing never to attack 
Tangier while Kirke was present there.155 But Ismā‘īl appears to have had another 
motivation for befriending Kirke. In his report, he remarks that the sultan ‘expected I 
should be a man of my worde and that I should help him with everything he lacked 
out of England’, promising him anything he desired in return. Furthermore, to 
reinforce the possibilities of what could be achieved from a peace, like his 
predecessors had done, Ismā‘īl evoked the memory of the relationship which had 
existed between the two countries during Queen Elizabeth’s reign.156  
 
A member of Kirke’s entourage provides a more detailed description of what the 
company found and experienced during the mission, but his account is marked by 
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distinct ambivalence.157 The author of The Last Account from Fez, noting the ‘extream 
care and kindness’ which was afforded to them by their guide, the Qā’id of Tétouan, 
reflects on the fact that despite having encountered many things on the party’s 
journey worthy of observation, nothing stands out more than ‘the civility and 
complement we found from the chief men’; yet he still found it necessary to add, ‘of 
this wild and crude race of people’. He refers to Meknes as ‘the Versailles of this 
kingdom’, and believed, in time, it would become ‘a most agreeable and magnificent 
palace’, but notes that it is being built ‘by the misery and slavery’ of Christians.158 He 
comments very favourably on the party’s sojourn in Fez, where, after having been 
received with ‘very civil expressions’, they were invited to view ‘New-Fez’. He found 
this part of the city ‘extremely delightful’, and at times his tone is almost lyrical: ‘their 
walks being adorned with rows of orange-trees, that grew through a pleasant and 
glittering pavement of painted tyles; the aqueducts and canals of water springing in 
the middle, represent a most pleasant and beautiful scene, and charming 
prospect’.159 He remarks that the royal stable was the ‘largest and most stately’ he 
had ever seen.160  
 
Nevertheless, the author’s observations of ‘Old-Fez’ appeared to confirm his general 
beliefs about the inhabitants of the country. He notes that in the past, the city had 
obviously been ‘extraordinarily large’, and of ‘great beauty and glory, but time hath 
laid a rough hand upon it’. While the structures which remained were ‘great 
monuments of the vertue and ingenuity of their ancestors’, the present condition of 
the city was not only testament to ‘the continual rapine these heathens practice out 
of ambition who shall command’, but also, without understanding the history of the 
city, he believed it to be a consequence of their having turned away from Christianity 
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and learning. However, the dissonance in the account again is highlighted when he 
then turns to describe having dinner with the governor of the city, referring to ‘the 
honour’ accorded to the party for having been invited, and the ‘great respect and 
kindness’ shown to them by their host. He found the governor’s residence to be richly 
furnished, and declared that its courtyards with their water features and orange trees 
‘delighted us extremely’, adding that ‘our cheer was extraordinarily plentiful, and 
pleasant, after their manner’.161 
 
Unlike Kirke, the author of The Last Account appears to have been genuinely 
surprised by what he discovered and had difficulty reconciling his observations and 
experiences with his preconceptions. In particular, his opinion of Ismā‘īl was clearly 
heavily influenced by the black legend of the sultan being bruited among Europeans. 
Despite the hospitality and favour which the sultan had accorded the party, and in 
marked contrast to Kirke’s opinion, the author delivers a scathing assessment of 
Ismā‘īl. According to him, the sultan ‘excells all mankind in barbarous and bloody 
actions; massacre and murder being his royal game and divertisement’ and, so he 
does not become bored, ‘he invents every day a new pastime of cruelty’; although it 
is not at all clear that the writer observed any of this behaviour. Nevertheless, he 
argued that ‘though it would be great inhumanity any where else, yet it’s in some 
degree necessary here’, and rationalised Ismā‘īl’s despotism by drawing on the 
familiar stereotypes of the barbarous and rebellious Moor. ‘This savage race of 
people is not to be deterred from insolencies and crimes but by hourly and horrid 
examples of punishment’, he explained, adding that as ‘force of arms is the only 
preservation of their state, so it is alone the means of attaining it’.162 In coming to 
this conclusion, he, like others, overlooked England’s own recent experience with 
political upheaval and civil war. 
 
Although the author had vilified Ismā‘īl, he paradoxically lavished praise on Qā’id 
Omar, despite acknowledging Omar’s senior position in what he had represented as 
a tyrannical regime. He claimed that words failed him in trying to describe someone 
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‘whose character is so extraordinary, as well as for goodness and greatness’, so as he 
could impress upon the king how his ‘affairs may be advantaged by the honesty and 
justice of so well principled a Moor’, a ‘discreet honest man’, who treated them as 
well as ‘any well bred man’.163 Whereas Inchiquin had been suspicious of the qā’id — 
a view which appears to have been grounded in some level of pre-existing prejudice 
— Sackville, Kirke, and the author of The Last Account esteemed Omar highly, and 
saw little or no distinction between him and any other civilised (Christian European) 
man, notwithstanding his role as commander of the army which had besieged 
Tangier.  
 
Kirke quickly developed what seems to be a deep rapport with both Ismā‘īl and Omar, 
and even feelings of friendship. Sometime after he had returned to Tangier, he wrote 
to the sultan to thank him for his treatment.  Obsequious to an extreme, Kirke wished 
to acknowledge ‘with my most submissive thanks’ the ‘great honours’ accorded to 
him by Ismā‘īl, and goes on to assure him: 
I shall ever boast of, and leave it as a glorious remembrance to my 
posterity, that I had once the happinesse of receiving greater marks 
of your majesties goodnesse in your royall court than had been 
shewn to any other, neither can I better expresse my gratitude for 
those high favours, than by devoting my self and all my actions to 
your royall service, in applying my greatest endeavours to the 
promotion and encrease of the good understanding between my 
master and your sacred majestie.164 
 
The letter goes beyond the dictates of diplomacy: the colonel had clearly been deeply 
affected by the experience and had become enamoured of the sultan. However, as 
also observed by Routh, Kirke’s attitude to Ismā‘īl and his people would change over 
time.165 
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Leslie finally arrived in Meknes on 20 March, having received his new instructions.166 
The directions were brief: while the treaty was to include a clear right for the English 
to fortify the city walls, and secure the ditch immediately outside the walls, he had 
liberty to not insist on the right to fortify ground beyond the ditch, although he was 
to use ‘his best endeavours’ to do so.167 Qā’id Omar was given responsibility to 
negotiate with the ambassador, and given the acrimony that had accompanied their 
previous meeting, and the fact that he was again required to test the waters on the 
issue of fortification, Leslie found dealing with Omar challenging.168 Nevertheless, a 
treaty was concluded nine days later.169 The treaty was for the promised four years, 
and the core provisions were those contained in the truce negotiated by Sackville 
(article 2).  While the English were not permitted to establish new defences, they 
could repair their existing fortifications (articles 3, 6). Opportunities for local trade 
were also expanded to include, among other things, powder, guns, and other 
previously contraband goods (articles 8, 11). Aside from the restrictions on 
fortification, the treaty provided the possibility for a peaceful and viable future for 
the colony, although it only applied to English activities in the ‘neighbourhood of 
Tanger by land’ (article 1); it did not include protection for their maritime interests. 
Given the relative weakness of their position, the English had achieved a reasonably 
good outcome.170 Furthermore, either during or shortly following the negotiations, it 
was agreed that the sultan would send an ambassador to London to attempt to 
resolve any remaining issues concerning the treaty.171 
 
Despite the peace, the inhabitants of Tangier remained wary, particularly after the 
Moroccans forced the capitulation of the Spanish garrison at ‘Mamora’ (Mehdya) in 
May. That victory had emboldened Ismā‘īl and unnerved the garrison, making the 
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Tangerines even more sensitive to perceived slights by the Moroccans.172 Omar in 
particular was the subject of suspicion. Lieutenant-Colonel Boynton admitted to 
suspecting that the qā’id ‘hopes to lull us into such security that his majesty may … 
withdraw, or lessen his troopes heare’ and upon doing so ‘hee will take any slight 
occasion of breaking with us, for their is noe credett or trust to bee given to his 
honour where there is the prospect of soe vast an advantage’ to him by taking 
Tangier.173 Leslie was similarly troubled by him, believing Omar to be ‘the chiefe if 
not the only man that opposed the interest of this place’,174 a view shared by Sheres, 
for whom Omar was ‘our great and implacable enimy’.175 However, Kirke, who was 
now in command following Sackville’s return to England, held more general concerns, 
and despite his earlier positive impressions, reveals that he was not free of prejudice. 
He appealed to London that Tangier’s needs be met, ‘for though the Moores have 
made a peace for four yeares, and may keepe there words, yet they are Moores and 
not to be trusted to farr, and the better condition our garrison is in the better their 
peace will be kept’.176 
 
Tensions were further heightened by a series of incidents over the following months. 
Gifts for the sultan were delayed or were received with disappointment.177 There 
were disputes over the interpretation of the treaty concerning the provision of guns 
and the purchase of cattle.178 More serious was a protracted and complex dispute 
involving the redemption of captives. Leslie had been instructed to negotiate the 
release of seventy soldiers from the garrison who had been taken prisoner, but Ismā‘īl 
refused to agree to the request unless another sixty English slaves held by him were 
also redeemed.179 When the required amount was made available — 200 pieces of 
eight per captive — Omar’s brother, Ali, insisted that the amount agreed had been 
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200 ducats per person. Kirke speculated that Ali was either seeking to profit from the 
transaction, or force him to concede on the matter of the guns.180 The situation was 
further complicated by the fact that Ismā‘īl  was also attempting to negotiate the 
release of some of his own subjects from the English. The sultan’s offer was declined 
by the Tangier Committee due its ‘utter dislike’ of payment in cattle, as proposed, 
and it sanctioned Kirke for having already released six of the captives as a gesture of 
good faith.181 Kirke defended his decision by insisting that it had been necessary to 
placate ‘a prince whom I know to be of a humour impatient of contradiction.182 
Furthermore, the Committee requested that Kirke attempt to delay the release of the 
Moroccans until the arrival of the sultan’s ambassador in London; it seems they 
intended using them as leverage in the treaty negotiations. 
 
By early the following year Kirke had finally persuaded the sultan to release the 
captive Britons at the formerly agreed price. However, the agreement was 
terminated shortly before the captives were to be handed over when it was reported 
that English traders were supplying Ismā‘īl’s enemies with contraband. The sultan 
was incensed by the news and refused to accept that the English government had not 
been complicit.183 Kirke was clearly growing frustrated by what he perceived as the 
Moroccans’ unreasonable behaviour, and his irritation, in turn, was influencing a 
reassessment of his previously favourable perceptions of them, even of Ismā‘īl. In a 
report to London in February 1682, he declared that this latest incident was ‘but an 
addition to those many instances you have already had of the caprice and humour of 
this prince and people’ and, therefore, gave cause to question all their future 
undertakings, ‘which will infallibly cease upon the slightest pretences, whenever our 
weakness shall afford them hope of successe’.184 Feelings of amity towards 
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Moroccans were giving way to intolerance and an increasing sense of general 
mistrust of them. 
 
Nevertheless, despite his growing apprehensions, Kirke remained committed to 
maintaining good relations. In early September 1681, a member of the Moroccan 
royal family, a sharif, arrived at Tangier seeking sanctuary. The colonel agreed to take 
him in, and set about ensuring his needs were met until he had resolved how best to 
deal with him. Attesting to Kirke’s new-found cynicism about Ismā‘īl, he states that 
he was convinced that the man was of ‘the royal blood’, pronouncing that in ‘all his 
behaviour and discourse he appears extravagant even to a degree of madness; which 
is a true character of a prince of the Morocco family’.185 Kirke appears to have sought 
a reward for handing over the sharif, however, Omar made it clear that not only 
would they not provide one, but warned Kirke that there would be dire consequences 
for the peace if he refused to release him.186 The colonel acquiesced and released the 
man contrary to instructions from London, which Kirke claimed only arrived after he 
had done so.187 His orders were that the sharif was not to be released until the sultan 
had delivered all deserters from the garrison.188 In response, Kirke justified his actions 
as having been in the king’s best interests, particularly given that the sharif had 
expressed his desire to leave.189 The English Government’s inclination to resort to 
such crude and provocative bargaining practices at this time attests to a signal failure 
by it to fully comprehend both the sultan’s disposition and the tenuous situation it 
faced in Morocco. 
 
The equivocal nature of Kirke’s attitude toward Moroccans is again demonstrated 
following news of Qā’id Omar’s death in late October 1681. While Sheres was 
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overjoyed to hear the news,190 the commander continued to regard him highly, 
referring to his successor, Ali ben Abdallah, as ‘the great Omars brother’. 
Furthermore, he appears to have quickly developed a rapport with Qā’id Ali, noting 
that after a discussion concerning their ‘good neighbourhood’, they had ‘parted with 
all the marks of mutual confidence and satisfaction’.191  Kirke’s relationship with Ali 
would be tested on occasions but he continued to exercise a notable degree of open-
mindedness in his dealings with him, as he did with other Moroccans. This was 
certainly the case with the sultan’s ambassador, Muhammad ben Haddu. 
 
After a lengthy delay, the ambassador finally arrival at Tangier on 28 November. He 
was greeted with due honour, and the pageantry of the event was reported in detail 
in the London Gazette.192 During the delegation’s stay, Kirke and his colleagues had 
time to become acquainted with ben Haddu and his entourage. Some were well 
known to the garrison, such as ‘Jonas, an English renegade, who had twice deserted 
this place’, had been employed as the ambassador’s interpreter, and was judged to 
be ‘a subtil and impudent vilain’ by Kirke.193 The ambassador’s secretary, ‘Sidi Hadge 
Lucas’ had a long connection with Tangier, having served as secretary to both Ghailan 
and Omar. According to Sheres, he was ‘a very cunning and able man’.194 Kirke, 
evidently having acquired some knowledge of Islam, reported how Lucas had 
enhanced his standing, and redeemed himself following the fall of Ghailan, by 
participating in the Hajj.195 Nevertheless, he possessed ‘so flexible a conscience that 
it never stands in opposition to his interests’. The ‘Almocaden Mahomet el Xatef’, 
Kirke observed, was ‘a man of active and haughty spirit’.196 While not flattering 
assessments, neither were they bigoted.  The ambassador, on the other hand, was 
relatively unknown to the Tangerines, and hence had an untarnished reputation. To 
Kirke, he appeared to be ‘a person of good temper and understanding’.197   
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The ambassador, accompanied by Leslie, left Tangier on 9 December and arrived in 
England at the end of the month. Kirke’s favourable opinion of ben Haddu was 
echoed, and, indeed, frequently exceeded, by those who encountered him during the 
almost seven months he spent in England, details of which are discussed in chapter 2 
of this thesis. The various accounts of the visit reveal much about the attitudes of the 
elite of English society towards Moroccans at this time, and the expectation the 
English government had of concluding a satisfactory long-term peace. However, as 
observed by Routh, the archives provide little detail about the business of the 
embassy.198 Nevertheless, correspondence that passed between Tangier and London 
does provide insights into the negotiations, and the contributions made by those who 
had both a stake in the colony’s success and firsthand experience of the country. 
 
Sheres and Kirke were Whitehall’s principal informants from Tangier, and recipients 
of news of the proceedings. Knowing little about the Moroccans, their compatriots at 
home welcomed anything they could provide to help them understand their 
character and aims.199 Kirke, in particular, was extremely concerned to ensure that 
the commissioners appointed to deal with the embassy were not beguiled and 
outmanoeuvred by the Moroccans, and asked that nothing be agreed until he had 
been given the opportunity to comment on the propositions and provide a proposal. 
The English were particularly interested in concluding a maritime treaty; however, 
Kirke had no knowledge as to the sultan’s position on the matter.200 A letter from the 
sultan to Charles, delivered by the ambassador, makes no mention of the issue. 
However, what Ismā‘īl does make patently clear is that while he desired peaceful 
trade with the English, it could only be achieved by respecting the customs and 
religion of his country, and his authority over it, including Tangier, for which he 
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expected an annual payment of six thousand pieces of eight.201 It took the English 
some time to understand the implications of what the sultan was expecting from 
them. 
 
By the end of January, Kirke had finalised his proposal.202 He opens by acknowledging 
that there was a deficiency of understanding of the ‘methods, interests and humours 
of the Moors’, which made it difficult to judge how best to progress the 
negotiations.203 Nevertheless, he claims to have consulted with people who 
possessed knowledge and experience of dealing with them. The key to any peace, 
Kirke argued, was providing them with ready access to contraband goods — guns and 
gunpowder — but he insisted that these transactions must remain under the king’s 
control. He pointed out that while the fortification of Tangier was highly desirable, 
the sultan had no reason to make any concession on the issue. Once again, he advised 
it was best to bide their time; besides, he observed, ‘the present posture of affairs in 
Barbary’ was ‘in great tranquillity’.204  He also suggested that the negotiations be 
conducted with an air of intrigue, claiming they tend to do so in their own affairs; that 
each member of the delegation be surreptitiously provided with a present; and that 
moderation and affability be maintained to overcome their ‘natural impatience’.205 
He assured Whitehall that ‘there is no more successful means of treating with them 
then their own way’.206 What he was recommending was that the process be 
conducted with deference to their customs and practices, or at least what he 
understood them to be; a similar message to that conveyed by Ismā‘īl.  
 
Against the wishes of the ambassador, the king endorsed the colonel’s proposed 
restrictions on the sale of contraband, but agreed to strict limits on the extent of land 
accessible by the English outside Tangier, so as to avoid ongoing ‘quarrels and 
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differences’, and a draft land treaty was concluded on this basis on 23 March 1682.207 
However, rather than having promoted understanding, the negotiations appear to 
have antagonised the English bureaucrats and reinforced their bias against the 
Moroccans. Writing to Sheres about the outcome, Leonell Jenkins noted that not only 
was there ‘nothing in it of the sea’, but also remarked that ‘the more we have to do 
with these people, the more is your character of them visible’. ‘However’, he added 
‘a warr with them is not his majesties business’.208 The king, on the other hand, had 
formed a good opinion of the ambassador and his secretary, and was so pleased with 
the proceedings that he wished for the latter to return to obtain the sultan’s 
confirmation of the treaty. He ordered that Lucas be given three hundred muskets, 
as already agreed, and three hundred more were to be provided as a present.   As a 
further gesture of good faith, the king requested that all his slaves held in Tangier be 
delivered to Lucas upon his arrival, with the remainder to be released upon the 
signing of the articles.209 In addition, when the ambassador departed on 23 July, he 
took with him one thousand barrels of powder which he had purchased, and a further 
240 quintals gifted by the king.210 The success of the embassy was further evidenced 
by the conclusion of a maritime treaty on 16 June.211  
 
While the embassy and resulting ‘Whitehall treaties’, may have been judged a success 
in England, it was not the case in Morocco, with concerns expressed by the 
protagonists on both sides. Kirke, newly confirmed as governor,212 was not impressed 
by the outcome. He found the land treaty differed little to the one concluded in 
Meknes, and a number of the articles to be ambiguous, which he expected would be 
exploited by ‘a people cautious in the highest degree and that are extream dextrous 
in cavills [vexatious objections]’.213  He was perplexed by a provision which appeared 
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to permit Moroccans to reside in the town. In arguing against this arrangement, Kirke 
reveals an interesting cultural comparison which perhaps reflects an acquired 
antagonism towards Moroccans. He claims ‘of all the people in the world’, there are 
none that are more incompatible for ‘intimacy and familiarity’ than the Moors and 
the English, for the former are ‘subtle, distrustfull, implacable and undermining’, 
while the latter are ‘generous, loving, credulous, and without reserve’; and for this 
reason they were susceptible to being deceived by them. Moreover, whereas Britons 
‘have minds naturally inclined to peace’, Moroccans were ‘restless’, ‘ever 
enterprising’, and antithetical to Christians.214 His recent experiences in Morocco had 
not led him to question his own society, as some of his compatriots had done, but 
rather to idealise it. In concluding that the two peoples were incompatible, he 
overlooked the irony of also complaining, in the same report, that his men continued 
to desert and ‘turn Moor’ because of the hardships of life in his garrison. 
 
Nevertheless, Kirke believed that ‘friendship’ was possible, although, he asserted, it 
would be ‘more durable’ if it was maintained ‘at a convenient distance’.215 What most 
concerned the governor though, was the right conferred on the Moroccans to 
purchase contraband ‘without limitation’.216 He foresaw that not only did this present 
a risk to the security of Tangier, but it would also create problems for supply, and give 
the Moroccans cause to dishonour their obligations if their demands were not met, 
as he had found a few months earlier in a dispute with Qā’id Ali.217 The only Moroccan 
that Kirke appears to have continued to respect and trust was ben Haddu, a person 
who he claimed possessed a ‘soundness of heart’ that he found ‘extraordinary in a 
man of his education and this climate’.218 The governor’s assessment of ben Haddu 
indicates that while his experiences had made him cynical about Moroccans, he 
maintained a degree of elasticity in his judgements, continuing to assess them on 
their individual merits and in the context of prevailing circumstances. 
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The period following ben Haddu’s return to Morocco at the end of August 1682 was 
marked by political intrigues in the sultan’s court, disagreements between Kirke and 
Qā’id Ali, and acts of provocation by the Moroccans.219 By early October it was still 
not known whether the sultan would ratify the new treaties, and Kirke suspected that 
Ali, Lucas, and local tribal chiefs were colluding against the ambassador to undermine 
the peace process.220 A month later the governor’s concerns were realised when ben 
Haddu advised him that as a result of the disagreement between his officials, the 
sultan had resolved that he would defer a decision until he had conferred with an 
ambassador sent by the king, and had written to Charles to this effect.221 This turn of 
events caught Kirke by surprise, and gave him cause to now suspect a wider 
conspiracy which also involved both ben Haddu and Ismā‘īl, the purpose of which was 
either to procure further gifts from an embassy, or, by refusal of the request, to give 
the sultan cause to break the peace.222  
 
The English were left with a dilemma as to how best to respond to the sultan’s 
request. To refuse risked open war, but to accede opened the possibility of more 
favourable terms. The governor did not think it likely that Ismā‘īl would break the 
peace for the sake of presents if Tangier was made sufficiently strong, which he 
claimed could be achieved at less cost than an embassy. Nevertheless, he warned 
that the parties were now effectively in a state of war, and Tangier must be reinforced 
and provisioned accordingly.223His underlying rationale was a familiar one: 
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appeasement would mark the English as weak and fearful, and would encourage 
further demands; refusal would show them to be honourable, and a people not to be 
trifled with, and besides, ‘they will never value us … for what we give them, but for 
what we are able to refuse them’.224 While Kirke was not proposing outright war, 
neither was what he espoused necessarily a doctrine conducive to peaceful 
coexistence, and, as such, it was premised on the ability of the king to provide the 
necessary resources to secure and maintain Tangier. However, it was made clear to 
the governor by the Secretary of State that he could not expect the reinforcements 
and supplies he requested, as the cost of maintaining Tangier already exceeded that 
of all the home garrisons combined.225 
 
Instead of preparing for war, the government committed itself to doing whatever was 
feasible to avoid compromising the present peace — including curtailing action 
against Moroccan corsairs — and finding a diplomatic solution to the impasse on the 
new treaties, and did so in the face of Moroccan provocation and opposition in 
England to their efforts.226 After deliberations in London on the matter in December, 
Lieutenant Nicholson was dispatched early in the New Year to Ismā‘īl’s camp bearing 
a response from Charles to the sultan’s earlier letter and detailed instructions from 
the governor on how he was to conduct himself.227 Kirke affirmed to Secretary 
Jenkins his own commitment to achieving a peaceful accommodation with Ismā‘īl 
and, more generally, his intention ‘to infuse into these people the thoughts of peace 
and of living within the bounds of good neighbourhoud’.228 He added that he had 
taken care in his dealings with the Moroccans to judge just how far to press them,229 
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and he had drafted his instructions to Nicholson accordingly: the lieutenant was to 
attempt to pursue all outstanding matters, including the sea treaty and the 
redemption of the captives, but without compromising the main objective, which was 
the ratification of the land treaty.230 The king’s letter, however, demonstrated an 
indifference to the sultan’s sensibilities. A copy of the final form of the letter, which 
was translated into Arabic, does not appear to have survived. However, it is evident 
that Ismā‘īl found the letter discourteous, being affronted by its tone and personal 
accusations.231 While the problem was attributed at the time to a poor translation,232 
an extant draft of the document indicates another possible factor. It shows an 
approach that was blunt and abrasive, with the king openly questioning the sultan’s 
conduct and honour, and reminding him of England’s sea-power.233 Whatever the 
precise reason, the sultan refused to ratify the treaties or release the captives, and 
the incident marked a pivotal turning point in Anglo-Moroccan relations. 
 
Despite the setback, Kirke remained upbeat. He judged that there had been little to 
gain from the Whitehall land treaty over what was already provided in the Meknes 
treaty, and rather than breaking with the English over the dispute, the sultan had 
confirmed his continuing support for the latter.234  The governor was also positive 
about the future. In a surprising about-face, he saw the former ambassador, 
Muhammad ben Haddu, and Qā’id Ahmed ben Haddu as valuable allies protecting 
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Hamami to King Charles II, Alacazar, 28 Rabbie Al-Awal 1094' [28 March 1683], in Bejjit, English Colonial 
Texts, pp. 243–244; Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, p. 231. According to Routh, Kirke 
attributed the sultan’s anger to being able for the first time to read correspondence from the English 
himself, without servile interpretation by others. She does not provide a citation for the source of this 
reference. The original manuscript for ‘Letter IX’ can be found in TNA, CO 279/32, f. 180. 
233 ‘Draft answer to the Emperor of Morocco’s letter to his majesty’, [December?] 1682, TNA, CO 
279/30, ff. 362–365. 
234 Kirke to Jenkins, Tangier, 19 March 1682/3, TNA, CO 279/31, f. 164v. 
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England’s interests, at least partly due to their kinship with the late Qā’id Omar. 
Furthermore, he believed that the sultan was only seeking a further embassy to 
satisfy his vanity and avarice, and was confident that an extension to the current 
truce would be granted, and at a considerably lesser charge.235 Kirke was not the first 
governor to make such a superficial judgement about the motivations of a Moroccan 
leader, but he would soon become the first to gain a real understanding of English 
Tangier’s place in their world-view, and what was required if they wished to retain it. 
  
6.4. A Price too High: The Final Days of English Tangier 
 
The governor had been given reason to feel positive. He had received letters from 
the sultan and Qā’id Ahmed which affirmed that he continued to be held in high 
regard, that the current treaty would be honoured, and an extension would be 
granted, but they also reminded him of his obligation to provide the sultan with guns 
and powder of whatever quantities he requested.236 Moreover, Ahmed’s letter 
concluded with a warning: if the English ‘observe the peace, that is well’, if they did 
not, once the treaty expired, ‘we shall be the first to confront you with the will and 
power of Allah with four thousand mounted soldiers’.237  However, the sultan’s letter 
to Charles was far less amicable, and more revealing of his thinking concerning 
relations with the English. He admonished the king on the discourteous tone of his 
response, disputed his claims about being obligated to honour the Whitehall treaties, 
and threatened to take Tangier if the English broke the terms of the existing peace.238 
More interestingly though, in amongst the bluster and spurious explanations of what 
had transpired, Ismā‘īl sets out the situation from his own perspective. He 
understood that Charles valued Tangier, and believed that the king would offer 
anything for peaceful possession of the city. He explained that the English presence 
was a cause of dissension among his people, and for that reason they had been told 
                                                        
235 Kirke to Jenkins, Tangier, 19 March 1682/3, ibid., f. 166v. 
236 'Letter VI: King Ismā‘īl to Colonel Percy Kirke, 3 March 1683/ 4 Rabbie Al-Awal 1094', in Bejjit, English 
Colonial Texts, pp. 231–232; 'Letter VII: Qā’id Ahmed ben Haddū Hamami to Percy Kirke, 3 March 
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237 'Letter VII', in Bejjit, English Colonial Texts, p. 235. 
238 'Letter VIII: Mawlay Ismā‘īl to King Charles II, 3 March 1683/ 4 Rabbie Al-Awal 1094', in ibid., pp. 
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Tangier was a mallah (a specific area set aside for Jewish residence).239 But now that 
he had extended his rule across the country, it was no longer tenable to tolerate the 
independence of the Christian enclaves and simply extract tribute from them; if he 
did so, his status and authority would be diminished. Nevertheless, he was prepared 
to honour the current ‘truce’ and even extend it, but only if the English ‘do what shall 
appease the anger of Muslims against you by keeping the same correspondence we 
expect from you’.240  
 
Ismā‘īl was, in effect, proclaiming his sovereignty over Tangier, and asserting that the 
English would only occupy the city at his pleasure, and on his terms. However, the 
precise meaning inherent in the sultan’s declaration was, admittedly, vague, and 
Kirke was seemingly unperturbed by it. It is perhaps because of this lack of response 
that the former Moroccan ambassador wrote, in a conspiratorial tone, to King Charles 
in August 1683. He claimed that he did so on his own volition to warn of his master’s 
plans to retake Tangier following the expiry of the treaty, after he had been pressured 
to do so by the Ottoman sultan.241 Drawing attention to the relative strengths of the 
two sides, ben Haddu asked the king to think carefully about committing to war. If he 
did not believe that the English could triumph, he asked Charles to consider another 
option: allow Tangier to become a mallah, ‘and accede to everything which he 
requests from you and give to him from it everything which he imposes in the way of 
gunpowder and armaments and everything which is found and needed by my lord in 
that land’.242 To obtain peace, the sultan was not only demanding that Tangier be 
recognised as part of his dominions, but that its inhabitants become his subjects and 
the king of England become a tributary to him.243 In an admission which could help 
explain Ismā‘īl’s equivocal diplomacy, ben Haddu also revealed that the sultan had 
                                                        
239 Such communities lived under the protection of the sultan, paid him tribute, and obeyed his 
commands. On Moroccan mallahs, see Boum and Park, Historical Dictionary of Morocco, pp. 322–323; 
Bejjit, ‘Introduction’, p. 48. 
240 'Letter VIII', in Bejjit, English Colonial Texts, p. 241. 
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been considering an expedition against Tangier for some time.244 There is no 
evidence that Ismā‘īl instigated the letter,245 but it clearly served his purpose of 
bringing the matter of Tangier’s future to a head. 
 
The alternative to war proposed by ben Haddu was clearly unacceptable, as Kirke 
made clear in his response to him, and he refused to forward it to the king. He 
concluded by stating that he hoped ben Haddu ‘will live to see your error, and to 
thank me for having proceeded with so much moderation’.246 In his subsequent 
report to Jenkins, Kirke dismissed the letter as a fraud, and as one more example of 
the machinations of the sultan’s courtiers.247 But in their dealings with the English, 
the Moroccans had made no error, and had achieved what they had long sought.248 
By the time this exchange occurred, Charles had already resolved the fate of Tangier, 
and plans were well advanced to give effect to his decision.  
 
With Parliament refusing funds for Tangier unless the king assented to the Exclusion 
Bill, uncertainty about the long-term security of the colony without the ratification of 
the Whitehall treaties, and, possibly, to appease Louis XIV — on whom Charles 
depended for financial assistance and who saw the English occupation of Tangier as 
                                                        
244 ‘Letter X’, in Bejjit, English Colonial Texts, p. 247.  
245 Cf. Bejjit in ibid., p. 255. Contrary to Bejjit’s conclusion, it is evident that Kirke wrote ‘Letter XII’ 
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an impediment to his own plans in the Mediterranean — the king was left with little 
choice: it was either Tangier or the Stuart succession. Furthermore, as well as 
presenting strategic risks, English prestige would also have suffered if Tangier fell into 
the hands of the French or Moroccans. In the end, the only viable option was to 
evacuate the colony, and destroy its fortifications and mole.249  
 
The task was given to Lord Dartmouth, a well-educated man who had enjoyed royal 
favour, but was prone to indecisiveness and extremes of self-judgement, and whose 
competence as a naval commander and leader were questionable.250  The expedition 
was prepared under strict secrecy and subterfuge to avoid public scrutiny and 
criticism of the decision. The fleet was assembled under the pretence of a supply 
mission to the colony, and Dartmouth’s appointment as its admiral, in addition to his 
commission as the new governor and commander-in-chief of Tangier, was only 
revealed shortly before the fleet was ready to sail.251  
 
Dartmouth’s entourage included Samuel Pepys, who had been requested to join the 
expedition but without having been informed of the reason.252 It was only after the 
fleet had set sail on 10 August that Dartmouth confided to him the true purpose of 
the mission and his role; he was to assess the interests of the inhabitants for the 
purpose of determining compensation. The announcement caught him by surprise, 
but he does not indicate that he was perturbed by the decision. Reasons for the 
evacuation and demolition of Tangier had already been agreed upon by the Privy 
                                                        
249 Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, pp. 242–246; Corbett, England in the Mediterranean, II, pp. 
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Council, and these were supplemented by others volunteered by Pepys.253 The final 
document argued that the benefits which had been expected to be derived from 
Tangier as a naval station and entrepôt had not been achieved. It explained that the 
fortifications were deficient, and it would take many years to rectify them and 
considerable cost to do so, and more to maintain them. In addition, ‘the Moors are 
no more the ignorant and unskilful neighbours they were to the Portuguese, but had 
grown to a great degree of knowledge in the business of war’, as they had recently 
demonstrated. Commerce had not flourished, nor had the port proved suitable for 
servicing naval vessels. It was seen as essential that Charles provided a convincing 
justification for the destruction of Tangier both to placate his subjects and to avoid 
humiliation, and the post hoc arguments which were developed presented a 
compelling, if somewhat partial, case for doing so.254 
 
When Dartmouth arrived in Tangier Bay on 14 September, he found that Qā’id Ali 
was encamped with a ‘considerable armye’ nearby,255 which reinforced in the new 
governor’s mind the concerns that the king’s counsellors possessed that the 
Moroccans would attack the town or otherwise frustrate the evacuation, should they 
discover what the English were planning. For this reason, they had charged him with 
taking all possible precautions to conceal the plan from them for as long as 
possible,256 and concerns about spying had led to the expulsion from Tangier of 
Moors and Jews who, according to Kirke, ‘were flocking among us’.257 However, 
despite these efforts, news of the fleet’s imminent arrival and its purpose preceded 
it, although not only had the inhabitants been informed but also, apparently, the 
Moroccans. It was for these reasons that Dartmouth and Kirke, who was, along with 
several others in Dartmouth’s company, also now enjoined in the enterprise, agreed 
on means by which they would seek to maintain the deception. Firstly, they intended 
to initiate an enquiry to provide the impression that Dartmouth had been sent to 
                                                        
253 Pepys, Tangier Papers, pp. 4, 11, 15–16, entries for 13, 14 August and 3, 13 September 1683. 
254 Pepys, 'Arguments for Destroying Tangier', ibid., pp. 75–83. For discussion on the arguments see 
Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, pp. 254–258; Chappel, 'Introduction', Tangier Papers, pp. 
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344 
 
survey the condition of the colony. Secondly, referencing Kirke’s recent, stalled 
negotiations for a new combined land and maritime treaty, they agreed to ‘continue 
treating civilly with the alcade and to amuse him as much as possibly we can’ to lead 
him to think otherwise; although even at this late stage Kirke appears to have 
remained surprisingly optimistic that Tangier’s future could still be secured through 
an acceptable peace.258 
 
Dartmouth also sought to dissuade the Moroccans against hostility by staging an 
elaborate military review on 28 September. To inflate the garrison’s strength, he even 
enlisted a thousand seamen. In all, some four thousand men were presented on the 
fields outside Tangier. All the remaining seamen were turned out on their vessels, 
which were arranged to flank the city, and on a signal all the ships fired their guns 
simultaneously. In turn the Moroccans exercised their cavalry in front of the English. 
Pleasantries were exchanged, and it was agreed with the Qā’id that commissioners 
would be appointed to progress negotiations.259  
  
Some of the most interesting insights to be gained from this period are not those 
relating to the abortive negotiations with the Moroccans, or the preparations for 
evacuating the town, but rather are provided by Samuel Pepys in the account he left 
of his experiences and reflections during this time, in what are referred to as his 
Tangier Papers.260 Pepys was an urbanite bureaucrat who had travelled little outside 
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of England. While he was well informed about developments in Tangier and Morocco 
as a result of his work in the Admiralty and on the Tangier Committee, through his 
discussions with others, and perhaps from his general reading, he had never travelled 
to Morocco or the Mediterranean. All of which makes the generally positive portrayal 
of his sojourn, and his favourable perceptions of the country and its people all the 
more surprising.  
 
The jaded perception that Pepys had developed of Tangier over the preceding six 
years was confirmed at his first sight of the city on his arrival in the bay. Observing 
that it was nestled amongst hills that overlooked it, he wondered how it could ever 
be secured, and marvelled at why the king had expended so much on such a place. 
Invited by Kirke for a ride outside the walls on his second day in Tangier, Pepys was 
filled with foreboding knowing that Moroccan soldiers were in close proximity.261 
Perhaps a source of greater concern to him, and certainly of indignation, was the 
immorality and depravity that he believed pervaded the town. ‘Nothing but vice in 
the whole place of all sorts’, he exclaimed in his notes 262 According to Pepys, it was 
not just moral decay that Tangier suffered from, but an all-consuming corruption that 
ate away at the very fabric of the colony: ‘Everything runs so to corruption here’. 
However, it was not the land that he blamed for this corrupting miasma, but rather 
its governors, with the sole exception of the revered Lord Teviot.263  He concurred 
with the chaplain, Dr Thomas Ken, that Tangier was a vicious place, and that it was 
‘time for God Almighty to destroy it’.264 
 
Plagued by ‘chinches’ (bedbugs) and mosquitoes, Pepys suffered much discomfort 
and restless sleep during his first few weeks in Tangier.265 Nonetheless, this 
inconvenience, and his concerns about Tangier society, did not diminish his ability to 
enjoy what else Morocco had to offer, and he demonstrated a marked degree of 
resilience to the change in his environment. He found many things there worthy of 
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comment and approbation.266 One of the fascinating aspects of Pepys’ account is his 
observation of the minutiae, in particular his almost child-like sense of fascination 
with the novelties of nature he finds.267 He also took pleasure in the local produce 
and foods, and pondered its provenance.268 As observed by Karim Bejjit, Pepys’ 
journal demonstrates a general vivacity inspired by the new ‘geographical and 
cultural space’ he encounters, providing perspectives which differ to those found in 
other accounts.269 In his curiosity and attention to detail, he is similar to Lancelot 
Addison, but lacking the latter’s ideological motivations.  
 
On his first excursion outside the walls he records that he ‘did it with no pleasure, but 
great danger’.270 He also baulked at Dartmouth’s suggestion that he and his 
colleague, Dr Trumbull, be dispatched to negotiate the new treaty with the sultan 
and, like John Luke, was much relieved when he was later informed that he was no 
longer required to do so.271 However, while Pepys was acutely aware of the risk of 
attack or abduction faced by any Briton who wandered too far from the town, and in 
his own estimation considered himself to be a ‘good prize’,272 he adjusted and was 
soon regularly leaving the town to relax and to explore the local area. One evening, 
he accompanied Dartmouth for a ride to the very end of the lines, and several times 
beyond them, with the group even engaging in discussion with Moroccan sentries. 
Later that night, he reflected that despite the risk, he was pleased at having done so 
at least once so as ‘to know the most of the place, some of the history of it against 
the Moors’.273 On another occasion he rowed alone around the bay, seeing the site 
of old Tangier and observing the Moroccans on the shore and ‘the manner of their 
huts’, and as the sun was setting, he marvelled at how blue the hills in the distance 
were, ‘as I have sometimes seen them painted but never believed it natural painted’, 
                                                        
266 Cf. Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, p. 294. 
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the scene evidently evoking feelings of familiarity, rather than distance.274 These 
excursions provided him the opportunity to observe and interact with Moroccans 
going about their daily lives, such as performing salah, and working with English 
carpenters to repair a boat. 275 Pepys’ response to his presence in Morocco stands in 
stark contrast to that of Dr Trumbull, who quickly sank into a state of depression; 
Trumbull was fearful and homesick, and Dartmouth agreed to release him early to 
return home.276 
 
Despite the uneasy peace which prevailed, and Pepys’ complicity in a report which 
partly justified Tangier’s evacuation on the basis of the ‘cruelty’ and ‘natural and 
known perfidiousness of that people’,277  his judgements about the indigenes are 
notably free of preconceived or acquired prejudice. Pepys recounts an episode 
concerning a young Moroccan who sought refuge. He describes him as a ‘very sober, 
good, well-looked youth’. Pepys was intrigued with how Muslims said their ‘prayers’ 
and asked him to demonstrate, remarking that he did so ‘with so much reverence in 
his manner, speech, the motion of his hands and eyes and [s  ?  ] of his voice and most 
of all of his prostrations, that I was never more taken with any appearance of 
devotion in my life’.278 Pepys’ admiration for the people was also evident at the 
military review a few days later. He describes Qā’id Ali and his entourage not only as 
‘as grave and sober men’, but he also thought the qā’id’s ‘discourse and manner of 
speech very good and with more presence of mind than I thought our master 
[Dartmouth] did’. He concluded with an emphatic endorsement: ‘Their appearance 
and habits I liked very well’.279  
 
Pepys’ favourable assessments of Moroccans contrast with sentiments expressed in 
some other contemporaneous sources which emphasised suspicion and fear of them, 
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and, to a lesser extent, religious difference.280  In a letter to a friend in London written 
in early November, one resident expressed his dislike of the ‘treacherous Moors’ and 
their use of ambushes, and for rhetorical effect described them as ‘these devils like 
so many rabbits cover’d in the sands, or so many snakes and poison’d adders, 
underneath the long grass, with their venomous darts, spitting fire at their mouths, 
lay in ambuscade ready to devour us’.281 While Pepys was not ignorant of the dangers 
the Moroccans posed, his observations lack any hint of general disdain, or 
ethnological or religious antipathy.282 His account reinforces, once again, the fact that 
the attitudes of Britons concerning Morocco and Moroccans were not always defined 
by prejudice, that they had an individual capacity to appreciate them on their own 
terms, and that even at this time of national shame all Britons did not necessarily 
harbour resentment towards a people whose dogged assertion of national interest 
and territorial sovereignty had supplanted their own.  
 
But the role played by the indigenes was certainly not downplayed. In a speech to the 
inhabitants on 4 October 1683, Dartmouth finally publicly revealed the king’s 
intentions. In explaining the reasons for abandoning Tangier the continuing threat 
posed by Ismā‘īl’s army features prominently.283 Whether out of simple obedience or 
genuine relief, or a mix of both, the proclamation appears to have been well received, 
with addresses affirming support for the decision provided soon after by both the 
citizens and the officers and soldiers of the garrison, with both groups agreeing it was 
better to abandon the settlement than wait until the sultan took it by force.284 Both 
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responses were seen by Dartmouth as important to mitigate potential criticism of the 
decision, and of the king’s stewardship of the colony.285 However, as it turned out, 
the outcome appears to have been far less controversial than anticipated, with the 
decision largely greeted in England by general indifference, or perhaps regret at the 
waste of lives and money.286 
 
The evacuation of the civilian inhabitants was completed a month later, which 
allowed work on demolition of the fortifications and the mole to proceed unabated. 
Contrary to the initial concerns, no attempt was made by the Moroccans to take 
advantage of, or impede, the withdrawal or destruction of Tangier. Nevertheless, the 
task proved more challenging than expected, and it was not until around midnight on 
5 February that the final mine was fired and, cloaked in darkness, Dartmouth and the 
rear-guard finally departed.287 Dartmouth wished to believe it was an end of their 
own choosing, a disciplined and honourable evacuation, and that the Moroccans 
would see it as such.288 He was wrong on both accounts. It was, in fact, an 
ignominious end to the king’s project, and was seen as such by Moroccans, who 
believed the English left simply out of fear,289 with one near contemporary Moroccan 
historian writing that ‘Tangier was besieged so closely that the Christians had to flee 
to their vessels and escape by sea’.290  
 
It was a signal moment for both Mawlay Ismā‘īl and King Charles; for the former it 
was a symbolic victory that would further strengthen his grip on power and ensure 
                                                        
complete. Dartmouth himself reported that the proclamation had been received ‘very joyfully’. See 
Dartmouth’s report, Tangier, 5 October 1683, TNA, CO 279/32, f. 191r. Dartmouth may not have been 
embellishing: a resident similarly reported the general feeling of relief and jubilation which followed. 
See Poseley, A Letter from Tangier, to a Friend, pp. 1–2. However, the consensus was threatened by 
the initial unwillingness of naval officers to endorse findings concerning the unsuitability of the 
harbour and the mole, but they were eventually persuaded to do so. See Routh, England's Lost Atlantic 
Outpost, pp. 258–360 
285 Dartmouth’s report, Tangier, 19 October 1683, TNA, CO 279/32, ff. 274r–v. 
286 Routh, England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, pp. 269–270. 
287 Dartmouth's Tangier journal, Dartmouth MSS, pp. 53–54, entry for 4–5 February 1684; Routh, 
England's Lost Atlantic Outpost, pp. 261–265. 
288 Dartmouth to Jenkins, Tangier, 5 February 1684, TNA, CO 279/33, f. 55r. 
289 Budgett Meakin, The Moorish Empire: A Historical Epitome  (London, 1899), p. 154; Matar, Britain 
and Barbary, p. 164. 
290 Muhammad Asaghir Al-Oufrani (1669/70–c.1743), cited in Budgett Meakin, The Land of the Moors: 
A Comprehensive Description  (London, 1901), p. 131. 
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his legacy, and for the latter it was a necessary concession to maintain his own 
dynastic ambitions. Soon after the evacuation, Ismā‘īl wrote to Charles to explain the 
situation in an effort to normalise relations. He expressed his appreciation for the 
treatment of his embassy, noting that it had been welcomed in a manner that other 
Christians would not have provided.  But, he declared, the occupation of Tangier had 
been a source of great shame for him. While he had honoured the four-year truce, 
he could not have countenanced a treaty while the English maintained their 
fortifications and cannons; a ‘treaty of dhimma’, like that applied by the Turks to 
Christians living in their lands, had been the only option. However, the sultan assured 
the king that the return of Tangier was ‘the perfection of good relations’ and that he 
harboured no ill-feeling, promising that they would be provided with everything they 
desired in Moroccan ports.291 Yet more than fifteen years would elapse before the 
two sides took the first substantive steps to renew diplomatic relations; nevertheless, 
that rapprochement was assisted by positive memories among Moroccans of their 
dealings with the English in Tangier.292  
 
Conclusion 
 
Hopes of peace and a prosperous future for Tangier quickly turned to despair from 
the beginning of 1678 as the ‘Alawīs commenced a sporadic, but protracted military 
campaign against the colony. It was a despair borne out of both fear of the Moroccans 
and frustration with the failure of the English government to adequately reinforce 
and supply the city. Yet Tangier’s leaders continued to cling to the long-held hope 
that, in time, a better understanding with the Moroccans was achievable, once they 
recognised the mutual benefits which could be derived through a peaceful 
settlement.  
 
                                                        
291 ‘Letter XIII: Mawlay Ismā‘īl to Charles II 6 RabīC the first 1095/ 26 February 1684’ [translation], in 
Bejjit, English Colonial Texts, pp. 257–258. The original manuscript can be found in TNA, SP 102/2, f. 
128. 
292 Rogers, Anglo-Moroccan Relations, pp. 65–71; Brown, 'Embassy of Aḥmad Qardanash', pp. 607–
609. 
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Tangier was no stranger to hostilities from the local people but what contributed to 
the sense of foreboding which pervaded the city was the fact that it was now being 
subjected to sustained assaults by a determined and militarily sophisticated 
opponent. No longer could the inhabitants take comfort from the safety afforded by 
their fortifications, which were being reduced before their eyes. Moreover, the 
fighting was intense and brutal, leading to heavy casualties on both sides. The conflict 
elicited a range of anti-Moroccan and patriotic sentiment, but this appears to have 
been largely fuelled by growing scepticism in England about Tangier and the political 
fallout from domestic political developments, rather than indicative of base hatred 
and innate prejudice toward Moroccans; and, in particular, there was little attention 
given to religious difference. On the contrary, the prevailing attitudes towards 
Moroccans which were informed by the conflict, were, if not ambivalent, remarkably 
positive, and, if anything, it enhanced the esteem with which they were already held 
as warriors. Moreover, it is evident that the conduct of Tangier’s commanders 
towards their adversaries was heavily prescribed by normative European rules and 
practices of war, and associated principles of honour and belief in the utility of 
reciprocity, and the transposition of this framework to North Africa was undoubtedly 
assisted by recognition of a shared metier of soldiering. 
 
The lack of a common perception among Britons about Moroccans is mirrored in the 
lack of consensus which existed among the garrison on how to deal with them. Both 
of these facts highlight an important point: that the inhabitants of Tangier did not 
represent a homogenous, like-minded community any more than their compatriots 
at home did, and consequently it is difficult to draw simple conclusions about the 
general impact that the events in Tangier had on shaping prevailing attitudes towards 
Moroccans, or North Africans or Muslims more generally, let alone on the 
development of British national identity.293  Moreover, the period was marked not 
just by conflict, but there were also extended periods of peace and consequent 
opportunities for civil engagement, which provide other insights into the attitudes of 
Britons and the factors which influenced them. Opinions about individual Moroccans 
                                                        
293 Bejjit advances a similar argument based on his reading of Pepys’ Tangier journal in 'Tangier that 
Was', p. 159. 
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varied considerably between commentators, ranging from the stereotypical negative 
assessment of Mawlay Ismā‘īl provided by the author of The Last Account, to the 
overtly enthusiastic praise initially accorded the sultan and Qā’id Omar by Kirke. Once 
again, as a result of differences in personal background, disposition, preconception 
and experience, they saw the cultural, religious and geographic character of Morocco 
in various, and frequently, conflicting ways. But neither were these views necessarily 
fixed, as amply demonstrated by Kirke, whose attitudes towards Moroccans varied 
over time depending on his feelings, particularly about the reciprocity of trust and 
goodwill. 
 
As has been observed elsewhere in this study, some Britons demonstrated an ability 
to positively acculturate in Morocco: to overcome ‘cultural shock’, to see beyond 
bigoted stereotypes and acquire some level of genuine knowledge, understanding 
and acceptance of the people as individuals, and as members of a distinct culture and 
society. The person who stands out in this respect in this chapter is, once again, Kirke. 
While aware of the limitations of his own insights, and challenged by ambivalent 
Moroccan policy, he became a critical mediator between the two sides, seeking to 
find an acceptable middle-ground between excessive Moroccan demands and 
culturally insensitive or otherwise unhelpful English responses. 
 
A range of issues frustrated resolution of a long-term peace: from the fixation of the 
English with fortification, disputes between the parties, instability in the Moroccan 
hierarchy, and lack of trust, to general cultural misunderstanding; and other factors 
contributed to the decision to abandon it. But, as Tristan Stein has argued, the key 
impediment to the continuation of English occupation of Tangier was its status as a 
crown colony: not only did this complicate the situation with respect to domestic 
opposition, but it also resulted in competing claims of sovereignty. Lacking both the 
military power to impose a solution — and, perhaps, even the inclination to do so — 
and the political flexibility possessed by a corporate entity such as the East India 
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Company, in the face of demands to surrender sovereignty over Tangier, Charles II 
was left no choice but to abandon the city.294 
 
The story of English Tangier is not simply one of trade and inter-cultural relations 
between two peoples, but also of the contestation of power and authority both 
within and between their respective polities. The acquisition and subsequent 
abandonment of Tangier highlight the gulf between imperial ambition and the ability 
of the English state to project its military power overseas in the seventeenth 
century.295 In this respect, sources from both sides of the encounter conspire to write 
back against a long-standing and influential imperial narrative concerning Tangier, 
which has marginalised Moroccan agency, as well as obscured the diverse and 
complex relationships which were established between Britons and Moroccans 
during this period.296 
 
  
                                                        
294 See Stein, 'Tangier in the Restoration Empire', pp. 987–988, 1006, 1008–1011. 
295 Linda Colley, Captives: Britain, Empire, and the World, 1600–1850  (New York, 2004), pp. 38, 40; 
Stein, 'Tangier in the Restoration Empire', p. 1007. 
296 On the omission of Moroccan agency in the historiography of English Tangier, see also Bejjit, 
‘Introduction’, p. 48. 
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Conclusion 
 
‘Travel, you will see the meanings [of things].’ 
‘He who does not travel will not know the value of men.’ 
 ‘When you travel with him you will get to know him.’ 
(Moroccan proverbs)1 
 
This study is fundamentally about the responses of individual people and how these 
responses, shaped as they were by their encounter with a new reality, in turn 
influenced subsequent events in Anglo-Moroccan relations in the seventeeth 
century. In pursuing this aim the thesis seeks to reappraise the claims of other 
scholars concerning these very same people and events. But its scope is different to 
that of the few related studies which have been undertaken. It is not principally 
concerned about the history of English Tangier or the attitudes of Britons toward the 
colony. Nor does it seek to situate the attitudes of the subjects towards Morocco 
solely within a framework of contemporary perspectives concerning Islamdom, 
although such comparisons are provided. Rather, my intention has been to untangle 
their individual responses from the far more general and teleological assertions of 
others concerning the contemporary views of Britons about the people of North 
Africa, and more specifically about the people of Morocco, and the impact that their 
interactions with them had on their own sense of individual and collective identity. 
Following this path reveals a very different picture of Anglo-Moroccan relations at 
the time, and of the disposition of Britons to relations with non-European peoples in 
the early modern period. However, I have argued that in order to do so it is necessary 
to clearly understand how particular historiographical developments have led to 
significant misunderstanding about the nature of events and the consequences 
arising from engagement of early modern Britons with the Mediterranean generally, 
and Morocco in particular. 
 
                                                        
1 Edward Westermarck, Wit and Wisdom in Morocco: A Study of Native Proverbs  (London, 1930), pp. 
135, 141. 
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It appears to be generally accepted among scholars that social, cultural and economic 
developments in England during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, 
accompanied by the nation’s increasing naval power, contributed to the foundation 
of an imperial ideology that provided Britons with a sense of common purpose and 
identity, which in turn led them to asserting their cultural and religious superiority 
over other peoples, debasing them, and thereby justifying their right to invade, 
dominate, and exploit them. What remains the subject of debate is precisely when 
this world view began to perceptively and generally manifest itself in both their 
thoughts and actions.  
 
Over the past two decades or so, there has been a tendency for commentators 
influenced by post-colonialism to posit that such beliefs began to become widely 
entrenched among Britons from around the late sixteenth century. However, there 
are others who argue that it was a much later development. As Daniel J. Vitkus has 
observed, prior to ‘the latter half of the seventeenth century, England’s “colonial” 
discourse was merely the premature articulation of a third-rank power’.2  Like Linda 
Colley and Jonathan Burton, he believes that the assumptions of post-colonial theory 
and criticism in which representations of cultural antagonism and exclusion, and 
delusions of grandeur, were enablers for the colonisation of others, do not apply to 
the thinking of Britons and their relations with Islamicate societies in the 
Mediterranean zone in the early modern period. The Mediterranean was far too 
culturally complex, England’s relations within it were too varied, and English military 
power too insufficient to sustain such a coherent and consistent discourse.3 The 
responses of the English state and individual Britons to their engagement with 
Morocco up until the abandonment of Tangier in 1684, which have been examined 
in this study, support this claim. Furthermore, it is useful to reflect on the fact that 
xenophobia and chauvinism were not restricted to Britons, nor only directed by them 
against non-Europeans, and such thinking was by no means necessarily associated 
                                                        
2 Daniel J. Vitkus, Turning Turk: English Theatre and the Multicultural Mediterranean, 1570–1630  (New 
York, 2008), pp. 3–11. Quotation is from p. 3. 
3 Linda Colley, Captives: Britain, Empire, and the World, 1600–1850  (New York, 2004), pp. 102–103; 
Jonathan Burton, Traffic and Turning: Islam and English Drama, 1579–1624  (Newark, NJ, 2005), pp. 
11–12; Vitkus, Turning Turk, pp. 7–8, 19–21. 
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with imperial aspiration.4 They can, in fact, be symptomatic of other social or 
individual pathologies, and it is also important not to confuse mentalities associated 
with early modern “Englishness”, or even what might more expansively be termed 
“Britonness”, with those of later “Britishness”. 
 
Attempts by England to assert extra-territorial authority to further its commercial and 
geopolitical interests in the Mediterranean in the sixteenth and seventeenth 
centuries did not go unchallenged by other states and polities operating in the region, 
both Christian and Muslim alike. Moreover, the behaviour of Britons seeking to 
exploit opportunities overseas did not begin to be driven by clearly defined state-
sponsored imperial or mercantilist policies until at least quite late in this period. To 
the extent there was a common purpose in the Mediterranean shared by the English 
state and private trading interests until then, it was simply to generate wealth — 
revenue for the former, and profit for the latter — in a region that was both 
geographically close and thought to possess considerable commercial potential. 
Despite occassional expressions of grand ambition, the experience of Britons in the 
Mediterranean in the seventeeth century continued to be defined by uncertainty, 
caution, and vulnerability. Critically, it has been argued in this thesis that while they 
found the exercise of naval power could be useful, they discovered that it could also 
be counterproductive, as well as costly. For these reasons, they remained heavily 
reliant on pragmatic compromise to foster positive relations in the region. 
Furthermore, while Britons harboured anxieties about the Mediterranean as a site of 
potentially contaminating cultural exchange, they often found it necessary, or 
otherwise useful, to accommodate ethnological and religious differences. In turn, the 
playing down of such differences in the interests of trade and diplomacy helped 
overcome barriers to engagement and enabled deeper processes of acculturation to 
be experienced by them. 
 
While there is much to be found in the general attitudes and behaviour of Britons in 
the wider Mediterranean in the seventeenth century which can be extended to their 
                                                        
4 Colley, Captives, pp. 104–105. 
357 
 
engagement with Morocco, there are also very important differences due to their 
unique history and dynamics of contact with that specific area of the Maghrib. 
England’s interests in Morocco were always more complex, and its diplomatic 
responses more circumspect and nuanced than those relating to the other Barbary 
States. Algiers, Tunis, and Tripoli posed a threat to English navigation which needed 
to be mitigated. So did Salé, but it was at the same time, an important centre of 
Anglo-Moroccan trade. Furthermore, the port was often under the suzerainty of 
other parties with whom the English sought to cultivate relations and who they did 
not wish to offend in the pursuit of other objectives; in fact, while English diplomacy 
in the Mediterranean was invariably complicated by the need to negotiate the 
redemption of captured Britons alongside terms for trade and peace,5 nowhere did 
this prove to be more problematic than in Morocco. Furthermore, development of 
profitable trade with Morocco in the second half of the sixteenth century had been 
supplemented by diplomatic exchanges and a promising alliance against Spain later 
in the century under Mawlay Ahmad al-Mansūr and Elizabeth I. This period of Anglo-
Moroccan relations would be evoked frequently by parties on both sides over the 
following decades, as an exemplar of what could be achieved by the two peoples. But 
by the beginning of the seventeenth century, not only had both sponsors of the 
accord passed away, but mutual interest in opposing Spain had waned, and with the 
subsequent collapse of state authority in Morocco, Britons had to navigate a far more 
complex political terrain of competing groups and diverse agendas in order to pursue 
their interests in the country. 
 
It was war with Spain that once more encouraged the English to seek to establish 
diplomatic relations with a Moroccan leader in 1625. Morocco was again recognised 
as possessing both geo-political and commercial value, but the English government 
struggled to conceive of means by which it could best capitalise on these 
opportunities, as well as address the joint problems of Moroccan corsair activity and 
the redemption of the king’s subjects held captive in the country. Not only were its 
efforts frustrated by the shifting mosaic of Moroccan politics, but also by competing 
                                                        
5 Alison Games, The Web of Empire: English Cosmopolitans in an Age of Expansion, 1560–1660  
(Oxford, 2009), p. 69. 
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interests within its own seafaring and merchant communities; reinforcing not only 
the limitations of the English state at this time to impose its authority on the extra-
territorial activities of its subjects, but also the absence of firm policies to guide its 
actions.  It was, therefore, left to the initiative of individuals such as John Harrison, 
Stephen Scott, Giles Penn, and Robert Blake to find other ways by which England 
could productively engage with Morocco, though their efforts were to some extent 
driven as much by financial or ideological self-interest as a desire to serve the 
common good of the nation. Possessing knowledge and experience of the country, 
and unconstrained by concerns about political legitimacy, these men established 
relationships with Moroccan magnates and provided advice to the English authorities 
to inform their responses. They proposed a variety of schemes to advance English 
interests in the country between the late 1620s and the 1630s, some of which 
exhibited quasi-colonial elements or otherwise involved military intervention. But, by 
and large, what they advocated were essentially pragmatic solutions to intractable 
problems, informed by a belief that they would be found acceptable by the majority 
of Moroccans because they provided mutual benefits in terms of trade and security.  
 
The promotion of mutual benefit and the exercise of realpolitik became the 
keystones of English diplomacy in Morocco from the late 1650s and continued to be 
so until Charles II finally decided to evacuate Tangier in 1683. Following the 
occupation of Tangier in 1662, the English had hoped that by demonstrating their 
good character, good intentions, and the benefits that could accrue through trade 
they could achieve a long-term accommodation with the Moroccans. They 
persevered with this policy in the face of Moroccan hostility and ambivalence, failing 
to accept that their occupation of Tangier had fundamentally changed how they were 
perceived by Moroccans, to whom they were no longer peaceable traders and 
potential allies, but hostile occupiers of their land, which was part of dar al-Islam. It 
was a change with both religious and political significance that put English Tangier at 
the heart of the internecine struggle in Morocco as the warring parties strove to win 
the support of the people to advance their respective claims.  
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The folly of English thinking about Tangier was not necessarily due to colonial 
covetousness or imperial ambition as asserted by other scholars, but, rather, appears 
to have principally been the result of a myopia induced by a strongly held belief that 
relations with Moroccans could essentially be monetised, that peace and cooperation 
could be bought at the right price. It was not an attitude just restricted to Morocco: 
one scholar has observed that Britons in India around this time also operated in the 
belief ‘that everything and everyone had a “price”’.6 It is, therefore, not surprising 
that Moroccan equivocation was often mistakenly intepreted as arising from avarice 
instead of genuine indecision. The Moroccans certainly found what they considered 
to be tribute paid by the English, particularly weapons and gunpowder, of tangible 
value, but it had to be weighed against the costs to religious legitimacy and political 
authority of being seen to sanction the continuing presence of the Christian enclaves. 
Following the occupation of Tangier by the English, the interests and objectives of the 
two sides become essentially diametrically opposed. The assumption of sovereignty 
over the town by the English compromised a long history of profitable commerce and 
generally constructive diplomacy, pitting one ruler against the other as both sought 
at the same time to deal with their own related domestic issues, and ultimately 
leaving no room for compromise.  
 
The conflict over possession of Tangier has hitherto been used to support a 
historiographical narrative which has emphasised that early modern Britons held 
strongly prejudicial attitudes about Muslim North Africans, defined by perceptions of 
racial, cultural, and religious difference, which were reinforced by their association 
with piracy, slavery, antipathy towards Christianity, and general barbarity. But this 
distinctly reductive perspective misrepresents what contemporary sources reveal 
                                                        
6 Bernard Cohn, cited in Ania Loomba, 'Of Gifts, Ambassadors, and Copy-cats: Diplomacy, Exchange, 
and Difference in Early Modern India', in Brinda Charry and Gitanjali Shahani, eds., Emissaries in Early 
Modern Literature and Culture: Mediation, Transmission, Traffic, 1550–1700 (Farnham, UK, 2009), p. 
49. Quotation is from Bernard Cohn, ‘Clothes, Clothes and Colonialism’, in Colonialism and its Forms 
of Knowledge (Princeton, 1996), p. 118. However, Loomba, in 'Of Gifts, Ambassadors, and Copy-cats’, 
pp. 49–52, does argue that Cohen’s position is an oversimplification, and that process of gift giving did 
retain symbolic value for the English. She goes on to explain that cultural differences concerning the 
symbolic value of particular gifts could result in tensions between the parties, as could situations 
where the English did not receive returns which exceeded the value of the gifts they themselves 
provided, resulting on accusations of greed. There are clear parallels between Loomba’s findings 
concerning gift exchange involving the English in the Mughal court and the situation in Morocco. 
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about the diverse forms of contact which occurred, relationships which developed, 
and the heterogeneity of the responses of Britons to their encounter with North 
Africa generally, and Morocco particularly, at this time.  Contrary to the claim of the 
author of the The Present Interest of Tangier with which this thesis began, Britons 
were neither disinterested in, nor wholly ignorant of, what existed beyond the walls 
of Tangier. Some even acquired respectable levels of knowledge and understanding 
of Moroccan society, culture, language, history, and religion. Therefore, the author’s 
plea should not be seen as evidence of a general lack of engagement with, and  
learning about, Morocco, but rather how little the man in question himself knew 
about these subjects, and, perhaps, the limited public transmission of such 
information at the time.7  
 
Between 1625 and 1684, large numbers of Britons travelled to Morocco for a variety 
of reasons and engaged with its people in different ways, under different 
circumstances. They came from diverse backgrounds, and possessed their own 
particular dispositions, system of beliefs and values, and preconceptions. All  of these 
factors made their encounters with Morocco to a lesser or greater extent individually 
unique from those of their compatriots. For this reason the plurality of their 
experiences, and their responses to them, defy simple generalisation or 
incorporation into a teleological narrative. It has been shown that Britons negotiated 
with Moroccans, traded with them, fought them, and sometimes developed close 
personal relationships — even friendships — with them. Hostility elicited fear of, and 
prejudice against, Moroccans, but conversely it also fostered admiration and respect 
for their bravery, determination, martial skills, and military capabilities. But during 
the course of the six decades over which this study has ranged, Britons enjoyed even 
longer periods of, admittedly sometimes tense, but relatively peaceful engagement, 
and these interactions enabled them to garner new and valuable knowledge and 
understanding of the country and its people.  
 
                                                        
7 Cf. Colley, Captives, p. 37; Karim Bejjit, 'Encountering the Infidels: Restoration Images of the Moors', 
in Working Papers on the Web, vol. 7 (2004), at http://extra.shu.ac.uk/wpw/morocco/Beljjitt/ 
Beljjitt.htm, under I–From Dramatic to Colonial Space. 
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A holistic and close examination of the interaction between Britons and Moroccans 
during this period provides important new insights into factors which more generally 
influenced their subsequent attitudes and behaviour. While they were prepared to 
resort to coercion on occasions, Britons also demonstrated adaptability in the pursuit 
of their interests in Morocco, as they did in the wider Mediterranean zone, and this 
can, at least partly, be attributed to a general aptitude for pragmatic dealing: through 
cultural and religious accommodation, and cooperation and collusion with Moroccan 
leaders, they sought to mitigate impediments to navigation and profitable trade. But 
in their dealings in Morocco, Britons were not necessarily acting insincerely or 
otherwise amorally.  
 
While it has not previously been identified, it is clearly evident, particularly from the 
beginning of the Tangier period, that their actions were often guided by a strong 
sense of what constituted honourable conduct, not just in conflict, but also in their 
interpersonal relations. The concept of personal honour was indisputably an 
important factor in influencing the behaviour of the English, and Britons more 
generally, in the early modern period. But this was not just the case in their dealings 
with each other and other Europeans. In the transposition of rules of war, 
expectations of reciprocity, and application of other normative principles of 
honourable conduct and practice in both conflictual and pacific contexts, Britons 
clearly demonstrated their belief not only in a shared humanity with Moroccans, but 
also, frequently, some measure of equality with them. While the importance that 
Britons attributed to honour goes some way to explaining their sensitivity to the way 
they were perceived by Moroccans, their self-consciousness about personal and 
national perception also points to how fragile any notion of English exceptionalism 
they possessed really was at this time.  
 
However, this deliberate, conscious behaviour does not fully account for the range of 
responses exhibited by Britons in their dealings and thinking about Morocco. Some 
Britons, like Lord Howard and Dr Trumbull, were so full of apprehension and fear 
following their arrival that they failed to positively engage with the place altogether. 
Others experienced the disorientating effects, the cognitive dissonance, of cultural 
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immersion, with their attempts to reconcile what they found with their pre-existing 
perceptions and beliefs, and understanding of normative cultural values and identity, 
clearly apparent in the ambivalence of their responses. Yet others, such as John 
Harrison, Lancelot Addison and Colonel Kirke, demonstrate remarkable open-
mindedness and early signs of positive acculturation. They were able to develop close 
relationships with Moroccans who acted as cultural mediators, and these 
relationships, in turn, facilitated deeper engagement and assisted these men to 
achieve relatively high levels of cultural proficiency.  
 
In contrast to the common image of Englishmen sticking resolutely to their own 
customs and preferring the company of their compatriots, it is clear that early 
modern Britons were, in fact, notably adaptable to other cultures, even as captives.8 
Nevertheless, while the establishment of relationships with indigenes as interpreters, 
cultural informants, and even friends, was a critical factor influencing the 
acculturation of Britons,9 they did not guarantee the maintenance of an entente 
cordiale between the individuals in question or their nations. As seen especially with 
Kirke’s Moroccan relationships, cultural differences could remain problematic as a 
source of uncertainty and tension. But, emotional investment in personal 
relationships could also make the parties vulnerable to heightened feelings of 
disappointment, frustration, and betrayal when their expectations were not met, 
leading not only to recriminations but also to attitudinal change.  
 
Confusion and conflict are not unique to relationships between people of different 
cultural traditions, they also occur between people who share the same culture and 
language, and the social significance of, and effects arising from, any given encounter 
can only be determined within its own unique parameters.10 Furthermore, the effects 
of cultural interaction are not necessarily best understood by focussing on the level 
                                                        
8 Colley, Captives, pp. 356–361. 
9 On the importance of such relationships for the development of English overseas interests, see 
Games, The Web of Empire, pp. 108–110. 
10 Fredrik Fahlander, 'Third Space Encounters: Hybridity, Mimicry and Interstitial Practice', in Per 
Cornell and Fredrik Fahlander, eds., Encounters-Materialities-Confrontations. Archaeologies of Social 
Space and Interaction (Edinburgh, 2007), p. 15. 
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of the social or cultural system, or the responses of kings and other social elites, but 
rather by examining the consequences of encounter for the individuals, subcultures, 
or segments of societies which were actually involved.11 In this way, Anglo-Moroccan 
relations in the early modern period should not be viewed as a single story of 
encounter, but, rather, multiple stories of individual and, to various degrees, 
collective encounters, both physical and imaginative, whose impact on the thought 
and behaviour of Britons was diverse and complex. 
 
The influence of factors which fettered the colonial and broader imperial aspirations 
of Britons would gradually diminish, and the world views held by them would change 
and coalesce as a consequence. But until their unified country’s fully-fledged imperial 
self-actualisation toward the end of the eighteenth century, the attitudes of Britons 
to Islam and Islamicate societies remained neither homogenous nor fixed; they were 
diverse and plastic, changing in accordance with developments in intellectual and 
religious thought, and estimations made by Britons of their position vis-à-vis their 
European competitors and the Muslim powers.12 There are no signs of a clear and 
sustained general ‘paradigm shift’ between the late sixteenth and late seventeenth 
centuries in the thinking of Britons about the people of North Africa, grounded in a 
belief in their relative superiority, as claimed by Nabil Matar.13 On the contrary, their 
experience in Tangier was a lesson in humility, not a reason for hubris for the 
English,14 and as Alison Games observes, afterwards they simply returned to their ‘old 
accommodating style of travel and trade in the Mediterranean’.15  
 
                                                        
11 Ibid., p. 16; Sanjay Subrahmanyam, Courtly Encounters: Translating Courtliness and Violence in Early 
Modern Eurasia  (Cambridge, MA, 2012), p. xiv. 
12 Colley, Captives, pp. 112–113, 366; Burton, Traffic and Turning, p. 12. Cf. Nabil Matar, 'Britons and 
Muslims in the Early Modern Period: From Prejudice to (a Theory of) Toleration', Patterns of Prejudice, 
43 (2009),  
13 Nabil Matar, Britain and Barbary, 1589–1689  (Gainesville, FL, 2006), p. 11. See the introduction to 
this thesis for details of Matar’s argument.  
14 In a review of Matar’s book, Britain and Barbary, Robert C. Davis concludes: ‘Far from representing 
the “’imperial’ call for conquering Barbary” (p. 40), invoked in Matar’s first chapters, their experience 
in Tangier seems to have taught the British to stay away from such heedless adventures, especially in 
Islamic lands’. Matar, in fact, later in the book, offers a contradictory assessment to this effect. See 
Robert C. Davis, 'Nabil Matar. Britain and Barbary, 1589–1689', The American Historical Review, 112 
(2007), p. 815; Matar, Britain and Barbary, pp. 164–165. 
15 Games, The Web of Empire, pp. 297–298. 
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Despite their increasing naval power during the course of the seventeenth century, 
the construction of Islamic alterity by Britons continued to be dependant on 
alternating feelings of fear and respect, similarity and difference, inferiority and 
superiority. In particular, sentiment amongst Britons at home concerning Morocco 
and Moroccans was influenced by immediate events, such as corsair raids, 
enslavement of their kin and compatriots, trade and diplomatic initiatives, 
developments at Tangier, as well as general domestic concerns, which could either 
reinforce old stereotypes or provide Britons with new ways in which to perceive 
Moroccans, and relations between the two countries. As one scholar has stressed, it 
was never simply a unilateral undertaking, it involved a reciprocal discourse between 
Moroccans and Britons, one that varied over time, and both shaped the course of 
events and was affected by them.16 In this way, it was possible for feelings of 
suspicion, fear, hostility, and alienation held by them to be replaced by trust, respect, 
amity, and cooperation, or, indeed, the converse. 
 
Renewed interest in the Mediterranean and the activity of Britons in the region in the 
early modern period is providing new insights into inter-cultural encounters during 
this period and the impact that this engagement had on development of the British 
empire and British self-identity. Having suffered from neglect in scholarship until 
recent times, as well as from the legacy of a particularly partisan historiography, the 
relationship between Britons and the Barbary States provides a promising area for 
future research. However, in undertaking such work it is necessary to be mindful of 
the unique historical, political, and economic character of Morocco vis-à-vis the other 
Barbary States. Furthermore, as demonstrated in this study, close, contextualised, 
critical (re-)reading of the archival sources is pivotal to revealing the diverse ways in 
which the English state and individual Britons engaged with Morocco during the 
sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and the complex ways they responded to it. A 
diachronic approach helps identify points of change over time and their contingent 
factors, ranging from the personal to the generational, both of which are well 
                                                        
16 J. A. O. C. Brown, '‘Orientalism’, ‘Occidentalism’ and Anglo-Moroccan Relations in the 16th and 17th 
Centuries: A Case Study in Historicising Concepts of Discourse', SOAS Journal of Graduate Research, 1 
(2005), pp. 10–12. 
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exemplified in the case of John Harrison.17 Finally, recognition of Moroccan agency 
and the recovery of the voices of the indigenous people are also critical to proper 
understanding of the dynamics of encounter and response between the two sides.18  
But, conversely, care does need to be exercised to not overemphasise the ‘politics of 
resistance’ at the expense of an appreciation of the intertwined, and at times 
interdependent, nature of Anglo-Moroccan relations during the early modern period. 
To do so simply risks producing another set of simplistic, anachronistic readings of 
what was, in reality, a rich and in many ways productive period of cultural interaction 
between Britons and Moroccans.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
17 John Reeve remarks that ‘History is insufficiently written as a story of generations’, and highlights 
the importance of studying generational differences to understand changes in attitudes and 
responses. See John Reeve, 'Sir Dudley Carleton and Sir Thomas Roe: English Servants of the Queen of 
Bohemia and the Protestant International during the Thirty Years War', Parergon, 32 (2015), p. 177. 
18 On these issues, see also Jonathan Burton, 'English Anxiety and the Muslim Power of Conversion: 
Five Perspectives on 'Turning Turk' in Early Modern Texts', Journal for Early Modern Cultural Studies, 
2 (2002), pp. 62–63; Karim Bejjit, ed., English Colonial Texts on Tangier, 1661–1684: Imperialism and 
the Politics of Resistance, Transculturalisms, 1400–1700 (Farnham, UK, 2015), pp. 44–47. 
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